Editing Cairo Conference (section)

=== November 24 ===
On November 24, Churchill, Mountbatten and Chiang met. Chiang demanded for land operations in northern Burma and amphibious operations to be conducted simultaneously.<ref name=":7"/> He expressed support for Operation Tarzan and was willing to include troops from Langga and Yunnan, but he insisted for it to be coupled with a massive naval operation in the Bay of Bengal to establish air and sea superiority for the operation to succeed. The problem with the operation was that the troops lacked the tools for amphibious landing operations.

Although the British supported Operation Tarzan, they were not keen on a large-scale naval offensive in the Bay of Bengal, and Churchill told Chiang that the navy could not be dispatched to the Indian Ocean until after the defeat of Italy.<ref name=":1"/> Churchill further insisted that land operations in northern Burma were not necessarily dependent on naval operations in the Bay of Bengal<ref name=":2"/> and that amphibious operations did not affect land operations. Chiang disagreed by pointing out that amphibious operations could attract some of the enemy's air power.<ref name=":7"/> British Chief of the Imperial General Staff Alan Brooke, on the other hand, pointed out that if amphibious landings were to be pursued, the landing of the Maharajah in France would have to be postponed.

Admiral Ernest King of the US Navy was less enthusiastic about a counteroffensive on Burma and was reluctant to push hard for large-scale operations in the Southeast Asia Command. He pointed out that those operations had to be considered in the context of an overall plan to defeat Japan, but that the overall plan had not been negotiated at all. King stated that to defeat Japan, the main theatre of operations should be in the Pacific, and land operations on the continental Asia were not strictly necessary.<ref name=":1"/>

Churchill explained that Britain could dispatch large fleets, but no date was set for an amphibious pincer attack. As the US representatives pressured him over amphibious operations, Churchill eventually agreed to land on the Andaman Islands.<ref name=":2"/> The Chiefs of Staff then agreed to drive Japan out of Burma and reopen land links with China, with Stilwell conducting the ground attack in the north and Mountbatten commanding the amphibious landing in the south, attacking the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal.<ref name=":7"/> The amphibious landing in Burma would be pursued "as soon as possible," but it was not appropriate to set a date. The Southeast Asia Command could propose changes to the planned operations.

The US delegation also told Chiang that for the following six months, only 8,900 tonnes of supplies could be flown to China via the Hump route each month. Chiang demanded that the US raise that number to 10,000 tonnes. The US delegation made it clear to Chiang he had to choose between opening the Yunnan-Burma highway and having 10,000 tons of military aid flown in. Chiang was also told that the US military could not provide any more transport or aircraft. However, Chiang continued to demand for the US to provide more transport planes and to commence large-scale operations to supply China.<ref name=":7"/>

On that same day, British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden met with former Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Tsung-Hui.<ref name=":6"/>