Editing Croatian Spring (section)

===SKH involvement until mid-1971===
[[File:Savka Dabcevic Kucar.jpg|thumb|left|upright|[[Savka Dabčević-Kučar]], one of the most prominent Croatian Spring participants and the head of the [[League of Communists of Croatia]] in 1969–1971.|alt=Photograph of Savka Dabčević-Kučar facing the camera]]
In December 1970, the SKH candidate lost the election of student [[Rector (academia)|pro-rector]] of the [[Zagreb University]] to an independent, [[Ivan Zvonimir Čičak]]. Non-communist candidates took over the remaining student organisations headquartered in Zagreb in April 1971. [[Dražen Budiša]] was elected the head of the Zagreb Student Federation, and [[Ante Paradžik]] became the head of the [[Savez studenata Hrvatske|Croatian Student Federation]].{{sfn|Haug|2012|p=244}}

Within days of the student-body elections, Tito requested that Dabčević-Kučar order the arrests of Šegedin, Marko Veselica, Budiša, Čičak and Đodan, but she declined.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|p=261}} This decision made Dabčević-Kučar very popular in Croatia. At a rally of 200,000 people to mark the 26th anniversary of the [[Zagreb in World War II|1945 liberation of Zagreb]] on 7 May, observers from the United States reported that her speech was interrupted about 40 times by cheering and applause directed at her rather than the SKH.{{sfn|Batović|2017|pp=188–189}} According to the [[British ambassador to Yugoslavia]] Dugald Stewart, Dabčević-Kučar and Tripalo were very skilled at use of public political rallies and their speeches drew crowds typically expected only at football matches.{{sfn|Batović|2017|pp=230–231}}

Another set of amendments to the Yugoslav constitution was adopted further restricting federal powers in June 1971. The only powers retained by the federal government were [[foreign affairs]], foreign trade, defence, [[common currency]], and common [[tariff]]s. Inter-republic committees were set up to make decisions by the federal government before [[ratification]].{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=247–248}} The SKH wanted further decentralisation in 1971 to include banking and foreign trade, and changes that would allow Croatia to retain more foreign currency earnings. Other demands were coming from outside the SKH Central Committee, ranging from establishing a Croatian military to complete independence.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=253–255}} Ultimately the Croatian Spring involved a wide variety of elements including anti-centralists, moderate and extreme nationalists, pro-[[Ustaše]], [[anti-communists]], reformists, democrats and [[democratic socialists]], liberals, and [[libertarians]].{{sfn|Rusinow|2007|p=141}}

The SKS leadership did not criticise the SKH; on the contrary, Nikezić and Perović defended Croatia's reformist leadership to Tito in 1971.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|p=244}} Serbian and Croatian newspapers traded accusations of mutual hostility, nationalism, and unitarism, leading Tito to admit that the SKJ had lost control of the media.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=249–250}} In a meeting with the SKH leaders in July 1971, Tito expressed concern with the political situation and offered Tripalo the post of [[Prime Minister of Yugoslavia]] to move him away from the SKH, but Tripalo declined.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=250–251}} Later that month, the conservative faction managed to gain sufficient support to expel Đodan and Marko Veselica from the SKH as "nationalist ringleaders".{{sfn|Ramet|2006|p=249}}

On 2 August, the SKH announced an Action Programme, criticising nationalism which was referred to in the programme as "national movement", and denouncing unnamed individuals associated with {{lang|hr|Matica hrvatska}} for conspiring against the SKH and the SKJ. The SKH leaders determined that the Action Programme would be formally adopted or rejected by its next [[plenary session]] in November.{{sfn|Swain|2011|p=172}} The SKH arranged another meeting with Tito on 14 September, insisting he had been misinformed about the situation. After the meeting, Tito said he was convinced that the stories about [[chauvinism]] reigning in Croatia were absurd.{{sfn|Ramet|2006|pp=250–251}} He also implied that he favoured the SKH's proposal to reform Yugoslavia's foreign currency policy. After the meeting, Tripalo suggested that the Action Programme would no longer be considered.{{sfn|Swain|2011|p=173}}