Editing Decree 900 (section)

==International response and 1954 coup==
===Expropriation of United Fruit===
In 1953 Árbenz announced that under the Agrarian Reform Law—specifically, because of an order made by the DAN—Guatemala was expropriating approximately<ref name=BowenUFCO/> {{cvt|234000|acres|-1|disp=flip}} of uncultivated land from the [[United Fruit Company]].<ref>Gleijeses, ''The Agrarian Reform of Jacobo Arbenz'' (1989), p. 474.</ref> United Fruit owned {{convert|550000|acre|km2}} in Guatemala, 42% of the nation's (arable) land.<ref>LaFeber, ''Inevitable Revolutions'' (1993), p. 120; citing Graham H. Stuart, and James L. Tigner, ''Latin America and the United States'', 6th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1975), pp. 519–520; Blanche Wiesen Cook, ''The Declassified Eisenhower'' (Garden City, N.Y., 1981), pp. 221–225.</ref> The company was compensated with $627,572 in bonds for the expropriation of their holdings, the amount United Fruit had claimed the land was worth for tax purposes. However, United Fruit proceeded to claim that its land was worth more. It had close ties to U.S. officials and lobbied the U.S. for intervention. The US State Department, on behalf of the United Fruit Company, claimed to Guatemala that the land was worth $15,854,849.<ref>LaFeber, ''Inevitable Revolutions'' (1993), p. 76.</ref>

===United States opposition===
A report written by the U.S. State Department's Office of Intelligence Research suggested that the reform itself would only affect 1,710 landowners, but expressed fear that the law would strengthen the position of communists in Guatemala.<ref>Gleijeses, ''The Agrarian Reform of Jacobo Arbenz'' (1989), pp. 461–462.</ref> U.S. opposition to the Árbenz government certainly resulted from his reformist policies, but historians differ on the relative importance of expropriating United Fruit versus the apparent communist threat implied by land reform.<ref name=Streeter>Stephen M. Streeter, "Interpreting the 1954 U.S. Intervention in Guatemala: Realist, Revisionist, and Postrevisionist Perspectives", ''The History Teacher'' 34(1), November 2000; {{jstor|3054375}} {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160605055955/http://www.jstor.org/stable/3054375 |date=2016-06-05 }}.</ref>

Because of the Agrarian Reform Law, the [[Wm. Wrigley Jr. Company]] in August 1952 announced that it would no longer purchase Guatemalan [[chicle]]. Since [[Wm. Wrigley Jr. Company]] had been the sole buyer of the product, the Árbenz government suddenly had to provide a massive aid program for [[chicle]] harvesters.<ref>LaFeber, ''Inevitable Revolutions'' (1993), p. 119; citing Donald Dozer, ''Are We Good Neighbors? Inter-American Relations 1930–1960'', Gainesville FL, 1959, p. 264.</ref>

After aborting a coup attempt called [[Operation PBFortune]], the United States—through its [[Central Intelligence Agency]] (CIA)—renewed efforts to unseat Árbenz with [[Operation PBSuccess]] (1953–1954). It sought to develop relationships with members of Guatemalan military, and instituted an arms blockade that caused the military to fear a security crisis or even US invasion. The key agent for a possible coup was the exiled colonel [[Castillo Armas]].<ref>Bowen, "U.S. Foreign Policy toward Radical Change" (1993), p. 93.</ref> The CIA also intensified propaganda campaigns to isolate Guatemala among Central American nations,<ref>Bowen, "U.S. Foreign Policy toward Radical Change" (1993), pp. 92–94. "At the same time, the United States sold new weapons to Guatemala's neighbors, promising future weapons purchases to the Guatemalan high command should Arbenz be removed from office. Already partners with the United States in a regionwide, mutual defense treaty(the Rio Treaty), Nicaragua and Honduras each signed supplementary military assistance pacts on a bilateral basis with the United States."</ref> and to convince the Guatemalan people that the Árbenz regime was on the brink of collapse.<ref>Bowen, "U.S. Foreign Policy toward Radical Change" (1993), p. 94. "In May and June 1954, CIA radio transmitters broadcast pro-Castillo Armas propaganda designed to neutralize the army. Nonexistent civilian uprisings, military defections and bogus incidents of sabotage were reported over CIA-manned Radio Liberation located outside Guatemala. When official Guatemalan radio stations attempted to counteract these erroneous rumors, Radio Liberation copied the identifying music and bells of the government station, enabling it to impose its own broadcast as the official government program, while jamming equipment in the U.S. embassy was blocking reception of the official station."</ref>

===Military coup===
In June 1954, Árbenz Guzmán was overthrown by a [[1954 Guatemalan coup d'état|multi-faceted coup operation]] involving a small army led by [[Carlos Castillo Armas]], scattered right-wing violence in the countryside, a U.S. Navy blockade (called [[Operation Hardrock Baker]]), bombardment by CIA planes, and a sophisticated CIA strategy of [[psychological warfare]] intended to demoralize Árbenz and provoke military defections.<ref>Nick Cullather, ''Secret History, Second Edition: The CIA’s Classified Account of Its Operations in Guatemala, 1952–1954'', Stanford University Press, 2006; particularly Appendix A ("PBSUCCESS Timeline")</ref> Thus, although Armas's ground invasion was quickly defeated, Árbenz resigned his post and Armas won control from the vacuum of power.<ref>Gordon, "Case History of U. S. Subversion" (1971), pp. 146–147. "Apparently unnverved by his isolation from the army and unwilling to face a large-scale civil war, he capitulated. Communists made vain, intensive efforts to persuade him to organize civilian resistance, but with his resignation they and other leading government backers became demoralized and fled to foreign embassies."</ref>