Editing Democracy in China (section)

==== 21st century ====
The CCP continues to operate on the Leninist principle of democratic centralism.<ref name=":22">{{Cite book |last=Cabestan |first=Jean-Pierre |title=The Chinese Communist Party: a 100-Year Trajectory |date=2024 |publisher=[[ANU Press]] |isbn=9781760466244 |editor-last=Doyon |editor-first=Jérôme |location=Canberra |chapter=Organisation and (Lack of) Democracy in the Chinese Communist Party: A Critical Reading of the Successive Iterations of the Party Constitution |journal=Journal of Current Chinese Affairs |volume=51 |issue=3 |pages=364–385 |doi=10.1177/18681026221117287 |editor-last2=Froissart |editor-first2=Chloé |doi-access=free}}</ref>{{Rp|page=18}} From 2007 to 2009, [[Hu Jintao]] promoted intra-party party democracy (''dangnei minzhu'', 党内民主) in an effort to decrease the party's focus on top-down decision-making.<ref name=":22"/>{{Rp|page=18}}

In December 2008, more than 350 intellectual and cultural leaders, including Liu Xiaobo, issued [[Charter 08]]. The Charter said China remains the only large world power to still retain an [[Authoritarianism|authoritarian]] system that so infringes on [[human rights]], and "This situation must change! Political democratic reforms cannot be delayed any longer!"<ref name="Macartney2008">{{cite news |last=Macartney |first=Jane |date=10 December 2008 |title=Leading Chinese dissident, Liu Xiaobo, arrested over freedom charter |publisher=[[Times Online]] |location=London |url=http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5313746.ece |url-status=dead |access-date=10 December 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110604141740/http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5313746.ece |archive-date=4 June 2011}}</ref>

Chinese premier [[Wen Jiabao]] called for more democracy in 2011, having generally been regarded as a political reformer during his career.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2011-09-15 |title=Chinese premier Wen Jiabao calls for more democracy |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-14932483 |access-date=2022-08-26 |work=[[BBC News]] |language=en-GB}}</ref> However, [[Wu Bangguo]], [[chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress]], said in 2011 that "we have made a solemn declaration that we will not employ a system of multiple parties holding office in rotation", having said similar remarks during his career.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Bristow |first=Michael |date=2011-03-10 |title=Chinese leader rules out democracy |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-12697997 |access-date=2022-08-23 |work=[[BBC News]] |language=en-GB |archive-date=11 July 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240711001127/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-12697997 |url-status=live }}</ref>

The CCP's [[Core Socialist Values]] campaign introduced during its [[18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|18th National Congress]] in 2012,<ref>{{Cite web |title=How Much Should We Read Into China's New "Core Socialist Values"? |url=https://www.cfr.org/blog/how-much-should-we-read-chinas-new-core-socialist-values |access-date=2023-12-13 |website=[[Council on Foreign Relations]] |language=en |archive-date=13 December 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231213143144/https://www.cfr.org/blog/how-much-should-we-read-chinas-new-core-socialist-values |url-status=live }}</ref> which lists democracy as one of its four national values.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Santos |first=Gonçalo |title=Chinese Village Life Today: Building Families in an Age of Transition |date=2021 |publisher=[[University of Washington Press]] |isbn=978-0-295-74738-5 |location=Seattle}}</ref>{{Rp|page=204}} 

After Xi Jinping became [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP general secretary]] in 2012, [[Amnesty International]] said that [[human rights in China]] have become worse.<ref name="auto2">{{Cite web |date=2017-11-17 |title=Human rights in China under Xi Jinping 'worst since Tiananmen crackdown': Amnesty |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2120318/human-rights-china-under-xi-jinping-worst-tiananmen |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191221073653/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2120318/human-rights-china-under-xi-jinping-worst-tiananmen |archive-date=21 December 2019 |access-date=26 December 2019 |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |language=en |agency=[[Amnesty International]]}}</ref> Human rights abuses are rejected by the government, which insists the country is run according to law.<ref name="auto2" />

Xi Jinping rejects notions of liberal democracy for China.<ref name=":Shan">{{Cite book |last=Shan |first=Patrick Fuliang |title=China under Xi Jinping: A New Assessment |publisher=[[Leiden University Press]] |year=2024 |isbn=9789087284411 |editor-last=Fang |editor-first=Qiang |chapter=What Did the CCP Learn from the Past? |jstor=jj.15136086 |editor-last2=Li |editor-first2=Xiaobing}}</ref>{{Rp|page=43}} In 2013, a CCP memo called [[Document Number Nine|Document Number 9]] was leaked, which warned against "Western constitutional democracy" along with other Western ideas.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Buckley |first=Chris |date=2013-08-19 |title=China Takes Aim at Western Ideas |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/20/world/asia/chinas-new-leadership-takes-hard-line-in-secret-memo.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.today/20130824085418/http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/20/world/asia/chinas-new-leadership-takes-hard-line-in-secret-memo.html |archive-date=24 August 2013 |access-date=2020-04-10 |work=[[The New York Times]] |language=en-US |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> During a visit to Europe in 2014, Xi Jinping said that a multi-party system would not work for China. He said China had experimented in the past with various political systems, including multi-party democracy, warning that copying foreign political or development models could be catastrophic because of its unique historical and social conditions.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2014-04-02 |title=Xi says multi-party system didn't work for China |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-politics-xi-idUSBREA3107S20140402 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190807221635/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-politics-xi-idUSBREA3107S20140402 |archive-date=7 August 2019 |access-date=2019-12-25 |work=[[Reuters]] |language=en}}</ref> According to Xi, Chinese history after the fall of the Qing dynasty demonstrates that Western political systems do not fit China's national circumstances.<ref name=":Shan" />{{Rp|page=43}} Xi states, "China had experimented with constitutional monarchy, imperial restoration, parliamentary politics, multi-partisan arrangement, presidential system, and others. All diverse political forces came unto the historical stage but none of them had successfully offered 'a correct answer' to the question of national salvation."<ref name=":Shan" />{{Rp|page=43}}

According to Xi's view of democracy, China "must not blindly copy the development models of other countries nor accept their dictation. The state system which is a socialist state under the people's democratic dictatorship led by the working class ... is under the leadership of the CPC ... and the principle of democratic centralism.<ref name=":ChineseTheory">{{Cite book |last1=Hayes |first1=Anna |title=Chinese International Relations Theory as Emerging From Practice and Policy |last2=Ping |first2=Jonathan |last3=McCormick |first3=Brett |date=2025 |publisher=[[Routledge]] |isbn=978-0-429-19769-7 |editor-last=Ping |editor-first=Jonathan H. |edition= |location=New York, NY |chapter=Towards a Chinese Theory of International Relations Evidenced in Practice and Policy |editor-last2=Hayes |editor-first2=Anna |editor-last3=McCormick |editor-first3=Brett}}</ref>{{Rp|page=10}}

Xi has strengthened the CCP's control over the government.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Mitchell |first=Tom |date=2021-09-06 |title=The Chinese control revolution: the Maoist echoes of Xi's power play |url=https://www.ft.com/content/bacf9b6a-326b-4aa9-a8f6-2456921e61ec |url-access=subscription |access-date=2022-04-14 |work=[[Financial Times]] |archive-date=6 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230206131922/https://www.ft.com/content/bacf9b6a-326b-4aa9-a8f6-2456921e61ec |url-status=live }}</ref> In [[19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|2017]] and [[2018 National People's Congress|2018 sessions]] respectively, the [[Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party|party]] and [[Constitution of the People's Republic of China|state constitutions]] were amended to include [[Xi Jinping Thought]], described as the next stage of [[socialism with Chinese characteristics]]. Also in the 2018 session, term limits for the [[President of the People's Republic of China|presidency]] were also abolished.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Xi Jinping as 'Authoritarian Reformer' |url=https://freedomhouse.org/article/xi-jinping-authoritarian-reformer |access-date=2022-04-13 |website=[[Freedom House]] |language=en |archive-date=14 December 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211214185020/https://freedomhouse.org/article/xi-jinping-authoritarian-reformer |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Andrésy |first=Agnès |url=https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780761866008/Xi-Jinping-Red-China-The-Next-Generation |title=Xi Jinping: Red China, The Next Generation |date=2016 |isbn=978-0-7618-6601-5 |location=Lanham, Maryland |oclc=927168921 |access-date=8 July 2024 |archive-date=2 December 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231202074832/https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780761866008/Xi-Jinping-Red-China-The-Next-Generation |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Doubek |first=James |date=2018-03-11 |title=China Removes Presidential Term Limits, Enabling Xi Jinping To Rule Indefinitely |url=https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/03/11/592694991/china-removes-presidential-term-limits-enabling-xi-jinping-to-rule-indefinitely |access-date=2022-04-13 |work=[[NPR]] |language=en |archive-date=16 May 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200516113653/https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/03/11/592694991/china-removes-presidential-term-limits-enabling-xi-jinping-to-rule-indefinitely |url-status=live }}</ref>

===== Whole-process people's democracy =====
{{Main article|Whole-process people's democracy}}
Xi has coined the term whole-process people's democracy ({{zh|s=全过程人民民主|labels=no}}), also called "whole-process democracy" ({{zh|s=全过程民主|labels=no}}, {{zh|s=全过程的民主|labels=no}}) which he said "put the [[people are the masters of their own country]]" and that in it "all major legislative decisions are made only after democratic deliberations and thorough procedures to ensure sound and democratic decision-making". He said that "whole-process democracy" had four pillars:<ref>{{Cite web |last=Chen |first=Stella |date=23 November 2021 |title=Whole-Process Democracy |url=https://chinamediaproject.org/the_ccp_dictionary/whole-process-democracy/ |access-date=2022-08-13 |website=China Media Project |language=en-US |archive-date=13 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220813104659/https://chinamediaproject.org/the_ccp_dictionary/whole-process-democracy/ |url-status=live }}</ref>
# process democracy ({{zh|s=过程民主|labels=no}}) and achievement democracy ({{zh|s=成果民主|labels=no}})
# procedural democracy ({{zh|s=程序民主|labels=no}}) and substantive democracy ({{zh|s=实质民主|labels=no}})
# direct democracy ({{zh|s=直接民主|labels=no}}) and indirect democracy ({{zh|s=间接民主|labels=no}})
# people's democracy ({{zh|s=人民民主|labels=no}}) and will of the state ({{zh|s=国家意志|labels=no}})

In 2021, in response to the [[Summit for Democracy]] held by US president [[Joe Biden]], the [[State Council of the People's Republic of China]] released a white paper called ''[[China: Democracy That Works]]'' which praised China's "whole-process democracy", said that "there are many ways to achieve democracy" and disparaged American democracy as "performative."<ref>{{Cite news |title=中国发布民主白皮书， "民主峰会"前夕与美争夺话语权 |url=https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-59532643 |access-date=2022-08-26 |work=[[BBC News]] |language=zh-hans |archive-date=1 January 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220101065145/https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/chinese-news-59532643 |url-status=live }}</ref>

Under the concept of whole-process people's democracy, whether a country is democratic should not be measured by the electoral process but instead by the results it delivers to the people.<ref name=":Tsang&Cheung">{{Cite book |last1=Tsang |first1=Steve |author-link=Steve Chang |title=The Political Thought of Xi Jinping |last2=Cheung |first2=Olivia |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |year=2024 |isbn=9780197689363}}</ref>{{Rp|page=189}} By using the improvement of living standards and development as the measure of democratic success, this framing favors China, which has undergone major advances in development and living standards during the last four decades.<ref name=":Tsang&Cheung" />{{Rp|page=189}}

===== Consultative democracy =====
{{Further|List of political parties in China}}
The Xi Jinping administration promotes a view of consultative democracy (''xieshang minzhu'' 协商民主) rather than intra-party democracy.<ref name=":22" />{{Rp|page=18}} This view of socialist democracy emphasizes consulting more often with society at large while strengthening the leading role of the party.<ref name=":22" />{{Rp|page=18}} Through consultative democracy, Chinese policymakers seek to balance conflicting interests and stakeholders as long as they do not challenge the CCP priorities, with the main channel for this being the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).<ref name=":04" />{{Rp|page=150}}<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":12.2">{{Cite web |last=Joske |first=Alex |author-link=Alex Joske |date=2020 |title=The party speaks for you: Foreign interference and the Chinese Communist Party's united front system |url=https://www.aspi.org.au/report/party-speaks-you |journal= |publisher=[[Australian Strategic Policy Institute]] |jstor=resrep25132 |jstor-access=free |access-date=21 November 2022 |archive-date=9 June 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200609000729/https://www.aspi.org.au/report/party-speaks-you |url-status=live }}</ref> The CPPCC is an institutional component of the CCP's [[People's democracy (Marxism–Leninism)|people's democracy]] and [[United Front (China)|united front]] strategy, which provides a "seat" for the [[List of political parties in China|eight small legally-permitted parties]] and independent nonparty "friends."<ref name=":04" />{{Rp|page=150}} These eight parties were founded before the proclamation of the PRC, and they must accept the "leading role" of the CCP as a condition of their continued existence.<ref>{{Cite book |title=China Versus the West: The Global Power Shift of the 21st Century |date=2012-01-02 |publisher=[[John Wiley & Sons, Inc.]] |isbn=978-1-119-19931-1 |editor-last=Tselichtchev |editor-first=Ivan |location=Hoboken, NJ, USA |language=en |doi=10.1002/9781119199311 |oclc=883259659}}</ref>

Such institutional mechanisms for addressing the interests of new elites while also taking into account disadvantaged groups have been described by academics as "administrative absorption of society" or "democracy in governance."<ref name=":052">{{Cite book |last=Meng |first=Wenting |title=Developmental Piece: Theorizing China's Approach to International Peacebuilding |date=2024 |publisher=[[Columbia University Press]] |isbn=9783838219073 |series=Ibidem |pages=}}</ref>{{Rp|page=50}}

===== Critiques of democracy outside of China =====

====== Contemporary Chinese Communist Party views ======
Chinese policymakers generally view democratic political systems as hampered in their ability to pursue long-term development targets and long-term programs because of their focus on election campaigns and the frequent changes of government in such systems.<ref name=":423">{{Cite book |last=Heilmann |first=Sebastian |author-link=Sebastian Heilmann |title=Red Swan: How Unorthodox Policy-Making Facilitated China's Rise |date=2018 |publisher=[[The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press]] |isbn=978-962-996-827-4 |doi=10.2307/j.ctv2n7q6b |jstor=j.ctv2n7q6b |s2cid=158420253}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=6–7}} In this view, policy under democratic systems as largely restricted to ad hoc interventions which leaves social development vulnerable to blind market forces and the short-term policy interventions available under democratic systems are not equipped to address long-term issues such as [[environmental degradation]], dysfunction in capital markets, or population change.<ref name=":423" />{{Rp|pages=144–145}}

Chinese policymakers generally view the experience of the [[post-Soviet states]] as an example of the harm caused by rapid democratization.<ref name=":052" />{{Rp|page=50}} According to this view, these states' adoption of democracy resulted in the collapse of their communist governments and a decade of political instability and economic instability.<ref name=":052" />{{Rp|page=50}}

The election of [[Donald Trump]] as President of the United States reinforced Chinese views that liberal democracy is dysfunctional.<ref name=":2">{{Cite book |last=Zhao |first=Suisheng |author-link=Suisheng Zhao |url= |title=The Dragon Roars Back: Transformational Leaders and Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Policy |date=2023 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-1-5036-3088-8 |location=Stanford, California |pages=91 |oclc=1331741429}}</ref> The United States' response to the COVID-19 pandemic compounded the situation, increasing views among the Chinese public that the United States political system and economy were not world benchmarks.<ref name=":2" />

Contending that the U.S. has increasingly adopted a "cold war mentality," [[Foreign policy of China|foreign policy]] discourse by [[China under Xi Jinping|Xi Jinping-era]] officials and media have increasingly depicted global politics as a contest between two different views of democracy.<ref name=":05" />{{Rp|page=53}} This view deems the U.S. as excessively focused on the internal governance of other countries and creating divisions with countries like China and Russia.<ref name=":05" />{{Rp|page=53}}  This Chinese discourse contends that, in contrast to the U.S. view of internal democracy, China seeks to democratize international relations by creating opportunities for non-Western countries to have an increased influence on international affairs.<ref name=":05" />{{Rp|page=53}}

====== Academic views ======
In his criticism of Western liberal democracy, academic [[Zhang Weiwei (professor)|Zhang Weiwei]], promotes the idea of Chinese socialist democracy, which he describes as a combination of "selective democracy" and electoral democracy.<ref name=":05" />{{Rp|page=211}} Zhang's view is that Chinese socialist democracy outperforms "Western procedural democracy" because the Western approach is insufficient to choose trustworthy leaders and the Chinese approach is more meritocratic.<ref name=":05" />{{Rp|page=211}} Zhang also points to China's long-term stability and economic growth as further evidence of what he believes is the superiority of its system.<ref name=":05" />{{Rp|page=211}}

[[Wang Hui (intellectual)|Wang Hui]] writes that while many consider China undemocratic, "during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, there existed within the party a self-correction mechanism. Theoretical debate, particularly open theoretical debate, played an important role in the course of the party's and the state's self-adjustment and self-reform."<ref name=":Wang">{{Cite book |last=Wang |first=David Der-wei |author-link=David Der-wei Wang |title=Red Legacies in China: Cultural Afterlives of the Communist Revolution |date=2016 |publisher=[[Harvard University Asia Center]] |isbn=978-0-674-73718-1 |editor-last=Li |editor-first=Jie |series=Harvard Contemporary China Series |volume= 18|location=Cambridge, Massachusetts |chapter=Red Legacies in Fiction |doi=10.2307/j.ctt1sq5t95 |jstor=j.ctt1sq5t95 |editor-last2=Zhang |editor-first2=Enhua}}</ref>{{Rp|page=206}}