Editing Divine command theory (section)

===Semantic objections===
Philosopher William Wainwright considered a challenge to the theory on semantic grounds, arguing that "being commanded by God" and "being obligatory" do not mean the same thing, contrary to what the theory suggests. He used the example of water not having an identical meaning to {{H2O}} to propose that "being commanded by God" does not have an identical meaning to "being obligatory". This was not an objection to the truth of divine command theory, but Wainwright believed it demonstrated that the theory should not be used to formulate assertions about the meaning of obligation.<ref>{{harvnb|Wainwright|2005|p=106}}</ref> Wainwright also noted that divine command theory might imply that one can only have moral knowledge if one has knowledge of God; Edward Wierenga argued that, if this is the case, the theory seems to deny atheists and agnostics moral knowledge.<ref>{{harvnb|Wainwright|2005|pp=106–107}}</ref> Hugh Storer Chandler has challenged the theory based on [[modal logic|modal]] ideas of what might exist in different worlds. He suggested that, even if one accepts that being commanded by God and being morally right are the same, they may not be synonyms because they might be different in other possible worlds.<ref>{{harvnb|Chandler|2007|p=185}}</ref>