Open main menu
Home
Random
Recent changes
Special pages
Community portal
Preferences
About Wikipedia
Disclaimers
Incubator escapee wiki
Search
User menu
Talk
Dark mode
Contributions
Create account
Log in
Editing
Evolutionary game theory
(section)
Warning:
You are not logged in. Your IP address will be publicly visible if you make any edits. If you
log in
or
create an account
, your edits will be attributed to your username, along with other benefits.
Anti-spam check. Do
not
fill this in!
===Asymmetries that allow new strategies=== {{multiple image | width=200 | footer=Animal strategy examples: by examining the behaviours, then determining both the costs and the values of resources attained in a contest the strategy of an organism can be verified | image1=Scatophaga stercoraria.jpg | caption1= Dung fly (''Scatophaga stercoraria'') β a war of attrition player | image2=30-EastTimor-Dive2 Maubara 35 (Mantis Shrimp)-APiazza.JPG | caption2=The mantis shrimp guarding its home with the bourgeois strategy }} In the war of attrition there must be nothing that signals the size of a bid to an opponent, otherwise the opponent can use the cue in an effective counter-strategy. There is however a mutant strategy which can better a bluffer in the [[War of attrition (game)|war of attrition]] game if a suitable asymmetry exists, the bourgeois strategy. Bourgeois uses an asymmetry of some sort to break the deadlock. In nature one such asymmetry is possession of a resource. The strategy is to play a hawk if in possession of the resource, but to display then retreat if not in possession. This requires greater cognitive capability than hawk, but bourgeois is common in many animal contests, such as in contests among [[mantis shrimp]]s and among [[speckled wood butterfly|speckled wood butterflies]].
Edit summary
(Briefly describe your changes)
By publishing changes, you agree to the
Terms of Use
, and you irrevocably agree to release your contribution under the
CC BY-SA 4.0 License
and the
GFDL
. You agree that a hyperlink or URL is sufficient attribution under the Creative Commons license.
Cancel
Editing help
(opens in new window)