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== Theories of the nature of existence == [[File:Bellerophon riding Pegasus and killing the Chimera, Roman mosaic, the Rolin Museum in Autun, France, 2nd to 3rd century AD.jpg|thumb|left|alt=Mosaic depicting Pegasus|One of the topics covered by theories of the nature of existence concerns the ontological status of fictional objects like [[Pegasus]].<ref name="auto3">{{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§2a. Meinongianism}}</ref>]] Theories of the nature of existence aim to explain what it means for something to exist. A central dispute in the academic discourse about the nature of existence is whether existence is a [[Property (philosophy)|property]] of individuals.<ref name="auto2">{{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=Lead Section}}</ref> An individual is a unique entity, like [[Socrates]] or a particular apple. A property is something that is attributed to an entity, like "being human" or "being red", and usually expresses a quality or feature of that entity.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Orilia|Paolini Paoletti|2022|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005|p=683}} | {{harvnb|Bigelow|1998|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> The two main theories of existence are first-order and second-order theories. First-order theories understand existence as a property of individuals while second-order theories say existence is a second-order property, that is, a property of properties.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=Lead Section}} |2={{harvnb|Mackie|1998|loc=Lead Section}} |3={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=Lead Section}} |4={{harvnb|Blackburn|2008|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095804522 Existence]}} }}</ref> A central challenge for theories of the nature of existence is an understanding of the possibility of coherently denying the existence of something, like the statement: "Santa Claus does not exist". One difficulty is explaining how the name "Santa Claus" can be meaningful even though there is no Santa Claus.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Mackie|1998|loc=§1 Objects and Existence}} | {{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Frege and Russell: Existence Is Not a Property of Individuals}} }}</ref> === Second-order theories === Second-order theories understand existence as a second-order property rather than a first-order property. They are often seen as the orthodox position in ontology.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=Lead Section, §1. Existence as a Second-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification}} |2={{harvnb|Blackburn|2008|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095804522 Existence]}} }}</ref> For instance, the [[Empire State Building]] is an individual object and "being {{convert|443.2|meters|abbr=out|spell=us}} tall" is a first-order property of it. "Being instantiated" is a property of "being 443.2 meters tall" and therefore a second-order property. According to second-order theories, to talk about existence is to talk about which properties have instances.<ref name="auto">{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Blackburn|2008|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095804522 Existence]}} |2={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§1. Existence as a Second-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification}} }}</ref> For example, this view says that the sentence "God exists" means "Godhood is instantiated" rather than "God has the property of existing".<ref name="auto4"/> A key reason against characterizing existence as a property of individuals is that existence differs from regular properties. Regular properties, such as ''being a building'' and ''being 443.2 meters tall'', express what an object is like but do not directly describe whether or not that building exists.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§1. Existence as a Second-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification}} |2={{harvnb|Lowe|2005|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-828 Existence]}} }}</ref> According to this view, existence is more fundamental than regular properties because an object cannot have any properties if it does not exist.<ref>{{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§ 1. Frege and Russell: Existence Is Not a Property of Individuals}}</ref> According to second-order theorists, [[Quantifier (logic)|quantifiers]] rather than [[Predication (philosophy)|predicates]] express existence.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=Lead Section, §1. Existence as a Second-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification}} |2={{harvnb|Mackie|1998|loc=§2 The Quantifier Account of Existence}} |3={{harvnb|Blackburn|2008|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095804522 Existence]}} |4={{harvnb|Lowe|2005|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-828 Existence]}} }}</ref> Predicates are expressions that apply to and classify objects, usually by attributing features to them, such as "is a butterfly" and "is happy".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Portner|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=E85VAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA141 141–143]}} | {{harvnb|Ellis|2014|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=DmLfBQAAQBAJ&pg=PT39 39–40]}} }}</ref> Quantifiers are terms that talk about the quantity of objects that have certain properties. [[Existential quantifier]]s express that there is at least one object, like the expressions "some" and "there exists", as in "some cows eat grass" and "there exists an even prime number".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Magnus|2005|pp=52–53}} | {{harvnb|Uzquiano|2022|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> In this regard, existence is closely related to counting because to assert that something exists is to assert that the corresponding concept has one or more instances.<ref name="auto"/> Second-order views imply a sentence like "[[egg-laying mammals]] exist" is misleading because the word "exist" is used as a predicate in them. These views say the true logical form is better expressed in reformulations like "there exist entities that are egg-laying mammals". This way, "existence" has the role of a quantifier and "egg-laying mammals" is the predicate. Quantifier constructions can also be used to express negative existential statements; for instance, the sentence "talking tigers do not exist" can be expressed as "it is not the case that there exist talking tigers".<ref>{{harvnb|Mackie|1998|loc=§2 The Quantifier Account of Existence}}</ref> [[File:Russell1907-2.jpg|thumb|alt=Photo of Bertrand Russell|upright=0.8|[[Bertrand Russell]] proposed his [[theory of descriptions]] to dissolve paradoxes surrounding negative existential statements.]] Many ontologists accept that second-order theories provide a correct analysis of many types of existential sentences. It is, however, controversial whether it is correct for all cases.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Mackie|1998|loc=§2 The Quantifier Account of Existence}} |2={{harvnb|Blackburn|2008|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095804522 Existence]}} }}</ref> Some problems relate to assumptions associated with everyday language about sentences like "[[Ronald McDonald]] does not exist". This type of statement is called ''negative singular existential'' and the expression ''Ronald McDonald'' is a [[singular term]] that seems to refer to an individual. It is not clear how the expression can refer to an individual if, as the sentence asserts, this individual does not exist. According to a solution philosopher [[Bertrand Russell]] (1872–1970) proposed, singular terms do not refer to individuals but are [[Theory of descriptions|descriptions of individuals]]. This theory states negative singular existentials deny an object matching the descriptions exists without referring to a nonexistent individual. Following this approach, the sentence "Ronald McDonald does not exist" expresses the idea: "it is not the case there is a unique happy hamburger clown".<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§ 1. Frege and Russell: Existence Is Not a Property of Individuals}} |2={{harvnb|Mackie|1998|loc=§2 The Quantifier Account of Existence}} |3={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§ 1. Frege and Russell: Existence Is Not a Property of Individuals}} }}</ref> === First-order theories === According to first-order theories, existence is a property of individuals. These theories are less-widely accepted than second-order theories but also have some influential proponents. There are two types of first-order theories: Meinongianism and universalism.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=Lead Section, §2. Existence as a First-Order Property and Its Relation to Quantification}} |2={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> ==== Meinongianism ==== Meinongianism, which describes existence as a property of some but not all entities, was first formulated by [[Alexius Meinong]]. Its main assertion is that there are some entities that do not exist, meaning [[objecthood]] is independent of existence. Proposed examples of nonexistent objects are merely possible objects such as flying pigs, as well as fictional and mythical objects like Sherlock Holmes and Zeus. According to this view, these objects are real and have being, even though they do not exist.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§2a. Meinongianism}} |2={{harvnb|Lowe|2005|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-828 Existence]}} }}</ref> Meinong states there is an object for any combination of properties. For example, there is an object that only has the single property of "being a singer" with no other properties. This means neither the attribute of "wearing a dress" nor the absence of it applies to this object. Meinong also includes impossible objects like round squares in this classification.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§ 2. Meinongianism}} |2={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§2a. Meinongianism}} }}</ref> [[File:Alexius Meinong 1900.jpg|alt=Photo of Alexius Meinong|left|thumb|upright|According to [[Alexius Meinong]], there are some entities that do not exist.]] According to Meinongians, sentences describing Sherlock Holmes and Zeus refer to nonexisting objects. They are true or false depending on whether these objects have the properties ascribed to them.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§2a. Meinongianism}} |2={{harvnb|Lowe|2005|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-828 Existence]}} |3={{harvnb|Küng|2012|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=mprnCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA208 208]}} }}</ref> For instance, the sentence "Pegasus has wings" is true because having wings is a property of Pegasus, even though Pegasus lacks the property of existing.<ref name="auto1">{{harvnb|Mackie|1998|loc=§1 Objects and Existence}}</ref> One key motivation of Meinongianism is to explain how negative singular existentials like "Ronald McDonald does not exist" can be true. Meinongians accept the idea that singular terms like "Ronald McDonald" refer to individuals. For them, a negative singular existential is true if the individual it refers to does not exist.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§ 2. Meinongianism}} |2={{harvnb|Mackie|1998|loc=§1 Objects and Existence}} }}</ref> Meinongianism has important implications for understandings of quantification. According to an influential view defended by [[Willard Van Orman Quine]], the domain of quantification is restricted to existing objects. This view implies quantifiers carry [[ontological commitments]] about what exists and what does not exist. Meinongianism differs from this view by saying the widest domain of quantification includes both existing and nonexisting objects.<ref name="auto3"/> Some aspects of Meinongianism are controversial and have received substantial criticism. According to one objection, one cannot distinguish between being an object and being an existing object.<ref name="auto1"/> A closely related criticism states objects cannot have properties if they do not exist.<ref name="auto1"/> A further objection is that Meinongianism leads to an "overpopulated universe" because there is an object corresponding to any combination of properties.<ref name="auto3"/> A more specific criticism rejects the idea that there are incomplete and impossible objects.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§ 2. Meinongianism}} |2={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§2a. Meinongianism}} |3={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§2a. Meinongianism}} |4={{harvnb|Jacquette|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=7jswCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA78 78–79, 180]}} }}</ref> ==== Universalism ==== Universalists agree with Meinongians that existence is a property of individuals but deny there are nonexistent entities. Instead, universalists state existence is a universal property; all entities have it, meaning everything exists. One approach is to say existence is the same as self-identity. According to the [[law of identity]], every object is identical to itself or has the property of self-identity. This can be expressed in [[predicate logic]] as <math>\forall x (x=x)</math>.<ref name="auto5">{{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§2b. Universalism}}</ref> An influential argument in favor of universalism is that the denial of the existence of something is contradictory. This conclusion follows from the premises that one can only deny the existence of something by referring to that entity and that one can only refer to entities that exist.<ref name="auto5"/> Universalists have proposed different ways of interpreting negative singular existentials. According to one view, names of fictional entities like "Ronald McDonald" refer to [[abstract object]]s, which exist even though they do not exist in space and time. This means, when understood in a strict sense, all negative singular existentials are false, including the assertion that "Ronald McDonald does not exist". Universalists can interpret such sentences slightly differently in relation to the context. In everyday life, for example, people use sentences like "Ronald McDonald does not exist" to express the idea that Ronald McDonald does not exist as a concrete object, which is true.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§ 3. An Anti-Meinongian First-Order View}} |2={{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=§2b. Universalism}} }}</ref> Another approach is to understand negative singular existentials as neither true nor false but [[Meaning (philosophy)|meaningless]] because their singular terms do not refer to anything.<ref>{{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§ 3. An Anti-Meinongian First-Order View}}</ref>
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