Editing Experience (section)

=== Perception ===
[[Perception|Perceptual experience]] refers to "an immediate consciousness of the existence of things outside us".<ref name="Crane1">{{cite web |last1=Crane |first1=Tim |last2=French |first2=Craig |title=The Problem of Perception: 1. Our Ordinary Conception of Perceptual Experience |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/#OrdConPerExp |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2 October 2021 |date=2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Silins |first1=Nicholas |title=Perceptual Experience and Perceptual Justification |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-justification/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=13 October 2021 |date=2019}}</ref> This [[Mental representation|representation]] of the [[World#Philosophy of mind|external world]] happens through stimuli registered and transmitted by the senses.<ref name="Hirst">{{cite web |last1=Hirst |first1=R. |title=Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Perception |url=https://www.encyclopedia.com/medicine/psychology/psychology-and-psychiatry/perception}}</ref> Perceptual experience occurs in different modalities corresponding to the different senses, e.g. as [[visual perception]], [[auditory perception]] or [[haptic perception]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Stokes |first1=Dustin |last2=Matthen |first2=Mohan |last3=Biggs |first3=Stephen |title=Perception and Its Modalities |date=2014 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BIGPAI |chapter=Sorting the senses}}</ref> It is usually held that the objects perceived this way are ''ordinary material objects'', like stones, flowers, cats or airplanes that are presented as public objects existing independent of the mind perceiving them.<ref name="Hirst"/><ref name="Crane1"/> This stands in contrast, for example, to how objects are presented in imaginative experience. Another feature commonly ascribed to perceptual experience is that it seems to put us into ''direct touch'' with the object it presents. So the perceiver is normally not aware of the cognitive processes starting with the stimulation of the sense organs, continuing in the transmission of this information to the brain and ending in the information processing happening there.<ref name="Hirst"/><ref name="Crane1"/> While perception is usually a reliable source of information for the practical matters of our everyday affairs, it can also include ''false information'' in the form of [[illusion]] and [[hallucination]].<ref name="Hirst"/><ref name="Crane1"/> In some cases, the unreliability of a perception is already indicated within the experience itself, for example, when the perceiver fails to identify an object due to blurry vision.<ref name="Hirst"/> But such indications are not found in all misleading experiences, which may appear just as reliable as their accurate counterparts.<ref name="Crane1"/>

This is the source of the so-called "problem of perception". It consists in the fact that the features ascribed to perception so far seem to be incompatible with each other, making the so-characterized perception impossible: in the case of misleading perceptions, the perceiver may be presented with objects that do not exist, which would be impossible if they were in direct touch with the presented objects.<ref name="Crane1"/> Different solutions to this problem have been suggested. [[Sense datum theory|Sense datum theories]], for example, hold that we perceive sense data, like patches of color in visual perception, which do exist even in illusions.<ref name="Coates">{{cite web |last1=Coates |first1=Paul |title=Sense-Data |url=https://iep.utm.edu/sense-da/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=2 October 2021}}</ref> They thereby deny that ordinary material things are the objects of perception.<ref name="Crane3"/> [[Disjunctivism|Disjunctivists]], on the other hand, try to solve the problem by denying that veridical perceptions and illusions belong to the same kind of experience.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Fish |first1=William |title=Disjunctivism |url=https://iep.utm.edu/disjunct/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=2 October 2021}}</ref> Other approaches include adverbialism and intentionalism.<ref name="Crane3">{{cite web |last1=Crane |first1=Tim |last2=French |first2=Craig |title=The Problem of Perception: 3. Theories of Experience |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/#TheExp |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=2 October 2021 |date=2021}}</ref><ref name="Coates"/> The problem with these different approaches is that neither of them is fully satisfying since each one seems to contradict some kind of introspective evidence concerning the fundamental features of perceptual experience.<ref name="Hirst"/><ref name="Crane3"/>