Editing Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (section)

===Monads<!--'Well-founded phenomenon' redirects here-->===
[[File:Leibniz Monadology 1.jpg|thumb|A page from Leibniz's manuscript of the ''[[Monadology]]'']]
Leibniz's best known contribution to [[metaphysics]] is his theory of [[Monad (philosophy)|monads]], as exposited in ''[[Monadology|Monadologie]]''. He proposes his theory that the universe is made of an infinite number of simple substances known as monads.<ref>{{cite book|last1=O'Leary-Hawthorne|first1=John|last2=Cover|first2=J. A.|title=Substance and Individuation in Leibniz|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-0-521-07303-5|page=65|date=2008-09-04}}</ref> Monads can also be compared to the corpuscles of the [[mechanical philosophy]] of René Descartes and others. These simple substances or monads are the "ultimate units of existence in nature". Monads have no parts but still exist by the qualities that they have. These qualities are continuously changing over time, and each monad is unique. They are also not affected by time and are subject to only creation and annihilation.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Rescher|first1=Nicholas|title=G. W. Leibniz's Monadology: an edition for students|url=https://archive.org/details/gwleibnizsmonado00resc|url-access=limited|date=1991|publisher=University of Pittsburgh Press|location=Pittsburgh|isbn=978-0-8229-5449-1|page=[https://archive.org/details/gwleibnizsmonado00resc/page/n40 40]}}</ref> Monads are centers of [[force]]; substance is force, while [[space]], [[matter]], and [[Motion (physics)|motion]] are merely phenomenal. He argued, against Newton, that [[space]], [[time]], and motion are completely relative:<ref name=Ferraro>{{cite book |title =Einstein's Space-Time: An Introduction to Special and General Relativity|page= 1| url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wa3CskhHaIgC&q=time+%22absolute+space%22&pg=PA1|first=Rafael |last=Ferraro |isbn=978-0-387-69946-2 |publisher=Springer |year=2007}}</ref> "As for my own opinion, I have said more than once, that I hold space to be something merely relative, as time is, that I hold it to be an order of coexistences, as time is an order of successions."<ref name="See H. G pp. 25">See H. G. Alexander, ed., ''The [[Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence]]'', Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 25–26.</ref> Einstein, who called himself a "Leibnizian", wrote in the introduction to [[Max Jammer]]'s book ''Concepts of Space'' that Leibnizianism was superior to Newtonianism, and his ideas would have dominated over Newton's had it not been for the poor technological tools of the time; Joseph Agassi argues that Leibniz paved the way for Einstein's [[theory of relativity]].<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Agassi|first=Joseph|title=Leibniz's Place in the History of Physics|journal=Journal of the History of Ideas|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2708561|date=September 1969|volume=30|issue=3|pages=331–344|doi=10.2307/2708561|jstor=2708561}}</ref>

Leibniz's proof of God can be summarized in the ''[[Théodicée]]''.<ref name="Leibniz: A Guide for the Perplexed">{{cite book|last1=Perkins|first1=Franklin|title=Leibniz: A Guide for the Perplexed|publisher=Bloomsbury Academic|isbn=978-0-8264-8921-0|pages=22|date=2007-07-10}}</ref> Reason is governed by the [[principle of contradiction]] and the [[principle of sufficient reason]]. Using the principle of reasoning, Leibniz concluded that the first reason of all things is God.<ref name="Leibniz: A Guide for the Perplexed"/> All that we see and experience is subject to change, and the fact that this world is contingent can be explained by the possibility of the world being arranged differently in space and time. The contingent world must have some necessary reason for its existence. Leibniz uses a geometry book as an example to explain his reasoning. If this book was copied from an infinite chain of copies, there must be some reason for the content of the book.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Perkins|first1=Franklin|title=Leibniz: A Guide for the Perplexed|publisher=Bloomsbury Academic|isbn=978-0-8264-8921-0|page=23|date=2007-07-10}}</ref> Leibniz concluded that there must be the "''monas monadum''" or God.

The [[ontology|ontological]] essence of a monad is its irreducible simplicity. Unlike atoms, monads possess no material or spatial character. They also differ from atoms by their complete mutual independence, so that interactions among monads are only apparent. Instead, by virtue of the principle of [[pre-established harmony]], each monad follows a pre-programmed set of "instructions" peculiar to itself, so that a monad "knows" what to do at each moment. By virtue of these intrinsic instructions, each monad is like a little mirror of the universe. Monads need not be "small"; e.g., each human being constitutes a monad, in which case [[free will]] is problematic.

Monads are purported to have gotten rid of the problematic:
* interaction between [[mind]] and matter arising in the system of [[Descartes]];
* lack of [[Principle of individuation|individuation]] inherent to the system of [[Spinoza]], which represents individual creatures as merely accidental.