Editing Intentionality (section)

===Forms of intentionalism===
These theories can roughly be divided into three categories: pure intentionalism, impure intentionalism, and qualia theories.<ref name="Crane" /> Both pure and impure intentionalism hold that there is a [[supervenience]] relation between phenomenal features and intentional features, for example, that two intentional states cannot differ regarding their phenomenal features without differing at the same time in their intentional features. Qualia theories, on the other hand, assert that among the phenomenal features of a mental state there are at least some non-intentional phenomenal properties, so-called "Qualia", which are not determined by intentional features. Pure and impure intentionalism disagree with each other concerning which intentional features are responsible for determining the phenomenal features. Pure intentionalists hold that only intentional content is responsible, while impure intentionalists assert that the manner or mode how this content is presented also plays a role.<ref name="Chalmers"/><ref name="Mitchell">{{cite journal |last1=Mitchell |first1=Jonathan |title=Another Look at Mode Intentionalism |journal=Erkenntnis |date=12 September 2020 |volume=87 |issue=6 |pages=2519–2546 |doi=10.1007/s10670-020-00314-4 |language=en |issn=1572-8420|doi-access=free |url=https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/144432/1/Mitchell2020_Article_AnotherLookAtModeIntentionalis.pdf }}</ref>

[[Tim Crane]], himself an impure intentionalist, explains this difference by distinguishing three aspects of intentional states: the intentional object, the intentional content, and the intentional mode.<ref name="Crane"/><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Chediak |first1=Karla |title=Intentionalism and the Problem of the Object of Perception |journal=Trans/Form/Ação |date=2016 |volume=39 |issue=2 |pages=87–100 |doi=10.1590/S0101-31732016000200005 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/CHEIAT-5 |doi-access=free |access-date=2020-11-10 |archive-date=2020-11-17 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201117043450/https://philpapers.org/rec/CHEIAT-5 |url-status=live }}</ref> For example, seeing that an apple is round and tasting that this apple is sweet both have the same intentional object: the apple. But they involve different contents: the visual perception ascribes the property of roundness to the apple while the gustatory perception ascribes the property of sweetness to the apple. Touching the apple will also result in a perceptual experience ascribing roundness to the apple, but the roundness is presented in a different manner. So the visual perception and the haptic perception agree in both intentional object and intentional content but differ in intentional mode. Pure intentionalists may not agree with this distinction. They may argue, for example, that the difference in the last case also belongs to intentional content,<ref name="Chalmers"/> because two different properties are ascribed to the apple: seen-roundness and felt-roundness.<ref name="Mitchell"/>