Editing Intuition (section)

===Western philosophy===
In the West, intuition does not appear as a separate field of study, but the topic features prominently in the works of many philosophers.

====Ancient philosophy====
Early mentions and definitions of intuition can be traced back to [[Plato]]. In his ''[[Plato Republic|Republic]]'' he tries to define intuition as a fundamental capacity of human [[reason]] to comprehend the true nature of [[reality]].<ref name="Plato">{{cite web|last=Kemerling|first=Garth|date=12 November 2011|title=Plato: Education and the Value of Justice|url=http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/2h.htm|website=Philosophy Pages}}</ref> In his works ''[[Meno (Plato)|Meno]]'' and ''[[Phaedo (Plato)|Phaedo]]'', he describes intuition as a pre-existing knowledge residing in the "soul of eternity", and as a phenomenon by which one becomes conscious of pre-existing knowledge. He provides an example of mathematical truths, and posits that they are not arrived at by reason. He argues that these truths are accessed using a knowledge already present in a dormant form and accessible to our intuitive capacity. This concept by Plato is also sometimes referred to as [[Anamnesis (philosophy)|anamnesis]]. The study was later continued by his intellectual successors, the [[Neoplatonists]].<ref name="Meno">{{cite book|last1=Klein|first1=Jacob|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=HXI2lcrSsxIC|title=A Commentary on Plato's Meno|publisher=University of Chicago Press|year=1989|isbn=0-226-43959-3|location=Chicago|pages=103–127|access-date=22 December 2014}}</ref>

====Islam====
In Islam various scholars have varied interpretations of intuition (often termed as {{transliteration|ar|hadas}}, [[Arabic]]: {{lang|ar|حدس}}, "hitting correctly on a mark"), sometimes relating the ability to have intuitive knowledge to [[prophet]]hood. 
[[Shahab al-Din Yahya ibn Habash Suhrawardi|Siháb al Din-al Suhrawardi]], in his book ''Philosophy Of Illumination'' ({{transliteration|ar|ishraq}}), from following influences of Plato, finds that intuition is knowledge acquired through illumination and is mystical in nature; he also suggests mystical contemplation ({{transliteration|ar|[[mushahada]]}}) to bring about correct judgment.<ref name="Islam1">{{cite book|last1=Lawson|first1=Todd|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Bq9zSbNr8gIC|title=Reason and Inspiration in Islam: Theology, Philosophy and Mysticism in Muslim Thought|date=23 September 2005|publisher=I.B touris co ltd|isbn=1-85043-470-0|location=London|pages=210–225|access-date=26 December 2014}}</ref> Also influenced by Platonic ideas, [[Ibn Sīnā]] (Avicenna) finds the ability to have intuition is a "prophetic capacity" and he describes intuition as knowledge obtained without intentionally acquiring it. He finds that regular knowledge is based on imitation while intuitive knowledge is based on intellectual certitude.<ref name="Islam2">{{cite book|last1=Kalin|first1=Ibrahim|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=H6EGwDLio0QC|title=Knowledge in Later Islamic Philosophy: Mulla Sadra on Existence, Intellect, and Intuition|date=April 2010|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=9780199739585|location=London|pages=155–160|access-date=26 December 2014}}</ref>

====Early modern philosophy====
In his book ''[[Meditations on First Philosophy]]'', [[René Descartes|Descartes]] refers to an "intuition" (from the [[Latin]] verb {{lang|la|intueor}}, which means "to see") as a pre-existing knowledge gained through rational reasoning or discovering truth through contemplation. This definition states that "whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive to be true is true";<ref>{{multiref2
|1={{cite encyclopedia|title=Descartes' Epistemology|encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|chapter-url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes-epistemology/#CaDRuleRoadPerfKnow|chapter=5. C&D Rule and the Road to Perfect Knowledge|year=2019}}
|2={{cite web|title=Descartes' Truth Rule: Clarity and Distinctness|url=https://spot.colorado.edu/~heathwoo/Phil100/descartes.html|access-date=June 11, 2021}} }}</ref> this is commonly referred to as [[logical intuition|rational intuition]]<ref name="Descartes">{{cite book|last1=L. Mursell|first1=James|title=The Philosophical Review|publisher=Duke University Press|series=4|volume=28|location=USA|pages=391–401|chapter=The Function of Intuition in Descartes' Philosophy of Science}}</ref> It is a component of a potential logical mistake called the [[Cartesian circle]]. Intuition and [[Natural deduction#Judgments and propositions|deduction]], says Descartes, are the unique possible sources of knowledge of the human intellect;<ref>{{cite journal|first1=Murray|last1=Miles|last2=Nolan|first2=Lawrence|editor1-first=Lawrence|editor1-last=Nolan|title=Deduction|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-descartes-lexicon/deduction/69C8310B58F3DFDEE90316F20FA7A3D0|journal=The Cambridge Companion to Descartes|year=2015|pages=183–186|publisher=Cambridge University Press|doi=10.1017/CBO9780511894695.075|isbn=9780511894695|s2cid=243420925 |url-access=subscription}}</ref> the latter is a "connected sequence of intuitions",<ref>{{cite book|last1=Cottingham|first1=John|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Prhr9FBdQ_MC|title=The Cambridge Companion to Descartes|date=September 25, 1992|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=9780521366960|series=Cambridge Companions to Philosophy|page=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Prhr9FBdQ_MC&pg=PA206 206]|oclc=24698917|access-date=June 11, 2021|authorlink=John Cottingham}}</ref> each of which is ''[[a priori]]'' a [[self-evidence|self-evident]], clear and distinct idea, before it is connected with the other ideas within a logical demonstration.

[[David Hume|Hume]] has a more ambiguous interpretation of intuition. Hume claims intuition is a recognition of relationships (relation of time, place, and causation). He states that "the resemblance" (recognition of relations) "will strike the eye" (which would not require further examination) but goes on to state, "or rather in mind"—attributing intuition to power of mind, contradicting the theory of [[empiricism]].<ref>{{multiref2
|1= {{cite book|last1=Hume|first1=David|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3RIusIRd2q8C|title=A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects|date=May 2009|publisher=The Floating Press|isbn=9781775410676|page=105|access-date=23 December 2014}}
|2={{cite book|last1=A. Johnson|first1=Oliver|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=fMjhcXhrv48C&q=intuition&pg=PA121|title=The Mind of David Hume: A Companion to Book I of A Treatise of Human Nature|publisher=The Floating Press|year=1995|isbn=0-252-02156-8|page=123|access-date=23 December 2014}} }}</ref>

====Immanuel Kant====
[[Immanuel Kant]]’s notion of "intuition" differs considerably from the Cartesian notion. It consists of the basic sensory information provided by the [[cognitive]] faculty of sensibility (equivalent to what might loosely be called [[perception]]). Kant held that our [[mind]] casts all of our external intuitions in the form of [[space]], and all of our internal intuitions ([[memory]], thought) in the form of time.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Kant|first=Immanuel|title=Critique of Pure Reason|url=https://www.gutenberg.org/catalog/world/readfile?fk_files=5144&pageno=35|publisher=gutenberg.org|page=35}}</ref>

====Contemporary philosophy====
Intuitions are customarily appealed to{{clarify|reason=by whom? by philosophers? or do philosophers claim that this is what people generally do?|date=August 2023}} independently of any particular theory of how intuitions provide evidence for claims. There are divergent accounts of what sort of mental state intuitions are, ranging from mere spontaneous judgment to a special presentation of a necessary truth.<ref>{{cite book|first=M.|last=Lynch|chapter=Trusting Intuitions|editor-first1=P.|editor-last1=Greenough|editor-first2=M.|editor-last2=Lynch|title=Truth and Realism|pages=227–238}}</ref> Philosophers such as [[George Bealer]] have tried to defend appeals to intuition against [[Willard Van Orman Quine|Quinean]] doubts about [[conceptual analysis]].<ref>{{cite book|first=G.|last=Bealer|chapter=Intuition and The Autonomy of Philosophy|editor-first1=M.|editor-last1=Depaul|editor-first2=W.|editor-last2=Ramsey|title=Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role In Philosophical Inquiry|year=1998|pages=201–239}}</ref>

A different challenge to appeals to intuition comes from [[experimental philosophy|experimental philosophers]], who argue that appeals to intuition must be informed by the methods of social science.{{citation needed|date=August 2015}}

The [[metaphilosophy|metaphilosophical]] assumption that philosophy ought to depend on intuitions has been challenged by experimental philosophers (e.g., Stephen Stich).<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Mallon|first1=Ron|last2=Machery|first2=Edouard|last3=Nichols|first3=Shaun|last4=Stich|first4=Stephen|date=September 2009|title=Against Arguments from Reference|journal=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research|volume=79|issue=2|pages=332–356|doi=10.1111/j.1933-1592.2009.00281.x|issn=0031-8205}}</ref> One of the main problems adduced by experimental philosophers is that intuitions differ, for instance, from one culture to another, and so it seems problematic to cite them as evidence for a philosophical claim.<ref>{{Citation|last1=Weinberg|first1=Jonathan M.|title=Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions|date=2012-08-13|work=Collected Papers, Volume 2|pages=159–190|publisher=Oxford University Press|doi=10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199733477.003.0008|isbn=978-0-19-973347-7|last2=Nichols|first2=Shaun|last3=Stich|first3=Stephen}}</ref> [[Timothy Williamson]] responded to such objections against philosophical methodology by arguing that intuition plays no special role in philosophy practice, and that skepticism about intuition cannot be meaningfully separated from a general [[skepticism]] about judgment. On this view, there are no qualitative differences between the methods of philosophy and [[common sense]], the sciences, or mathematics.<ref>{{cite book|last=Williamson|first=Timothy|year=2008|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YN2KGBgKwOcC&q=intuition|title=The Philosophy of Philosophy|publisher=John Wiley & Sons |isbn=9780470695913 }}{{page needed|date=August 2023}}</ref> Others like Ernest Sosa seek to support intuition by arguing that the objections against intuition merely highlight {{clarify|text=a verbal disagreement|date=August 2023}}.<ref>{{Citation|last=Sosa|first=Ernest|title=A Defense of the Use of Intuitions in Philosophy|work=Stich|pages=101–112|year=2009|publisher=Wiley-Blackwell|doi=10.1002/9781444308709.ch6|isbn=978-1-4443-0870-9}}</ref>

=====Philosophy of mathematics and logic=====
[[Intuitionism]] is a position advanced by [[L. E. J. Brouwer]] in [[philosophy of mathematics]] derived from Kant's claim that all [[mathematics|mathematical knowledge]] is knowledge of the pure forms of the intuition—that is, intuition that is not empirical.

[[Intuitionistic logic]] was devised by [[Arend Heyting]] to accommodate this position (it has also been adopted by other forms of [[constructivism (mathematics)|constructivism]]). It is characterized by rejecting the [[law of excluded middle]]: as a consequence it does not in general accept rules such as [[double negation elimination]] and the use of {{lang|la|[[reductio ad absurdum]]}} to prove the existence of something.{{citation needed|date=August 2015}}