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Is–ought problem
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=== Functionalist counterexamples === Several counterexamples have been offered by philosophers claiming to show that there are cases when an "ought" logically follows from an "is." First of all, [[Hilary Putnam]], by tracing back the quarrel to Hume's dictum, claims fact/value entanglement as an objection, since the distinction between them entails a value.{{Clarify|date=July 2020}} [[Arthur Prior|A. N. Prior]] points out, from the statement "He is a sea captain," it logically follows, "He ought to do what a sea captain ought to do."{{sfn|MacIntyre|1981|p=[https://archive.org/details/aftervirtuestudy0000maci/page/54 54]}} [[Alasdair MacIntyre]] points out, from the statement "This watch is grossly inaccurate and irregular in time-keeping and too heavy to carry about comfortably," the evaluative conclusion validly follows, "This is a bad watch."{{sfn|MacIntyre|1981|p=[https://archive.org/details/aftervirtuestudy0000maci/page/57 57-58]}} John Searle points out, from the statement "Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars," it logically follows that "Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars." The act of promising by definition places the promiser under obligation.<ref>{{Cite book |last=MacNiven |first=Don |url=https://archive.org/details/creativemorality0000macn/page/40/mode/2up |title=Creative Morality |date=1993 |publisher=[[Routledge]] |isbn=978-0-415-00030-7 |edition=1st |pages=41–42}}</ref>
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