Editing Knowledge argument (section)

=== The three strategies ===
Kind brings up three strategies that have been brought up in reaction to this argument: the ability analysis, the acquaintance analysis, and the old fact/new guise analysis.

==== Ability hypothesis ====
Several objections to the argument have been raised on the grounds that Mary does not gain new factual knowledge when she leaves the room, but rather a new ability. Nemirow claims that "knowing what an experience is like is the same as knowing how to imagine having the experience". He argues that Mary only obtained the ability to do something, not the knowledge of something new.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/mindcognitionrea0000unse|title=Mind and cognition: a reader|date=1990-01-01|publisher=Basil Blackwell|isbn=978-0631160762|editor-last=Lycan|editor-first=William G.|location=Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA|url-access=registration}}</ref> Lewis put forth a similar argument, claiming that Mary gained an ability to "remember, imagine and recognize."<ref>{{Cite book|title=Philosophical Papers Volume I - Oxford Scholarship|last=Lewis|first=David|doi=10.1093/0195032047.001.0001|isbn=9780199833382|publisher=Oxford University Press|date=1983-08-18}}</ref> In the response to Jackson's knowledge argument, they both agree that Mary makes a genuine discovery when she sees red for the first time, but deny her discovery involves coming to know some facts of which she was not already cognizant before her release. Therefore, what she obtained is a discovery of new abilities rather than new facts; her discovery of what it is like to experience color consists merely in her gaining new ability of how to do certain things, but not gaining new factual knowledge. In light of such considerations, Churchland distinguishes between two senses of knowing, "knowing how" and "knowing that", where knowing how refers to abilities and knowing that refers to knowledge of facts. He aims to reinforce this line of objection by appealing to the different locations in which each type of knowledge is represented in the brain, arguing that there is a true, demonstratively physical distinction between them.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://archive.org/details/neurocomputation0000chur|title=A neurocomputational perspective: the nature of mind and the structure of science|last=Churchland|first=Paul M.|date=1989-01-01|publisher=MIT Press|isbn=978-0262031516|location=Cambridge, Massachusetts}}</ref> By distinguishing that Mary does not learn new facts, simply abilities, it helps to negate the problem posed by the thought experiment to the physicalist standpoint.

In response, Levin argues that a novel color experience does in fact yield new factual knowledge, such as "information about the color's similarities and compatibilities with other colors, and its effect on other of our mental states."<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Levin|first=Janet|date=1986-01-01|title=Could Love Be like a Heatwave?: Physicalism and the Subjective Character of Experience|jstor=4319824|journal=Philosophical Studies|volume=49|issue=2|pages=245–261|doi=10.1007/bf00354338|s2cid=170227257}}</ref> Tye counters that Mary could have (and would have, given the stipulations of the thought experiment) learned all such facts prior to leaving the room, without needing to experience the color firsthand. For example, Mary could know the fact "red is more like orange than green" without ever experiencing the colors in question.<ref>{{Cite book|url=http://webcat1.library.ubc.ca:80/vwebv/holdingsInfo?bibId=2405834|title=Consciousness, color, and content|last=Tye|first=Michael|date=2000-01-01|publisher=MIT Press|isbn=978-0262201292|series=Representation and mind|location=Cambridge, Massachusetts}}</ref>

One might accept Conee's arguments that imaginative ability is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowing what it is like to see a color, but preserve a version of the ability hypothesis that employs an ability other than imagination. For example, Brie Gertler discusses the option that what Mary gains is not an ability to imagine colors, but an ability to recognize colors by their phenomenal quality.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last=Gertler|first=Brie|date=1999-03-01|title=A Defense of the Knowledge Argument|journal=Philosophical Studies|language=en|volume=93|issue=3|pages=317–336|doi=10.1023/A:1004216101557|s2cid=169356196|issn=0031-8116}}</ref>

Kind offers a concrete and more realistic example: a driving test, where a person would have to complete a written test where their knowledge of road laws and facts will be tested, as well as an in-car exam, where they must display their ability to drive correctly while following the laws they know as well as putting their facts into practice. One can have all the knowledge-that (knowing all the safety rules related to driving) while having no knowledge-how (driving safely). Kind characterizes Mary's understanding of color sensation as what it's like knowledge, a sub-category of knowledge-that. She states that while Mary does learn something upon seeing the red tomato for the first time and gains knowledge-how; David Lewis claims Mary is now able to recognize, remember and imagine seeing the color red. Advocates of the ability analysis hold the belief that while Mary may have a surprised reaction to seeing red for the first time, she doesn't gain any new facts about the sensation of red.

==== Acquaintance hypothesis ====
The acquaintance analysis argues that Mary is able to learn something new without obtaining accurate knowledge. Due to his dissatisfaction with the ability hypothesis, Earl Conee presents another variant. Conee's acquaintance hypothesis describes a third category of knowledge "by acquaintance of an experience".

Tye also defends a version of the acquaintance hypothesis that he compares to Conee's, though he clarifies that acquaintance with a color should not be equated to applying a concept to one's color experience.

In Conee's account, one can come to know (be acquainted with) a phenomenal quality only by experiencing it, but not by knowing facts about it as Mary did. This is different from other physical objects of knowledge: one comes to know a city, for example, simply by knowing facts about it. For example: A person may know facts about Sydney, Australia, but they won't actually be acquainted with it until they have been there in person. Gertler uses this disparity to oppose Conee's account: a dualist who posits the existence of qualia has a way of explaining it, with reference to qualia as different entities than physical objects; while Conee describes the disparity, Gertler argues that his physicalist account does nothing to explain it.<ref name=":2">{{Cite book |last=Kind |first=Amy |title=Philosophy of mind: the basics |date=2020 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-138-80782-2 |location=London New York}}</ref>

==== The old fact/new guise analysis ====
The response to the knowledge argument depends on whether we can accurately capture the new type of knowledge Mary gains when she leaves the room. Those who propose the ability analysis and the acquaintance analysis both agree that Mary learns something new, but they differ on whether this new knowledge can be reduced to factual knowledge or whether it requires direct experience. Another analysis, called the old fact/new guise analysis, denies that Mary learns something new at all. Instead, it suggests that Mary gains a new understanding of an old fact in a different way. This analysis depends on the idea that there are many ways to express the same fact. For example, the fact that Bruce Wayne is 6'2" tall can also be expressed as "Batman is 6'2" tall" or "Bruce Wayne mesure 1.8796 mètres" in French. Proponents of the old fact/new guise analysis argue that Mary gains a new understanding of an old fact through the acquisition of a phenomenal concept of red. They believe that Mary is now able to express an old fact about the sensation of red in a new way. However, whether this analysis is successful in responding to the knowledge argument depends on how phenomenal concepts are defined in a way that is compatible with physicalism.<ref name=":2" />