Editing Metaethics (section)

==Moral ontology<!--'Moral ontology' redirects here-->==

'''Moral ontology'''<!--boldface per [[WP:R#PLA]]--> attempts to answer the question, "What is the nature of moral judgments?"

Amongst those who believe there to be some standard(s) of morality (as opposed to [[moral nihilism|moral nihilists]]), there are two divisions:

# [[moral universalism|universalists]], who hold that the same moral facts or principles apply to everyone everywhere; and
# [[moral relativism|relativists]], who hold that different moral facts or principles apply to different people or societies.

=== Moral universalism ===
[[Moral universalism]] (or universal morality) is the metaethical position that some system of ethics, or a [[universal ethic]], applies universally, that is to all intelligent beings regardless of [[culture]], [[Race (classification of human beings)|race]], [[sex]], [[religion]], [[nationality]], [[sexual orientation|sexuality]], or other distinguishing feature. The source or justification of this system may be thought to be, for instance, [[human nature]], shared vulnerability to suffering, the demands of universal [[reason]], what is common among existing moral codes, or the common mandates of [[religion]] (although it can be argued that the latter is not in fact moral universalism because it may distinguish between Gods and mortals). Moral universalism is the opposing position to various forms of [[moral relativism]].

Universalist theories are generally forms of [[moral realism]], though exceptions exists, such as the subjectivist [[ideal observer theory|ideal observer]] and [[divine command theory|divine command]] theories, and the non-cognitivist [[universal prescriptivism]] of [[R.M. Hare|R. M. Hare]]. Forms of moral universalism include:
* Value monism is the common form of universalism, which holds that all goods are [[Commensurability (ethics)|commensurable]] on a single value scale.
* [[Value pluralism]] contends that there are two or more genuine scales of value, knowable as such, yet incommensurable, so that any prioritization of these values is either non-cognitive or subjective. A value pluralist might, for example, contend that both a life as a nun and a life as a mother realize genuine values (in a universalist sense), yet they are incompatible (nuns may not have children), and there is no purely rational way to measure which is preferable. A notable proponent of this view is [[Isaiah Berlin]].

=== Moral relativism ===
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[[Moral relativism]] maintains that all moral judgments have their origins either in societal or in individual standards, and that no single standard exists by which one can objectively assess the truth of a moral proposition. Metaethical relativists, in general, believe that the descriptive properties of terms such as "good", "bad", "right", and "wrong" do not stand subject to [[Universality (philosophy)|universal]] [[truth]] conditions, but only to societal convention and personal preference. Given the same set of verifiable facts, some societies or individuals will have a fundamental disagreement about what one ''ought'' to do based on societal or individual [[norm (sociology)|norm]]s, and one cannot adjudicate these using some independent standard of evaluation. The latter standard will always be societal or personal and not universal, unlike, for example, the scientific standards for assessing [[thermodynamic temperature|temperature]] or for determining [[proof theory|mathematical truths]]. {{Clarify span|text=Some philosophers maintain that moral relativism entails [[non-cognitivism]], while others consider it a form of [[Cognitivism (ethics)|cognitivism]]. Some but not all relativist theories are forms of [[moral subjectivism]], although not all subjectivist theories are relativistic.|date=February 2019}}

=== Moral nihilism ===
[[Moral nihilism]], also known as ethical nihilism, is the metaethical view that nothing has intrinsic moral value. For example, a moral nihilist would say that killing someone, for whatever reason, is intrinsically neither morally right nor morally wrong. Moral nihilism must be distinguished from [[moral relativism]], which does allow for moral statements to be intrinsically true or false in a non-universal sense, but does not assign any static truth-values to moral statements. Insofar as only true statements can be known, moral nihilists are [[moral skepticism|moral skeptics]]. Most forms of moral nihilism are [[non-cognitivism|non-cognitivist]] and vice versa, though there are notable exceptions such as [[universal prescriptivism]] (which is semantically non-cognitive but substantially universal).