Editing Metaphysics (section)

=== Space, time, and change ===
{{main|Philosophy of space and time}}

[[Space]] and [[time]] are dimensions that entities occupy. Spacetime realists state that space and time are fundamental aspects of reality and exist independently of the human mind. Spacetime idealists, by contrast, hold that space and time are constructs of the human mind, created to organize and make sense of reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dainton|2010|pp=[https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/time-and-space/spatial-antirealism/CE284C8D3088AF598998951618D4867D 245–246]}} | {{harvnb|Janiak|2022|loc=§ 4.2 Absolute/Relational Vs. Real/Ideal}} | {{harvnb|Pelczar|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=tkjTBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA115 115]}} }}</ref> Spacetime absolutism or substantivalism understands spacetime as a distinct object, with some metaphysicians conceptualizing it as a container that holds all other entities within it. [[Relationalism#Relationalism (theory of space and time)|Spacetime relationism]] sees spacetime not as an object but as a network of relations between objects, such as the spatial relation of {{em|being next to}} and the temporal relation of {{em|coming before}}.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hoefer|Huggett|Read|2023|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Benovsky|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=4KHWCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA19 19–20]}} | {{harvnb|Romero|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5wJ2DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA135 135]}} }}</ref>

In the metaphysics of time, an important contrast is between the [[A series and B series|A-series and the B-series]]. According to the A-series theory, the [[flow of time]] is real, meaning that events are categorized into the past, present, and future. The present continually moves forward in time and events that are in the present now will eventually change their status and lie in the past. From the perspective of the B-series theory, time is static, and events are ordered by the temporal relations earlier-than and later-than without any essential difference between past, present, and future.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dyke|2002|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=IxIlqbSWg4gC&pg=PA138 138]}} | {{harvnb|Koons|Pickavance|2015|pp=182–185}} | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|pp=160–161}} }}</ref> [[Eternalism (philosophy of time)|Eternalism]] holds that past, present, and future are equally real, whereas [[Presentism (philosophy of time)|presentism]] asserts that only entities in the present exist.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carroll|Markosian|2010|pp=179–181}} | {{harvnb|Loux|Crisp|2017|pp=206, 214–215}} | {{harvnb|Romero|2018|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5wJ2DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA135 135]}} }}</ref>

Material objects persist through time and change in the process, like a tree that grows or loses leaves.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Miller|2018|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Costa|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Simons|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ql27m77IveQC&pg=PA166 166]}} }}</ref> The main ways of conceptualizing persistence through time are [[endurantism]] and [[perdurantism]]. According to endurantism, material objects are three-dimensional entities that are wholly present at each moment. As they change, they gain or lose properties but otherwise remain the same. Perdurantists see material objects as four-dimensional entities that extend through time and are made up of different [[temporal parts]]. At each moment, only one part of the object is present, not the object as a whole. Change means that an earlier part is qualitatively different from a later part. For example, when a banana ripens, there is an unripe part followed by a ripe part.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Miller|2018|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Costa|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Theories of Persistence}} | {{harvnb|Simons|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ql27m77IveQC&pg=PA166 166]}} | {{harvnb|Hawley|2023|loc=3. Change and Temporal Parts}} }}</ref>