Editing Neutral monism (section)

== Arguments against ==
While neutral monism presents a novel approach to the [[mind-body problem]], it must navigate a complex web of objections and reconcile its tenets with the consciousness combination, [[reductionist]], [[materialist]], mentalist, the problem of experience, and emergence to establish its viability as a solution.<ref>Stubenberg, Leopold and Donovan Wishon, "Neutral Monism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2023/entries/neutral-monism/>.</ref>

Critics of neutral monism, which addresses the mind-body problem, frequently identify the "combination problem" as its most significant challenge.<ref>"Consciousness, Information and Panpsychism", Theories of Consciousness, Routledge, pp. 226–262, 2002-01-31,</ref> Neutral monism argues that the mind and body are two aspects of the same underlying, neutral substance. In this framework, micro-entities possess basic conscious experiences, leading to questions about how these experiences amalgamate to form complex human consciousness. A major point of contention is the mechanics of combination. Sam Coleman specifically argues that the notion of subject-summing is inherently incoherent. He posits that if two distinct viewpoints, A and B, were to merge into an "uber-mind," this entity would paradoxically need to encompass A's experiences without B's and vice versa, while still maintaining a unified experience, a scenario that appears contradictory.<ref>Coleman, Sam (2013-01-20). "The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism, Micro-Subjects, and Emergence". Erkenntnis. 79 (1): 19–44. doi:10.1007/s10670-013-9431-x. hdl:2299/13415. ISSN 0165-0106. S2CID 145708852.</ref> On the other hand, [[Galen Strawson]] suggests that the solution to this conundrum might lie in yet unresolved aspects of consciousness. He implies that our current understanding of consciousness is incomplete, and that further exploration could potentially unravel how the subject-summing problem could logically occur, providing a resolution to the combination problem central to neutral monism.<ref>Strawson, Galen (2006). "Panpsychism? Replies to commentators and a celebration of Descarte" (PDF). Journal of Consciousness Studies. 13: 184–208.</ref>

Expanding upon this criticism, neutral monism grapples with the dilemma of reduction versus elimination. The theory grapples with the ontological status of entities it seeks to reduce: are they merely simplified or entirely eliminated? This debate is integral to understanding neutral monism's approach to traditional concepts like “mind” and “matter.” Ernst Mach <ref>Mach, Ernst, 1886, Die Analyse der Empfindungen und das Verhältnis des Physischen zum Psychischen, fifth edition translated as The Analysis of Sensations and the Relation of Physical to the Psychical, New York: Dover, 1959.</ref> exemplified this dilemma by proposing that entities such as "body" and "ego" are not fixed unities but rather provisional constructs or composites of more tightly interlinked elements. This suggests a fluidity in the conceptualization of these entities, oscillating between them being useful fictions and complex combinations of more fundamental parts. Similarly, [[Bertrand Russell]]<ref>Russell, Bertrand, 1996, “Analysis of Mind”, A fresh Look at Empiricism 1927–42 (Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, Volume 10), John Slater and Peter Köllner (ed.), New York: Routledge.</ref> advocated for the elimination of traditional psychological terms like "knowledge," "memory," "perception," and "sensation" from our vocabulary, as he believed they did not accurately represent the underlying reality. In his view, traditional dualist and materialist conceptions of mind and matter were inadequate. Instead, Russell proposed neutral constructions to replace these entities, which, though devoid of traditional properties like solidity or inherent object-reference, were designed to fulfill similar roles.

Bertrand Russell proposed protophenomenal properties to address this issue.<ref>Russell, Bertrand, 1927, The Analysis of Matter, London: George Allen & Unwin.</ref> These properties, as basic, non-mental, and non-physical, are meant to underlie both mental and physical phenomena, thereby bridging the gap between mind and matter. However, [[David Chalmers]] criticizes this approach as being [[ad hoc]],<ref>Chalmers, David John, 1966- (1996). The conscious mind : in search of a fundamental theory. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-510553-2. OCLC 33101543.</ref> questioning whether these differ sufficiently from physicalism.<ref>Alter, Torin; Pereboom, Derk (2019), "Russellian Monism", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2019 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 2020-08-30</ref> Contemporary interpretations of neutral monism, such as those by Gregory Landini <ref name="Landini, Gregory 2011">Landini, Gregory, 2011, Russell, London and New York: Routledge.</ref> and Erik Banks,<ref>Banks, Erik C., 2014, The Realistic Empiricism of Mach, James, and Russell. Neutral Monism Reconsidered, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.</ref> further complicate this distinction. Landini argues that Russell's transient particulars are physical entities foundational to mental and physical continuants, while Banks' "realistic empiricism" suggests a physicalist interpretation of these basic entities. Additionally, Donovan Wishon <ref>Wishon, Donovan, 2015, “Russell on Russellian Monism”, in Alter and Nagasawa 2015: 91–118</ref> observes a later shift in Russell's work towards a materialistic ontology, indicating that the mental-physical distinction may be rooted more in our methods of knowledge acquisition than in intrinsic properties. These developments challenge the central neutral monist assertion that reality's fundamental constituents are neither purely mental nor physical, suggesting that the conceptual gap between neutral monism and physicalism may be narrower than previously thought.

The suspicion of mentalism also looms over neutral monism. The critics, such as Lenin and Ayer, argue that these remain fundamentally mentalistic,<ref>Lenin, V.I., 1909, Materializm i Empirio-Kritisizm, Translated as Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959.</ref><ref>Ayer, A.J., 1971, Russell and Moore. The Analytical Heritage, London: Macmillan.</ref> thus undermining the neutrality claim. Although traditional neutral monists removed mentalistic connotations from sensations and experiences, the charge of mentalism remains a point of contention.

Additionally, the problem of experience persists. Critics like Chalmers and Strawson argue that neutral monism, like materialism, fails to accommodate experience, suggesting a gap between qualities and the awareness of them.<ref>Chalmers, David, 2015, “Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism”, in Alter and Nagasawa 2015: 246–276.
</ref><ref>Strawson, Galen, 2020, “What Does ‘Physical’ Mean? A Prolegomenon to Physicalist Panpsychism”, The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism, William Seager (ed.), New York: Routledge, 317–39.</ref> Traditional neutral monists respond by arguing that appropriate relationships among qualities can lead to awareness, although the debate continues.

The notion of emergence further complicates the picture. The concept of emergence, particularly the distinctions between weak, strong, and radical emergence as outlined by Chalmers,<ref>Chalmers, David, 2006, “Strong and Weak Emergence”, in The Re-Emergence of Emergence, Philip Clayton and Paul Davies (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 244–254.</ref> bring up challenges. While neutral monism comfortably accommodates weak emergence, where novel phenomena unexpectedly arise from known domains, it struggles with strong and radical emergence, the latter involving novel features in complex systems not fully grounded in their components. For instance, Landini suggests that Russell's later work implies a radical emergence of qualia, a position not universally accepted.<ref name="Landini, Gregory 2011"/>