Editing Pascal's wager (section)

=== Argument from inconsistent revelations ===
{{main|Argument from inconsistent revelations}}

Since there have been many religions throughout history, and therefore many conceptions of God (or gods), some assert that all of them need to be factored into the wager, in an argumentation known as the argument from inconsistent revelations. This, its proponents argue, would lead to a high probability of believing in "the wrong god" and would eliminate the mathematical advantage Pascal claimed with his wager. [[Denis Diderot]], a contemporary of Voltaire, expressed this opinion when asked about the wager, saying "an [[Imam]] could reason the same way".<ref name="Diderot">{{cite book
  | last = Diderot
  | first = Denis
  | author-link = Denis Diderot
  | editor = J. Assézar
  | title = Pensées philosophiques, LIX, Volume 1
  | orig-year = 1746
  | year = 1875–77
  | language = fr
  | pages = 167
}}</ref> [[J. L. Mackie]] writes that "the church within which alone salvation is to be found is not necessarily the Church of Rome, but perhaps that of the [[Anabaptists]] or the [[the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints|Mormons]] or the [[Sunni Muslims|Muslim Sunnis]] or the worshipers of [[Kali]] or of [[Odin]]."<ref>[[J.L. Mackie|Mackie, J. L.]] (1982). ''The Miracle of Theism'', Oxford, pg. 203</ref>

Pascal considers this type of objection briefly in the notes compiled into the ''Pensées'', and dismisses it:<ref>Wetsel, David (1994). ''Pascal and Disbelief: Catechesis and Conversion in the Pensées''. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, p. 117. {{ISBN|0-8132-1328-2}}</ref>

{{quote box|quote=What say [the unbelievers] then? "Do we not see," say they, "that the brutes live and die like men, and Turks like Christians? They have their ceremonies, their prophets, their doctors, their saints, their monks, like us," etc. If you care but little to know the truth, that is enough to leave you in repose. But if you desire with all your heart to know it, it is not enough; look at it in detail. That would be sufficient for a question in philosophy; but not here, where everything is at stake. And yet, after a superficial reflection of this kind, we go to amuse ourselves, etc. Let us inquire of this same religion whether it does not give a reason for this obscurity; perhaps it will teach it to us.<ref name="Pensée #72"/>}}

Pascal says that the skepticism of unbelievers who rest content with the many-religions objection has seduced them into a fatal "repose". If they were really bent on knowing the truth, they would be persuaded to examine "in detail" whether Christianity is like any other religion, but they just cannot be bothered.<ref>Wetsel, ''Pascal and Disbelief'', p. 370.</ref> Their objection might be sufficient were the subject concerned merely some "question in philosophy", but not "here, where everything is at stake". In "a matter where they themselves, their eternity, their all are concerned",<ref name="Pensée #72"/> they can manage no better than "a superficial reflection" ("une reflexion légère") and, thinking they have scored a point by asking a [[leading question]], they go off to amuse themselves.<ref>Wetsel, ''Pascal and Disbelief'', p. 238.</ref>

As Pascal scholars observe, Pascal regarded the many-religions objection as a rhetorical ploy, a "trap" that he had no intention of falling into.<ref>Wetsel, ''Pascal and Disbelief'', pp. 118 (quotation from Jean Mesnard), 236.</ref>

David Wetsel notes that Pascal's treatment of the pagan religions is brisk: "As far as Pascal is concerned, the demise of the pagan religions of antiquity speaks for itself. Those pagan religions which still exist in the New World, in India, and in Africa are not even worth a second glance. They are obviously the work of superstition and ignorance and have nothing in them which might interest 'les gens habiles' ('clever men')<ref name="Pensée #251">[http://www.gutenberg.org/files/18269/18269-h/18269-h.htm#p_251 ''Pensée'' #251]".</ref><ref>Wetsel, ''Pascal and Disbelief'', p. 181.</ref> Islam warrants more attention, being distinguished from paganism (which for Pascal presumably includes all the other non-Christian religions) by its claim to be a revealed religion. Nevertheless, Pascal concludes that the religion founded by Mohammed can on several counts be shown to be devoid of divine authority, and that therefore, as a path to the knowledge of God, it is as much a dead end as paganism."<ref>Wetsel, ''Pascal and Disbelief'', p. 182.</ref> Judaism, in view of its close links to Christianity, he deals with elsewhere.<ref>Wetsel, ''Pascal and Disbelief'', p. 180.</ref>

The many-religions objection is taken more seriously by some later [[apologist]]s of the wager, who argue that of the rival options only those awarding infinite happiness affect the wager's [[dominance (game theory)|dominance]]. In the opinion of these apologists "finite, semi-blissful promises such as Kali's or Odin's" therefore drop out of consideration.<ref name="SEP entry" />  Also, the infinite bliss that the rival conception of God offers has to be mutually exclusive. If Christ's promise of bliss can be attained concurrently with [[Jehovah]]'s and [[Allah]]'s (all three being identified as the [[God in Abrahamic religions|God of Abraham]]), there is no conflict in the decision matrix in the case where the cost of believing in the wrong conception of God is neutral (limbo/purgatory/spiritual death), although this would be countered with an infinite cost in the case where not believing in the correct conception of God results in punishment (hell).<ref name="IEP entry">{{Cite web|url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/pasc-wag/|title=Pascal's Wager about God|last=Saka|first=Paul|website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy|access-date=April 21, 2016}}</ref>

[[Ecumenical]] interpretations of the wager<ref>For example: Jeff Jordan, ''Gambling on God: Essays on Pascal's Wager'', 1994, Rowman & Littlefield.</ref> argues that it could even be suggested that believing in a generic God, or a god by the wrong name, is acceptable so long as that conception of God has similar essential characteristics of the conception of God considered in Pascal's wager (perhaps the [[Aristotelian view of God|God of Aristotle]]).  Proponents of this line of reasoning suggest that either all of the conceptions of God or gods throughout history truly boil down to just a small set of "genuine options", or that if Pascal's wager can simply bring a person to believe in "generic theism", it has done its job.<ref name="IEP entry" />

Pascal argues implicitly for the uniqueness of Christianity in the wager itself, writing: "If there is a God, He is infinitely incomprehensible...Who then can blame the Christians for not being able to give reasons for their beliefs, professing as they do a religion which they cannot explain by reason?"<ref>{{cite web |first=Blaise |last=Pascal |work=Pensées |translator-first=John |translator-last=Warrington |date=1932 |title=Pascal's Wager: 343 [6-233] |url=http://www.stat.ucla.edu/history/pascal_wager.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190213131607/http://www.stat.ucla.edu/history/pascal_wager.pdf |archive-date=February 13, 2019 |publisher=Everyman's Library No. 874 |via=ucla.edu}}</ref>