Editing Resource curse (section)

== Other effects ==
Natural resources are a source of [[economic rent]] which can generate large revenues for those controlling them even in the absence of political stability and wider economic growth. Their existence is a potential source of conflict between factions fighting for a share of the revenue, which may take the form of armed [[separatist]] conflicts in regions where the resources are produced or internal conflict between different government ministries or departments for access to budgetary allocations. This tends to erode governments' abilities to function effectively.<ref>{{cite journal | last1 = Gray | first1 = Cheryl W. | last2 = Kaufmann | first2 = Daniel | year = 1998 | title = Corruption and development | journal = Finance and Development | volume = 35 | issue = 1| pages = 7–10 |url=https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1998/03/pdf/gray.pdf|hdl=10986/11545}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Ross|first1=Michael L.|title=The oil curse how petroleum wealth shapes the development of nations|date=2012|publisher=Princeton University Press|location=Princeton, N.J.|isbn=9781400841929}}</ref>

Even when politically stable, countries whose economies are dominated by resource extraction industries tend to be less democratic and more corrupt.<ref name="Ross 2001"/><ref>{{cite journal |url=https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/198/40112.html |title=Lifting the Natural Resource Curse |first=Thomas I. |last=Palley |journal=Foreign Service Journal |date=December 2003}}</ref>

=== Violence and conflict ===
{{Anchor|Conflict}}
A 2019 meta-analysis of 69 studies found "that there is no aggregate relationship between natural resources and conflict."<ref>{{Cite journal|title=A meta-analysis of natural resources and conflict|journal=Research & Politics|volume=6|pages=205316801881823|date=2019|doi=10.1177/2053168018818232|last1 = o'Brochta|first1 = William|doi-access=free}}</ref> According to a 2017 review study, "while some studies support the link between resource scarcity/abundance and armed conflict, others find no or only weak links."<ref>{{Cite encyclopedia|last1=Koubi|first1=Vally|last2=Spilker|first2=Gabriele|date=2017-06-28|chapter=Natural Resources, Climate Change, and Conflict|volume=1|doi=10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.346|title=Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics|isbn=9780190228637}}</ref> According to one academic study, a country that is otherwise typical but has primary commodity exports around 5% of GDP has a 6% risk of conflict, but when exports are 25% of GDP the chance of conflict rises to 33%.<ref name="collier1">Bannon, Ian; Collier, Paul (eds.), [https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/15047/282450Natural0resources0violent0conflict.pdf ''Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions'']. World Bank (2003), p.3.</ref> "Ethno-political groups are more likely to resort to rebellion rather than using nonviolent means or becoming terrorists when representing regions rich in oil."<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Dreher|first1=Axel|last2=Kreibaum|first2=Merle|date=2016-07-01|title=Weapons of choice: The effect of natural resources on terror and insurgencies |journal=Journal of Peace Research|volume=53|issue=4|pages=539–553|doi=10.1177/0022343316634418|s2cid=143350892|issn=0022-3433}}</ref>

There are several factors behind the relationship between natural resources and armed conflicts.<ref name=":2" /> Resource wealth may increase the vulnerability of countries to conflicts by undermining the quality of governance and economic performance<ref>{{cite journal |last=Norman |first=C. S. |title=Rule of Law and the Resource Curse |journal=Environmental and Resource Economics |volume=43 |issue=2 |pages=183–207 |doi=10.1007/s10640-008-9231-y |year=2008|s2cid=59417490 }}</ref> (the "resource curse" argument). Secondly, conflicts can occur over the control and exploitation of resources and the allocation of their revenues (the "[[resource war]]" argument). Thirdly, access to resource revenues by belligerents can prolong conflicts (the "[[conflict resource]]" argument).<ref>Le Billon, Philippe (2006), "Fuelling War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts", ''[[Adelphi Paper]]'' 373, [[IISS]] & [[Routledge]]</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Adhvaryu|first1=Achyuta|last2=Fenske|first2=James E.|last3=Khanna|first3=Gaurav|last4=Nyshadham|first4=Anant|date=February 2018|title=Resources, Conflict, and Economic Development in Africa |journal=NBER Working Paper No. 24309 |doi=10.3386/w24309 |s2cid=31976233|doi-access=free}}</ref> A 2018 study in the ''Journal of Conflict Resolution'' found that rebels were particularly likely to be able to prolong their participation in civil wars when they had access to natural resources that they could smuggle.<ref>{{Cite journal|date=2018|title=Rebel Natural Resource Exploitation and Conflict Duration |journal=Journal of Conflict Resolution |volume=63|issue=3 |pages=591–616|doi=10.1177/0022002718755853|last1=Conrad|first1=Justin M|last2=Greene|first2=Kevin T|last3=Walsh|first3=James Igoe|last4=Whitaker|first4=Beth Elise|s2cid=158710051 }}</ref>

A 2004 literature review finds that oil makes the onset of war more likely and that lootable resources lengthen existing conflicts.<ref>{{Cite journal|title = What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?|journal = Journal of Peace Research|pages = 337–356|volume = 41|issue = 3|doi = 10.1177/0022343304043773|first = Michael L.|last = Ross|year=2004|s2cid = 85511470}}</ref> One study finds the mere discovery (as opposed to just the exploitation) of petroleum resources increases the risk of conflict, as oil revenues have the potential to alter the balance of power between regimes and their opponents, rendering bargains in the present obsolete in the future.<ref>{{Cite journal|title = Oil Discoveries, Shifting Power, and Civil Conflict |journal = International Studies Quarterly|date = 2015-09-01|issn = 1468-2478|pages = 517–530|volume = 59|issue = 3|doi = 10.1111/isqu.12150|first1 = Curtis|last1 = Bell|first2 = Scott|last2 = Wolford|doi-access = free}}</ref> One study suggests that the rise in mineral prices over the period 1997–2010 contributed to up to 21 percent of the average country-level violence in Africa.<ref>{{Cite journal|title = This Mine is Mine! How Minerals Fuel Conflicts in Africa|ssrn = 2627073|date = 2015-06-29|first1 = Nicolas|last1 = Berman|first2 = Mathieu|last2 = Couttenier|first3 = Dominic|last3 = Rohner|first4 = Mathias|last4 = Thoenig}}</ref> Research shows that declining oil prices make oil-rich states less bellicose.<ref>{{Cite journal|title = Oil prices and interstate conflict |journal = Conflict Management and Peace Science|volume = 34|issue = 6|pages = 575–596|date = 2015-10-19|issn = 0738-8942|doi = 10.1177/0738894215606067|first = Cullen S.|last = Hendrix|s2cid = 155477031}}</ref> Jeff Colgan observed that oil-rich states have a propensity to instigate international conflicts as well as to be the targets of them, which he referred to as "[[petro-aggression]]".<ref name=":6">{{cite book|last=Colgan|first=Jeff|title=Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War|date = 2013 | isbn =9781107654976|publisher=Cambridge University Press}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Colgan|first=Jeff D|date=2021|title=Oil and Security: The Necessity of Political Economy|url=https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogaa008|journal=Journal of Global Security Studies|volume=6|issue=1|doi=10.1093/jogss/ogaa008|issn=2057-3170}}</ref> Arguable examples include Iraq's invasions of Iran and Kuwait; Libya's repeated incursions into Chad in the 1970s and 1980s; Iran's long-standing suspicion of Western powers; the United States' relations with Iraq and Iran. It is not clear whether the pattern of petro-aggression found in oil-rich countries also applies to other natural resources besides oil.<ref name=":6" /> Some scholars argue that the relationship between oil and interstate war is primarily driven by the case of the [[Iran–Iraq War]] and that the overall evidence points in the direction of an oil-peace.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Jang|first1=Hye Ryeon|last2=Smith|first2=Benjamin|date=2021|title=Pax Petrolica? Rethinking the Oil–Interstate War Linkage|url=https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2021.1914718|journal=Security Studies|volume=30|issue=2|pages=159–181|doi=10.1080/09636412.2021.1914718|s2cid=236221366 |issn=0963-6412}}</ref>

A 2016 study finds that "oil production, oil reserves, oil dependence, and oil exports are associated with a higher risk of initiating conflict while countries enjoying large oil reserves are more frequently the target of military actions."<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Strüver|first1=Georg|last2=Wegenast|first2=Tim|date=2016-04-01|title=The Hard Power of Natural Resources: Oil and the Outbreak of Militarized Interstate Disputes |journal=Foreign Policy Analysis|doi=10.1093/fpa/orw013|issn=1743-8586|page=orw013}}</ref> As of 2016, the only six countries whose reported military expenditures exceeded 6 percent of GDP were significant oil producers: Oman, South Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Libya, Algeria (data for Syria and North Korea were unavailable).<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex |title=SIPRI Military Expenditure Database |publisher=[[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]] |access-date=13 July 2016}}</ref> A 2017 study in the ''[[The American Economic Review|American Economic Review]]'' found that mining extraction contributed to conflicts in Africa at the local level over the period 1997–2010.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Nicolas|first1=Berman|last2=Mathieu|first2=Couttenier|last3=Dominic|first3=Rohner|last4=Mathias|first4=Thoenig|date=June 2017|title=This Mine Is Mine! How Minerals Fuel Conflicts in Africa|journal=American Economic Review|volume=107|issue=6|pages=1564–1610|doi=10.1257/aer.20150774|issn=0002-8282|citeseerx=10.1.1.715.4065|s2cid=53402320}}</ref> A 2017 study in ''[[Security Studies (journal)|Security Studies]]'' found that while there is a statistical relationship between oil wealth and ethnic war, the use of [[Qualitative research|qualitative methods]] reveals "that oil has rarely been a deep cause of ethnic war."<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Tang|first1=Shiping|last2=Xiong|first2=Yihan|last3=Li|first3=Hui|date=2017-07-03|title=Does Oil Cause Ethnic War? Comparing Evidence from Process-tracing with Quantitative Results |journal=Security Studies|volume=26|issue=3|pages=359–390|doi=10.1080/09636412.2017.1306392|s2cid=148921315|issn=0963-6412}}</ref>

The emergence of the [[Sicilian Mafia]] has been attributed to the resource curse. Early Mafia activity is strongly linked{{qualify evidence}} to Sicilian municipalities abundant in sulphur, Sicily's most valuable export commodity.<ref>{{Cite journal|title = Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse in the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia|url = https://zenodo.org/record/1134881|journal = The Economic Journal|date = 2015-08-01|issn = 1468-0297|pages = F175–F202|volume = 125|issue = 586|doi = 10.1111/ecoj.12236|first1 = Paolo|last1 = Buonanno|first2 = Ruben|last2 = Durante|first3 = Giovanni|last3 = Prarolo|first4 = Paolo|last4 = Vanin| hdl=10446/41026 |s2cid = 55694103|hdl-access = free}}</ref> A 2017 study in the ''[[The Journal of Economic History|Journal of Economic History]]'' also links{{qualify evidence}} the emergence of the Sicilian Mafia to surging demand for oranges and lemons following the late 18th-century discovery that citrus fruits cured [[scurvy]].<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Dimico|first1=Arcangelo|last2=Isopi|first2=Alessia|last3=Olsson|first3=Ola|date=2017|title=Origins of the Sicilian Mafia: The Market for Lemons |journal=The Journal of Economic History|volume=77|issue=4|pages=1083–1115|doi=10.1017/S002205071700078X|issn=0022-0507|doi-access=free}}</ref>

A 2016 study argues that [[petrostates]] may be emboldened to act more aggressively because of the inability of allied great powers to punish the petrostate.<ref name=":3">{{Cite journal|last1=Kim|first1=Inwook|last2=Woods|first2=Jackson|date=2016-08-01|title=Gas on the Fire: Great Power Alliances and Petrostate Aggression |journal=International Studies Perspectives|volume=17|issue=3|pages=231–249|doi=10.1093/isp/ekv004|issn=1528-3577|hdl=10722/229405|hdl-access=free}}</ref> The great powers have strong incentives not to upset the relationship with its client petrostate ally for both strategic and economic reasons.<ref name=":3" />

A 2017 study found evidence of the resource curse in the American frontier period of the [[Western United States]] in the 19th century (the [[Wild West]]).<ref name=":8">{{Cite journal|last1=Couttenier|first1=Mathieu|last2=Grosjean|first2=Pauline|author2-link=Pauline Grosjean|last3=Sangnier|first3=Marc|date=2017|title=The Wild West IS Wild: The Homicide Resource Curse |journal=Journal of the European Economic Association|volume=15|issue=3|pages=558–585|doi=10.1093/jeea/jvw011|url=https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01267373/file/WP%202016%20-%20Nr%2005.pdf}}</ref> The study found, "In places where mineral discoveries occurred before formal institutions were established, there were more homicides per capita historically and the effect has persisted to this day. Today, the share of homicides and assaults explained by the historical circumstances of mineral discoveries is comparable to the effect of education or income."<ref name=":8" />

A 2018 study in the ''Economic Journal'' found that "oil price shocks are seen to promote coups in onshore-intensive oil countries, while preventing them in offshore-intensive oil countries."<ref name=":02">{{Cite journal|last=Nordvik|first=Frode Martin|title=Does Oil Promote or Prevent Coups? the Answer Is Yes|journal=The Economic Journal|volume=129|issue=619|pages=1425–1456|doi=10.1111/ecoj.12604|issn=1468-0297|year=2018|hdl=11250/2657360 |s2cid=158738285}}</ref> The study argues that states which have onshore oil wealth tend to build up their military to protect the oil, whereas states do not do that for offshore oil wealth.<ref name=":02" /> A 2020 study determined that low levels of oil and gas revenue actually increases the likelihood of nonviolent resistance in autocratic countries, despite the general logic of the resource curse.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Pinckney |first1=Jonathan |title=Curving the resource curse: Negative effects of oil and gas revenue on nonviolent resistance campaign onset |journal=Research and Politics |date=2020 |volume=7 |issue=2 |pages=1–6 |doi=10.1177/2053168020936890|s2cid=220069995 |doi-access=free }}</ref>

=== Democracy and human rights ===
{{see also|Rentier state}}
{{too long|section|date=November 2022}}
Research shows that oil wealth lowers levels of democracy and strengthens autocratic rule because political leaders in oil-rich countries refuse democratic development because they will have more to give up from losing power. Similarly, political leaders of oil-rich countries refuse democratic development because the political elite collects the revenues from the oil export and use the money for cementing its political, economic, and social power by controlling government and its bureaucracy,<ref>{{Cite journal|title = Natural-Resource Wealth and the Survival of Autocracy |journal = Comparative Political Studies|date = 2007-08-01|issn = 0010-4140|pages = 995–1018|volume = 40|issue = 8|doi = 10.1177/0010414006287238|first = Jay|last = Ulfelder|s2cid = 154316752}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Andersen|first1=Jørgen J.|last2=Ross|first2=Michael L.|date=2014-06-01|title=The Big Oil Change A Closer Look at the Haber–Menaldo Analysis |journal=Comparative Political Studies|volume=47|issue=7|pages=993–1021|doi=10.1177/0010414013488557|issn=0010-4140|url=https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/195819/Andersen_CPS_2014.pdf?sequence=1|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180723095213/https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/195819/Andersen_CPS_2014.pdf?sequence=1|url-status=dead|archive-date=2018-07-23|hdl=11250/195819|s2cid=154653329}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Girod|first1=Desha M.|last2=Stewart|first2=Megan A.|last3=Walters|first3=Meir R.|date=2016-07-27|title=Mass protests and the resource curse: The politics of demobilization in rentier autocracies |journal=Conflict Management and Peace Science|volume=35|issue=5|pages=503–522|doi=10.1177/0738894216651826|s2cid=157573005|issn=0738-8942}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Cassidy|first=Traviss|title=The Long-Run Effects of Oil Wealth on Development: Evidence from Petroleum Geology|journal=The Economic Journal|volume=129|issue=623|pages=2745–2778|doi=10.1093/ej/uez009|year=2019|url=https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/97778/1/MPRA_paper_97777.pdf}}</ref> Military spending generally increases with oil wealth and so a military coup, one of the strongest tools in toppling autocracies, is less likely in oil-rich countries since dictators can quell resistance through additional funding.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Wright |first1=Joseph |last2=Frantz |first2=Erica |last3=Geddes |first3=Barbara |title=Oil and Autocratic Regime Survival |journal=British Journal of Political Science |date=April 2015 |volume=45 |issue=2 |pages=287–306 |doi=10.1017/S0007123413000252}}</ref> According to Michael Ross, "only one type of resource has been consistently correlated with less democracy and worse institutions: petroleum, which is the key variable in the vast majority of the studies that identify some type of curse."<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal
| last = Ross
| first = Michael L.
| s2cid = 154308471
| date = May 2015
| title = What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse?
| journal = Annual Review of Political Science
| volume = 18
| pages = 239–259
| doi = 10.1146/annurev-polisci-052213-040359
| doi-access=free
| url = https://escholarship.org/uc/item/8tp5x1hb
}}</ref> A 2014 meta-analysis confirms the negative impact of oil wealth on democratization.<ref>{{Cite journal
| last = Ahmadov
| first = Anar K.
| date = 2014-08-01
| title = Oil, Democracy, and Context A Meta-Analysis
| journal = Comparative Political Studies
| language = en
| volume = 47
| issue = 9
| pages = 1238–1267
| doi = 10.1177/0010414013495358
| s2cid = 154661151
| issn = 0010-4140
}}</ref> A 2016 study challenges the conventional academic wisdom on the relationship between oil and authoritarianism.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Brooks|first1=Sarah M.|last2=Kurtz|first2=Marcus J.|s2cid=58904661|title=Oil and Democracy: Endogenous Natural Resources and the Political 'Resource Curse' |journal=International Organization|pages=1–33|doi=10.1017/s0020818316000072|volume=70|issue=2|year=2016}}</ref> A 2022 study found that the resource curse is tied only to easily-extractable oil, not to oil that requires complex extraction.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Brooks|first1=Sarah M.|last2=Kurtz|first2=Marcus J.|date=2022|title=Oil "Rents" and Political Development: What Do We Really Know About the Curse of Natural Resources?|url=https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140211060281|journal=Comparative Political Studies|volume=55 |issue=10 |pages=1698–1731 |doi=10.1177/00104140211060281|s2cid=246560368 |issn=0010-4140}}</ref> Other forms of resource wealth have also been found to strengthen autocratic rule.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Krishnarajan|first=Suthan|title=Economic Crisis, Natural Resources, and Irregular Leader Removal in Autocracies|journal=International Studies Quarterly|volume=63|issue=3|pages=726–741|doi=10.1093/isq/sqz006|year=2019}}</ref> A 2016 study found that resource windfalls have no political impact on democracies and deeply entrenched authoritarian regimes, but significantly exacerbate the autocratic nature of moderately authoritarian regimes.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Caselli|last2=Tesei|first2=Andrea|s2cid=5181852|date=2015-08-12|title=Resource Windfalls, Political Regimes, and Political Stability|journal=Review of Economics and Statistics|doi=10.1162/REST_a_00538|issn=0034-6535|volume=98|issue=3|pages=573–590|url=http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/64587/13/Casaelli_Resource%20windfalls_2016.pdf}}</ref> A third 2016 study finds that while it is accurate that resource richness has an adverse impact on the prospects of democracy, this relationship has held only since the 1970s.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Lall|first=Ranjit|date=2016-09-08|title=The Missing Dimension of the Political Resource Curse Debate |journal=Comparative Political Studies|volume=50|issue=10|pages=1291–1324|doi=10.1177/0010414016666861|s2cid=157376423|issn=0010-4140|url=http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/89178/1/CPS_Website_Version.pdf}}</ref> A 2017 study found that the presence of multinational oil companies increases the likelihood of state repression.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Wegenast|first1=Tim|last2=Schneider|first2=Gerald|date=2017-11-01|title=Ownership matters: Natural resources property rights and social conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa |journal=Political Geography|volume=61|pages=110–122|doi=10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.07.007|url=http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-0-415729}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=http://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2017/08/31/why-multinational-resource-owners-incite-social-dissent/|title=Why Multinational Resource Owners Incite Social Dissent|date=2017-08-31|website=Political Violence at a Glance|access-date=2017-08-31}}</ref> Another 2017 study found that the presence of oil reduced the likelihood that a democracy would be established after the breakdown of an authoritarian regime.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Houle|first=Christian|s2cid=149373007|date=2017-09-12|title=A two-step theory and test of the oil curse: the conditional effect of oil on democratization |journal=Democratization|volume=25|issue=3|pages=404–421|doi=10.1080/13510347.2017.1366449|url=https://figshare.com/articles/journal_contribution/5398570}}</ref> A 2018 study found that the relationship between oil and authoritarianism primarily holds after the end of the [[Cold War]]. The study argues that without American or Soviet support, resource-poor authoritarian regimes had to democratize, but resource-rich authoritarian regimes resisted domestic pressures to democratize.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Hendrix|first=Cullen S|date=2018-01-01|title=Cold War Geopolitics and the Making of the Oil Curse |journal=Journal of Global Security Studies|volume=3|issue=1|pages=2–22|doi=10.1093/jogss/ogx022|doi-access=free}}</ref> Prior to the 1970s, oil-producing countries did not have democratization levels that differed from other countries.<ref>{{cite journal|doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-050718-043546|doi-access=free|title=Economic Development and Democracy: Predispositions and Triggers|year=2020|author1-link=Daniel Treisman|last1=Treisman|first1=Daniel|journal=Annual Review of Political Science|volume=23|pages=241–257}}</ref> Oil-abundant authoritarian governments are suggested to earn high levels of income for oil but spend an extremely minimal amount on social expenditures for individuals being ruled and democracies are suggested to do the opposite.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Hong |first1=Ji Yeon |title=Does Oil Hinder Social Spending? Evidence from Dictatorships, 1972–2008 |journal=Studies in Comparative International Development |date=December 2017 |volume=52 |issue=4 |pages=457–482 |doi=10.1007/s12116-017-9237-y|s2cid=157642196}}</ref>

Research by [[Stephen Haber]] and Victor Menaldo found that increases in natural resource reliance do not induce authoritarianism but may instead promote democratization.<ref name=":0">{{cite journal|last1=Haber|first1=Stephen|last2=Menaldo|first2=Victor|s2cid=7789235|year=2011|title=Do natural resources fuel authoritarianism? A reappraisal of the resource curse|journal=American Political Science Review|volume=105|issue=1|page=1|doi=10.1017/s0003055410000584}}</ref><ref>{{citation|last1=Haber|first1=Stephen|title=Lifting the Resource Curse|url=http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/49806|journal=Hoover Digest|year=2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101028175200/http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/49806|archive-date=2010-10-28|last2=Menaldo|first2=Victor|url-status=dead}}</ref><ref>{{citation|last1=Haber|first1=Stephen|title=Natural Resources in Latin America: Neither Curse Nor Blessing|date=2010-06-15|ssrn=1625504|last2=Menaldo|first2=Victor}}</ref> The authors say that their method rectifies the methodological biases of earlier studies which revolve around [[random effects]]: "Numerous sources of bias may be driving the results [of earlier studies on the resource curse], the most serious of which is omitted variable bias induced by unobserved country-specific and time-invariant heterogeneity."<ref name=":0" /> In other words, this means that countries might have specific, enduring traits that get left out of the model, which could increase the explanation power of the argument. The authors claim that the chances of this happening are larger when assuming random effects, an assumption that does not allow for what the authors call "unobserved country-specific heterogeneity".<ref name=":0" /> The criticisms have themselves been subject to criticism. One study reexamined the Haber-Menaldo analysis by using Haber and Menaldo's own data and statistical models. It reported that their conclusions were only valid for the period before the 1970s, but since about 1980, there has been a pronounced resource curse. Authors Andersen and Ross suggest that oil wealth became a hindrance to democratic transitions only after the transformative events of the 1970s, which enabled the governments of developing countries to capture the oil rents that were previously siphoned off by foreign-owned firms.

There are two ways that oil wealth might negatively affect democratization. The first is that oil strengthens authoritarian regimes, making transitions to democracy less likely.<ref name=":2" /> The second is that oil wealth weakens democracies.<ref name=":2" /> Research generally supports the first theory but is mixed on the second.<ref name=":2" /> A 2019 study found that oil wealth is associated with increases in the level of personalism in dictatorships.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Fails|first=Matthew D.|date=2019|title=Oil income and the personalization of autocratic politics|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/political-science-research-and-methods/article/oil-income-and-the-personalization-of-autocratic-politics/55DC4E21E3206EF09EEB69E63BF298D1|journal=Political Science Research and Methods|volume=8|issue=4|pages=772–779|doi=10.1017/psrm.2019.14|s2cid=159372031|issn=2049-8470}}</ref>

Both pathways might result from the ability of oil-rich states to provide citizens with a combination of generous benefits and low taxes. In many economies that are not resource-dependent, governments tax citizens, who demand efficient and responsive [[implied level of government service|government]] in return. This bargain establishes a political relationship between rulers and subjects. In countries whose economies are dominated by natural resources, however, rulers don't need to tax their citizens because they have a guaranteed source of income from natural resources.<ref>{{cite web |first=Deborah |last=Bräutigam |url=http://www.aei.org/publication/taxation-and-governance-in-africa/ |title=Taxation and Governance in Africa |work=AEI |publisher=American Enterprise Institute |date=11 April 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190828224757/http://www.aei.org/publication/taxation-and-governance-in-africa/|archive-date=2019-08-28}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Morrison|first1=Kevin M.|title=Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributional Foundations of Regime Stability|journal=International Organization|date=9 January 2009|volume=63|issue=1|pages=107–138|doi=10.1017/S0020818309090043|doi-access=free}}</ref> Because the country's citizens aren't being taxed, they have less incentive to be watchful with how government spends its money.<ref name="Ross 2004">{{cite journal|last1=Ross|first1=Michael L.|title=Does Taxation Lead to Representation?|journal=British Journal of Political Science|date=April 2004|volume=34|issue=2|pages=229–249|doi=10.1017/S0007123404000031|citeseerx=10.1.1.471.6907|s2cid=59329781}}</ref> In addition, those benefiting from mineral resource wealth may perceive an effective and watchful civil service and civil society as a threat to the benefits that they enjoy, and they may take steps to thwart them.<ref name="Ross 2001">{{cite journal|last1=Ross|first1=Michael L.|s2cid=18404|title=Does Oil Hinder Democracy?|journal=World Politics|date=13 June 2011|volume=53|issue=3|pages=325–361|doi=10.1353/wp.2001.0011}}</ref> As a result, citizens are often poorly served by their rulers,<ref>[http://www.ids.ac.uk/gdr/cfs/pdfs/PB34.pdf Moore, Mick; Unsworth, Sue (2007). IDS Policy Briefing ''How Does Taxation Affect the Quality of Governance?''] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110813080817/http://www2.ids.ac.uk/gdr/cfs/pdfs/pb34.pdf |date=2011-08-13 }}.</ref> and if the citizens complain, money from the natural resources enables governments to pay for armed forces to keep the citizens in check. It has been argued that rises and falls in the price of petroleum correlate with rises and falls in the implementation of [[human rights]] in major oil-producing countries.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Friedman |first=Thomas L. |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/16/the-first-law-of-petropolitics/ |title=The First Law of Petropolitics |journal=[[Foreign Policy]] |year=2006 |access-date=2016-04-25}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=DeMeritt|first1=Jacqueline H. R.|last2=Young|first2=Joseph K.|s2cid=73608254|date=2013-04-01|title=A political economy of human rights: Oil, natural gas, and state incentives to repress|journal=Conflict Management and Peace Science|volume=30|issue=2|pages=99–120|doi=10.1177/0738894212473915|issn=0738-8942}}</ref>

Corrupt members of national governments may collude with resource extraction companies to override their own laws and ignore objections made by indigenous inhabitants.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.worldwatch.org/node/543 |title=The Hidden Shame of the Global Industrial Economy |publisher=Worldwatch.org |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190129103923/http://www.worldwatch.org/node/543 |access-date=2012-07-26|archive-date=2019-01-29}}</ref> The [[United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee]] report entitled "Petroleum and Poverty Paradox" states that "too often, oil money that should go to a nation's poor ends up in the pockets of the rich, or it may be squandered on grand palaces and massive showcase projects instead of being invested productively."<ref>{{cite web|url=http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_senate_committee_prints&docid=f:44727.pdf |title=The Petroleum And Poverty Paradox - Assessing U.S. And International Community Efforts To Fight The Resource Curse |access-date=2012-06-21}}</ref> A 2016 study found that mining in Africa substantially increases corruption; an individual within {{convert|50|km||||}} of a recently opened mine is 33% more likely to have paid a bribe the past year than a person living within 50 km of mines that "will open" in the future.<ref name=":5">{{Cite journal|last1=Knutsen|first1=Carl Henrik|last2=Kotsadam|first2=Andreas|last3=Olsen|first3=Eivind Hammersmark|last4=Wig|first4=Tore|date=2016|title=Mining and Local Corruption in Africa|journal=American Journal of Political Science|volume=61|issue=2|pages=320–334|doi=10.1111/ajps.12268|bibcode=2017AmJPS..61..320K |url=https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/119540/1/82678710X.pdf|hdl=10852/59624|hdl-access=free}} Summary available at:<br/>{{Cite web|url=https://ajps.org/2016/10/31/mining-increases-local-corruption/|title=Mining Increases Local Corruption|date=2016|website=American Journal of Political Science|access-date=2016-10-31}}</ref> The former also pay bribes for permits more frequently, and perceive their local councilors to be more corrupt.<ref name=":5" /> In a study examining the effects of mining on local communities in Africa, researchers concluded that active mining areas are associated with more bribe payments, particularly police bribes.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Knutsen|first1=Carl Henrik|last2=Kotsadam|first2=Andreas|last3=Olsen|first3=Eivind Hammersmark|last4=Wig|first4=Tore|date=2017|title=Mining and Local Corruption in Africa|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26384734|journal=American Journal of Political Science|volume=61|issue=2|pages=320–334|doi=10.1111/ajps.12268|jstor=26384734|bibcode=2017AmJPS..61..320K |hdl=10852/59624|issn=0092-5853|hdl-access=free}}</ref> Their findings were consistent with the hypothesis that mining increases corruption.

The [[Center for Global Development]] argues that governance in resource-rich states would be improved by the government making universal, transparent, and regular payments of oil revenues to citizens and then attempting to reclaim it through the tax system, which they argue will fuel public demand for the government to be transparent and accountable in its management of natural resource revenues and in the delivery of public services.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/revenues_distribution |title=Oil-to-Cash: Fighting the Resource Curse through Cash Transfers : Center for Global Development : Initiatives: Active |publisher=cgdev.org |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121211162105/http://cgdev.org/section/initiatives/_active/revenues_distribution|archive-date=2012-12-11}}</ref>

One study found that "oil producing states dependent on exports to the USA exhibit lower human rights performance than those exporting to China". The authors argue that this stems from the fact that US relationships with oil producers were formed decades ago, before human rights became part of its foreign policy agenda.<ref>{{Cite journal|title = A Chinese resource curse? The human rights effects of oil export dependence on China versus the United States|journal = Journal of Peace Research|date = 2015-10-09|issn = 0022-3433|pages = 774–790|doi = 10.1177/0022343315593332|first1 = Julia|last1 = Bader|first2 = Ursula|last2 = Daxecker|volume=52|issue = 6|s2cid = 112605648}}</ref>

One study found that resource wealth in authoritarian states lowers the probability of adopting [[freedom of information]] laws.<ref name=":4">{{Cite journal|last1=Vadlamannati|first1=Krishna C.|last2=Soysa|first2=Indra De|s2cid=151545694|date=2016-08-13|title=Do Resource-Wealthy Rulers Adopt Transparency-Promoting Laws?|journal=International Studies Quarterly|volume=60|issue=3|pages=457–474|doi=10.1093/isq/sqw026|issn=0020-8833|hdl=11250/2468349|hdl-access=free}}</ref> However, democracies that are resource-rich are more likely than resource-poor democracies to adopt such laws.<ref name=":4" />

One study looking at oil wealth in Colombia found "that when the [[price of oil]] rises, legislators affiliated with right-wing paramilitary groups win office more in oil-producing municipalities. Consistent with the use of force to gain power, positive price shocks also induce an increase in paramilitary violence and reduce electoral competition: fewer candidates run for office, and winners are elected with a wider vote margin. Ultimately, fewer centrist legislators are elected to office, and there is diminished representation at the center."<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Carreri|first1=Maria|last2=Dube|first2=Oeindrila|s2cid=55566951|date=2017-01-10|title=Do Natural Resources Influence Who Comes to Power, and How?|journal=The Journal of Politics|volume=79|issue=2|pages=000|doi=10.1086/688443|issn=0022-3816}}</ref>

A 2018 study in ''International Studies Quarterly'' found that oil wealth was associated with weaker private liberties (freedom of movement, freedom of religion, the right to property, and freedom from forced labor).<ref name=":10">{{Cite journal |last=Wigley |first=Simon |date=December 2018 |title=Is There a Resource Curse for Private Liberties? |journal=International Studies Quarterly |volume=62 |issue=4 |pages=834–844 |doi=10.1093/isq/sqy031 |hdl-access=free |hdl=11693/48786}}</ref>

Research by Nathan Jensen indicates that countries that have resource wealth are considered to have a greater political risk for foreign direct investors. He argues that this is because leaders in resource-rich countries are less sensitive to being punished in elections if they take actions that adversely affect foreign investors.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Jensen|first=Nathan|date=2008|title=Political Risk, Democratic Institutions, and Foreign Direct Investment|journal=The Journal of Politics|volume=70|issue=4|page=1047|doi=10.1017/s0022381608081048|jstor=10.1017/s0022381608081048|s2cid=155002838|issn=0022-3816}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Jensen|first1=Nathan M.|last2=Johnston|first2=Noel P.|date=2011-05-16|title=Political Risk, Reputation, and the Resource Curse|journal=Comparative Political Studies|language=en-US|volume=44|issue=6|pages=662–688|doi=10.1177/0010414011401208|s2cid=220992450|issn=0010-4140}}</ref> Countries with higher natural resource export share show a correlation between receiving [[Foreign direct investment]] and decreasing [[democracy index]], while this correlation is opposite for countries with low natural resource export share.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Asiedu |first1=Elizabeth |last2=Lien |first2=Donald |date=2011 |title=Democracy, foreign direct investment and natural resources |url=https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S002219961000125X |journal=Journal of International Economics |language=en |volume=84 |issue=1 |pages=99–111 |doi=10.1016/j.jinteco.2010.12.001}}</ref>

=== Distribution ===
According to a 2017 study, "social forces condition the extent to which oil-rich nations provide vital public services to the population. Although it is often assumed that oil wealth leads to the formation of a distributive state that generously provides services in the areas of water, sanitation, education, health care, or infrastructure... quantitative tests reveal that oil-rich nations who experience demonstrations or riots provide better water and sanitation services than oil-rich nations who do not experience such dissent. Subsequent tests find that oil-rich nations who experience nonviolent, mass-based movements provide better water and sanitation services than those who experience violent, mass-based movements."<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Mazaheri|first=Nimah|title=Oil, Dissent, and Distribution|journal=World Development|doi=10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.05.028|volume=99|year=2017|pages=186–202}}</ref>

=== Gender inequality ===
Studies suggest countries with abundant natural resources have higher levels of [[gender inequality]] in the areas of wages, labor force participation, violence, and education. Research links gender inequality in the Middle East to resource wealth.<ref name=":12">{{Cite journal|last=Ross|first=Michael L.|date=2008-02-01|title=Oil, Islam, and Women|journal=American Political Science Review|volume=102|issue=1|pages=107–123|doi=10.1017/S0003055408080040|issn=1537-5943|s2cid=54825180}}</ref> According to Michael Ross:<blockquote>Oil production affects gender relations by reducing the presence of women in the labor force. The failure of women to join the nonagricultural labor force has profound social consequences: it leads to higher fertility rates, less education for girls, and less female influence within the family. It also has far-reaching political consequences: when fewer women work outside the home, they are less likely to exchange information and overcome collective action problems; less likely to mobilize politically, and to lobby for expanded rights; and less likely to gain representation in government. That leaves oil-producing states with atypically strong patriarchal cultures and political institutions.<ref name=":12" /></blockquote>
Ross argues that in oil-rich countries, across the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Asia, the need for female labor reduces as export-oriented and female-dominated manufacturing is ousted by Dutch disease effects.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Ross|first=Michael L.|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9781400841929|title=The Oil Curse|date=2012-03-04|publisher=Princeton University Press|doi=10.1515/9781400841929|isbn=978-1-4008-4192-9}}</ref> This hypothesis has received further support by the analysis of mining booms in Africa.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Kotsadam|first1=Andreas|last2=Tolonen|first2=Anja|date=July 2016|title=African Mining, Gender, and Local Employment|url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0305750X1600005X|journal=World Development|volume=83|pages=325–339|doi=10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.01.007|s2cid=153471048}}</ref> For the United States, the evidence is mixed. State-level comparisons suggest that resource wealth leads to lower levels of female labor force participation, lower turnout and fewer seats held by women in legislatures.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Simmons|first=Joel W.|date=January 2016|title=Resource Wealth and Women's Economic and Political Power in the U.S. States|journal=Comparative Political Studies|volume=49|pages=115–152|doi=10.1177/0010414015597510|number=1|s2cid=155279746}}</ref> On the other hand, a county-level analysis of resource booms in the early 20th century found an overall positive effect of resource wealth on single women's labor force participation.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Maurer|first1=Stephan|last2=Potlogea|first2=Andrei|date=January 2021|title=Male-biased Demand Shocks and Women's Labour Force Participation: Evidence from Large Oil Field Discoveries|journal=Economica|volume=88|issue=349|pages=167–188|doi=10.1111/ecca.12341|s2cid=158697381|doi-access=free}}</ref>

Research has also linked resource wealth to greater domestic violence,<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Krauser|first1=Mario|last2=Wegenast|first2=Tim|last3=Schneider|first3=Gerald|last4=Hess Elgersma|first4=Ingeborg|date=October 2019|title=A gendered resource curse? Mineral ownership, female unemployment and domestic violence in Sub-Saharan Africa|url=http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s42597-019-00019-8|journal=Zeitschrift für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung|language=en|volume=8|issue=2|pages=213–237|doi=10.1007/s42597-019-00019-8|s2cid=211451656|issn=2192-1741}}</ref> and a gender gap in education.<ref>{{Cite book|author=Gylfason, Thorvaldur|url=http://worldcat.org/oclc/1065189720|title=Inequality and economic growth : do natural resources matter?|date=2002|publisher=Birkbeck College, Dept. of Economics|oclc=1065189720}}</ref><ref>Papyrakis Elissaios, Richard Palmer-Jones, Nitya Rao, Bola Akanji, Godwin Akpokodje, and Bayo Ajala (2009). "Gender and Growth Assessment: Macroeconomic study. Research Report." Report produced for the Department for International Development (DFID) and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).</ref>

=== International cooperation ===
Research finds that the more that states depend on oil exports, the less cooperative they become. They become less likely to join intergovernmental organizations, accept the compulsory jurisdiction of international judicial bodies, and agree to binding arbitration for investment disputes.<ref>{{Cite journal|title = Oil and International Cooperation|journal = International Studies Quarterly|volume = 60|date = 2015-12-14|issn = 0020-8833|pages = 85–97|doi = 10.1093/isq/sqv003|author-link2=Erik Voeten|first1 = Michael L.|last1 = Ross|first2 = Erik|last2 = Voeten|s2cid = 67832402}}</ref>

=== Foreign aid ===
There is an argument in political economy that [[foreign aid]] can have the same negative effects in the long run towards development as in the case of the resource curse. The so-called "aid curse" results from giving perverse political incentives to a weak body of civil servants, lowering politicians' accountability towards citizens and decreasing economic pressure thanks to the income of an unearned resource to mitigate economic crisis.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Moss|first1=Todd|last2=Pettersson|first2=Gunilla|date=2006|title=An aid-institutions paradox? A review essay on aid dependency and state building in sub-Saharan Africa|url=https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/5646_file_WP_74.pdf|journal=Center for Global Development|volume=Working paper 74|pages=5}}</ref> When foreign aid represents a major source of revenue to governments, especially in low-income countries, state-building capacity is hindered by undermining responsiveness toward taxpayers or by decreasing the incentive for governments to look for different sources of income or the increase in taxation.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Bräutigam|first=Deborah|date=2002|title=Building Leviathan: Revenue, State Capacity, and Governance|url=https://deborahbrautigam.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/2002-building-leviathan.pdf|journal=IDS Bulletin |volume=33|issue=3|pages=1–17|doi=10.1111/j.1759-5436.2002.tb00034.x}}</ref>

=== Crime ===
A 2018 study found that in [[Texas]], "a 1% increase in the value of oil reserves increases murder by 0.16%, robbery by 0.55% and larceny by 0.18%."<ref>{{Cite journal|date=2018-07-01|title=Local natural resources and crime: Evidence from oil price fluctuations in Texas|journal=Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization|volume=151|pages=123–142|doi=10.1016/j.jebo.2018.02.011|issn=0167-2681|last1=Andrews|first1=Rodney J.|last2=Deza|first2=Monica|s2cid=158700671}}</ref>