Editing Sino-Soviet split (section)

== Onset of the disputes==
To Mao, the events of the 1958–1959 period indicated that Khrushchev was politically untrustworthy as an orthodox Marxist.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/one-fingers-worth-historical-events-new-russian-and-chinese-evidence-the-sino-soviet|title=One Finger's Worth of Historical Events: New Russian and Chinese Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Alliance and Split, 1948–1959|author=David Wolff|date=7 July 2011|website=Wilson Center|access-date=24 February 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160307170823/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/one-fingers-worth-historical-events-new-russian-and-chinese-evidence-the-sino-soviet|archive-date=7 March 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> In 1959, First Secretary Khrushchev met with US President [[Dwight Eisenhower]] to decrease US-Soviet geopolitical tensions. To that end, the USSR: (i) reneged an agreement for technical aid to develop [[Project 596]], and (ii) sided with India in the [[Sino-Indian War]]. Each US-Soviet collaboration offended Mao and he perceived Khrushchev as an opportunist who had become too tolerant of the West. The CCP said that the CPSU concentrated too much on "Soviet–US co-operation for the domination of the world", with geopolitical actions that contradicted Marxism–Leninism.<ref>{{cite web|title=Chinese Communist Party: The Leaders of the CPSU are the Greatest Splitters of Our Times, February 4, 1964|url=http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1964CCP-onCPSU.html|website=Modern History Sourcebook|publisher=Fordham University|access-date=1 July 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151231225103/http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1964CCP-onCPSU.html|archive-date=31 December 2015|url-status=dead}}</ref>

The final face-to-face meeting between Mao and Khruschev took place on 2 October 1959, when Khrushchev visited Beijing to mark the 10th anniversary of the Chinese Revolution. By this point relations had deteriorated to the level where the Chinese were going out of their way to humiliate the Soviet leader - for example, there was no honour guard to greet him, no Chinese leader gave a speech, and when Khrushchev insisted on giving a speech of his own, no microphone was provided. The speech in question would turn out to contain praise of the US President Eisenhower, whom Khrushchev had recently met, obviously an intentional insult to Communist China. The leaders of the two Socialist states would not meet again for the next 30 years.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/khrushchev-in-water-wings-on-mao-humiliation-and-the-sino-soviet-split-80852370/ | title=Khrushchev in Water Wings: On Mao, Humiliation and the Sino-Soviet Split }}</ref>

===Khrushchev's criticism of Albania at the 22nd CPSU Congress===

In June 1960, at the zenith of de-Stalinization, the USSR denounced the [[People's Republic of Albania]] as a politically backward country for retaining Stalinism as government and model of socialism. In turn, Bao Sansan said that the CCP's message to the cadres in China was:

<blockquote>"When Khrushchev stopped Russian aid to Albania, [[Enver Hoxha|Hoxha]] said to his people: 'Even if we have to eat the roots of grass to live, we won't take anything from Russia.' China is not guilty of [[chauvinism]], and immediately sent food to our brother country."<ref>Sansan, Bao and Lord, Bette Bao (1964–1966) ''Eighth Moon: The True Story of a Young Girl's Life in Communist China'', New York: Scholastic, p.&nbsp;123.</ref></blockquote>

[[File:Mao Zedong and Enver Hoxha.jpg|thumb|Solidarity: China's Mao Zedong and Albania's [[Enver Hoxha]] were united in both their stance against [[Revisionism (Marxism)|Revisionism]] as well as ideologically upholding Stalin.]]

During his opening speech at the CPSU's [[22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|22nd Party Congress]] on 17 October 1961 in Moscow, Khrushchev once again criticized Albania as a politically backward state and the [[Albanian Party of Labour]] as well as its leadership, including [[Enver Hoxha]], for refusing to support reforms against Stalin's legacy, in addition to their criticism of [[Belgrade declaration|rapprochement with Yugoslavia]], leading to the [[Soviet–Albanian split]].<ref>{{cite web |title=1961: Zhou Enlai calls for reunification of all communist parties |url=http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/228081.htm |website=China.org |publisher=China Internet Information Center |access-date=3 April 2022}}</ref> In response to this rebuke, on the 19 October the delegation representing China at the Party Congress led by [[Premier of the People's Republic of China|Chinese Premier]] [[Zhou Enlai]] sharply criticised Moscow's stance towards Tirana:

<blockquote>"We hold that should a dispute or difference unfortunately arise between fraternal parties or fraternal countries, it should be resolved patiently in the spirit of [[proletarian internationalism]] and according to the principles of equality and of unanimity through consultation. Public, one-sided censure of any fraternal party does not help unity and is not helpful in resolving problems. To bring a dispute between fraternal parties or fraternal countries into the open in the face of the enemy cannot be regarded as a serious Marxist–Leninist attitude."<ref>{{cite book |title=Daily Report, Foreign Radio Broadcasts, Issues 245-246 |date=18 December 1962 |publisher=Central Intelligence Agency |page=BBB2}}</ref></blockquote>

Subsequently, on 21 October, Zhou visited the [[Lenin Mausoleum]] (then still entombing Stalin's body), laying two wreaths at the base of the site, one of which read "Dedicated to the great Marxist, Comrade Stalin". On 23 October, the Chinese delegation left Moscow for Beijing early, before the Congress' conclusion; within days, Khrushchev had Stalin's body removed from the mausoleum.<ref>{{cite web |title=This week in history: December 5–11 |url=https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2011/12/twih-d05.html |website=World Socialist Website |date=5 December 2011 |access-date=3 April 2022}}</ref><ref name="MacFarquhar">{{cite book |last1=MacFarquhar |first1=Roderick |title=The Origins of the Cultural Revolution |date=1999 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=0-231-11083-9 |page=128 |ref=MacFarquhar}}</ref>

===Mao, Khrushchev, and the US===
In 1960, Mao expected Khrushchev to deal aggressively with US President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] by holding him to account for the USSR having [[1960 U-2 incident|shot down a U-2 spy plane]], the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]]'s photographing of military bases in the USSR; aerial espionage that the US said had been discontinued. In Paris, at the [[1960 Paris Summit|Four Powers Summit]] meeting, Khrushchev demanded and failed to receive Eisenhower's apology for the CIA's continued aerial espionage of the USSR. In China, Mao and the CCP interpreted Eisenhower's refusal to apologize as disrespectful of the national sovereignty of socialist countries, and held political rallies aggressively demanding Khrushchev's military confrontation with US aggressors; without such decisive action, Khrushchev lost face with the PRC.<ref>Gordon H. Chang, ''Friends and enemies : the United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948–1972'' (1990) [[iarchive:friendsenemiesth00chan|online]]</ref>

In the Romanian capital of [[Bucharest]], at the [[1960 International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties|International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties]] (November 1960), Mao and Khrushchev respectively attacked the Soviet and the Chinese interpretations of [[Marxism-Leninism]] as the wrong road to world socialism in the USSR and in China. Mao said that Khrushchev's emphases on consumer goods and material plenty would make the Soviets ideologically soft and un-revolutionary, to which Khrushchev replied: "If we could promise the people nothing, except revolution, they would scratch their heads and say: 'Isn't it better to have good goulash?{{' "}}{{sfnp|Chi-Kwan|2013|page=49}}

=== Ho Chi Minh's attempts to defuse the split ===
In 1960, Ho Chi Minh, uniquely among Marxist-Leninist world leaders, attempted to mediate the growing Sino-Soviet tensions, staking his own personal reputation by doing so. On 14 August 1960, Ho attended a meeting in [[Sochi]] with Khrushchev, [[Władysław Gomułka]], [[Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal]], and [[Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej]], the purpose of which was to discuss the growing tensions with China. Khrushchev expressed reservations about Mao's growing nationalism, which he perceived as similar to the racial, pan-Asian nationalist propaganda of [[Empire of Japan|Imperial Japan]]. Later, when Ho met with Deng Xiaoping, Deng used the information he had received from Ho to denounce the Soviets and accuse them of spreading [[Yellow Peril]]. Although Ho was able to foster dialogue between the two states, the limited influence of North Vietnam within the Marxist-Leninist world resulted in Ho failing to prevent the split.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Grundy |first=Steven Crawford |date=2 July 2024 |title=Mission Impossible: Explaining the Failure of Ho Chi Minh’s Mediation Efforts Inside the Marxist-Leninist World, 1960-1961 |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14682745.2024.2329284#abstract |journal=[[Cold War History (journal)|Cold War History]] |language=en |volume=24 |issue=3 |pages=423–452 |doi=10.1080/14682745.2024.2329284 |issn=1468-2745 |access-date=8 April 2025 |via=Taylor and Francis Online|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

===Personal attacks and USSR technical support ceased===
In the 1960s, public displays of acrimonious quarrels about Marxist–Leninist doctrine characterized relations between hardline Stalinist Chinese and post-Stalinist Soviet Communists. At the [[Romanian Communist Party|Romanian Communist Party Congress]], the CCP's senior officer [[Peng Zhen]] quarrelled with Khrushchev, after the latter had insulted Mao as being a Chinese nationalist, a geopolitical adventurist, and an [[Deviationism|ideological deviationist]] from Marxism–Leninism. In turn, Peng insulted Khrushchev as a [[Anti-revisionism|revisionist]] whose régime showed him to be a "patriarchal, arbitrary, and tyrannical" ruler.<ref>Allen Axelrod, ''The Real History of the Cold War: A New Look at the Past'', p.&nbsp;213.</ref> In the event, Khrushchev denounced the PRC with 80 pages of criticism to the congress of the PRC.

In response to the insults, Khrushchev withdrew 1,400 Soviet technicians from the PRC, which cancelled some 200 joint scientific projects. According to Chinese records, the Soviet Union suddenly withdrew 1390 technicians and ended 600 contracts with PRC in 1960.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Wang |first=Zhenyou |date=2015-01-12 |title=20世纪60年代初期苏联驻华商务机构撤销问题的历史考察 |url=http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2015/0112/c83867-26370025.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240611070122/http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2015/0112/c83867-26370025.html |archive-date=2024-06-11 |access-date=2024-12-29 |website=[[People's Daily|People's Net]] |publisher=Contemporary China History Studies (当代中国史研究) |language=zh}}</ref> In response, Mao justified his belief that Khrushchev had somehow caused China's great economic failures and the famines that occurred in the period of the Great Leap Forward. Nonetheless, the PRC and the USSR remained pragmatic allies, which allowed Mao to alleviate famine in China and to resolve Sino-Indian border disputes. To Mao, Khrushchev had lost political authority and ideological credibility, because his US-Soviet ''[[détente]]'' had resulted in successful military (aerial) espionage against the USSR and public confrontation with an unapologetic capitalist enemy. Khrushchev's miscalculation of person and circumstance voided US-Soviet diplomacy at the [[1960 Paris Summit|Four Powers Summit in Paris]].{{sfnp|Chi-Kwan|2013|pages=49–50}}

=== Monolithic communism fractured ===
[[File:Jupiter IRBM.jpg|thumb|right|250px|In late 1962, the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] concluded when the US and the USSR respectively agreed to remove intermediate-range [[PGM-19 Jupiter]] nuclear missiles from Italy and Turkey, and to remove intermediate-range [[R-12 Dvina]] and [[R-14 Chusovaya]] nuclear missiles from Cuba. In the context of the Sino-Soviet split, Mao said that the USSR's military stand-down was Khrushchev's betrayal of Marxist–Leninist geopolitics.]]

In late 1961, at the [[22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|22nd Congress of the CPSU]], the PRC and the USSR revisited their doctrinal disputes about the orthodox interpretation and application of Marxism–Leninism.<ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,873466,00.html One-Third of the Earth] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110204212557/http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,873466,00.html |date=4 February 2011 }}, ''Time'', 27 October 1961</ref> In December 1961, the USSR broke diplomatic relations with Albania, which escalated the Sino-Soviet disputes from the political-party level to the national-government level.

During the [[Yi–Ta incident]] from March to May 1962, over 60,000 Chinese citizens, mostly ethnic Kazakhs driven in part by uncertainty over the Sino-Soviet split, crossed the border from [[Xinjiang]] into [[Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic|Soviet Kazakhstan]].<ref>{{cite journal |last=Kraus |first=Charles |title=Laying Blame for Flight and Fight: Sino-Soviet Relations and the 'Yi–Ta' Incident in Xinjiang, 1962 |journal=The China Quarterly |date=June 2019 |volume=238 |doi=10.1017/S0305741018001789 |s2cid=159226403 |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/abs/laying-blame-for-flight-and-fight-sinosoviet-relations-and-the-yita-incident-in-xinjiang-1962/D22C7C77E535CCE504AE7512D2C9015F |language=en |issn=0305-7410 |access-date=13 January 2024 |archive-date=5 January 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240105022350/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/abs/laying-blame-for-flight-and-fight-sinosoviet-relations-and-the-yita-incident-in-xinjiang-1962/D22C7C77E535CCE504AE7512D2C9015F |url-status=live |pages=516–517|url-access=subscription }}</ref> In late 1962, the PRC broke relations with the USSR because Khrushchev did not go to war with the US over the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]]. Regarding that Soviet loss-of-face, Mao said that "Khrushchev has moved from adventurism to capitulationism" with a negotiated, bilateral, military stand-down. Khrushchev replied that Mao's belligerent foreign policies would lead to an East–West nuclear war.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ibiblio.org/chinesehistory/contents/03pol/c05s04.html|title=Exploring Chinese History: Politics: International Relations: Sino- Soviet Relations|author=Richard R. Wertz|website=ibiblio.org|access-date=15 April 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160407175611/http://www.ibiblio.org/chinesehistory/contents/03pol/c05s04.html|archive-date=7 April 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> For the Western powers, the averted atomic war threatened by the Cuban Missile Crisis made [[nuclear disarmament]] their political priority. To that end, the US, the UK, and the USSR agreed to the [[Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty]] in 1963, which formally forbade [[Nuclear weapons testing|nuclear-detonation tests]] in the [[Atmosphere of Earth|Earth's atmosphere]], in [[outer space]], and [[under water]] – yet did allow the underground testing and detonation of atomic bombs. In that time, the PRC's nuclear-weapons program, [[Project 596]], was nascent, and Mao perceived the test-ban treaty as the nuclear powers' attempt to thwart the PRC's becoming a nuclear superpower.{{sfnp|Chi-Kwan|2013|pages=53–55}}

Between 6 and 20 July 1963, a series of Soviet-Chinese negotiations were held in Moscow. However, both sides maintained their own ideological views and, therefore, negotiations failed.<ref>Mihai Croitor, Sanda Borşa (2014), Moscova 1963: eşecul negocierilor sovieto-chineze, Editura Eikon & Editura Mega, p.23-299</ref> In March 1964, the [[Romanian Communist Party|Romanian Workers' Party]] publicly announced the intention of the Bucharest authorities to mediate the Sino-Soviet conflict. In reality, however, the Romanian mediation approach represented only a pretext for forging a Sino-Romanian rapprochement, without arousing the Soviets' suspicions.<ref>Mihai Croitor, (2009) România şi conflictul sovieto-chinez (1956-1971), Editura Mega, p.250-284;Mihai Croitor, From Moscow to Beijing Romania and the Mediation of the Sino-Soviet Split, Transylvanian Review, Vol. 21, p. 449-459</ref>

Romania was neutral in the Sino-Soviet split.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=NWwRzLr-Y7MC&q=%22they+remained+neutral%22|title=Civilization in the West|first1=Crane|last1=Brinton|first2=John B.|last2=Christopher|first3=Robert Lee|last3=Wolff|date=24 January 1973|publisher=Prentice-Hall|isbn=9780131350120|via=Google Books|access-date=28 July 2021|archive-date=28 July 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210728220404/https://books.google.ro/books?id=NWwRzLr-Y7MC&q=%22they+remained+neutral%22|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=lnBnN7tqFSoC&q=%22Soviet-led+efforts+at+condemning+China%22|title=Today's Isms: Communism, Fascism, Capitalism, Socialism|first1=William|last1=Ebenstein|first2=Edwin|last2=Fogelman|date=24 January 1980|publisher=Prentice-Hall|isbn=9780139243998|via=Google Books|access-date=28 July 2021|archive-date=28 July 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210728221749/https://books.google.ro/books?id=lnBnN7tqFSoC&q=%22Soviet-led%2Befforts%2Bat%2Bcondemning%2BChina%22|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8ExpAAAAMAAJ&q=%22strict+neutrality%22|title=Romania: Politics, Economics and Society : Political Stagnation and Simulated Change|first=Michael|last=Shafir|date=24 January 1985|publisher=Pinter|isbn=9780861874385|via=Google Books|access-date=28 July 2021|archive-date=28 July 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210728220407/https://books.google.ro/books?hl=en&id=8ExpAAAAMAAJ&dq=%22strict+neutrality%22|url-status=live}}</ref> Its neutrality along with being the small communist country with the most influence in global affairs enabled Romania to be recognized by the world as the "third force" of the communist world. Romania's independence - achieved in the early 1960s through its [[De-satellization of the Socialist Republic of Romania|freeing from its Soviet satellite status]] - was tolerated by Moscow because Romania was surrounded by socialist states and because its ruling party was not going to abandon communism.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hafLHZgZtt4C&pg=PA1075,|title=Europe Since 1945: An Encyclopedia|first1=Bernard A.|last1=Cook|first2=Bernard Anthony|last2=Cook|date=24 January 2001|publisher=Taylor & Francis|isbn=9780815340584|via=Google Books|access-date=28 July 2021|archive-date=28 July 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210728214456/https://books.google.ro/books?id=hafLHZgZtt4C&pg=PA1075,|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=j2KzAAAAIAAJ&q=%22third+force%22|title=The Reporter|first=Max|last=Ascoli|date=24 January 1965|publisher=Reporter Magazine, Company|via=Google Books|access-date=28 July 2021|archive-date=28 July 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210728214457/https://books.google.ro/books?hl=en&id=j2KzAAAAIAAJ&dq=%22third%2Bforce%22|url-status=live}}</ref> [[North Korea]] under [[Kim Il Sung]] also remained neutral because of its strategic status after the [[Korean War]], although it later moved more decisively towards the USSR after [[Deng Xiaoping]]'s [[reform and opening up]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Cha |first=Victor D. |url=http://archive.org/details/impossiblestaten0000chav_j2c1 |title=The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future |publisher=Ecco |year=2013 |isbn=978-0-06-199850-8 |location=New York |pages=29–30 |language=en}}</ref>

The [[Italian Communist Party]] (PCI), one of the largest and most politically influential communist parties in Western Europe, adopted an ambivalent stance towards Mao's split from the USSR. Although the PCI chastised Mao for breaking the previous global unity of socialist states and criticised the Cultural Revolution brought about by him, it simultaneously applauded and heaped praise on him for the People's Republic of China's enormous assistance to [[North Vietnam]] in its war against [[South Vietnam]] and the United States.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Clivio |first1=Carlotta |date=20 December 2018 |title=Neither for, nor against Mao: PCI-CCP interactions and the normalisation of Sino-Italian Relations, 1966–71 |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14682745.2018.1529758 |journal=[[Cold War History (journal)|Cold War History]] |volume=19 |issue=3 |pages=383–400 |doi=10.1080/14682745.2018.1529758 |s2cid=158702260 |access-date=13 February 2023}}</ref>

As a Marxist–Leninist, Mao was much angered that Khrushchev did not go to war with the US over their failed [[Bay of Pigs Invasion]] and the [[United States embargo against Cuba]] of continual economic and agricultural sabotage. For the Eastern Bloc, Mao addressed those Sino-Soviet matters in "Nine Letters" critical of Khrushchev and his leadership of the USSR. Moreover, the break with the USSR allowed Mao to reorient the development of the PRC with formal relations (diplomatic, economic, political) with the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.{{sfnp|Chi-Kwan|2013|pages=53–55}}

=== Formal and informal statements ===
{{History of the Soviet Union}}
In the 1960s, the Sino-Soviet split allowed only written communications between the PRC and the USSR, in which each country supported their geopolitical actions with formal statements of Marxist–Leninist ideology as the true road to [[world communism]], which is the [[general line of the party]]. In June 1963, the PRC published ''The Chinese Communist Party's Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement'',<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/proposal.htm|title=A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement|website=marxists.org|access-date=24 February 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160131074829/https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/sino-soviet-split/cpc/proposal.htm|archive-date=31 January 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> to which the USSR replied with the ''Open Letter of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union''; each ideological stance perpetuated the Sino-Soviet split.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.etext.org/Politics/MIM/classics/mao/polemics/sevenlet.html |title=Seven Letters Exchanged Between the Central Committees of the Communist Party of China and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union |access-date=21 October 2007 |url-status=bot: unknown |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071225024740/http://www.etext.org/Politics/MIM/classics/mao/polemics/sevenlet.html |archive-date=25 December 2007 |website=Etext Archives }}</ref> In 1964, Mao said that, in light of the Chinese and Soviet differences about the interpretation and practical application of Orthodox Marxism, a counter-revolution had occurred and re-established capitalism in the USSR; consequently, following Soviet suit, the [[Warsaw Pact]] countries broke relations with the PRC.

In late 1964, after Nikita Khrushchev had been deposed, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai met with the new Soviet leaders, First Secretary [[Leonid Brezhnev]] and Premier [[Alexei Kosygin]], but their ideological differences proved a diplomatic impasse to renewed economic relations. The Soviet defense minister's statement damaged the prospects of improved Sino-Soviet relations. Historian Daniel Leese noted that improvement of the relations "that had seemed possible after Khrushchev's fall evaporated after the Soviet minister of defense, [[Rodion Malinovsky]]... approached Chinese Marshal [[He Long]], member of the Chinese delegation to Moscow, and asked when China would finally get rid of Mao like the [[CPSU]] had disposed of Khrushchev."<ref>Daniel Leese, ''Mao Cult: Rhetoric and Ritual in China's Cultural Revolution'' (Cambridge University Press, 2011) p84</ref> Back in China, Zhou reported to Mao that Brezhnev's Soviet government retained the policy of peaceful coexistence which Mao had denounced as "[[Khrushchevism]] without Khrushchev"; despite the change of leadership, the Sino-Soviet split remained open. At the [[Glassboro Summit Conference]], between Kosygin and US President [[Lyndon B. Johnson]], the PRC accused the USSR of betraying the peoples of the Eastern bloc countries. The official interpretation, by [[Radio Peking]], reported that US and Soviet politicians discussed "a great conspiracy, on a worldwide basis ... criminally selling the rights of the revolution of [the] Vietnam people, [of the] Arabs, as well as [those of] Asian, African, and Latin-American peoples, to US imperialists".<ref name="ap19670624">{{cite news |url=https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=WAFOAAAAIBAJ&pg=6332%2C5746364 |title=At the Summit: Cautious Optimism |work=The Free Lance-Star |date=24 June 1967 |agency=Associated Press |access-date=17 July 2013 |location=Fredericksburg, Virginia |pages=1 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160427111356/https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=WAFOAAAAIBAJ&sjid=AYwDAAAAIBAJ&pg=6332,5746364 |archive-date=27 April 2016 |url-status=live}}</ref>