Editing Soviet space program (section)

==Sputnik and Vostok==
[[Image:Korolev Kurchatov Keldysh.jpg|thumb|Chief Designer [[Sergei Korolev]] (left), with the father of the Soviet atomic bomb [[Igor Kurchatov]], and Chief Theoretician [[Mstislav Keldysh]] in 1956]]

The Soviet space program was tied to the USSR's [[Five-Year Plan (USSR)|Five-Year Plans]] and from the start was reliant on support from the Soviet military. Although he was "single-mindedly driven by the dream of space travel", Korolev generally kept this a secret while working on military projects—especially, after the Soviet Union's [[RDS-1|first atomic bomb test]] in 1949, a missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead to the United States—as many mocked the idea of launching satellites and crewed spacecraft. Nonetheless, the first Soviet rocket with animals aboard launched in July 1951; the two dogs, [[Dezik and Tsygan]], were recovered alive after reaching 101&nbsp;km in altitude. Two months ahead of America's first such achievement, this and subsequent flights gave the Soviets valuable experience with [[space medicine]].{{r|siddiqi2000}}{{rp|84–88,95–96,118}}

Because of its global range and large payload of approximately five tons, the reliable R-7 was not only effective as a strategic delivery system for nuclear warheads, but also as an excellent basis for a space vehicle. The United States' announcement in July 1955 of its plan to launch a satellite during the [[International Geophysical Year]] greatly benefited Korolev in persuading Soviet leader [[Nikita Khrushchev]] to support his plans. {{r|siddiqi2000}}{{rp|148–151}} In a letter addressed to Khrushchev, Korolev stressed the necessity of launching a "simple satellite" in order to compete with the American space effort.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/165445|title=On Work to Create an Artificial Earth Satellite|last1=Korolev|first1=Sergei|last2=Riabikov|first2=Vasilii |publisher=Baturin|year=2008}}</ref> Plans were approved for Earth-orbiting satellites (''[[Sputnik]]'') to gain knowledge of space, and four uncrewed military reconnaissance satellites, [[Zenit (satellite)|Zenit]]. Further planned developments called for a crewed [[Geocentric orbit|Earth orbit]] flight by and an uncrewed lunar mission at an earlier date.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://spp.fas.org/eprint/lindroos_moon1.htm | title=The Soviet Manned Lunar Program }}</ref>

[[File:Sputnik asm.jpg|thumb|left|A replica of ''[[Sputnik 1]]'']]

After the first Sputnik proved to be successful, Korolev—then known publicly only as the anonymous "Chief Designer of Rocket-Space Systems"{{r|siddiqi2000}}{{rp|168–169}}—was charged to accelerate the crewed program, the design of which was combined with the Zenit program to produce the [[Vostok spacecraft]]. After Sputnik, Soviet scientists and program leaders envisioned establishing a crewed station to study the effects of zero-gravity and the long term effects on lifeforms in a space environment.<ref>M.K. Tikhonravov, ''Memorandum on an Artificial Earth Satellite,'' History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, orig. May 26, 1954, Published in Raushenbakh, editor (1991), 5–15. Edited by Asif Siddiqi and translated by Gary Goldberg. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/165393</ref> Still influenced by Tsiolkovsky—who had chosen Mars as the most important goal for space travel—in the early 1960s, the Soviet program under Korolev created substantial plans for crewed trips to Mars as early as 1968 to 1970. With [[Controlled Ecological Life Support System|closed-loop life support systems]] and electrical rocket engines, and launched from large orbiting space stations, these plans were much more ambitious than America's goal of [[Project Apollo|landing on the Moon]].{{r|siddiqi2000}}{{rp|333–337}}

In late 1963 and early 1964 the [[Polyot (satellite)|Polyot 1 and Polyot 2]] satellites were launched, these were the first satellites capable of adjusting both [[orbital inclination]] and [[Apsis]]. This marked a significant step in the potential use of spacecraft in [[Anti-satellite weapon|Anti-satellite]] warfare, as it demonstrated the potential to eventually for unmanned satellites to intercept and destroy other satellites. This would have highlighted the potential use of the space program in a conflict with the US.<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Historic Beginnings Of The Space Arms Race |url=https://www.spacewar.com/reports/The_Historic_Beginnings_Of_The_Space_Arms_Race_999.html |access-date=2024-11-21 |website=www.spacewar.com}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last1=RBTH |last2=Novosti |first2=Yury Zaitsev, RIA |date=2008-11-01 |title=The historic beginnings of the space arms race |url=https://www.rbth.com/articles/2008/11/01/311008_space.html |access-date=2024-11-21 |website=Russia Beyond |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2013-11-01 |title=The Hidden History of the Soviet Satellite-Killer |url=https://www.popularmechanics.com/space/satellites/a9620/the-hidden-history-of-the-soviet-satellite-killer-16108970/ |access-date=2024-11-21 |website=Popular Mechanics |language=en-US}}</ref>

===Funding and support===
[[File:Russia-Moscow-VDNH-Rocket R-7-1.jpg|thumb|upright|The [[Vostok (rocket family)|Vostok]] rocket at the [[Exhibition of Achievements of National Economy|VDNH]]]]

The Soviet space program was secondary in military funding to the [[Strategic Rocket Forces]]' ICBMs. While the West believed that Khrushchev personally ordered each new space mission for propaganda purposes, and the Soviet leader did have an unusually close relationship with Korolev and other chief designers, Khrushchev emphasized missiles rather than space exploration and was not very interested in competing with Apollo.{{r|siddiqi2000}}{{rp|351,408,426–427}}

While the government and the Communist Party used the program's successes as propaganda tools after they occurred, systematic plans for missions based on political reasons were rare, one exception being [[Valentina Tereshkova]], the first woman in space, on [[Vostok 6]] in 1963.{{r|siddiqi2000}}{{rp|351}} Missions were planned based on rocket availability or ad hoc reasons, rather than scientific purposes. For example, the government in February 1962 abruptly ordered an ambitious mission involving two Vostoks simultaneously in orbit launched "in ten days time" to eclipse [[John Glenn]]'s [[Mercury-Atlas 6]] that month; the program could not do so until August, with [[Vostok 3]] and [[Vostok 4]].{{r|siddiqi2000}}{{rp|354–361}}