Editing Work design (section)

===  Economic theory ===
In economics, job design has been studied in the field of [[contract theory]]. In particular, [[Bengt Holmström|Holmström]] and Milgrom (1991) have developed the multi-task [[moral hazard]] model.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Holmstrom|first1=Bengt|last2=Milgrom|first2=Paul|date=1991|title=Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design|journal=Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization|volume=7|pages=24–52|citeseerx=10.1.1.715.3715|doi=10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24|jstor=764957}}</ref> Some of the tasks are easier to measure than other tasks, so one can study which tasks should be bundled together.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Itoh|first=Hideshi|date=1994|title=Job design, delegation and cooperation: A principal-agent analysis|url=https://repository.kulib.kyoto-u.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/2433/37916/1/21.pdf|journal=European Economic Review|volume=38|issue=3–4|pages=691–700|doi=10.1016/0014-2921(94)90104-x|issn=0014-2921|hdl=2433/37916|hdl-access=free}}</ref> While the original model was focused on the incentives versus insurance trade-off when agents are risk-averse, subsequent work has also studied the case of risk-neutral agents who are protected by limited liability. In this framework, researchers have studied whether tasks that are in direct conflict with each other (for instance, selling products that are imperfect substitutes) should be delegated to the same agent or to different agents.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Bolton|first1=P.|title=Contract theory|last2=Dewatripont|first2=M.|publisher=MIT Press|year=2005|pages=223}}</ref> The optimal task assignment depends on whether the tasks are to be performed simultaneously or sequentially.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Schmitz|first=Patrick W.|date=2013|title=Job design with conflicting tasks reconsidered|journal=European Economic Review|volume=57|pages=108–117|doi=10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.11.001|issn=0014-2921|doi-access=free}}</ref>