Editing Absolute idealism

{{Short description|Type of idealism in metaphysics}}
{{no footnotes|date=September 2010}}
{{Hegelianism}}
'''Absolute idealism''' is chiefly associated with [[Friedrich Schelling]] and [[G. W. F. Hegel]], both of whom were [[German idealist]] philosophers in the 19th century. The label has also been attached to others such as [[Josiah Royce]], an American philosopher who was greatly influenced by Hegel's work, and the [[British idealism|British idealists]].<ref>{{cite encyclopedia | author=[[Brian Duignan]]|url = http://www.britannica.com/topic/Absolute-Idealism |title =Absolute Idealism |encyclopedia = [[ Encyclopaedia Britannica]] |date = October 30, 2018}}</ref><ref>The term ''{{lang|de|absoluter Idealismus}}'' occurs for the first time in Schelling's ''Ideen zu einer Philosophie der Natur als Einleitung in das Studium dieser Wissenschaft'' (''Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature: as Introduction to the Study of this Science''), Vol. 1, P. Krüll, 1803 [1797], p. 80.</ref> 

According to Hegel, [[being]] is ultimately comprehensible only as an all-inclusive whole (''[[Absolute (philosophy)|das Absolute]]''). Hegel asserted that in order for the thinking subject (human reason or consciousness) to be able to know its [[object (philosophy)|object]] (the world) at all, there must be in some sense an [[Identity (philosophy)|identity]] of thought and being. Otherwise, the subject would never have access to the object and we would have no certainty about any of our knowledge of the world. 

The absolute idealist position dominated philosophy in nineteenth-century Britain and Germany, while exerting significantly less influence in the [[United States]]. The absolute idealist position should be distinguished from the [[subjective idealism]] of [[George Berkeley|Berkeley]], the [[transcendental idealism]] of [[Immanuel Kant|Kant]], or the [[post-Kantian]] transcendental idealism (also known as "critical idealism")<ref>[[Frederick C. Beiser]], ''German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism, 1781-1801'', Harvard University Press, 2002, p. 3.</ref> of [[J. G. Fichte|Fichte]] and of the early [[Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling|Schelling]].<ref>Nectarios G. Limnatis, ''German Idealism and the Problem of Knowledge: Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel'', Springer, 2008, pp. 138, 166, 177.<!--the term 'post-Kantian transcendental idealism' is used on page 177 as constrasting to 'absolute idealism'--></ref>{{Clarify|date=July 2023|reason=Distinction between early/late Schelling requires clarification.}}

==Schelling and Hegel's concepts of the absolute==
According to the scholar [[Andrew Bowie (philosopher)|Andrew Bowie]], Hegel's system depends upon showing how each view and positing of how the world is really has an internal contradiction: "This necessarily leads thought to more comprehensive ways of grasping the world, until the point where there can be no more comprehensive way because there is no longer any contradiction to give rise to it."<ref name="SEPSchel"/>

For Hegel, the interaction of opposites generates, in a [[dialectic]]al fashion, all concepts necessary to comprehend what is. 

For Kant, reason was only for us, and the categories only emerged within the subject. However, for Hegel, reason is fully immanent. Spirit emerges from nature in history and, in art, religion, and philosophy, knows itself in its truth. 

Hegel shows that the world is not other than self. With the realization that mind and world are, by logical necessity, meaningfully coherent, our access to the world is made secure, a security that was lost in Kant's proclamation that the [[thing-in-itself]] was ultimately inaccessible.

Hegel's position is a critical transformation of the concept of the absolute advanced by [[Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling]] (1775–1854), who argued for a philosophy of Identity; as articulated by Bowie:

{{blockquote|text=‘Absolute identity’ is, then, the ''link'' of the two aspects of being, which, on the one hand, is the ''uni''verse, and, on the other, is the changing ''multi''plicity which the knowable universe also is. Schelling insists now that “The ''I'' think, ''I'' am, is, since Descartes, the basic mistake of all knowledge; thinking is not my thinking, and being is not my being, for everything is only of God or the totality” (SW I/7, p. 148),<ref>{{Cite book|last=Schelling|first=F.W.J.|title=Sämmtliche Werke, ed. K.F.A. Schelling, I Abtheilung Vols. 1–10, II Abtheilung Vols. 1–4, Stuttgart: Cotta, 1856–61.|location=Stuttgart}}</ref> so the I is ‘affirmed’ as a predicate of the being by which it is preceded.<ref name="SEPSchel"/>}}

For Schelling, the absolute is a causeless 'ground' upon which relativity (difference and similarity) can be discerned by human judgement (and thus permit 'freedom' itself) and this ground must be simultaneously not of the 'particular' world of finites, but also not wholly different from them (or else there would be no commensurability with empirical reality, objects, sense data, etc. to be compared as 'relative' or otherwise).

In both Schelling and Hegel's systems (especially the latter), the project aims towards a completion of metaphysics. As Redding describes it: "While opinions divide as to how Hegel's approach to logic relates to that of Kant, it is important to grasp that for Hegel logic is not simply a science of the form of our thoughts. It is also a science of actual ''content'' as well, and as such has an ontological dimension."<ref>{{Citation|last=Redding|first=Paul|title=Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|date=2020|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/hegel/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Spring 2020|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2020-04-15}}</ref>

For Schelling, reason was an organic 'striving' in nature, and this striving was one in which the subject and the object approached an identity. Schelling saw reason as the link between spirit and the phenomenal world, as [[Quentin Lauer|Lauer]] explains: "For Schelling [...] nature is not the negative of reason, to be submitted to it as reason makes the world its home, but has since its inception been turning itself into a home for reason."<ref>{{Cite book|last=Lauer|first=Christopher|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=WRv3oc6fJzoC&q=Schelling+reason&pg=PT57|title=The Suspension of Reason in Hegel and Schelling|date=2011-11-03|publisher=Bloomsbury Publishing|isbn=978-1-4411-1588-1|language=en}}</ref> 

Hegel's doubts about intellectual intuition's ability to prove or legitimate that the particular is in identity with whole led him to progressively formulate a [[Georg_Wilhelm_Friedrich_Hegel#Dialectics,_speculation,_idealism|speculative dialectic]] in which concepts like ''[[Aufheben|Aufhebung]]'' came to be articulated. [[Frederick C. Beiser|Beiser]] summarizes the early formulation as follows:

<blockquote>a) Some finite concept, true of only a limited part of reality, would go beyond its limits in attempting to know all of reality. It would claim to be an adequate concept to describe the absolute because, like the absolute, it has a complete or self-sufficient meaning independent of any other concept. 

b) This claim would come into conflict with the fact that the concept depends for its meaning on some other concept, having meaning only in contrast to its negation. There would then be a contradiction between its claim to independence and its de facto dependence upon another concept. 

c) The only way to resolve the contradiction would be to reinterpret the claim to independence, so that it applies not just to one concept to the exclusion of the other but to the whole of both concepts. Of course, the same stages could be repeated on a higher level, and so on, until we come to the complete system of all concepts, which is alone adequate to describe the absolute.<ref>{{Cite book|date=2008-11-17|editor-last=Beiser|editor-first=Frederick C.|title=The Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth-Century Philosophy|doi=10.1017/ccol9780521831673|isbn=9780521539388}}</ref>{{failed verification|date=July 2023}}</blockquote>

Hegel's innovation in German Idealism was to theorize a historical mode of self-consciousness self-reflection capable of generating a more inclusively holistic understanding of what it ultimately means to be rational in the grand scheme of things.

==Absolute idealism in Britain==
{{also|British idealism}}
By the beginning of the 19th century, German idealist philosophy, particularly that of Kant, Hegel, and Fichte, was being read by British philosophers. Figures such as [[Samuel Taylor Coleridge]], [[Thomas Carlyle]] and [[James Frederick Ferrier|J. F. Ferrier]] found in idealism an alternative and a response to the then-dominant empiricist views in Britain.<ref>William J. Mander, ''British Idealism: A History,'' Oxford University Press, 2011</ref> Early authors such as [[James Hutchison Stirling]] not only attempted to introduce German idealist thought to Britain, but sought to present their own version of absolute idealism in an English medium.<ref>''The Secret of Hegel'' (1st edition, 1865, in 2 vols.; revised edition, 1898, in 1 vol.)</ref> 

[[Edward Caird]] and [[T. H. Green]] were of the first generation of British idealists who took the work of Hegel and some of his successors and, from their positions as professors at the universities of Glasgow and Oxford, respectively, influenced generations of students. Absolute idealism was more fully developed in a second generation by their students, especially [[F. H. Bradley]] and [[Bernard Bosanquet (philosopher)|Bernard Bosanquet]]. Bradley's 1893 ''Appearance and Reality'' and Bosanquet's two volumes of Gifford lectures, ''The Principle of Individuality and Value'' (1912) and ''The Value and Destiny of the Individual'' were the most influential volumes of absolute idealism of the period. British absolute idealism had an influence not only within philosophy, but in theology, politics, and social and public policy.<ref>William Sweet, ''The Moral, Social, and Political Philosophy of British Idealism'', Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic, 2009.</ref> Moreover, many of the students of the idealists, in turn, introduced absolute idealism to [[Canadian idealism|Canada]], southern Africa, and India.{{cn|date=May 2025}}

==Reactions<!--'Neo-Hegelianism', 'Neo-hegelianism', 'Neo-Hegelian', and 'Neo-hegelian' redirect here-->==
{{also|Post-Hegelianism}}
Absolute idealism has greatly altered the philosophical landscape. This influence is mostly felt in the strong opposition it engendered. Both [[logical positivism]] and [[analytic philosophy]] grew out of a rebellion against Hegelianism prevalent in England during the 19th century.<ref name="Searle03P1">
"Without exception, the best philosophy departments in the United States are dominated by analytic philosophy, and among the leading philosophers in the United States, all but a tiny handful would be classified as analytic philosophers. Practitioners of types of philosophizing that are not in the analytic tradition—such as phenomenology, classical pragmatism, [[existentialism]], or [[Marxism]]—feel it necessary to define their position in relation to analytic philosophy." [[John Searle]] (2003) ''Contemporary Philosophy in the United States'' in N. Bunnin and E.P. Tsui-James (eds.), ''The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy'', 2nd ed., (Blackwell, 2003), p. 1.</ref> Continental [[Phenomenology (philosophy)|phenomenology]], [[existentialism]], and [[postmodernism]] also seek to 'free themselves from Hegel's thought'. 

[[Geoffrey Warnock]], writing after the demise of absolute idealism as a philosophical movement in Britain, wrote that the absolute idealists were motivated by emotional concerns, which he says Bradley and McTaggart admitted. He also criticized them for vagueness and overreliance on rhetoric as opposed to argument, he added that in the writings of some "solemnity and unclarity seem to rise not seldom to the pitch of actual fraud".<ref>{{cite book |last1=Warnock |first1=Geoffrey |title=English Philosophy since 1900 |date=1969 |publisher=Oxford University Press |pages=3-5}}</ref>

[[Martin Heidegger]], one of the leading figures of [[Continental philosophy]] in the 20th century, sought to distance himself from Hegel's work. One of Heidegger's philosophical themes in ''[[Being and Time]]'' was "overcoming metaphysics," aiming to distinguish his book from Hegelian tracts. After the 1927 publication, Heidegger's "early dismissal of them [German idealists] gives way to ever-mounting respect and critical engagement." He continued to compare and contrast his philosophy with Absolute idealism, principally due to critical comments that certain elements of this school of thought anticipated Heideggerian notions of "overcoming metaphysics."<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Dahlstrom |first1=Daniel |title=Heidegger and German Idealism |journal=A Companion to Heidegger |date=2008 |pages=65–79}}</ref>

==See also==
* [[Doctrine of internal relations]]
* [[Jena Romanticism]]
* [[Objective idealism]]

==Notes==
{{reflist|refs=
<ref name="SEPSchel">{{Citation|last=Bowie|first=Andrew|title=Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling|date=2024|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/schelling/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last1=Zalta|editor-first1=Edward N.|editor-last2=Nodelman|editor-first2=Uri|edition=Summer 2024|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2024-12-21}}</ref>
}}

==Further reading==
* Robert B. Pippin, ''Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self Consciousness'', Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
* Rebecca Comay, John McCumber (eds.), ''Endings: Questions of Memory in Hegel and Heidegger'', Evanston (Ill.), Northwestern University Press, 1999.
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[[Category:Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel]]
[[Category:German idealism]]
[[Category:Idealism]]
[[Category:Metaphysical theories]]
[[Category:Hegelianism]]