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{{Short description|Academic field of logic and rhetoric}} [[File:Whatley.png|thumb|Example of an early [[argument map]], from [[Richard Whately]]'s ''Elements of Logic'' (1852 edition)]] '''Argumentation theory''' is the [[interdisciplinary]] study of how conclusions can be supported or undermined by [[premise]]s through [[logical reasoning]]. With historical origins in [[logic]], [[dialectic]], and [[rhetoric]], argumentation theory includes the arts and sciences of civil debate, [[dialogue]], [[conversation]], and [[persuasion]]. It studies rules of [[inference]], [[logic]], and procedural rules in both [[Artificial intelligence|artificial]] and real-world settings.<ref>{{cite book |last1=van Eemeren |first1=Frans H. |last2=Grootendorst |first2=Rob |title=A systematic theory of argumentation: the pragma-dialectical approach |location=New York |publisher=Cambridge University Press |page=[https://archive.org/details/systematictheory0000eeme/page/9 9–13] |year=2004 |isbn=0521830753 |oclc=51931118 |url=https://archive.org/details/systematictheory0000eeme/page/9 |url-access=registration}}</ref><ref name=Handbook2014/> Argumentation includes various forms of dialogue such as [[deliberation]] and [[negotiation]] which are concerned with collaborative [[decision-making]] procedures.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Jory |first=Constanza Ihnen |date=May 2016 |title=Negotiation and deliberation: grasping the difference |journal=Argumentation |volume=30 |issue=2 |pages=145–165 [146] |doi=10.1007/s10503-014-9343-1|s2cid=189944698 }}</ref> It also encompasses [[eristic]] dialogue, the branch of social debate in which victory over an opponent is the primary goal, and [[didactic]] dialogue used for teaching.<ref name=Handbook2014>{{cite book |last1=van Eemeren |first1=Frans H. |author-link1=Frans H. van Eemeren |last2=Garssen |first2=Bart |last3=Krabbe |first3=Erik C. W. |last4=Snoeck Henkemans |first4=A. Francisca |last5=Verheij |first5=Bart |last6=Wagemans |first6=Jean H. M. |date=2014 |title=Handbook of argumentation theory |location=New York |publisher=[[Springer Verlag]] |pages=65–66 |isbn=9789048194728 |oclc=871004444 |doi=10.1007/978-90-481-9473-5 |quote=At the start of ''Topics'' VIII.5, [[Aristotle]] distinguishes three types of dialogue by their different goals: (1) the truly dialectical debate, which is concerned with training (''gumnasia''), with critical examination (''peira''), or with inquiry (''skepsis''); (2) the didactic discussion, concerned with teaching; and (3) the competitive (eristic, contentious) type of debate in which winning is the only concern.}}</ref> This discipline also studies the means by which people can express and rationally resolve or at least manage their disagreements.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Walton |first=Douglas N. |date=1990 |title=What is Reasoning? What Is an Argument? |journal=The Journal of Philosophy |volume=87 |issue=8 |pages=399–419 |doi=10.2307/2026735|jstor=2026735 }}</ref> Argumentation is a daily occurrence, such as in [[public debate]], [[science]], and [[law]].<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Palau |first1=Raquel Mochales |last2=Moens |first2=Marie-Francine |title=Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law |chapter=Argumentation mining |date=2009-06-08 |chapter-url=https://doi.org/10.1145/1568234.1568246 |series=ICAIL '09 |location=New York, NY, USA |publisher=Association for Computing Machinery |pages=98–107 |doi=10.1145/1568234.1568246 |isbn=978-1-60558-597-0|s2cid=1788414 |url=https://lirias.kuleuven.be/handle/123456789/234784 }}</ref> For example in [[law]], in [[Court|courts]] by the [[judge]], the parties and the [[prosecutor]], in presenting and testing the [[Validity (logic)|validity]] of [[Evidence (law)|evidences]]. Also, argumentation scholars study the ''post hoc'' [[Rationalization (psychology)|rationalizations]] by which organizational actors try to justify decisions they have made [[Irrationality|irrationally]]. Argumentation is one of four [[rhetorical modes]] (also known as ''modes of discourse''), along with [[Exposition (literary technique)|exposition]], [[description]], and [[narrative mode|narration]]. == Key components of argumentation == Some key components of argumentation are: * Understanding and identifying arguments, either explicit or implied, and the goals of the participants in the different [[#Types of dialogue|types of dialogue]]. * Identifying the [[Premise|premises]] from which conclusions are derived. * Establishing the "[[Philosophical burden of proof|burden of proof]]" – determining who made the initial claim and is thus responsible for providing evidence why their position merits acceptance. * For the one carrying the "burden of proof", the advocate, to marshal [[evidence]] for their position in order to convince or force the opponent's acceptance. The method by which this is accomplished is producing valid, sound, and [[wikt:cogent|cogent]] arguments, devoid of weaknesses, and not easily attacked. * In a debate, fulfillment of the burden of proof creates a burden of rejoinder. One must try to identify faulty reasoning in the opponent's argument, to attack the reasons/premises of the argument, to provide counterexamples if possible, to identify any [[fallacy|fallacies]], and to show why a valid conclusion cannot be derived from the reasons provided for their argument. For example, consider the following exchange, illustrating the [[No true Scotsman]] fallacy: : Argument: "No Scotsman puts sugar on his porridge." : Reply: "But my friend Angus, who is a Scotsman, likes sugar with his porridge." : Rebuttal: "Well perhaps, but no true Scotsman puts sugar on his porridge." In this dialogue, the proposer first offers a premise, the premise is challenged by the interlocutor, and so the proposer offers a modification of the premise, which is designed only to evade the challenge provided. == Internal structure of arguments == {{Unreferenced section|date=June 2023}} Typically an argument has an internal structure, comprising the following: # a set of assumptions or [[premise]]s, # a method of reasoning or deduction, and # a conclusion or point. An argument has one or more premises and one conclusion. Often classical logic is used as the method of reasoning so that the conclusion follows logically from the assumptions or support. One challenge is that if the set of assumptions is inconsistent then anything can follow logically from inconsistency. Therefore, it is common to insist that the set of assumptions be consistent. It is also good practice to require the set of assumptions to be the minimal set, with respect to set inclusion, necessary to infer the consequent. Such arguments are called MINCON arguments, short for minimal consistent. Such argumentation has been applied to the fields of law and medicine. A non-classical approach to argumentation investigates abstract arguments, where 'argument' is considered a primitive term, so no internal structure of arguments is taken into account.{{citation needed|date=December 2021}} ==Types of dialogue== In its most common form, argumentation involves an individual and an interlocutor or opponent engaged in dialogue, each contending differing positions and trying to persuade each other, but there are various types of dialogue:<ref name="WaltonKrabbe1995"/> * [[Persuasion]] dialogue aims to resolve conflicting points of view of different positions. * [[Negotiation]] aims to resolve conflicts of interests by cooperation and dealmaking. * [[Inquiry]] aims to resolve general ignorance by the growth of knowledge. * [[Deliberation]] aims to resolve a need to take action by reaching a decision. * [[Information seeking]] aims to reduce one party's ignorance by requesting information from another party that is in a position to know something. * [[Eristic]] aims to resolve a situation of antagonism through verbal fighting. ==Argumentation and the grounds of knowledge== Argumentation theory had its origins in [[foundationalism]], a theory of knowledge ([[epistemology]]) in the field of [[philosophy]]. It sought to find the grounds for claims in the forms (logic) and materials (factual laws) of a universal system of knowledge. The [[dialectic]]al method was made famous by [[Plato]] and his use of [[Socrates]] critically questioning various characters and historical figures. But argument scholars gradually rejected [[Aristotle]]'s systematic philosophy and the [[idealism]] in Plato and [[Kant]]. They questioned and ultimately discarded the idea that argument premises take their soundness from formal philosophical systems. The field thus broadened.<ref>Bruce Gronbeck. "From Argument to Argumentation: Fifteen Years of Identity Crisis." Jack Rhodes and Sara Newell, ed.s ''Proceedings of the Summer Conference on Argumentation''. 1980.</ref> One of the original contributors to this trend was the philosopher [[Chaïm Perelman]], who together with [[Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca]] introduced the French term ''la nouvelle rhetorique'' in 1958 to describe an approach to argument which is not reduced to application of formal rules of inference. Perelman's view of argumentation is much closer to a [[juridical]] one, in which rules for presenting evidence and rebuttals play an important role. Karl R. Wallace's seminal essay, "The Substance of Rhetoric: Good Reasons" in the ''Quarterly Journal of Speech'' (1963) 44, led many scholars to study "marketplace argumentation" – the ordinary arguments of ordinary people. The seminal essay on marketplace argumentation is Ray Lynn Anderson's and C. David Mortensen's "Logic and Marketplace Argumentation" ''Quarterly Journal of Speech'' 53 (1967): 143–150.<ref>See Joseph W. Wenzel "Perspectives on Argument." Jack Rhodes and Sara Newell, ed.s Proceedings of the Summer Conference on Argumentation. 1980. </ref><ref>David Zarefsky. "Product, Process, or Point of View? Jack Rhodes and Sara Newell, ed.s ''Proceedings of the Summer Conference on Argumentation''. 1980.</ref> This line of thinking led to a natural alliance with late developments in the [[sociology of knowledge]].<ref>See Ray E. McKerrow. "Argument Communities: A Quest for Distinctions."</ref> Some scholars drew connections with recent developments in philosophy, namely the [[pragmatism]] of [[John Dewey]] and [[Richard Rorty]]. Rorty has called this shift in emphasis "the [[linguistic turn]]". In this new hybrid approach argumentation is used with or without [[empirical]] evidence to establish convincing conclusions about issues which are moral, scientific, epistemic, or of a nature in which science alone cannot answer. Out of pragmatism and many intellectual developments in the humanities and social sciences, "non-philosophical" argumentation theories grew which located the formal and material grounds of arguments in particular intellectual fields. These theories include [[informal logic]], [[social epistemology]], [[ethnomethodology]], [[speech acts]], the sociology of knowledge, the [[sociology of science]], and [[social psychology]]. These new theories are not non-logical or anti-logical. They find logical coherence in most communities of discourse. These theories are thus often labeled "sociological" in that they focus on the social grounds of knowledge. == Kinds of argumentation == ===Conversational argumentation=== {{Main article|Conversation analysis|Discourse analysis}} The study of naturally occurring conversation arose from the field of sociolinguistics. It is usually called ''conversation analysis'' (CA). Inspired by ethnomethodology, it was developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s principally by the sociologist [[Harvey Sacks]] and, among others, his close associates [[Emanuel Schegloff]] and [[Gail Jefferson]]. Sacks died early in his career, but his work was championed by others in his field, and CA has now become an established force in sociology, anthropology, linguistics, speech-communication and psychology.<ref>Psathas, George (1995): Conversation Analysis, Thousand Oaks: Sage Sacks, Harvey. (1995). Lectures on Conversation. Blackwell Publishing. {{ISBN|1-55786-705-4}}. Sacks, Harvey, Schegloff, Emanuel A., & Jefferson, Gail (1974). A simple systematic for the organization of [[turn-taking]] for conversation. Language, 50, 696–735. Schegloff, Emanuel A. (2007). Sequence Organization in Interaction: A Primer in Conversation Analysis, Volume 1, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ten Have, Paul (1999): Doing Conversation Analysis. A Practical Guide, Thousand Oaks: Sage.</ref> It is particularly influential in [[interactional sociolinguistics]], discourse analysis and discursive psychology, as well as being a coherent discipline in its own right. Recently CA techniques of sequential analysis have been employed by phoneticians to explore the fine [[Phonetics|phonetic]] details of speech. Empirical studies and theoretical formulations by Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs, and several generations of their students, have described argumentation as a form of managing conversational disagreement within communication contexts and systems that naturally prefer agreement. ===Mathematical argumentation=== {{Main article|Philosophy of mathematics}} The basis of mathematical truth has been the subject of long debate. [[Frege]] in particular sought to demonstrate (see Gottlob Frege, [[The Foundations of Arithmetic]], 1884, and ''[[Begriffsschrift]]'', 1879) that arithmetical truths can be derived from purely logical axioms and therefore are, in the end, [[logical truth]]s.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Boolos|first1=George|title=Logic, logic, and logic|date=1999|publisher=Harvard University Press|location=Cambridge, Mass.|isbn=9780674537675|edition=2nd print.|chapter=Chapter 9: Gottlob Frege and the Foundations of Arithmetic}}</ref> The project was developed by [[Bertrand Russell|Russell]] and [[Alfred North Whitehead|Whitehead]] in their ''[[Principia Mathematica]]''. If an argument can be cast in the form of sentences in [[symbolic logic]], then it can be tested by the application of accepted proof procedures. This was carried out for arithmetic using [[Peano axioms]], and the foundation most commonly used for most modern mathematics is [[Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory]], with or without the [[Axiom of Choice]]. Be that as it may, an argument in mathematics, as in any other discipline, can be considered valid only if it can be shown that it cannot have true premises and a false conclusion. ===Scientific argumentation=== {{Main article|Philosophy of science|Rhetoric of science}} Perhaps the most radical statement of the social grounds of scientific knowledge appears in Alan G.Gross's ''The Rhetoric of Science'' (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990). Gross holds that science is rhetorical "without remainder",<ref>{{Cite book|title=The Rhetoric of Science|last=Gross|first=Alan|publisher=Harvard University Press|year=1990|isbn=978-0674768734|pages=33}}</ref> meaning that scientific knowledge itself cannot be seen as an idealized ground of knowledge. Scientific knowledge is produced rhetorically, meaning that it has special epistemic authority only insofar as its communal methods of verification are trustworthy. This thinking represents an almost complete rejection of the [[foundationalism]] on which argumentation was first based. ===Interpretive argumentation=== {{Main article|Interpretive discussion}} Interpretive argumentation is a dialogical process in which participants [[divergent thinking|explore]] and/or [[convergent thinking|resolve]] interpretations often of a [[text (literary theory)|text]] of any medium containing significant [[ambiguity]] in meaning. Interpretive argumentation is pertinent to [[humanities|the humanities]], [[hermeneutics]], [[literary theory]], [[linguistics]], [[semantics]], [[pragmatics]], [[semiotics]], [[analytic philosophy]] and [[Analytic philosophy#Aesthetics|aesthetics]]. Topics in [[Interpretation (philosophy)#Conceptual interpretations|conceptual interpretation]] include [[Aesthetic interpretation|aesthetic]], [[Judicial interpretation|judicial]], [[Logical interpretation|logical]] and [[Religious interpretation|religious]] interpretation. Topics in [[Interpretation (philosophy)#Scientific interpretation|scientific interpretation]] include [[scientific modeling]]. ===Legal argumentation=== ====By lawyers==== {{Main article|Oral argument|Closing argument}} Legal arguments are spoken presentations to a [[judge]] or [[appellate court]] by a [[lawyer]], or parties when representing themselves of the legal reasons why they should prevail. Oral argument at the appellate level accompanies written briefs, which also advance the argument of each party in the legal dispute. A closing argument, or summation, is the concluding statement of each party's counsel reiterating the important arguments for the [[trier of fact]], often the jury, in a court case. A closing argument occurs after the presentation of evidence. ====By judges==== {{Main articles|Judicial opinion|Legal opinion|Ratio decidendi}} A [[judicial opinion]] or [[legal opinion]] is in certain [[jurisdiction]]s a written explanation by a [[judge]] or group of judges that accompanies an order or ruling in a case, laying out the [[Justification (epistemology)|rationale (justification)]] and [[Legal doctrine|legal principles]] for the ruling.<ref name=KerrCM>{{cite web |url=http://euro.ecom.cmu.edu/program/law/08-732/Courts/howtoreadv2.pdf |title=How to Read a Judicial Opinion: A Guide for New Law Students |author= Orin S. Kerr |date=August 2005 |publisher=Carnegie Mellon; Computation Organizations & Society |access-date=15 March 2016}}</ref> It cites the [[Case law|decision]] reached to [[wikt:resolve|resolve]] the dispute. A judicial opinion usually includes the [[Reason (argument)|reasons]] behind the decision.<ref name=KerrCM/> Where there are three or more judges, it may take the form of a [[majority opinion]], [[minority opinion]] or a [[concurring opinion]].<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/judicial-opinion.html |title=judicial opinion |website=businessdictionary.com |access-date=15 March 2016 |archive-date=9 June 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160609075543/http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/judicial-opinion.html |url-status=dead }}</ref> ===Political argumentation=== {{Main article|Political argument}} Political arguments are used by academics, media pundits, candidates for political office and government officials. Political arguments are also used by citizens in ordinary interactions to comment about and understand political events.<ref>Michael McGee. "The 'Ideograph' as a Unit of Analysis in Political Argument." Jack Rhodes and Sara Newell, eds. Proceedings of the Summer Conference on Argumentation. 1980.</ref> The rationality of the public is a major question in this line of research. Political scientist [[Samuel L. Popkin]] coined the expression "[[low information voter]]s" to describe most voters who know very little about politics or the world in general. In practice, a "[[low information voter]]" may not be aware of legislation that their representative has [[Sponsor (legislative)|sponsored]] in Congress. A low-information voter may base their [[ballot box]] decision on a media sound-bite, or a flier received in the mail. It is possible for a media sound-bite or campaign flier to present a political position for the [[incumbent]] candidate that completely contradicts the legislative action taken in the Capitol on behalf of the constituents. It may only take a small percentage of the overall voting group who base their decision on the inaccurate information to form a voter bloc large enough to swing an overall election result. When this happens, the constituency at large may have been duped or fooled. Nevertheless, the election result is legal and confirmed. Savvy [[political consulting|Political consultants]] will take advantage of low-information voters and sway their votes with [[disinformation]] and [[fake news]] because it can be easier and sufficiently effective. [[Fact checker]]s have come about in recent years to help counter the effects of such campaign tactics. ==Psychological aspects== [[Psychology]] has long studied the non-logical aspects of argumentation. For example, studies have shown that [[Ad nauseam|simple repetition of an idea]] is often a more effective method of argumentation than appeals to reason. [[Propaganda]] often utilizes repetition.<ref>Jacques Ellul, ''Propaganda'', Vintage, 1973, {{ISBN|0-394-71874-7}} {{ISBN|978-0394718743}}.</ref> "Repeat a lie often enough and it becomes the truth" is a law of propaganda often attributed to the [[Nazism|Nazi]] politician [[Joseph Goebbels]]. Nazi rhetoric has been studied extensively as, inter alia, a repetition campaign. Empirical studies of communicator credibility and attractiveness, sometimes labeled ''charisma,'' have also been tied closely to empirically-occurring arguments. Such studies bring argumentation within the ambit of persuasion theory and practice. Some psychologists such as William J. McGuire believe that the [[syllogism]] is the basic unit of human reasoning. They have produced a large body of empirical work around McGuire's famous title "A Syllogistic Analysis of Cognitive Relationships". A central line of this way of thinking is that logic is contaminated by psychological variables such as "wishful thinking", in which subjects confound the likelihood of predictions with the desirability of the predictions. People hear what they want to hear and see what they expect to see. If planners want something to happen they see it as likely to happen. If they hope something will not happen, they see it as unlikely to happen. Thus smokers think that they personally will avoid cancer, promiscuous people practice unsafe sex, and teenagers drive recklessly. ==Theories== ===Argument fields=== [[Stephen Toulmin]] and [[Charles Arthur Willard]] have championed the idea of argument fields, the former drawing upon [[Ludwig Wittgenstein|Ludwig Wittgenstein's]] notion of [[language-game|language games]], (Sprachspiel) the latter drawing from communication and argumentation theory, sociology, political science, and social epistemology. For Toulmin, the term "field" designates discourses within which arguments and factual claims are grounded.<ref>{{cite book|first = Stephen E.|last = Toulmin|title = The Uses of Argument|date = 1958|publisher = Cambridge University Press|isbn = 978-0521092302|url-access = registration|url = https://archive.org/details/usesofargument0000toul}}</ref> For Willard, the term "field" is interchangeable with "community", "audience", or "readership".<ref>Charles Arthur Willard. "Some Questions About Toulmin's View of Argument Fields." Jack Rhodes and Sara Newell, eds. ''Proceedings of the Summer Conference on Argumentation''. 1980. "Field Theory: A Cartesian Meditation." George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes, eds. ''Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation.''</ref> Similarly, G. Thomas Goodnight has studied "spheres" of argument and sparked a large literature created by younger scholars responding to or using his ideas.<ref>G. T. Goodnight, "The Personal, Technical, and Public Spheres of Argument." ''Journal of the American Forensics Association.'' (1982) 18:214–227.</ref> The general tenor of these field theories is that the premises of arguments take their meaning from social communities.<ref>Bruce E. Gronbeck. "Sociocultural Notions of Argument Fields: A Primer." George Ziegelmueller and Jack Rhodes, eds. ''Dimensions of Argument: Proceedings of the Second Summer Conference on Argumentation.'' (1981) 1–20.</ref> ===Stephen E. Toulmin's contributions=== One of the most influential theorists of argumentation was the philosopher and educator, [[Stephen Toulmin]], who is known for creating the [[Toulmin model of argument]]. His book ''[[The Uses of Argument]]'' is regarded as a seminal contribution to argumentation theory.<ref>{{cite book |last=Loui|first=Ronald P. |editor1-first=David| editor1-last=Hitchcock |editor2-first=Bart| editor2-last=Verheij |title=Arguing on the Toulmin Model: New Essays in Argument Analysis and Evaluation |year=2006 |publisher=Springer Netherlands|pages=31–38|chapter=A Citation-Based Reflection on Toulmin and Argument |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3xE5ichwr5MC&q=A+Citation-Based+Reflection+on+Toulmin+and+Argument&pg=PA31 |isbn=978-1-4020-4937-8 |quote=Toulmin's 1958 work is essential in the field of argumentation. |doi=10.1007/978-1-4020-4938-5_3 |access-date=2010-06-25}}</ref> ====Alternative to absolutism and relativism==== {{transcluded section|source=Stephen Toulmin}} {{trim|{{#section-h:Stephen Toulmin|Objection to absolutism and relativism}}}} ====Toulmin model of argument==== {{transcluded section|source=Stephen Toulmin}} {{trim|{{#section-h:Stephen Toulmin|Toulmin model of argument}}}} ==== Evolution of knowledge ==== {{transcluded section|source=Stephen Toulmin}} {{trim|{{#section-h:Stephen Toulmin|Evolutionary model}}}} ===Pragma-dialectics=== {{Main article|Pragma-dialectics}} Scholars at the [[University of Amsterdam]] in the Netherlands have pioneered a rigorous modern version of [[dialectic]] under the name ''pragma-dialectics''. The intuitive idea is to formulate clear-cut rules that, if followed, will yield reasonable discussion and sound conclusions. [[Frans H. van Eemeren]], the late [[Rob Grootendorst]], and many of their students and co-authors have produced a large body of work expounding this idea. The dialectical conception of reasonableness is given by ten rules for critical discussion, all being instrumental for achieving a resolution of the difference of opinion (from Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Snoeck Henkemans, 2002, p. 182–183). The theory postulates this as an ideal model, and not something one expects to find as an empirical fact. The model can however serve as an important [[heuristic]] and critical tool for testing how reality approximates this ideal and point to where discourse goes wrong, that is, when the rules are violated. Any such violation will constitute a [[fallacy]]. Albeit not primarily focused on fallacies, pragma-dialectics provides a systematic approach to deal with them in a coherent way. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst identified four stages of argumentative dialogue. These stages can be regarded as an argument protocol. In a somewhat loose interpretation, the stages are as follows:{{Citation needed|date=April 2020}} * Confrontation stage: Presentation of the difference of opinion, such as a debate question or a political disagreement. * Opening stage: Agreement on material and procedural starting points, the mutually acceptable common ground of facts and beliefs, and the rules to be followed during the discussion (such as, how evidence is to be presented, and determination of closing conditions). * Argumentation stage: Presentation of reasons for and against the standpoint(s) at issue, through application of logical and common-sense principles according to the agreed-upon rules * Concluding stage: Determining whether the standpoint has withstood reasonable criticism, and accepting it is justified. This occurs when the termination conditions are met (Among these could be, for example, a time limitation or the determination of an arbiter.) Van Eemeren and Grootendorst provide a detailed list of rules that must be applied at each stage of the protocol.{{Citation needed|date=April 2020}} Moreover, in the account of argumentation given by these authors, there are specified roles of protagonist and antagonist in the protocol which are determined by the conditions which set up the need for argument. ===Walton's logical argumentation method=== [[Douglas N. Walton]] developed a distinctive philosophical theory of logical argumentation built around a set of practical methods to help a user identify, analyze and evaluate arguments in everyday conversational discourse and in more structured areas such as debate, law and scientific fields.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Walton|first1=Douglas|title=Methods of Argumentation|date=2013|publisher=Cambridge University Press|location=Cambridge}}</ref> There are four main components: [[argumentation scheme]]s,<ref>{{cite book|last1=Walton|first1=Douglas|last2=Reed|first2=Chris|last3=Macagno|first3=Fabrizio|title=Argumentation Schemes|date=2008|publisher=Cambridge University Press|location=New York}}</ref> dialogue structures, [[argument map]]ping tools, and formal argumentation systems. The method uses the notion of commitment in dialogue as the fundamental tool for the analysis and evaluation of argumentation rather than the notion of belief.<ref name="WaltonKrabbe1995">{{cite book|last1=Walton|first1=Douglas|last2=Krabbe|first2=E. C. W.|title=Commitment in Dialogue: Basic Concepts of Interpersonal Reasoning|date=1995|publisher=SUNY Press|location=Albany}}</ref> Commitments are statements that the agent has expressed or formulated, and has pledged to carry out, or has publicly asserted. According to the commitment model, agents interact with each other in a dialogue in which each takes its turn to contribute speech acts. The dialogue framework uses critical questioning as a way of testing plausible explanations and finding weak points in an argument that raise doubt concerning the acceptability of the argument. Walton's logical argumentation model took a view of proof and justification different from [[analytic philosophy]]'s dominant [[epistemology]], which was based on a [[justified true belief]] framework.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Walton|first1=Douglas|last2=Zhang|first2=Nanning|title=The Epistemology of Scientific Evidence|journal=Artificial Intelligence and Law|date=2 October 2013|volume=21|issue=2|page=1|publisher=Social Science Research Network|doi=10.1007/s10506-012-9132-9|language=en|quote=In place of the traditional epistemological view of knowledge as justified true belief we argue that artificial intelligence and law needs an evidence -based epistemology|ssrn=2335090|s2cid=16536938}}</ref> In the logical argumentation approach, knowledge is seen as form of belief commitment firmly fixed by an argumentation procedure that tests the evidence on both sides, and uses standards of proof to determine whether a proposition qualifies as knowledge. In this evidence-based approach, knowledge must be seen as [[Defeasible reasoning|defeasible]]. == Artificial intelligence == {{See also|Argument technology|Argument mapping|Argumentation framework}} [[File:Intelligent assistant for argumentative support and arguments inquiry.png|thumb|Structured debates from platforms like [[Kialo]] could be used for "artificial deliberative agents" (ADAs) or computational reasoning.<ref name="10.1145/3469595.3469615">{{cite book |last1=Anastasiou |first1=Lucas |last2=De Liddo |first2=Anna |title=Extended Abstracts of the 2021 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems |chapter=Making Sense of Online Discussions: Can Automated Reports help? |date=8 May 2021 |pages=1–7 |doi=10.1145/3411763.3451815 |publisher=Association for Computing Machinery|isbn=9781450380959 |s2cid=233987842 }}</ref><ref name="Betz">{{cite journal |last1=Betz |first1=Gregor |title=Natural-Language Multi-Agent Simulations of Argumentative Opinion Dynamics |journal=Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation |pages=2 |doi=10.18564/jasss.4725 |date=2022|volume=25 |arxiv=2104.06737 |s2cid=233231231 }}</ref>]] [[File:Basic design of artificial deliberative agents (ADAs) for argumentation.png|thumb|Example of an ADA contributing missing information to a debate via crawled Kialo data and selected based [[natural language processing|on the prior conversation]] and crawled [[Kialo#collective determination of argument weights|argument weight ratings]]<ref name="Betz"/>]] Efforts have been made within the field of [[artificial intelligence]] to perform and analyze argumentation with computers. Argumentation has been used to provide a proof-theoretic [[semantics]] for [[non-monotonic logic]], starting with the influential work of Dung (1995). Computational argumentation systems have found particular application in domains where formal logic and classical [[decision theory]] are unable to capture the richness of reasoning, domains such as law and medicine. In ''Elements of Argumentation'', Philippe Besnard and Anthony Hunter show how classical logic-based techniques can be used to capture key elements of practical argumentation.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Besnard |first1=Philippe |last2=Hunter |first2=Anthony |date=2008 |title=Elements of Argumentation |location=Cambridge, MA |publisher=[[MIT Press]] |isbn=9780262026437 |oclc=163605008 |doi=10.7551/mitpress/9780262026437.001.0001}} Reviewed in: {{cite journal|last1=Lundström|first1=Jenny Eriksson|title=Book Reviews: Elements of Argumentation|journal=Studia Logica|date=11 September 2009|volume=93|issue=1|pages=97–103|doi=10.1007/s11225-009-9204-3|s2cid=3214194}}</ref> Within computer science, the ArgMAS workshop series (Argumentation in Multi-Agent Systems), the CMNA workshop series,<ref>{{cite web |title=Computational Models of Natural Argument |url=https://cmna.csc.liv.ac.uk/ |website=cmna.csc.liv.ac.uk}}</ref> and the COMMA Conference,<ref>{{cite web |title=Computational Models of Argument |url=https://intranet.csc.liv.ac.uk/~comma/ |website=intranet.csc.liv.ac.uk}}</ref> are regular annual events attracting participants from every continent. The journal ''Argument & Computation''<ref>{{cite web |title=Argument & Computation |url=https://www.iospress.com/catalog/journals/argument-computation |website=www.iospress.com|date=August 2023 }}</ref> is dedicated to exploring the intersection between argumentation and computer science. ArgMining is a workshop series dedicated specifically to the related [[argument mining]] task.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://research.ibm.com/haifa/Workshops/argmining18/|title=5th Workshop on Argument Mining|date=2011-05-17|website=www.research.ibm.com}}</ref> Data from the collaborative structured online argumentation platform [[Kialo]] has been used to train and to evaluate [[natural language processing]] AI systems such as, most commonly, [[BERT (language model)|BERT]] and its variants.{{refn|name=NLPapplic|<ref name="10.1145/3485447.3512144">{{cite book |last1=Agarwal |first1=Vibhor |last2=Joglekar |first2=Sagar |last3=Young |first3=Anthony P. |last4=Sastry |first4=Nishanth |title=Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2022 |chapter=GraphNLI: A Graph-based Natural Language Inference Model for Polarity Prediction in Online Debates |date=25 April 2022 |pages=2729–2737 |doi=10.1145/3485447.3512144|arxiv=2202.08175 |isbn=9781450390965 |s2cid=246867079 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Prakken |first1=H. |last2=Bistarelli |first2=S. |last3=Santini |first3=F. |title=Computational Models of Argument: Proceedings of COMMA 2020 |date=25 September 2020 |publisher=IOS Press |isbn=978-1-64368-107-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=I6EGEAAAQBAJ |language=en}}</ref><ref name="conclusion">{{cite arXiv |title=Conclusion-based Counter-Argument Generation |eprint=2301.09911 |last1=Alshomary |first1=Milad |last2=Wachsmuth |first2=Henning |year=2023 |class=cs.CL }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Thorburn |first1=Luke |last2=Kruger |first2=Ariel |title=Optimizing Language Models for Argumentative Reasoning |date=2022 |url=https://ceur-ws.org/Vol-3208/paper3.pdf}}</ref><ref name="Revise"/><ref name="Durmus">{{cite book |last1=Durmus |first1=Esin |last2=Ladhak |first2=Faisal |last3=Cardie |first3=Claire |title=Proceedings of the 57th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics |chapter=Determining Relative Argument Specificity and Stance for Complex Argumentative Structures |pages=4630–4641 |doi=10.18653/v1/P19-1456 |date=2019|arxiv=1906.11313 |s2cid=195699602 }}</ref><ref name="Bolton">{{cite arXiv |title=High Quality Real-Time Structured Debate Generation |eprint=2012.00209 |last1=Bolton |first1=Eric |last2=Calderwood |first2=Alex |last3=Christensen |first3=Niles |last4=Kafrouni |first4=Jerome |last5=Drori |first5=Iddo |year=2020 |class=cs.CL }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Jo |first1=Yohan |last2=Bang |first2=Seojin |last3=Reed |first3=Chris |last4=Hovy |first4=Eduard |title=Classifying Argumentative Relations Using Logical Mechanisms and Argumentation Schemes |journal=Transactions of the Association for Computational Linguistics |date=2 August 2021 |volume=9 |pages=721–739 |doi=10.1162/tacl_a_00394|s2cid=234742133 |arxiv=2105.07571 }}</ref><ref name="impactrating">{{cite book |last1=Durmus |first1=Esin |last2=Ladhak |first2=Faisal |last3=Cardie |first3=Claire |title=Proceedings of the 2019 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing and the 9th International Joint Conference on Natural Language Processing (EMNLP-IJCNLP) |chapter=The Role of Pragmatic and Discourse Context in Determining Argument Impact |pages=5667–5677 |doi=10.18653/v1/D19-1568 |date=2019|arxiv=2004.03034 |s2cid=202768765 }}</ref><ref name="Khatib">{{cite book |last1=Al Khatib |first1=Khalid |last2=Trautner |first2=Lukas |last3=Wachsmuth |first3=Henning |last4=Hou |first4=Yufang |last5=Stein |first5=Benno |chapter=Employing Argumentation Knowledge Graphs for Neural Argument Generation |title=Proceedings of the 59th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics and the 11th International Joint Conference on Natural Language Processing (Volume 1: Long Papers) |date=August 2021 |pages=4744–4754 |doi=10.18653/v1/2021.acl-long.366 |chapter-url=https://aclanthology.org/2021.acl-long.366.pdf |publisher=Association for Computational Linguistics|s2cid=236460348 }}</ref>}} This includes argument extraction, conclusion generation,<ref name="conclusion"/>{{additional citation needed|date=June 2023}} argument form quality assessment,<ref name="Skitalinskaya">{{cite arXiv |title=Learning From Revisions: Quality Assessment of Claims in Argumentation at Scale |eprint=2101.10250 |last1=Skitalinskaya |first1=Gabriella |last2=Klaff |first2=Jonas |last3=Wachsmuth |first3=Henning |year=2021 |class=cs.CL }} The study investigates revisions of the same argument for machine learning of general style quality assessment.</ref> machine argumentative debate generation or participation,<ref name="Bolton"/><ref name="impactrating"/><ref name="Khatib"/> surfacing most relevant previously overlooked viewpoints or arguments,<ref name="Bolton"/><ref name="impactrating"/> argumentative writing support<ref name="Revise">{{cite arXiv |title=To Revise or Not to Revise: Learning to Detect Improvable Claims for Argumentative Writing Support |eprint=2305.16799 |last1=Skitalinskaya |first1=Gabriella |last2=Wachsmuth |first2=Henning |year=2023 |class=cs.CL }}</ref> (including sentence attackability scores),<ref name="Detecting"/> automatic real-time evaluation of how truthful or convincing a sentence is (similar to [[fact-checking]]),<ref name="Detecting">{{cite arXiv |title=Detecting Attackable Sentences in Arguments |eprint=2010.02660 |last1=Jo |first1=Yohan |last2=Bang |first2=Seojin |last3=Manzoor |first3=Emaad |last4=Hovy |first4=Eduard |last5=Reed |first5=Chris |year=2020 |class=cs.CL }}</ref> [[Fine-tuning (machine learning)|language model fine tuning]]<ref>{{cite book |last1=Fanton |first1=Margherita |last2=Bonaldi |first2=Helena |last3=Tekiroglu |first3=Serra Sinem |last4=Guerini |first4=Marco |title=Proceedings of the 59th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics and the 11th International Joint Conference on Natural Language Processing (Volume 1: Long Papers) |chapter=Human-in-the-Loop for Data Collection: a Multi-Target Counter Narrative Dataset to Fight Online Hate Speech |pages=3226–3240 |doi=10.18653/v1/2021.acl-long.250 |date=2021|arxiv=2107.08720 |s2cid=236087808 }}</ref><ref name="Khatib"/> (including for [[chatbot]]s),<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Björklin |first1=Hampus |last2=Abrahamsson |first2=Tim |last3=Widenfalk |first3=Oscar |title=A retrieval-based chatbot's opinion on the trolley problem |date=2021 |url=https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A1571401}}</ref><ref>{{cite arXiv |title=Opening up Minds with Argumentative Dialogues |eprint=2301.06400 |last1=Farag |first1=Youmna |last2=Brand |first2=Charlotte O. |last3=Amidei |first3=Jacopo |last4=Piwek |first4=Paul |last5=Stafford |first5=Tom |last6=Stoyanchev |first6=Svetlana |last7=Vlachos |first7=Andreas |year=2023 |class=cs.CL }}</ref> argument impact prediction, argument classification and polarity prediction.<ref name="graphbased">{{cite journal |last1=Agarwal |first1=Vibhor |last2=P. Young |first2=Anthony |last3=Joglekar |first3=Sagar |last4=Sastry |first4=Nishanth |title=A Graph-Based Context-Aware Model to Understand Online Conversations |journal=ACM Transactions on the Web |year=2024 |volume=18 |pages=1–27 |doi=10.1145/3624579 |arxiv=2211.09207 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |title=Towards an Argument Mining Pipeline Transforming Texts to Argument Graphs |doi=10.3233/FAIA200510 |arxiv=2006.04562 |last1=Lenz |first1=Mirko |last2=Sahitaj |first2=Premtim |last3=Kallenberg |first3=Sean |last4=Coors |first4=Christopher |last5=Dumani |first5=Lorik |last6=Schenkel |first6=Ralf |last7=Bergmann |first7=Ralph |year=2020 |pages=263–270 |publisher=IOS Press |s2cid=219531343 }}</ref> ==See also== {{Portal|Psychology}} {{Div col|colwidth=20em}} * {{annotated link|Argument}} * {{annotated link|Argumentum a fortiori|''Argumentum a fortiori''}} * {{annotated link|Aristotelian rhetoric}} ** {{annotated link|Modes of persuasion}} ** {{annotated link|Rhetoric (Aristotle)|''Rhetoric'' (Aristotle)}} ** {{annotated link|Topics (Aristotle)|''Topics'' (Aristotle)}} * {{annotated link|Criticism}} * {{annotated link|Critical thinking}} * {{annotated link|Defeasible reasoning}} * {{annotated link|Dialectic}} * {{annotated link|Discourse ethics}} * {{annotated link|Essentially contested concept}} * {{annotated link|Forensics}} * {{annotated link|Legal theory}} * {{annotated link|Logic and dialectic}} * {{annotated link|Logic of argumentation}} * {{annotated link|Logical reasoning}} * {{annotated link|Negotiation theory}} * {{annotated link|Pars destruens and pars construens|''Pars destruens'' and ''pars construens''}} * {{annotated link|Policy debate}} ** {{annotated link|Stock issues}} * {{annotated link|Presumption}} * {{annotated link|Public sphere}} * {{annotated link|Rationality}} * {{annotated link|Rhetoric}} * {{annotated link|Rogerian argument}} * {{annotated link|Social engineering (political science)}} * {{annotated link|Social psychology}} * {{annotated link|Sophistry}} * {{annotated link|Source criticism}} * {{annotated link|Straight and Crooked Thinking|''Straight and Crooked Thinking''}} {{Div col end}} ==References== {{Reflist}} == Further reading == {{refbegin|colwidth=30em}} * J. Robert Cox and Charles Arthur Willard, eds. (1982). ''Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research''. * {{cite journal|doi=10.1016/0004-3702(94)00041-X|title=On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in nonmonotonic reasoning, logic programming and n-person games|journal=Artificial Intelligence|volume=77|issue=2|pages=321–357|year=1995|last1=Dung|first1=Phan Minh|doi-access=free}} * Bondarenko, A., Dung, P. M., Kowalski, R., and [[Francesca Toni|Toni, F.]] (1997). "An abstract, argumentation-theoretic approach to default reasoning", ''Artificial Intelligence'' 93(1–2), 63–101. * Dung, P. M., Kowalski, R., and [[Francesca Toni|Toni, F.]] (2006). "Dialectic proof procedures for assumption-based, admissible argumentation." ''Artificial Intelligence.'' 170(2), 114–159. * Frans van Eemeren, Rob Grootendorst, Sally Jackson, and Scott Jacobs (1993). ''Reconstructing Argumentative Discourse'' * Frans van Eemeren & Rob Grootendorst (2004). ''A Systematic Theory of Argumentation: The Pragma-Dialectical Approach''. * Frans van Eemeren, Bart Garssen, Erik C. W. Krabbe, A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans, Bart Verheij, & Jean H. M. Wagemans (2014). ''Handbook of Argumentation Theory'' (Revised edition). New York: Springer. * Richard H. Gaskins (1993). ''Burdens of Proof in Modern Discourse.'' [[Yale University Press]]. * Michael A. Gilbert (1997). ''Coalescent Argumentation''. * Trudy Govier (1987). ''Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation.'' Dordrecht, Holland; Providence, RI: Foris Publications. * Trudy Govier (2014). ''A Practical Study of Argument'', 7th ed. Australia; Boston, MA: Wadsworth/Cengage Learning. (First edition published 1985.) * Dale Hample. (1979). "Predicting belief and belief change using a cognitive theory of argument and evidence." ''Communication Monographs.'' 46, 142–146. * Dale Hample. (1978). "Are attitudes arguable?" ''Journal of Value Inquiry.'' 12, 311–312. * Dale Hample. (1978). "Predicting immediate belief change and adherence to argument claims." ''Communication Monographs,'' 45, 219–228. * Dale Hample & Judy Hample. (1978). "Evidence credibility." ''Debate Issues.'' 12, 4–5. * Dale Hample. (1977). "Testing a model of value argument and evidence." ''Communication Monographs.'' 14, 106–120. * Dale Hample. (1977). "The Toulmin model and the syllogism." ''Journal of the American Forensic Association.'' 14, 1–9. * Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs, "Structure of Conversational Argument: Pragmatic Bases for the Enthymeme." ''The Quarterly Journal of Speech''. LXVI, 251–265. * [[Ralph Johnson (philosopher)|Ralph H. Johnson]]. ''Manifest Rationality: A Pragmatic Theory of Argument.'' Lawrence Erlbaum, 2000. * Ralph H. Johnson. (1996). ''The Rise of Informal Logic''. Newport News, VA: Vale Press * Ralph H. Johnson. (1999). ''The Relation Between Formal and Informal Logic''. ''Argumentation'', 13(3) 265–74. * Ralph H. Johnson. & Blair, J. Anthony. (2006). ''Logical Self-Defense.''First published, McGraw Hill Ryerson, Toronto, ON, 1997, 1983, 1993. Reprinted, New York: Idebate Press. * Ralph H. Johnson. & Blair, J. Anthony. (1987). The current state of informal logic. ''Informal Logic'' 9, 147–51. * Ralph H. Johnson. & Blair, J. Anthony. (1996). Informal logic and critical thinking. In F. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, & F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), ''Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory.'' (pp. 383–86). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates * Ralph H. Johnson, Ralph. H. & Blair, J. Anthony. (2000). "Informal logic: An overview." ''Informal Logic.'' 20(2): 93–99. * Ralph H. Johnson, Ralph. H. & Blair, J. Anthony. (2002). Informal logic and the reconfiguration of logic. In D. Gabbay, R. H. Johnson, H.-J. Ohlbach and J. Woods (Eds.). ''Handbook of the Logic of Argument and Inference: The Turn Towards the Practical''. (pp. 339–396). Elsevier: North Holland. * [[Chaïm Perelman]] and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca (1970). ''The New Rhetoric'', Notre Dame. * [[Stephen Toulmin]] (1958). ''The Uses of Argument''. * Stephen Toulmin (1964). ''The Place of Reason in Ethics''. * [[Douglas N. Walton]] (1990). ''Practical Reasoning: Goal-Driven, Knowledge-Based, Action-Guiding Argumentation''. Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. * Douglas N. Walton (1992). ''The Place of Emotion in Argument''. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. * Douglas N. Walton (1996). ''Argument Structure: A Pragmatic Theory''. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. * Douglas N. Walton (2006). ''Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation''. New York: Cambridge University Press. * Douglas N. Walton (2013). ''Methods of Argumentation''. New York: Cambridge University Press. * Douglas N. Walton (2016). ''Argument Evaluation and Evidence''. Cham: Springer * [[Joseph W. Wenzel]] (1990). Three perspectives on argumentation. In R Trapp and J Scheutz, (Eds.), ''Perspectives on argumentation: Essays in honour of Wayne Brockreide'' (9–26). Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press. * John Woods. (1980). What Is informal logic? In J.A. Blair & R. H. Johnson (Eds.), ''Informal Logic: The First International Symposium .''(pp. 57–68). Point Reyes, CA: Edgepress. * John Woods. (2000). How Philosophical Is Informal Logic? ''Informal Logic.'' 20(2): 139–167. 2000 * [[Charles Arthur Willard]] (1982). ''Argumentation and the Social Grounds of Knowledge''. University of Alabama Press. * Charles Arthur Willard (1989). ''A Theory of Argumentation''. [[University of Alabama Press]]. * Charles Arthur Willard (1996). ''Liberalism and the Problem of Knowledge: A New Rhetoric for Modern Democracy.'' University of Chicago Press. * [[Harald Wohlrapp]] (2008). ''Der Begriff des Arguments. Über die Beziehungen zwischen Wissen, Forschen, Glaube, Subjektivität und Vernunft''. Würzburg: Königshausen u. Neumann. {{ISBN|978-3-8260-3820-4}} {{refend}} ===Flagship journals=== * ''Argumentation'' * ''Argumentation in Context'' * ''Informal Logic'' * ''Argumentation and Advocacy'' (formerly ''Journal of the American Forensic Association'') * ''Social Epistemology'' * ''Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology'' * ''Journal of Argument and Computation'' {{logic}} {{Authority control}} {{DEFAULTSORT:Argumentation Theory}} [[Category:Debating]] [[Category:Legal reasoning]] [[Category:Social epistemology]] [[Category:Informal arguments]]
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