Editing Biosecurity

{{Short description|Preventive measures designed to reduce the risk of infectious disease transmission}}
{{Distinguish|Biosafety}}
{{use dmy dates|date=May 2020}}
[[File:Influenza virus research.jpg|thumb|A [[microbiologist]] working on the reconstructed virus of the 1918 [[Spanish flu|Spanish Flu]], using a [[fume hood]] for [[biocontainment]].<ref>{{Cite web |date=2023-09-13 |title=Reconstruction of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic Virus |url=https://archive.cdc.gov/www_cdc_gov/flu/about/qa/1918flupandemic.htm |access-date=2024-12-14 |website=archive.cdc.gov |language=en-us}}</ref>]]
'''Biosecurity''' refers to measures aimed at preventing the introduction or spread of harmful [[organism]]s (e.g. [[virus]]es, [[bacteria]], [[plant]]s, [[animal]]s etc.) intentionally or unintentionally outside their native range or within new environments. In [[agriculture]], these measures are aimed at protecting [[food crop]]s and [[livestock]] from [[pest (organism)|pests]], [[invasive species]], and other organisms not conducive to the welfare of the [[human population]]. The term includes [[Biological pest control|biological threats]] to people, including those from [[pandemic]] diseases and [[bioterrorism]]. The definition has sometimes been broadened to embrace other concepts, and it is used for different purposes in different contexts.

The [[COVID-19 pandemic]] is a recent example of a threat for which biosecurity measures have been needed in all countries of the world.

==Background and terminology==
The term "biosecurity" has been defined differently by various disciplines. The term was first used by the [[agricultural]] and [[environmental science|environmental]] communities to describe preventative measures against threats from naturally occurring diseases and pests, later expanded to [[introduced species]]. Australia and New Zealand, among other countries, had incorporated this definition within their legislation by 2010.<ref name="koblentz2010">{{cite journal |last=Koblentz|first= Gregory D. |title=Biosecurity Reconsidered: Calibrating Biological Threats and Responses |journal=International Security |volume=34 |issue=4 |pages=96–132 |year=2010 |doi=10.1162/isec.2010.34.4.96|s2cid= 57560210 }} [https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/isec.2010.34.4.96 Full text]</ref> New Zealand was the earliest adopter of a comprehensive approach with its [[Biosecurity Act 1993]]. In 2001, the US [[National Association of State Departments of Agriculture]] (NASDA) defined biosecurity as "the sum of risk management practices in defense against biological threats", and its main goal as "protect[ing] against the risk posed by disease and organisms".<ref name="bioscience">{{cite journal|journal=BioScience|volume=52|issue=7|date=July 2002|title=Biosecurity: Moving toward a Comprehensive Approach: A comprehensive approach to biosecurity is necessary to minimize the risk of harm caused by non-native organisms to agriculture, the economy, the environment, and human health|pages= 593–600|doi=10.1641/0006-3568(2002)052[0593:BMTACA]2.0.CO;2|first1=Laura A.|last1=Meyerson|first2=Jamie K. |last2=Reaser|doi-access=free}}</ref>

In 2010, the [[World Health Organization]] (WHO) provided an information note describing biosecurity as a strategic and integrated approach to analysing and managing relevant risks to human, animal and plant life and health and associated risks for the environment.<ref>{{cite web | title=Biosecurity: An integrated approach to manage risk to human, animal and plant life and health | website=WHO.int | date=3 March 2010 | url=https://www.who.int/foodsafety/fs_management/No_01_Biosecurity_Mar10_en.pdf | access-date=13 April 2020}}</ref> In another document, it describes the aim of biosecurity being "to enhance the ability to protect [[human health]], agricultural production systems, and the people and industries that depend on them", with the overarching goal being "to prevent, control and/or manage risks to life and health as appropriate to the particular biosecurity sector".<ref name="infosan">{{cite web|url=https://www.who.int/foodsafety/fs_management/No_01_Biosecurity_Mar10_en.pdf|title=Biosecurity: An integrated approach to manage risk to human, animal and plant life and health |publisher=World Health Organization & Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations|author=International Food Safety Authorities Network (INFOSAN)|date=3 March 2010|series=INFOSAN Information Note No. 1/2010 - Biosecurity|access-date=23 May 2020 }}</ref>

Measures taken to counter biosecurity risks typically include compulsory terms of [[quarantine]], and are put in place to minimise the risk of [[Invasive species in Australia|invasive pests]] or [[disease]]s arriving at a specific location that could damage crops and [[livestock]] as well as the wider environment.<ref name="fitt2013">{{cite web | last=Fitt | first=Gary | title=Explainer: why Australia needs biosecurity | website=The Conversation | date=15 November 2013 | url=http://theconversation.com/explainer-why-australia-needs-biosecurity-20105 | access-date=21 May 2020}}</ref>

In general, the term is today taken to include managing [[Biological pest control|biological threats]] to people, industries or environment. These may be from foreign or [[endemic]] organisms, but they can also extend to [[pandemic]] diseases and the threat of [[bioterrorism]], both of which pose threats to [[public health]].<ref name="fitt2013" />

===Laboratory biosafety and intentional harm===
{{main|Bioterrorism|Laboratory biosafety|Biological weapons}}

The definition has sometimes been broadened to embrace other concepts, and it is used for different purposes in different contexts. It can be defined as the "successful minimising of the risks that the biological sciences will be deliberately or accidentally misused in a way which causes harm for humans, animals, plants or the environment, including through awareness and understanding of the risks".<ref name="handbook">{{cite book|url=https://www.bradford.ac.uk/bioethics/Handbook_complete-draft.pdf|title= Biological Security Education Handbook: The Power of Team-Based Learning|first=Tatyana| last=Novossiolova |isbn=978-1-85143-278-3|date=January 2016|publisher=Bradford Disarmament Research Centre|access-date=22 May 2020}}</ref>

From the late 1990s, in response to the threat of [[biological terrorism]], the term started to include the prevention of the theft of biological materials from [[research laboratories]], called "laboratory biosecurity" by WHO.<ref name="koblentz2010" /> The term [[laboratory biosafety]] refers to the measures taken "to reduce the risk of accidental release of or exposure to infectious disease agents", whereas laboratory biosecurity is usually taken to mean "a set of systems and practices employed in legitimate bioscience facilities to reduce the risk that dangerous biological agents will be stolen and used maliciously".<ref name="labbio" /> Joseph Kanabrocki (2017) source elaborates: "Biosafety focuses on protection of the researcher, their contacts and the environment via accidental release of a pathogen from containment, whether by direct release into the environment or by a laboratory-acquired infection. Conversely, biosecurity focuses on controlling access to pathogens of consequence and on the reliability of the scientists granted this access (thereby reducing the threat of an intentional release of a pathogen) and/or access to sensitive information related to a pathogen's virulence, host-range, transmissibility, resistance to medical countermeasures, and environmental stability, among other things".<ref>{{cite web|url=https://sites.nationalacademies.org/cs/groups/pgasite/documents/webpage/pga_176433.pdf|title=Biosafety and Biosecurity in the Realm of Dual-Use Research of Concern|first=Joseph|last= Kanabrocki|date=20 January 2017|page=2|access-date=23 May 2020}}</ref><ref>{{cite book | title=Dual Use Research of Concern in the Life Sciences: Current Issues and Controversies|chapter=3. Managing Dual Use Research of Concern | via=NCBI Bookshelf|publisher=National Academies Press |place=Washington DC|author=National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine| date=14 September 2017|isbn =978-0-309-45888-7 | doi= 10.17226/24761 | pmid=29001489| url=https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK458500/ | access-date=23 May 2020}} [https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK458491/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK458491.pdf PDF]</ref>

In the US, the National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity was created in 2004 to provide biosecurity oversight of "[[Dual-use technology|dual-use research]]", defined as "biological research with legitimate scientific purpose that may be misused to pose a biological threat to [[public health]] and/or [[national security]]". In 2006, the [[National Academy of Sciences]] defined biosecurity as "security against the inadvertent, inappropriate, or intentional malicious or malevolent use of potentially dangerous biological agents or [[biotechnology]], including the development, production, stockpiling, or use of biological weapons as well as outbreaks of newly emergent and epidemic disease".<ref name="koblentz2010" />

A number of nations have developed [[biological agent|biological weapons]] for military use, and many civilian research projects in medicine have the potential to be used in military applications (dual-use research), so biosecurity [[protocol (science)|protocol]]s are used to prevent dangerous biological materials from falling into the hands of malevolent parties.<ref name="koblentz2010" />

===Laboratory program===
Components of a laboratory biosecurity program include:<ref name="labbio" />
* [[Physical security]]
* Personnel security
* Material control and [[accountability]]
* Transport security
* [[Information security]]
* Program management
* Biological Security

==Animals and plants==
[[File:Boot cleaning (6921518442).jpg|thumb|A biologist washing his boots to avoid contaminating a site with invasive species]]
Threats to animals and plants, in particular [[food crop]]s, which may in turn threaten human health, are typically overseen by a government [[department of agriculture]].<ref>{{cite web | title=Controlling disease in farm animals | website=GOV.UK | date=18 September 2012 | url=https://www.gov.uk/guidance/controlling-disease-in-farm-animals | access-date=22 May 2020}}</ref><ref>{{cite web | title=Biosecurity | website=Department of Agriculture | url=https://www.agriculture.gov.au/biosecurity | access-date=22 May 2020}}</ref>

Animal biosecurity encompasses different means of prevention and containment of disease agents in a specific area. A critical element in animal biosecurity is biocontainment – the control of disease agents already present in a particular area and work to prevent transmission.<ref name="ReferenceA">1. Thomson, J. Biosecurity: preventing and controlling diseases in the beef herd. Livestock Conservation Institute; 1991; 49-51.</ref> Animal biosecurity may protect organisms from infectious agents or noninfectious agents such as toxins or pollutants, and can be executed in areas as large as a nation or as small as a local farm.<ref>5. Anderson, F. Biosecurity - a new term for an old concept: how to apply it. Bovine Practitioner; 1998; 32:61-70.</ref>

Animal biosecurity takes into account the [[epidemiology|epidemiological]] triad for disease occurrence: the individual host, the disease, and the environment in contributing to disease susceptibility. It aims to improve nonspecific immunity of the host to resist the introduction of an agent, or limit the risk that an agent will be sustained in an environment at adequate levels. Biocontainment works to improve specific immunity towards already present pathogens.<ref>8. Thomson, J. Biosecurity: preventing and controlling diseases in the beef herd. Livestock Conservation Institute; 1991; 49-51.</ref>

The [[aquaculture]] industry is also vulnerable to pathogenic organisms, including [[fungal infection|fungal]], bacterial, or viral infections which can affect fish at different stages of their life cycle.<ref>{{cite web | title=Biosecurity in Aquaculture: Fighting Disease Transmission | website=Syndel | date=30 October 2019 | url=https://syndel.com/supportive-resources/biosecurity-in-aquaculture-fighting-disease-transmission/ | access-date=12 August 2020}}</ref>

==Human health==
Direct threats to human health may come in the form of [[epidemic]]s or [[pandemic]]s, such as the 1918 [[Spanish flu]] pandemic and other [[influenza]] epidemics, [[MERS]], [[SARS]], or the [[COVID-19 pandemic]], or they may be deliberate attacks (bioterrorism). The country/federal and/or state [[health department]]s are usually responsible for managing the control of outbreaks and transmission and the supply of information to the public.<ref =>{{cite web | title=Coronavirus (COVID-19) health alert | website=Australian Government Department of Health | date=6 February 2020 | url=https://www.health.gov.au/news/health-alerts/novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov-health-alert | access-date=22 May 2020}}</ref><ref>{{cite web | title=HSE news | website=Coronavirus: latest information and advice | date=21 May 2020 | url=https://www.hse.gov.uk/news/coronavirus.htm | access-date=22 May 2020 | archive-date=22 May 2020 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200522050449/https://www.hse.gov.uk/news/coronavirus.htm | url-status=dead }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | title=Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza (AHMPPI) | website=Department of Health | date=5 September 2014 | url=https://www1.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/ohp-ahmppi.htm | access-date=22 May 2020}}</ref>

===Medical countermeasures===
Medical countermeasures (MCMs) are products such as [[biologics]] and [[pharmaceutical drug]]s that can protect from or treat the effects of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) attack or in the case of public health emergencies. MCMs can also be used for prevention and diagnosis of symptoms associated with CBRN attacks or threats.<ref name="fdamcm">{{cite web|title=What are Medical Countermeasures?|url=https://www.fda.gov/EmergencyPreparedness/Counterterrorism/MedicalCountermeasures/AboutMCMi/ucm431268.htm|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150220210054/http://www.fda.gov/EmergencyPreparedness/Counterterrorism/MedicalCountermeasures/AboutMCMi/ucm431268.htm|url-status=dead|archive-date=20 February 2015|website=FDA: Emergency Preparedness and Response|publisher=Food and Drug Administration|access-date=15 June 2016}}</ref>

In the US, the [[Food and Drug Administration]] (FDA) runs a program called the "FDA Medical Countermeasures Initiative" (MCMi), with programs funded by the [[US government|federal government]]. It helps support "partner" agencies and organisations prepare for public health emergencies that could require MCMs.<ref name="fdamcm" /><ref>{{cite news|title=Alliance for Biosecurity applauds subcommittee efforts to sustain medical countermeasure funding|url=https://homelandprepnews.com/biological-threats/bioterrorism/18984-alliance-biosecurity-applauds-subcommittee-efforts-sustain-medical-countermeasure-funding/|access-date=15 June 2016|work=Homeland Preparedness News|date=8 June 2016|location=Washington, D.C.}}</ref>

==International agreements and guidelines==
===Agricultural biosecurity and human health===
[[File:Vervoersverbod sign.jpg|thumb|Biosecurity sign for use on a farm or agricultural area experiencing [[swine fever]] (Dutch example)]]

Various international organisations, international bodies and legal instruments and agreements make up a worldwide governance framework for biosecurity.<ref name=infosan/>

Standard-setting organisations include the [[Codex Alimentarius Commission]] (CAC), the [[World Organisation for Animal Health]] (OIE) and the [[Commission on Phytosanitary Measures]] (CPM) develop standards pertinent to their focuses, which then become international reference points through the [[World Trade Organization]] (WTO)'s [[Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures]] (SPS Agreement), created in 1995.<ref name=infosan/> This agreement requires all members of the WTO to consider all import requests concerning agricultural products from other countries.<ref>{{cite book | chapter=Chapter 5: Biosecurity and food safety |others=Published online 14 April 2013 | url=https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Former_Committees/foodprocessing/foodprocessing/report/c05 | access-date=23 May 2020|title= Inquiry into Australia's food processing sector|date= 16 August 2012|publisher=Select Committee on Australia's Food Processing Sector |isbn =978-1-74229-657-9}}</ref> Broadly, the measures covered by the agreement are those aimed at the protection of human, animal or plant life or health from certain risks.<ref>Peter Van den Bossche and Werner Zdouc, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 834.</ref>

Other important global and regional agreements include the [[International Health Regulations]] (IHR, 2005), the [[International Plant Protection Convention]] (IPPC), the [[Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety]], the [[Codex Alimentarius]], the [[Convention on Biological Diversity]] (CBD) and the [[General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]] (GATT, 1947).<ref name=infosan/><ref name=ozag>{{cite web | title=Australia's international biosecurity obligations | website=Department of Agriculture | url=https://www.agriculture.gov.au/biosecurity/risk-analysis/conducting/international-obligations | access-date=23 May 2020}}</ref><ref name=ozhealth>{{cite web | title=Protecting Australia's Health Through Human Biosecurity | website=Department of Health | date=27 September 2017 | url=https://www1.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/ohp-biosec-protect-aus-health.htm | access-date=23 May 2020}}</ref>

The UN [[Food and Agriculture Organization]] (FAO), the [[International Maritime Organization]] (IMO), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ([[OECD]]) and WHO are the most important organisations associated with biosecurity.<ref name=infosan/>

The IHR is a legally binding agreement on 196 nations, including all member states of WHO. Its purpose and scope is "to prevent, protect against, control, and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks and that avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade", "to help the international community prevent and respond to acute public health risks that have the potential to cross borders and threaten people worldwide".<ref>{{cite web | title=What are the International Health Regulations and Emergency Committees? | website=WHO | date=19 December 2019 | url=https://www.who.int/news-room/q-a-detail/what-are-the-international-health-regulations-and-emergency-committees | access-date=23 May 2020}}</ref>

===Biological weapons===
* The [[Biological Weapons Convention]] was the first multilateral [[disarmament]] treaty banning the production of an entire category of weapons, being [[biological weapon]]s.<ref>{{cite web | title=Biological Weapons:The Biological Weapons Convention | website= United Nations | date=10 April 1972 | url=https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/bio/ | access-date=23 May 2020}}</ref><ref>{{cite web | title=The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) At A Glance | website=Arms Control Association | date=28 January 2004 | url=https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/bwc | access-date=23 May 2020}}</ref>
* ''UN Resolution 1540'' (2004) "affirms that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The resolution obliges States, inter alia, to refrain from supporting by any means non-State actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery". Resolution 2325, reaffirming 1540, was adopted unanimously on 15 December 2016.<ref>{{cite web | title=1540 Committee (Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004)): 1540 Fact Sheet| website=United Nations | date=28 April 2004 | url=https://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/1540-fact-sheet.shtml|access-date=23 May 2020}}</ref>

===Laboratory safety===
*''OECD Best Practice Guidelines for Biological Resource Centres'', a consensus report created in 2001 after experts from [[OECD]] countries came together, calling upon "national governments to undertake actions to bring the BRC concept into being in concert with the international scientific community". BRCs are "repositories and providers of high-quality biological materials and information".<ref>{{cite web | title=OECD Best Practice Guidelines for Biological Resource Centres | website=[[OECD]] | url=http://www.oecd.org/sti/emerging-tech/oecdbestpracticeguidelinesforbiologicalresourcecentres.htm | access-date=23 May 2020}} [http://www.oecd.org/sti/emerging-tech/2487422.pdf pdf]</ref>

==As international security issue==
For a long time, health security or biosecurity issues were not considered as an [[international security]] issue, especially in the traditional view of international relations. However, some changes in trend have contributed to the inclusion of biosecurity (health security) in discussions of security. As time progressed, there was a movement towards securitisation. Non-traditional security issues such as [[climate change]], [[organised crime]], [[terrorism]], and [[landmine]]s came to be included in the definition of international security. There was a general realisation that the actors in the international system not only involved nation-states but also included international organisations, institutions, and individuals, which ensured the security of various actors within each nation became an important agenda. Biosecurity is one of the issues to be securitised under this trend. On 10 January 2000, the [[UN Security Council]] convened to discuss [[HIV/AIDS]] as a security issue in Africa and designated it a threat in the following month. The UNDP [[Millennium Development Goals]] also recognise health issues as international security issue.<ref name=koblentz2010/><ref>{{cite book|publisher=United Nations|date=2006|url=https://www.un.org/zh/millenniumgoals/pdf/MDGReport2006.pdf |title=The Millennium Development Goals Report: 2006|access-date=22 May 2020}}</ref>

Several instances of [[epidemic]]s such as [[SARS]] increased awareness of health security (biosecurity). Several factors have rendered biosecurity issues more severe: there is a continuing advancement of [[biotechnology]], which increases the possibility for malevolent use, evolution of [[infectious disease]]s, and globalising force which is making the world more interdependent and more susceptible to spread of epidemics.<ref name=koblentz2010/>

Controversial experiments in [[synthetic biology]], including the synthesis of [[poliovirus]] from its genetic sequence, and the modification of [[Influenza A virus subtype H5N1|flu type H5N1]] for [[airborne transmission]] in [[mammal]]s, led to calls for tighter controls on the materials and information used to perform similar feats.<ref name=ord2020>{{Cite news|last=Ord|first=Toby|url=https://www.theguardian.com/science/2020/mar/06/worst-case-thinking-prevent-pandemics-coronavirus-existential-risk|title=Why we need worst-case thinking to prevent pandemics|date=2020-03-06|work=The Guardian|access-date=2020-04-11|language=en-GB|issn=0261-3077|quote=This is an edited extract from ''[[The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity]]''}}</ref> Ideas include better enforcement by national governments and private entities concerning shipments and downloads of such materials, and registration or background check requirements for anyone handling such materials.<ref>{{cite web | title=Biosecurity for the Age of Redesigned Life|format=Audio & transcript|first1=John|last1= Dankosky|first2=Kenneth|last2=Oye |first3= Laurie |last3=Garrett|first4=Peter|last4=Carr |website=NPR.org | date=8 November 2013 | url=https://www.npr.org/2013/11/08/243950742/biosecurity-for-the-age-of-redesigned-life | access-date=22 May 2020}}</ref>

==Challenges==
Diseases caused by [[emerging virus]]es are a major threat to global [[public health]].<ref>{{cite journal|title=Laboratory biosafety for handling emerging viruses|first1=I. Made|last1= Artika|first2=Chairin Nisa|last2= Ma'roef|journal=Asian Pacific Journal of Tropical Biomedicine|doi=10.1016/j.apjtb.2017.01.020|volume =7|issue= 5| date=May 2017|pages=483–491|pmid=32289025|pmc=7103938|doi-access=free}}</ref> The proliferation of high biosafety level laboratories around the world has resulted in concern about the availability of targets for those that might be interested in stealing dangerous pathogens. The growth in containment laboratories is often in response to emerging diseases, and many new containment labs' main focus is to find ways to control these diseases. By strengthening national disease surveillance, prevention, control and response systems, the labs have improved international public health.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1145442|title=Biosecurity and Biosafety—A Growing Concern|first=Jennifer|last= Gaudioso|date=28 March 2008|publisher=[[Sandia National Laboratories|Sandia Corporation]]|access-date=23 May 2020}}</ref>

One of the major challenges of biosecurity is that harmful technology has become more available and accessible.<ref>{{cite web |last=McClellan |first=Paul  |title=Designer Plague |publisher=EDA Graffiti |date=27 March 2009 |url=http://www.edn.com/blog/920000692/post/620041462.html  |archive-url=http://webarchive.loc.gov/all/20100512095059/http://www.edn.com/blog/920000692/post/620041462.html  |url-status=dead |archive-date=12 May 2010 |access-date=23 April 2009}}</ref><ref name=":0" /> Biomedical advances and the globalisation of scientific and technical expertise have made it possible to greatly improve public health; however, there is also the risk that these advances can make it easier for terrorists to produce biological weapons.<ref>{{cite book |doi=10.17226/11567 |title=Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences |doi-access=free |author=Institute of Medicine |date=31 January 2006  |publisher=National Academies Press |author-link=Institute of Medicine|isbn=978-0-309-10032-8 }}</ref>

Communication between the citizen and law enforcement officials is important. Indicators of [[agro-terrorism]] at a food processing plant may include persons taking notes or photos of a business, theft of employee uniforms, employees changing working hours, or persons attempting to gain information about security measures and personnel. Unusual activity is best handled if reported to law enforcement personnel promptly.<ref>Criminal Investigation Handbook for Agroterrorism|2008|U.S. Government Printing Office|Washington, D.C.|pages=34-36</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.wmdcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/bio-response-report-card-2011.pdf |title=Bio-Response Report Card |author=The Bipartisan WMD Terrorism Research Center |date=October 2011 |access-date=2011-11-22 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20111225054617/http://www.wmdcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/bio-response-report-card-2011.pdf |archive-date=2011-12-25 }}</ref> Communication between [[policymaker]]s and [[life sciences]] scientists is also important.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Benson|first1=David|first2=Roger K. |last2=Kjelgren|title=Tacit Diplomacy in Life Sciences A Foundation for Science Diplomacy|journal=Science & Diplomacy|date=2014-01-13|volume=3|issue=1|url=http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/perspective/2014/tacit-diplomacy-in-life-sciences |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231205161607/https://www.sciencediplomacy.org/perspective/2014/tacit-diplomacy-in-life-sciences |archive-date= Dec 5, 2023 }}</ref>

The [[MENA]] ([[Middle East]] and [[North Africa]]) region, with its socio-political unrest, diverse cultures and societies, and recent biological weapons programs, faces particular challenges.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Nasim|first=Anwar|title=Paths to Biosafety and Biosecurity Sustainability|journal=Science & Diplomacy|date=2013-11-26|volume=2|issue=4|url=http://www.sciencediplomacy.org/perspective/2013/paths-biosafety-and-biosecurity-sustainability|display-authors=etal |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230128093943/https://www.sciencediplomacy.org/perspective/2013/paths-biosafety-and-biosecurity-sustainability |archive-date= Jan 28, 2023 }}</ref>

===Future===
{{See also|Pandemic prevention#Biosafety technologies and biotechnology regulation}}
Biosecurity requires the cooperation of scientists, technicians, policy makers, security engineers, and [[law enforcement]] officials.<ref name=labbio>{{cite book|title=Laboratory Biosecurity Handbook|first1=Reynolds M. |last1=Salerno|first2= Jennifer|last2= Gaudioso|first3=Benjamin H.|last3= Brodsky|edition=Illustrated|publisher=CRC Press|date=2007|isbn=9781420006209|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=V7XwtVhtr1oC&pg=PR11|page=xi|chapter=Preface|access-date=23 May 2020}}</ref><ref name=":0">{{Cite web |last=Piper |first=Kelsey |date=2022-04-05 |title=Why experts are terrified of a human-made pandemic — and what we can do to stop it |url=https://www.vox.com/22937531/virus-lab-safety-pandemic-prevention |access-date=2022-04-08 |website=Vox |language=en}}</ref>

The emerging nature of newer biosecurity threats means that small-scale risks can blow up rapidly, which makes the development of an effective policy challenging owing to the limitations on time and resources available for analysing threats and estimating the likelihood of their occurrence.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Del Rio Vilas|first1= Alberto|last2=Voller|first2= Fay |last3=Montibeller|first3= Gilberto|last4=Franco |first4= L. Alberto | last5=Sribhashyam |first5=Sumitra| last6=Watson|first6=Eamon |last7=Hartley|first7=Matt| last8=Gibbens|first8=Jane C.|display-authors=3|date=2013-02-01|title=An integrated process and management tools for ranking multiple emerging threats to animal health|url=https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/25118 |s2cid-access=free |journal=Preventive Veterinary Medicine|volume=108|issue=2–3|pages=94–102|doi=10.1016/j.prevetmed.2012.08.007|pmid=22954461|s2cid= 23937402 |url-status=live |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20231106191721/https://repository.lboro.ac.uk/articles/journal_contribution/An_integrated_process_and_management_tools_for_ranking_multiple_emerging_threats_to_animal_health/9500423 |archive-date= Nov 6, 2023 }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Jaspersen|first1=Johannes G.|last2=Montibeller|first2=Gilberto|date=2015-07-01|title=Probability Elicitation Under Severe Time Pressure: A Rank-Based Method|journal=Risk Analysis|volume=35 |issue=7|pages=1317–1335|doi=10.1111/risa.12357|issn=1539-6924|pmid=25850859|bibcode=2015RiskA..35.1317J |s2cid=30118666 |url=https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/21596 }}</ref> It is likely that further synergies with other disciplines, such as [[virology]] or the detection of [[chemical contaminant]]s, will develop over time.<ref name=infosan/>

Some uncertainties about the policy implementation for biosecurity remain for future. In order to carefully plan out preventive policies, policy makers need to be able to somewhat predict the probability and assess the risks; however, as the uncertain nature of the biosecurity issue goes it is largely difficult to predict and also involves a complex process as it requires a multidisciplinary approach. The policy choices they make to address an immediate threat could pose another threat in the future, facing an unintended trade-off.<ref name=koblentz2010/>

Philosopher [[Toby Ord]], in his 2020 book ''[[The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity]]'', puts into question whether the current international conventions regarding biotechnology research and development regulation, and self-regulation by biotechnology companies and the scientific community are adequate.<ref name=ord2020/><ref>{{Cite news|last=Ord|first=Toby|date=2021-03-23|title=Covid-19 has shown humanity how close we are to the edge|language=en-GB|work=The Guardian|url=https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/mar/23/covid-19-humanity-resilience-climate-ai-pandemic|access-date=2021-03-26|issn=0261-3077}}</ref>

American scientists have proposed various [[policy]]-based measures to reduce the large risks from life sciences research – such as [[Pandemic prevention|pandemics through accident or misapplication]]. [[Risk management]] measures may include novel [[global governance|international guidelines]], effective oversight, improvement of US policies to influence policies globally, and identification of gaps in biosecurity policies along with potential approaches to address them.<ref>{{cite web |title=Forschung an Krankheitserregern soll sicherer werden |url=https://www.sciencemediacenter.de/alle-angebote/research-in-context/details/news/forschung-an-krankheitserregern-soll-sicherer-werden/ |website=Science Media Center Germany |date=2022 |access-date=17 January 2023 |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Pannu |first1=Jaspreet |last2=Palmer |first2=Megan J. |last3=Cicero |first3=Anita |last4=Relman |first4=David A. |last5=Lipsitch |first5=Marc |last6=Inglesby |first6=Tom |title=Strengthen oversight of risky research on pathogens |s2cid-access=free |url=https://www.science.org/cms/asset/f5fa7633-934b-402d-b23f-2661eacfdb36/science.adf6020.v1.pdf |journal=Science |date=16 December 2022 |volume=378 |issue=6625 |pages=1170–1172 |doi=10.1126/science.adf6020 |pmid=36480598 |bibcode=2022Sci...378.1170P |s2cid=254998228 |language=en |issn=0036-8075 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230523125753/https://www.science.org/cms/asset/f5fa7633-934b-402d-b23f-2661eacfdb36/science.adf6020.v1.pdf |archive-date= May 23, 2023 }}
* University press release: {{cite news |title=Stanford Researchers Recommend Stronger Oversight of Risky Research on Pathogens |url=https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/stanford-researchers-recommend-stronger-oversight-risky-research-pathogens |access-date=17 January 2023 |work=Stanford University Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies |date= December 8, 2022 |first1=Ari |last1=Chasnoff |language=en}}</ref>

Researchers have also warned in 2024 of potential risks from [[mirror life]], a hypothetical form of life whose molecular building blocks have inverted [[chirality]]. If mirror bacteria were synthesized, they may be able to evade immune systems and spread in the environment without natural predators. They noted that the technology to create mirror bacteria was still probably more than a decade away, but called for a ban on research aiming to create them.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Adamala |first1=Katarzyna P. |last2=Agashe |first2=Deepa |last3=Belkaid |first3=Yasmine |last4=Bittencourt |first4=Daniela Matias de C. |last5=Cai |first5=Yizhi |last6=Chang |first6=Matthew W. |last7=Chen |first7=Irene A. |last8=Church |first8=George M. |last9=Cooper |first9=Vaughn S. |last10=Davis |first10=Mark M. |last11=Devaraj |first11=Neal K. |last12=Endy |first12=Drew |last13=Esvelt |first13=Kevin M. |last14=Glass |first14=John I. |last15=Hand |first15=Timothy W. |date=2024-12-12 |title=Confronting risks of mirror life |url=https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.ads9158 |journal=Science |volume=386 |issue=6728 |pages=1351–1353 |doi=10.1126/science.ads9158|pmid=39666824 |bibcode=2024Sci...386.1351A }}</ref>

=== Role of education ===
The advance of the life sciences and biotechnology has the potential to bring great benefits to humankind through responding to societal challenges. However, it is also possible that such advances could be exploited for hostile purposes, something evidenced in a small number of incidents of bioterrorism, particularly by the series of large-scale offensive [[biological warfare]] programs carried out by major states in the last century. Dealing with this challenge, which has been labelled the "dual-use dilemma", requires a number of different activities. However, one way of ensuring that the life sciences continue to generate significant benefits and do not become subject to misuse for hostile purposes is a process of engagement between scientists and the security community, and the development of strong ethical and normative frameworks to complement legal and regulatory measures that are developed by states.<ref name=handbook/><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.bradford.ac.uk/bioethics/Guide_complete.pdf|title=Preventing Biological Threats: What You Can Do |editor-first1=Simon |editor-last1=Whitby|editor-first2=Tatyana |editor-last2=Novossiolova |editor-first3=Gerald|editor-last3= Walther|editor-first4=Malcolm|editor-last4= Dando|date=Dec 2015|publisher=Bradford Disarmament Research Centre|access-date=22 May 2020}}</ref>

==See also==
{{div col|colwidth=22em}}
* [[Biodefence]]
* [[Biological Weapons Convention]]
* [[Biorisk]]
* [[Biosecurity in Australia]]
* [[Biosecurity in New Zealand]]
* [[Biosecurity in the United States]]
* [[Biowar]]
* [[Cyberbiosecurity]]
* [[Food safety]]
* [[Global health]] 
* [[Global Health Security Initiative]] (GHSI) 
* [[Good Agricultural Practices]]
* [[Human security]]
* [[International Health Regulations]]
* [[Interplanetary contamination]]
* [[Public health]]
* [[Quarantine]]
* [[Select agent]]
{{div col end}}

==References==
{{Reflist}}

==Further reading==
===General===
* '''[http://biosecuritycommons.org/index.php?title=Main_Page Biosecurity Commons]''', a [[Wiki]] Database
* {{citation |url=https://www.jglobalbiosecurity.com/|issn=2652-0036|title=Global Biosecurity|publisher=[[University of New South Wales]]}} – A peer-reviewed, open access electronic journal for cross-disciplinary research in all aspects of human or animal epidemics, pandemics, biosecurity, bioterrorism and CBRN, including prevention, governance, detection, mitigation and response.

===Articles and books===
* Chen, Lincoln, Jennifer Leaning, and Vasant Narasimhan, eds. (2003). [https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674014534 ''Global Health Challenges for Human Security''] Harvard University Press.
*{{cite book|title=Managing Biosecurity Across Borders|editor-first1=Ian|editor-last1= Falk|editor-first2= Ruth |editor-last2=Wallace|editor-first3=Marthen L.|editor-last3= Ndoen|edition=Illustrated|publisher=Springer Science & Business Media|date=2011|isbn=9789400714120}}
* {{cite book|publisher=United Nations|date=2004|author=High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change|author-link=High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change|title=A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change|url=http://providus.lv/article_files/931/original/HLP_report_en.pdf?1326375616|page=41}}
*Hoyt, Kendall and Brooks, Stephen G. (2003). [https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/016228803773100093 "A Double-Edged Sword: Globalization and Biosecurity"]. ''International Affairs'', Vol. 23, No. 3. 
* Koblentz, Gregory D. (2012). [https://www.jstor.org/stable/41428545 "From biodefence to biosecurity: the Obama administration's strategy for countering biological threats"]. ''International Affairs'', Vol. 88, Issue 1. 
* Lakoff, Andrew, and Sorensen, Georg. (October 2008). ''Biosecurity Interventions: Global Health and Security in Question'', Columbia University Press, {{ISBN|9780231146067}}. (Details [http://cup.columbia.edu/book/biosecurity-interventions/9780231146067 here].)
*Paris, Roland. (2001). [http://users.metu.edu.tr/utuba/Paris.pdf "Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?"]. ''International Affairs'', Vol. 26, No. 2.
* Tadjbakhsh, Shahrbanou. and Chenoy, Anuradha. (2007). ''Human Security: Concepts and Implications''. New York, Routledge. {{ISBN|978-0415473385}} p.&nbsp;42. (Also 2005 article [https://www.sciencespo.fr/ceri/sites/sciencespo.fr.ceri/files/etude117_118.pdf here])

==External links==
* [http://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/dece81cb-988b-56a1-af14-6699cd1bc0f2/ Biosecurity] at the FAO
* [https://www.inspection.gc.ca/eng/1297964599443/1297965645317 Canadian Food Inspection Agency]
* [https://www.oie.int/en/what-we-do/global-initiatives/biological-threat-reduction/ OIE Biological Threat Reduction Strategy] ([[World Organisation for Animal Health]])

{{Sustainability}}

[[Category:Biosecurity| ]]