Editing Collective action

{{Short description|Action taken together by a group of people to further a common objective}}
{{sociology}}

'''Collective action ''' refers to action taken together [[Advocacy group|by a group of people]] whose [[goal]] is to enhance their condition and achieve a common objective.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1917157/collective-action-problem|title=collective action problem - collective action|website=Encyclopædia Britannica}}</ref> It is a term that has formulations and theories in many areas of the [[social science]]s including [[psychology]], [[sociology]], [[anthropology]], [[political science]] and [[economics]].

==The social identity model==
Researchers Martijn van Zomeren, Tom Postmes, and Russell Spears conducted a meta-analysis of over 180 studies of collective action, in an attempt to integrate three dominant socio-psychological perspectives explaining antecedent conditions to this phenomenon – injustice, efficacy, and identity.<ref name="van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears (2008)">{{cite journal|last1 = van Zomeren|first1 = M.|last2=Postmes|first2=T.|last3=Spears|first3=R.|title = Toward an integrative social identity model of collective action: A quantitative research synthesis of three socio-psychological perspectives |journal = Psychological Bulletin|volume = 134| issue = 4| pages = 504–535|year = 2008|doi = 10.1037/0033-2909.134.4.504|pmid = 18605818|citeseerx = 10.1.1.576.5638| s2cid=18741272 }}</ref> In their resultant 2008 review article, an integrative Social Identity Model of Collective Action (SIMCA) was proposed which accounts for interrelationships among the three predictors as well as their predictive capacities for collective action.<ref name="van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears (2008)"/> An important assumption of this approach is that people tend to respond to subjective states of disadvantage, which may or may not flow from objective physical and social reality.

===Perceived injustice===
Examining collective action through perceived injustice was initially guided by [[Relative deprivation theory|relative deprivation theory (RDT)]]. RDT focuses on a subjective state of unjust disadvantage, proposing that engaging in fraternal (group-based) social comparisons with others may result in feelings of relative deprivation that foster collective action. Group-based emotions resulting from perceived injustice, such as anger, are thought to motivate collective action in an attempt to rectify the state of unfair deprivation.<ref name="van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears (2008)"/> The extent to which individuals respond to this deprivation involves several different factors and varies from extremely high to extremely low across different settings.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Ostrom|first1=Elinor|title=Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms|journal=The Journal of Economic Perspectives|volume=14|issue=3|pages=137–158|doi=10.1257/jep.14.3.137|year=2000|url=http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/5683/Collective%20action%20and%20the%20evolution%20of%20social%20norms.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y|hdl=10535/5683|hdl-access=free}}</ref>  Meta-analysis results confirm that effects of injustice causally predict collective action, highlighting the theoretical importance of this variable.<ref name="van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears (2008)"/>

===Perceived efficacy===
Moving beyond RDT, scholars suggested that in addition to a sense of injustice, people must also have the objective, structural resources necessary to [[Resource mobilization|mobilize change]] through social protest. An important psychological development saw this research instead directed towards subjective expectations and beliefs that unified effort (collective action) is a viable option for achieving group-based goals – this is referred to as perceived collective efficacy. Empirically, collective efficacy is shown to causally affect collective action among a number of populations across varied contexts.<ref name="van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears (2008)"/>

===Social identity===
[[Social identity theory]] (SIT) suggests that people strive to achieve and maintain positive social identities associated with their group memberships.<ref name="Tajfel & Turner (1979)">{{cite journal|last1 = Tajfel|first1 = H.|last2=Turner|first2=J.C.|title = An integrative theory of inter-group conflict. In W.G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.)|journal = The Social Psychology of Inter-group Relations|pages= 33–47|year = 1979}}</ref> Where a group membership is disadvantaged (for example, low status), SIT implicates three variables in the evocation of collective action to improve conditions for the group – permeability of group boundaries,<ref name="Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam (1990)">{{cite journal| author1 = Stephen C. Wright | author2 = Donald M. Taylor | author3 = Fathali M. Moghaddam |title = Responding to Membership in a Disadvantaged Group: From Acceptance to Collective Protest |journal = Journal of Personality and Social Psychology| volume = 58|pages = 994–1003|date = June 1990| doi = 10.1037/0022-3514.58.6.994|issue = 6| url = http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=64044 }}</ref> legitimacy of the intergroup structures, and the stability of these relationships. For example, when disadvantaged groups perceive intergroup status relationships as illegitimate and unstable, collective action is predicted to occur, in an attempt to change status structures for the betterment of the disadvantaged group.

Meta-analysis results also confirm that social identity causally predicts collective action across a number of diverse contexts. Additionally, the integrated SIMCA affords another important role to social identity – that of a psychological bridge forming the collective base from which both collective efficacy and group injustice may be conceived.{{Citation needed|date=October 2016}}

===Model refinement===
While there is sound empirical support for the causal importance of SIMCA's key theoretical variables on collective action,<ref name="van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears (2008)"/> more recent literature has addressed the issue of reverse causation, finding support for a related, yet distinct, encapsulation model of social identity in collective action (EMSICA).<ref name="Thomas, Mavor & McGarty (2011)">{{cite journal|last1 = Thomas|first1 = E.F.|last2=Mavor|first2=K.I.|last3=McGarty|first3=C.|s2cid = 53577195|title = Social identities facilitate and encapsulate action-relevant constructs: A test of the social identity model of collective action|journal = Group Processes and Intergroup Relations|volume = 15| issue = 1| pages = 75–88|year = 2011|doi = 10.1177/1368430211413619|hdl = 1885/66105|hdl-access = free}}</ref> This model suggests that perceived group efficacy and perceived injustice provide the basis from which social identity emerges, highlighting an alternative causal pathway to collective action. Recent research has sought to integrate SIMCA with [[Contact hypothesis|intergroup contact theory]] (see Cakal, Hewstone, Schwär, & Heath<ref name="Cakal, Hewstone, Schwär & Heath (2011)">{{cite journal|last1 = Cakal|first1 = H.|last2=Hewstone|first2=M.|last3=Schwär|first3=G.|last4=Heath|first4=A.|title = An investigation of the social identity model of collective action and the 'sedative' effect of intergroup contact among Black and White students in South Africa|journal = British Journal of Social Psychology|volume = 50| pages = 606–627|year = 2011|doi = 10.1111/j.2044-8309.2011.02075.x|pmid = 22122025|issue = 4}}</ref>) and others have extended SIMCA through bridging morality research with the collective action literature (see van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears<ref name="van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears (2012)">{{cite journal|last1 = van Zomeren|first1 = M.|last2=Postmes|first2=T.|last3=Spears|first3=R.|s2cid = 44659756|title = On conviction's collective consequences: Integrating moral conviction with the social identity model of collective action|journal = British Journal of Social Psychology|volume = 51| pages = 52–71|year = 2012|doi = 10.1111/j.2044-8309.2010.02000.x|pmid = 22435846|issue = 1|url = https://pure.rug.nl/ws/files/143451835/On_conviction_s_collective_consequences_Integrating_moral_conviction_with.pdf}}</ref> for a review).

Also, utopian thinking has been proposed as an antecendant to collective action, aside to the route affecting perceived injustice, efficacy, or social identity.<ref name="Fernando-2020">{{Cite journal |last1=Fernando |first1=Julian W. |last2=O'Brien |first2=Léan V. |last3=Burden |first3=Nicholas J. |last4=Judge |first4=Madeline |last5=Kashima |first5=Yoshihisa |date=March 2020 |title=Greens or space invaders: Prominent utopian themes and effects on social change motivation |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ejsp.2607 |journal=European Journal of Social Psychology |language=en |volume=50 |issue=2 |pages=278–291 |doi=10.1002/ejsp.2607 |issn=0046-2772|hdl=10536/DRO/DU:30136822 |hdl-access=free }}</ref> Utopian thinking contributes to accessing cognitive alternatives, which are imagined models of societies that are different from the current society.<ref name="Fernando-2020" /> Cognitive alternatives are proposed by many social identity theorists as an effective way to increase collective action.<ref>{{Cite book |last= Tajfel, Henri; Turner, John C. |title=The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior |publisher=Psychology Press |date=2004-01-09 |isbn=978-0-203-50598-4 |pages=276–293}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Reicher, S. D., & Haslam, S. A. |title=Change we can believe in: The role of social identity, cognitive alternatives, and leadership in group mobilization and social transformation. In B. Wagoner, E. Jensen, & J. A. Oldmeadow (Eds.), Culture and social change: Transforming society through the power of ideas |publisher=IAP Information Age Publishing. |year=2012 |pages=53–73}}</ref> Moreover, utopian thinking has the potential to increase perceived injustice, perceived efficacy, or form new social identities and therefore affect collective action.<ref name="Fernando-2020" />

==Public good==
The economic theory of collective action is concerned with the provision of [[Public good (economics)|public good]]s (and other collective consumption) through the [[collaboration]] of two or more individuals, and the impact of [[externality|externalities]] on group behavior. It is more commonly referred to as [[Public Choice]].  [[Mancur Olson]]'s 1965 book ''[[The Logic of Collective Action|The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups]],'' is an important early analysis of the problems of public good cost.

Besides economics, the theory has found many applications in [[political science]], [[sociology]], [[communication]], [[anthropology]] and [[environmentalism]].

===Collective action problem===
{{main|Collective action problem}}
The term collective action problem describes the situation in which multiple individuals would all benefit from a certain action, but has an associated cost making it implausible that any individual can or will undertake and solve it alone. The ideal solution is then to undertake this as a collective action, the cost of which is shared. Situations like this include the [[prisoner's dilemma]], a collective action problem in which no communication is allowed, the [[free rider problem]], and the [[tragedy of the commons]], also known as the problem with open access.<ref>Archived at [https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211211/WYA1y405JW0 Ghostarchive]{{cbignore}} and the [https://web.archive.org/web/20160409041214/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WYA1y405JW0 Wayback Machine]{{cbignore}}: {{cite web|last1=Agar|first1=Jesse|title=Tragedy of the Commons │ The Problem with Open Access|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WYA1y405JW0|website=Youtube|date=9 June 2015 |publisher=This Place (youtube channel)|access-date=Jun 9, 2015}}{{cbignore}}</ref>  An allegorical metaphor often used to describe the problem is "[[belling the cat]]".<ref>{{Cite book |last=Dowding |first=Keith |author-link=Keith Dowding |year=1996 |title=Power |pages=31&nbsp;''ff.'' |publisher=University of Minnesota Press |isbn= 978-0-8166-2941-1 }}</ref>

Solutions to collective action problems include mutually binding agreements, government regulation, privatisation, and [[assurance contract]]s, also known as crowdacting.<ref>Archived at [https://ghostarchive.org/varchive/youtube/20211211/u6tqZqoh8DY Ghostarchive]{{cbignore}} and the [https://web.archive.org/web/20170609234457/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u6tqZqoh8DY&list=PLhZIV92at14Sq0eEvvgSFpyMHnK269pNj Wayback Machine]{{cbignore}}: {{cite web|last1=van den Akker|first1=Ron|title=Crowdacting|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u6tqZqoh8DY|website=YouTube|date=7 September 2016 |publisher=Bord&Stift|access-date=Sep 7, 2016}}{{cbignore}}</ref>

===Exploitation of the great by the small===
[[Mancur Olson]] made the claim that individual [[Rational choice theory|rational choice]] leads to situations where individuals with more resources will carry a higher burden in the provision of the public good than poorer ones.<ref>{{Cite document|last=Olson|first=Mancur|title=logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups|year=1965|publisher=Harvard University Press|location=Cambridge, MA}}</ref><!-- why exactly is this so controversial? --> Poorer individuals will usually have little choice but to opt for the [[Free rider problem|free rider]] strategy, i.e., they will attempt to benefit from the public good without contributing to its provision. This may also encourage the under-production (inefficient production) of the public good.

===Institutional design===
While public goods are often provided by governments, this is not always the case.  Various institutional designs have been studied with the aim of reducing the collaborative failure.  The best design for a given situation depends on the production costs, the utility function, and the collaborative effects, amongst other things.  Here are only some examples:

====Joint products====
A joint-product model analyzes the collaborative effect of joining a private good to a public good.  For example, a tax deduction (private good) can be tied to a donation to a charity (public good).

It can be shown that the provision of the public good increases when tied to the private good, as long as the private good is provided by a monopoly (otherwise the private good would be provided by competitors without the link to the public good).

====Clubs====
Some institutional design, e.g., [[Intellectual property|intellectual property rights]], can introduce an exclusion mechanism and turn a pure [[Public good (economics)|public good]] into an impure public good artificially.

If the costs of the exclusion mechanism are not higher than the gain from the [[collaboration]], clubs can emerge.  [[James M. Buchanan]] showed in his seminal paper that clubs can be an efficient alternative to government interventions.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Buchanan|first=James M.|title=An Economic Theory of Clubs|journal=Economica|year=1965|volume=32|pages=1–14|jstor=2552442|doi=10.2307/2552442|issue=125}}</ref>

A [[nation]] can be seen as a club whose members are its citizens. Government would then be the manager of this club.

====Federated structure====
In some cases, theory shows that collaboration emerges spontaneously in smaller groups rather than in large ones (see e.g. [[Dunbar's number]]). This explains why [[trade union|labor unions]] or [[Charitable organization|charities]] often have a federated structure.

==In philosophy==
Since the late 20th century, analytic philosophers have been exploring the nature of collective action in the sense of acting together, as when people paint a house together, go for a walk together, or together execute a pass play. These particular examples have been central for three of the philosophers who have made well known contributions to this literature:  [[Michael Bratman]], [[Margaret Gilbert]], and [[John Searle]], respectively.

In {{Harv|Gilbert|1989}} and subsequent articles and book chapters including Gilbert (2006, chapter 7), whom argues for an account of collective action according to which this rests on a special kind of interpersonal commitment, what Gilbert calls a "joint commitment". A joint commitment in Gilbert's sense is not a matter of a set of personal commitments independently created by each of the participants, as when each makes a personal decision to do something. Rather, it is a single commitment to whose creation each participant makes a contribution. Thus suppose that one person says "Shall we go for a walk?" and the other says "Yes, let's". Gilbert proposes that as a result of this exchange the parties are jointly committed to go for a walk, and thereby obligated to one another to act as if they were parts of a single person taking a walk. Joint commitments can be created less explicitly and through processes that are more extended in time. One merit of a joint commitment account of collective action, in Gilbert's view, is that it explains the fact that those who are out on a walk together, for instance, understand that each of them is in a position to demand corrective action of the other if he or she acts in ways that affect negatively the completion of their walk. In {{Harv|Gilbert|2006a}} she discusses the pertinence of joint commitment to collective actions in the sense of the theory of rational choice.

In Searle (1990) Searle argues that what lies at the heart of a collective action is the presence in the mind of each participant of a "we-intention". Searle does not give an account of we-intentions or, as he also puts it, "[[collective intentionality]]", but insists that they are distinct from the "I-intentions" that animate the actions of persons acting alone.

In Bratman (1993) Bratman proposed that, roughly, two people "share an intention" to paint a house together when each intends that the house is painted by virtue of the activity of each, and also intends that it is so painted by virtue of the intention of each that it is so painted. That these conditions obtain must also be "common knowledge" between the participants.

Discussion in this area continues to expand, and has influenced discussions in other disciplines including anthropology, developmental psychology, and economics. One general question is whether it is necessary to think in terms that go beyond the personal intentions of individual human beings properly to characterize what it is to act together. Bratman's account does not go beyond such personal intentions. Gilbert's account, with its invocation of joint commitment, does go beyond them. Searle's account does also, with its invocation of [[collective intentionality]]. The question of whether and how one must account for the existence of mutual obligations when there is a collective intention is another of the issues in this area of inquiry.

==Spontaneous consensus==

In addition to the psychological mechanisms of collective action as explained by the [[#The social identity model|social identity model]], researchers have developed sociological models of why collective action exists and have studied under what conditions collective action emerges.<ref name="Baronchelli (2017)">{{Cite journal |last=Baronchelli |first=Andrea |arxiv=1704.07767|title=The Emergence of Consensus |journal=Royal Society Open Science |volume=5 |issue=2 |pages=172189 |year=2018 |bibcode=2018RSOS....572189B |doi=10.1098/rsos.172189 |pmid=29515905 |pmc=5830794}}</ref> Along this social dimension, a special case of the general collective action problem is one of collective agreement: how does a group of agents (humans, animals, robots, etc.) reach consensus about a decision or belief, in the absence of central organization? Common examples can be found from domains as diverse as biology ([[flocking (behavior)|flocking]], [[shoaling and schooling]], and general [[collective animal behavior]]), economics ([[Herd behavior#Stock market bubbles|stock market bubbles]]), and sociology ([[Convention (norm)#Social|social conventions]] and [[Norm (social)|norms]]) among others.

Consensus is distinct from the [[#Collective action problem|collective action problem]] in that there often is not an explicit goal, benefit, or cost of action but rather it concerns itself with a [[social equilibrium]] of the individuals involved (and their beliefs). And it can be considered '''''spontaneous''''' when it emerges without the presence of a centralized [[institution]] among self-interested individuals.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Sugden |first1=Robert |date=1989 |title=Spontaneous order |journal=The Journal of Economic Perspectives |volume=3 |issue=4 |pages=85–97 |doi=10.1257/jep.3.4.85 |doi-access=free }}</ref>

===Dimensions===

Spontaneous consensus can be considered along 4 dimensions involving the social structure of the individuals participating (local versus global) in the consensus as well as the processes (competitive vs cooperative) involved in reaching consensus:<ref name="Baronchelli (2017)"/>

* Competitive
* Cooperative
* Local
* Global

====Competitive versus cooperative====

The underlying processes of spontaneous consensus can be viewed either as ''cooperation'' among individuals trying to coordinate themselves through their interactions or as ''competition'' between the alternatives or choices to be decided upon.<ref name="Baronchelli (2017)"/> Depending on the dynamics of the individuals involved as well as the context of the alternatives considered for consensus, the process can be wholly cooperative, wholly competitive, or a mix of the two.

====Local versus global====

The distinction between local and global consensus can be viewed in terms of the social structure underlying the network of individuals participating in the consensus making process. ''Local consensus'' occurs when there is agreement between groups of neighboring nodes while ''global consensus'' refers to the state in which most of the population has reached an agreement.<ref name="Baronchelli (2017)"/> How and why consensus is reached is dependent on both the structure of the social network of individuals as well as the presence (or lack) of centralized [[institutions]].

===Equilibrium mechanisms===

There are many mechanisms (social and psychological) that have been identified to underlie the consensus making process.<ref name="Baronchelli (2017)"/> They have been used to both explain the emergence of spontaneous consensus and understand how to facilitate an equilibrium between individuals and can be grouped according to their role in the process.

* Facilitation of Equilibrium
** Communication<ref name="ReferenceA">{{cite journal |last1=Garrod |first1=Simon |last2=Doherty |first2=Gwyneth |date=1994 |title=Conversation, co-ordination and convention: An empirical investigation of how groups establish linguistic conventions |pmid=7842633 |journal=Cognition |volume=53 |issue=3 |pages=181–215 |doi=10.1016/0010-0277(94)90048-5 |s2cid=26766644 }}</ref>
** Punishment of Deviants<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Boyd |first1=Robert |last2=Richerson |first2=Peter |date=1992 |title=Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/222465471 |journal=Ethology and Sociobiology |volume=13 |issue=3 |pages=171–195 |doi=10.1016/0162-3095(92)90032-Y }}</ref>
** Positive Payoffs<ref name="Schelling 1960">{{cite book |last=Schelling |first=Thomas |date=1960 |title=The strategy of conflict |url=http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674840317 |publisher=Harvard University Press |isbn=9780674840317 }}</ref>
** [[Conformity]] Bias<ref>{{cite book |last=Asch |first=Solomon |editor-last=Aronson |editor-first=Elliot |title=Readings about the social animal |publisher=Macmillan |date=1955 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/readingsaboutso000aron/page/17 17–26] |chapter=Opinions and social pressure |isbn=9780716759669 |chapter-url=https://archive.org/details/readingsaboutso000aron |url=https://archive.org/details/readingsaboutso000aron/page/17 }}</ref>
* Selection of Alternatives
** Logical Reflection<ref>{{cite book |last1=Harsanyi |first1=John |last2=Selten |first2=Reinhard |date=1988 |title=A general theory of equilibrium selection in games |url=https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/general-theory-equilibrium-selection-games |publisher=MIT Press Books |page=1 |isbn=9780262582384 }}</ref>
** Psychological and shared biases<ref name="Schelling 1960"/>
** Chance (when all alternatives are equivalent)<ref>{{cite journal |last=Young |first=H Peyton |s2cid=155064244 |date=1996 |title=The economics of convention |jstor=2138484 |journal=The Journal of Economic Perspectives |volume=10 |issue=2 |pages=105–122 |doi=10.1257/jep.10.2.105 |doi-access=free }}</ref>

===Methods and techniques===

Due to the interdisciplinary nature of both the mechanisms as well as the applications of spontaneous consensus, a variety of techniques have been developed to study the emergence and evolution of spontaneous cooperation. Two of the most widely used are [[game theory]] and [[social network analysis]].

====Game theory====

Traditionally [[game theory]] has been used to study [[zero-sum games]] but has been extended to many [[game theory#Game types|different types of games]]. Relevant to the study of spontaneous consensus are [[cooperative game theory|cooperative]] and [[non-cooperative game theory|non-cooperative]] games. Since a consensus must be reached without the presence of any external authoritative institution for it to be considered ''spontaneous'', non-cooperative games and [[Nash equilibrium]] have been the dominant paradigm for which to study its emergence.

In the context of non-cooperative games, a consensus is a formal Nash equilibrium that all players tend towards through [[self-enforcing agreement|self-enforcing]] alliances or agreements.

An important case study of the underlying mathematical dynamics is the [[coordination game]]. Even when coordination is desired, it can be difficult to achieve due to incomplete information and constrained time horizons.

====Social network analysis====

An alternative approach to studying the emergence of spontaneous consensus—that avoids many of the unnatural or overly constrained assumptions of game theoretic models—is the use of network based methods and social network analysis (SNA). These SNA models are theoretically grounded in the communication mechanism<ref name="ReferenceA"/> of facilitating consensus and describe its emergence through the information propagation processes of the network ([[behavioral contagion]]). Through the spread of influence (and ideas) between agents participating in the consensus, local and global consensus can emerge if the agents in the network achieve a shared equilibrium state. Leveraging this model of consensus, researchers have shown that local peer influence can be used to reach a global consensus and cooperation across the entire network.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Mani |first1=Ankur |last2=Rahwan |first2=Iyad |last3=Pentland |first3=Alex |date=2013 |title=Inducing Peer Pressure to Promote Cooperation |journal=Scientific Reports |volume=3 |issue=1735 |pages=1735 |doi=10.1038/srep01735 |pmid=23619166 |pmc=3636514 |bibcode=2013NatSR...3.1735M }}</ref> While this model of consensus and cooperation has been shown to be successful in certain contexts, research suggest that communication and social influence cannot be fully captured by simple contagion models<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Alshamsi |first1=Aamena |last2=Pianesi |first2=Fabio |last3=Lepri |first3=Bruno |last4=Pentland |first4=Alex |last5=Rahwan |first5=Iyad |date=2015 |title=Beyond Contagion: Reality Mining Reveals Complex Patterns of Social Influence |journal=PLOS ONE |volume=10 |issue=8 |doi=10.1371/journal.pone.0135740 |pmid=26313449 |pmc=4551670 |page=e0135740|arxiv=1507.04192 |bibcode=2015PLoSO..1035740A |doi-access=free }}</ref> and as such a pure contagion based model of consensus may have limits.

==See also==

* [[Anti-corruption#Collective action|Anti-corruption collective action]]
* [[Collaborative innovation network]]
* [[Collective intelligence]]
* [[Collective intentionality]]
* [[Common property resource]]
* [[Constitutional economics]]
* [[Coordination good]]
* [[Free rider problem]]
* [[Group action (sociology)]]
* [[Mass collaboration]]
* [[Nash equilibrium]]
* [[Outline of organizational theory]]
* [[Pareto efficiency]]
* [[Polytely]]
* [[Prisoner's dilemma]]
* [[Private-collective model of innovation]]
* [[Public good (economics)|Public good]]
* [[Social fact]]
* [[Tragedy of the commons]]
* [[Tragedy of the anticommons]]

== Footnotes ==
{{reflist}}

== Bibliography ==
{{Library resources box}}{{refbegin}}
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* {{cite book | editor-last1 = Meinzen-Dick | editor-first1 = Ruth Suseela | editor-last2 = di Gregorio | editor-first2 = Monica | title = Collective action and property rights for sustainable development | url = http://www.ifpri.org/publication/collective-action-and-property-rights-sustainable-development | publisher = International Food Policy Research Institute | location = Washington, DC | id = 2020 Focus No. 11 | year = 2004 }} [http://www.ifpri.org/cdmref/p15738coll2/id/129259/filename/129470.pdf Pdf.]
* {{cite book | last = Olson | first = Mancur | title = The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups | publisher = Harvard University Press | location = Cambridge, Massachusetts | year = 1965 | isbn = 9780674537514 | url = https://archive.org/details/logicofcollectiv00olso_0 }}
* {{cite book | last = Ostrom | first = Elinor | title = Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action | publisher = Cambridge University Press | location = Cambridge New York | year = 1990 | isbn = 9780521405997 }}
* {{citation | last = Searle | first = John R. | contribution = Collective intentions and actions | editor-last = Searle | editor-first = John R. | title = Consciousness and language | pages = [https://archive.org/details/consciousnesslan00john/page/90 90–105] | publisher = Cambridge University Press | location = New York | year = 2002 | isbn = 9780521597449 | postscript = . | url = https://archive.org/details/consciousnesslan00john/page/90 }}
* {{cite journal | last = van Winden | first = Frans | title = Political economy with affect: on the role of emotions and relationships in political economics | journal = [[European Journal of Political Economy]] | volume = 40 | issue = B | pages = 298–311 | doi= 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.05.005 | date = December 2015 }}
{{refend}}

==External links==
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{{DEFAULTSORT:Collective Action}}
[[Category:Community building]]
[[Category:Public choice theory]]
[[Category:Political science terminology]]
[[Category:Sociological terminology]]
[[Category:Social sciences terminology]]