Editing Constructive empiricism

{{Short description|Form of empiricism in philosophy of science}}
In [[philosophy of science]], '''constructive empiricism''' is a form of [[empiricism]]. While it is sometimes referred to as an empiricist form of [[Structuralism (philosophy of science)|structuralism]], its main proponent, [[Bas van Fraassen]], has consistently distinguished between the two views.<ref>Votsis, I. (2004), ''The Epistemological Status of Scientific Theories: An Investigation of the Structural Realist Account'', University of London, London School of Economics, PhD Thesis, p. 39.</ref>

==Overview==
[[Bas van Fraassen]] is nearly solely responsible for the initial development of constructive empiricism; its historically most important presentation appears in his ''The Scientific Image'' (1980). Constructive empiricism states that [[scientific theory|scientific theories]] are [[semantics|semantically]] literal, that they aim to be empirically adequate, and that their acceptance involves, as belief, only that they are empirically adequate. A theory is empirically adequate if and only if everything that it says about observable [[wikt:entity|entities]] is true (regardless of what it says about unobservable entities). A theory is semantically literal if and only if the language of the theory is interpreted in such a way that the claims of the theory are either true or false (as opposed to an [[instrumentalism|instrumentalist]] reading).

Constructive empiricism is thus a [[norm (philosophy)|normative]], [[semantic]] and [[epistemology|epistemological]] thesis.  That [[science]] aims to be empirically adequate expresses the [[normative]] component. That scientific theories are semantically literal expresses the [[semantic]] component. That acceptance involves, as belief, only that a theory is empirically adequate expresses the epistemological component.

Constructive empiricism opposes [[scientific realism]], [[logical positivism]] (or [[logical empiricism]]) and [[instrumentalism]]. Constructive empiricism and scientific realism agree that theories are semantically literal, which logical positivism and instrumentalism deny. Constructive empiricism, logical positivism and instrumentalism agree that theories do not aim for [[truth]] about unobservables, which scientific realism denies.

Constructive empiricism has been used to analyze various scientific fields, from [[physics]] to [[psychology]] (especially [[Psychology#Computer simulation|computational psychology]]).

==See also==
* [[Structuralism (philosophy of science)]], a related view<ref>Votsis, I. (2004), ''The Epistemological Status of Scientific Theories: An Investigation of the Structural Realist Account'', University of London, London School of Economics, PhD Thesis, p. 196.</ref>

==Notes==
{{reflist}}

==References==
*Van Fraassen, Bas. ''The Scientific Image''. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. {{ISBN|0-19-824427-4}}
*Godfrey-Smith, Peter ''Theory and Reality'' p.&nbsp;184-186, 234. University of Chicago Press. {{ISBN|0-226-30063-3}}
*Monton, Bradley (ed.), ''Images of Empiricism: Essays on Science and Stances, with a Reply from Bas C. van Fraassen''. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. {{ISBN|0-19-921884-6}}.

==External links==
*{{cite SEP |url-id=constructive-empiricism |title=Constructive Empiricism}}
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20070927035151/http://journal.ilovephilosophy.com/Article/In-Defence-of-van-Fraassen/140 In Defense of van Fraassen]
*[http://www.princeton.edu/~fraassen/ van Fraassen's website]

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{{Philosophy of science}}
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[[Category:Metatheory of science]]
[[Category:Constructivism]]
[[Category:Empiricism]]