Editing Coombs' method

{{Short description|Single-winner ranked voting rule}}{{Confused|Combs method|text=the [[Combs method]]}}{{Electoral systems sidebar|expanded=Single-winner}}

'''Coombs' method''' is a [[ranked voting systems|ranked voting system]]. Like [[Instant-runoff voting|instant-runoff (IRV-RCV)]], Coombs' method is a [[Sequential elimination method|sequential-loser method]], where the last-place finisher according to one method is eliminated in each round. However, unlike in instant-runoff, each round has electors voting against their least-favorite candidate; the candidate ranked last by the most voters is eliminated.<ref name="Grofman">{{Cite journal |last=Grofman |first=Bernard |last2=Feld |first2=Scott L. |date=2004-12-01 |title=If you like the alternative vote (a.k.a. the instant runoff), then you ought to know about the Coombs rule |url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S026137940300060X |journal=Electoral Studies |volume=23 |issue=4 |pages=641–659 |doi=10.1016/j.electstud.2003.08.001 |issn=0261-3794|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

The method fails several [[voting system criteria]], including [[Condorcet winner criterion|Condorcet's majority criterion]], [[Monotonicity criterion|monotonicity]], [[Participation criterion|participation]], and [[Independence of clones criterion|clone-independence]].<ref>{{cite journal |last=Nurmi |first=Hannu |title=Voting Procedures: A Summary Analysis |journal=British Journal of Political Science |volume=13 |issue=2 |pages=181-208 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |date=1983-04-01 |language=English |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/abs/voting-procedures-a-summary-analysis/67C52E7250EB4B88018B22D59CAA6908 |doi=10.1017/S0007123400003215 |access-date=2024-05-19 |url-access=subscription }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Nurmi |first=Hannu |title=Comparing Voting systems  |publisher=Springer Dordrecht |series= Theory and Decision Library A |volume=3 |edition=Illustrated |date=2012-12-06 |pages=209 |language=English |url= https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-94-009-3985-1?utm_medium=referral&utm_source=google_books&utm_campaign=3_pier05_buy_print&utm_content=en_08082017 |doi= 10.1007/978-94-009-3985-1 |isbn= 9789400939851}}</ref> However, it does satisfy Black's single-peaked [[Median voter property|median voter criterion]].<ref name="Grofman" />{{rp|at=prop. 2}}

== History ==
The method was popularized by [[Clyde Coombs]].<ref name="Grofman" /> It was described by [[Edward J. Nanson]] as the "Venetian method"<ref>{{Cite book |last=Royal Society of Victoria (Melbourne |first=Vic ) |url=http://archive.org/details/transactionsproc1719roya |title=Transactions and proceedings of the Royal Society of Victoria .. |date=1864 |publisher=Melbourne : The Society |others=American Museum of Natural History Library}}</ref> (which should not be confused with the [[Republic of Venice]]'s use of [[score voting]] in elections for [[Doge of Venice|Doge]]).

==Procedures==
Each voter rank-orders all of the candidates on their ballot. Otherwise, the candidate ranked last by the largest number ([[plurality (voting)|plurality]]) of voters is eliminated, making each individual round equivalent to [[anti-plurality voting]]. Conversely, under [[instant-runoff voting]], the candidate ranked first (among non-eliminated candidates) by the fewest voters is eliminated.

In some sources, the elimination proceeds regardless of whether any candidate is ranked first by a majority of voters, and the last candidate to be eliminated is the winner.<ref>Pacuit, Eric, [https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/voting-methods/ "Voting Methods"], ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (Fall 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)</ref> This variant of the method can result in a different winner than the former one (unlike in instant-runoff voting, where checking to see if any candidate is ranked first by a majority of voters is only a shortcut that does not affect the outcome).

==An example==
{{Tenn_voting_example}}

Assuming all of the voters vote sincerely (strategic voting is discussed below), the results would be as follows, by percentage:

{| border="1"
|+'''Coombs' method election results'''
|-
! rowspan="2" | City
! colspan="2" | Round 1
! colspan="2" | Round 2
|-
! First
! Last
! First
! Last
|-
! bgcolor="#ffc0c0" | Memphis
| bgcolor="#ffc0c0" | 42
| bgcolor="#ffc0c0" | 58
| bgcolor="#e0e0ff" | <s>42</s> 0
| bgcolor="#c0c0c0" rowspan="4" |
|-
! bgcolor="#ffc0c0" | Nashville
| bgcolor="#ffc0c0" | 26
| bgcolor="#ffc0c0" | 0
| bgcolor="#ffc0c0" | <s>26</s> 68
|-
! bgcolor="#ffc0c0" | Chattanooga
| bgcolor="#ffc0c0" | 15
| bgcolor="#ffc0c0" | 0
| bgcolor="#ffc0c0" | 15
|-
! bgcolor="#ffc0c0" | Knoxville
| bgcolor="#ffc0c0" | 17
| bgcolor="#ffc0c0" | 42
| bgcolor="#ffc0c0" | 17
|}

* In the first round, no candidate has an absolute majority of first-place votes (51).
* Memphis, having the most last-place votes (26+15+17=58), is therefore eliminated.
* In the second round, Memphis is out of the running, and so must be factored out. Memphis was ranked first on Group A's ballots, so the second choice of Group A, Nashville, gets an additional 42 first-place votes, giving it an absolute majority of first-place votes (68 versus 15+17=32), and making it the winner.
* Note that the last-place votes are only used to eliminate a candidate in a voting round where no candidate achieves an absolute majority; they are disregarded in a round where any candidate has more than 50%. Thus last-place votes play no role in the final round.

== In practice ==
The voting rounds used in the [[reality television]] program ''[[Survivor (TV series)|Survivor]]'' could be considered a variation of Coombs' method but with sequential voting rounds. Everyone votes for one candidate they support for elimination each round, and the candidate with a plurality of that vote is eliminated. A strategy difference is that sequential rounds of voting means the elimination choice is fixed in a ranked ballot Coombs' method until that candidate is eliminated.

== Potential for strategic voting ==
Like [[anti-plurality voting]], Coombs' rule is extremely vulnerable to strategic voting. As a result, it is more often used as an example of a [[Pathological (mathematics)|pathological]] voting rule than a serious proposal.<ref name=":0" /> The equilibrium position for Coombs' method is extremely sensitive to [[Exhausted ballot|incomplete ballots]] and [[strategic nomination]] because the vast majority of voters' effects on the election come from how they fill out the bottom of their ballots.<ref name=":0">[http://www.accuratedemocracy.com/l_data.htm "Data on Manipulability"]</ref> As a result, voters have a strong incentive to rate the strongest candidates last to defeat them in earlier rounds.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Smith |first=Warren D. |date=12 July 2006 |title=Descriptions of single-winner voting systems |url=http://www.9mail.de/m-schulze/votedesc.pdf |journal=Voting Systems}}</ref>

==See also==
* [[List of democracy and elections-related topics]]

==Notes==
<references />

{{voting systems}}

[[Category:Single-winner electoral systems]]
[[Category:Preferential electoral systems]]