Editing Cosmological argument

{{Short description|Argument for the existence of God}}

In the [[philosophy of religion]], a '''cosmological argument''' is an argument for the existence of [[God]] based upon [[observation]]al and [[fact]]ual statements concerning the [[universe]] (or some general category of its [[natural]] contents) typically in the context of [[cause and effect|causation]], change, contingency or finitude.<ref name="Reichenbach">{{cite encyclopedia|last1=Reichenbach |first1=Bruce |title=Cosmological Argument |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmological-argument/ |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=14 January 2025 |date=2022}}</ref><ref name=oderberg>{{cite book |last=Oderberg |first=David S. |author-link=David S. Oderberg |editor1-last=Meister |editor1-first=Chad |editor2-last=Copan |editor2-first=Paul |title=The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Religion |publisher=Routledge |date=September 1, 2007 |pages=341–350 |chapter=The Cosmological Argument |isbn=978-0415380386}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Craig |first1=William Lane |title=The Cosmological Argument From Plato to Leibniz |date=2001 |publisher=[[Wipf and Stock|Wipf and Stock Publishers]] |location=Eugene, Oregon |isbn=1-57910-787-7}}</ref> In referring to [[reason]] and observation alone for its [[premises]], and precluding [[revelation]], this category of argument falls within the domain of [[natural theology]]. A cosmological argument can also sometimes be referred to as an '''argument from universal causation''', an '''argument from first cause''', the '''causal argument''' or the '''prime mover argument'''.

The concept of causation is a principal underpinning idea in all cosmological arguments, particularly in affirming the necessity for a [[First Cause]]. The latter is typically determined in [[philosophical analysis]] to be [[God]], as identified within [[classical theism|classical conceptions of theism]].

The origins of the argument date back to at least [[Aristotle]], developed subsequently within the scholarly traditions of [[Neoplatonism]] and [[early Christianity]], and later under medieval [[muslim|Islamic]] [[scholasticism]] through the 9th to 12th centuries. It would eventually be re-introduced to Christian theology in the 13th century by [[Thomas Aquinas]]. In the 18th century, it would become associated with the [[principle of sufficient reason]] formulated by [[Gottfried Leibniz]] and [[Samuel Clarke]], itself an exposition of the [[Parmenides|Parmenidean]] causal principle that "[[creatio ex materia|nothing comes from nothing]]".

[[Contemporary philosophy|Contemporary]] defenders of cosmological arguments include [[William Lane Craig]],<ref name="craig-sinclair">{{cite book |last1=Craig |first1=William Lane |author-link=William Lane Craig |last2=Sinclair |first2=James D. |editor1-last=Craig |editor1-first=William Lane |editor2-last=Moreland |editor2-first=J. P. |editor2-link=J. P. Moreland |title=The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology |publisher=Wiley-Blackwell |date=May 18, 2009 |pages=101–201 |chapter=The ''Kalam'' Cosmological Argument |isbn=978-1405176576}}</ref> [[Robert Koons]],<ref name="newlook">{{cite journal |last=Koons |first=Robert |author-link=Robert Koons |date=1997 |title=A New Look at the Cosmological Argument |url=http://www.dla.utexas.edu/depts/philosophy/faculty/koons/cosmo.pdf |journal=American Philosophical Quarterly |publisher=University of Illinois Press |volume=34 |issue=2 |pages=193–211 |access-date=2015-03-27 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20030314133629/http://www.dla.utexas.edu/depts/philosophy/faculty/koons/cosmo.pdf |archive-date=2003-03-14 }}</ref> [[John Lennox]], [[Stephen Meyer]], and [[Alexander Pruss]].<ref name="pruss-gale">{{cite book |editor1-last=Gale |editor1-first=Richard M. |editor2-last=Pruss |editor2-first=Alexander |editor2-link=Alexander Pruss |date=March 2003 |title=The Existence of God |location=Burlington, VT |publisher=Ashgate |isbn=978-0754620518}}</ref>

== History ==
<!--- this section is linked to from the article Celestial spheres.  Please do not change its title without either adding an appropriate anchor or appropriately amending all other articles which link to it --->
[[Image:Sanzio 01 Plato Aristotle.jpg|thumb|left|200px|[[Plato]] and [[Aristotle]], depicted here in [[Raphael]]'s ''[[The School of Athens]]'', both developed first cause arguments.]]

=== Classical philosophy ===

[[Plato]] (c. 427–347 BC) and [[Aristotle]] (c. 384–322 BC) both posited first cause arguments, though each had certain notable caveats.<ref>{{harvnb|Craig|2001|pp=1–5, 13}}</ref> In ''[[The Laws]]'' (Book X), Plato posited that all movement in the world and the [[Cosmos]] was "imparted motion". This required a "self-originated motion" to set it in motion and to maintain it. In ''[[Timaeus (dialogue)|Timaeus]]'', Plato posited a "demiurge" of supreme wisdom and intelligence as the creator of the Cosmos.

Aristotle argued ''against'' the idea of a first cause, often confused with the idea of a "prime mover" or "[[unmoved mover]]" ({{lang|grc|πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον}} or ''primus motor'') in his ''[[Physics (Aristotle)|Physics]]'' and ''[[Metaphysics (Aristotle)|Metaphysics]]''.<ref>Aristotle, ''Physics'' VIII, 4–6; ''Metaphysics'' XII, 1–6.</ref> Aristotle argued in ''favor'' of the idea of several unmoved movers, one powering each [[celestial sphere]], which he believed lived beyond the sphere of the fixed stars, and explained why motion in the universe (which he believed was eternal) had continued for an infinite period of time. Aristotle argued the [[atomism|atomist's]] assertion of a non-eternal universe would require a [[first uncaused cause]] – in his terminology, an [[four causes|efficient]] first cause – an idea he considered a nonsensical flaw in the reasoning of the atomists.

Like Plato, Aristotle believed in an eternal [[cosmos]] with no beginning and no end (which in turn follows [[Parmenides]]' famous statement that "[[nothing comes from nothing]]"). In what he called "first philosophy" or metaphysics, Aristotle ''did'' intend a theological correspondence between the prime mover and a deity; functionally, however, he provided an explanation for the apparent motion of the "[[fixed stars]]" (now understood as the daily rotation of the Earth). According to his theses, immaterial unmoved movers are eternal unchangeable beings that constantly think about thinking, but being immaterial, they are incapable of interacting with the cosmos and have no knowledge of what transpires therein. From an "aspiration or desire",<ref>{{cite encyclopedia|title=Cosmological Argument for the Existence of God|encyclopedia=Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy|year=1967|volume=2|page=233}}</ref> the [[celestial spheres]], ''imitate'' that purely intellectual activity as best they can, by [[uniform circular motion]]. The unmoved movers ''inspiring'' the [[classical planets|planetary]] spheres are no different in kind from the prime mover, they merely suffer a dependency of relation to the prime mover. Correspondingly, the motions of the planets are subordinate to the motion inspired by the prime mover in the sphere of fixed stars. Aristotle's natural theology admitted no creation or capriciousness from the immortal [[pantheon (gods)|pantheon]], but maintained a defense against dangerous charges of impiety.<ref>{{Cite journal|title=Review of: Aristotle and the Theology of the Living Immortals |url=https://bmcr.brynmawr.edu/2001/2001.02.29/ |journal=Bryn Mawr Classical Review}}</ref>

=== Late antiquity to the Islamic Golden Age ===

[[Plotinus]], a third-century [[platonism|Platonist]], taught that [[Plotinus#The One|the One]] transcendent absolute caused the universe to exist simply as a consequence of its existence (''creatio ex deo'').<ref>{{cite encyclopedia|last1= Gerson|first1= Lloyd|title=Plotinus| encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | year= 2018|url= https://plato.stanford.edu/archIves/spr2022/entries/plotinus/}}</ref> His disciple [[Proclus]] stated, "The One is God".<ref>{{cite book |author=Proclus |editor=E.R. Dodds |title=The Elements of Theology, A Revised Text |date=1992 |publisher=Clarendon |chapter=Prop. 113}}</ref> In the 6th century, [[Syriac Christianity|Syriac Christian]] [[neo-platonism|neo-Platonist]] [[John Philoponus]] (c. 490&nbsp;– c. 570) examined the contradiction between Greek pagan adherences to the concept of a [[Eternity of the world|past-eternal world]] and Aristotelian rejection of the existence of [[actual infinities]]. Thereupon, he formulated arguments in defense of [[temporal finitism]], which underpinned his arguments for the existence of God. Philosopher Steven M. Duncan notes that Philoponus's ideas eventually received their fullest articulation "at the hands of Muslim and Jewish exponents of ''[[kalam]]''", or medieval Islamic [[scholasticism]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Duncan |first1=Steven |title=Analytic Philosophy of Religion: its history since 1955 |year=2010 |publisher=Humanities-Ebooks |page=165}}</ref>

In the 11th century, Islamic philosopher [[Avicenna]] (c. 980&nbsp;– 1037) inquired into the question of [[being]], in which he distinguished between [[essence]] (''māhiyya'') and [[existence]] (''wuǧūd'').<ref>{{cite encyclopedia| last1=Lizzini| first1=Olga | title=Ibn Sina's Metaphysics| encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | year= 2021 |url= https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ibn-sina-metaphysics/#MetBetOntThe|access-date=14 January 2025}}</ref> He argued that the fact of existence could not be inferred from or accounted for by the essence of existing things, and that [[substantial form|form]] and matter by themselves could not originate and interact with the movement of the universe or the progressive actualization of existing things. Thus, he reasoned that existence must be due to an [[agent causation|agent cause]] that necessitates, imparts, gives, or adds existence to an essence. To do so, the cause must coexist with its effect and be an existing thing.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia| title=Islam |year=2007| encyclopedia=Encyclopædia Britannica | access-date=2007-11-27|url=https://www.britannica.com/eb/article-69190/Islam}}</ref>

=== Medieval Christian theology ===

[[Thomas Aquinas]] (c. 1225&nbsp;– 1274) adapted and enhanced the argument he found in his reading of Aristotle, Avicenna (the [[Proof of the Truthful]]) and [[Maimonides]] to formulate one of the most influential versions of the cosmological argument.<ref name=Aq5w>{{cite web|last1=Aquinas |first1=Thomas |url=https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1002.htm#article3|title=Summa Theologica: I Q2.3|website=New Advent}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|last1=Foutz|first1=Scott|url=https://www.quodlibet.net/aqu5ways.shtml|title=An Examination of Thomas Aquinas' Cosmological Arguments as found in the Five Ways|website=Quodlibet Online Journal of Christian Theology and Philosophy}}</ref> His conception of the first cause was the idea that the universe must be caused by something that is itself uncaused, which he claimed is 'that which we call God':<ref name=Aq5w/>

{{blockquote|The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.}}

Importantly, [[Five Ways (Aquinas)|Aquinas's Five Ways]], given the second question of his ''[[Summa Theologica]]'', are not the entirety of Aquinas's demonstration that the Christian God exists. The Five Ways form only the beginning of Aquinas's Treatise on the Divine Nature.

== General principles ==

=== The infinite regress ===

A ''regress'' is a series of related elements, arranged in some type of sequence of succession, examined in backwards succession (regression) from a fixed point of reference. Depending on the type of regress, this retrograde examination may take the form of [[recursion|recursive]] analysis, in which the elements in a series are studied as products of prior, often simpler, elements. If there is no 'last member' in a regress (i.e. no 'first member' in the series) it becomes an [[infinite regress]], continuing in perpetuity.<ref name="Cameron">{{cite encyclopedia|last1=Cameron |first1=Ross |title=Infinite Regress Arguments |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/infinite-regress/ |encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |date=2018}}</ref> In the context of the cosmological argument the term 'regress' usually refers to ''causal regress'', in which the series is a chain of [[cause and effect]], with each element in the series arising from causal activity of the prior member.<ref name="Huemer">{{cite book |last1=Huemer |first1=Michael |title=Approaching Infinity |date=2016 |publisher=New York: Palgrave Macmillan |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HUEAI-2 |chapter=13. Assessing Infinite Regress Arguments}}</ref> Some variants of the argument may also refer to ''temporal regress'', wherein the elements are past events (discrete units of time) arranged in a [[temporality|temporal]] sequence.<ref name="craig-sinclair"/>

An [[infinite regress argument]] attempts to establish the falsity of a proposition by showing that it [[logical consequence|entails]] an infinite regress that is [[Infinite regress#Viciousness|vicious]].<ref name="Cameron"/><ref name="Maurin">{{cite book |last1=Maurin |first1=Anna-Sofia |title=Hommage À Wlodek |date=2007 |publisher=Department of Philosophy, Lund University |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/MAUIR |chapter=Infinite Regress – Virtue or Vice?}}</ref> The cosmological argument is a type of ''positive'' infinite regress argument given that it defends a proposition (in this case, the existence of a [[first cause]]) by arguing that its negation would lead to a vicious regress.<ref name="Day">{{cite journal |last1=Day |first1=Timothy Joseph |title=Infinite Regress Arguments |journal=Philosophical Papers |date=1987 |volume=16 |issue=2 |pages=155–164 |doi=10.1080/05568648709506273 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/TIMIRA|url-access=subscription }}</ref> An infinite regress may be vicious due to various reasons:<ref name="Wieland">{{cite journal |last1=Wieland |first1=Jan Willem |title=Infinite Regress Arguments |journal=Acta Analytica |date=2013 |volume=28 |issue=1 |pages=95–109 |doi=10.1007/s12136-012-0165-1 |s2cid=170181468 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/WIEIRA}}</ref><ref name="Reichenbach"/>

*Impossibility: [[Thought experiments]] such as [[Hilbert's paradox of the grand hotel|Hilbert's Hotel]] are cited to demonstrate the [[metaphysics|metaphysical]] impossibility of [[actual infinities]] existing in reality. Accordingly, it may be argued that an infinite causal or temporal regress cannot occur in the real world.<ref name="Maurin"/>
*Implausibility: The regress contradicts empirical evidence (e.g. for the [[temporal finitism|finitude of the past]]) or basic principles such as [[Occam's razor]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Schaffer |first1=Jonathan |year=2015 |title=What Not to Multiply Without Necessity |url=http://www.jonathanschaffer.org/laser.pdf |journal=Australasian Journal of Philosophy |volume=93 |issue=4|pages=644–664|doi=10.1080/00048402.2014.992447 |s2cid=16923735 }}</ref>
*Explanatory failure: A failure of explanatory goals resulting in an infinite regress of explanations. This may arise in the case of logical fallacies such as [[begging the question]] or from an attempt to investigate causes concerning origins or fundamental principles.<ref name="Clark">{{cite journal |last1=Clark |first1=Romane |title=Vicious Infinite Regress Arguments |journal=Philosophical Perspectives |date=1988 |volume=2 |pages=369–380 |doi=10.2307/2214081 |jstor=2214081 |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/CLAVIR|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

=== Accidental and essential ordering of causes ===

Aquinas refers to the distinction found in Aristotle's ''[[Physics (Aristotle)|Physics]]'' (8.5) that a series of causes may either be [[Accident (philosophy)|accidental]] or essential,<ref name="ICR">{{Cite web|url=http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1065&context=sor_fac_pubs|title=Infinite Causal Regress and the Secunda Via in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas}}</ref><ref name="IEPAI">{{cite encyclopedia|title=Aquinas: Philosophical Theology 2.b. |url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/aq-ph-th/#SH2b |last=Floyd |first=Shawn |encyclopedia=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref> though the designation of this terminology would follow later under [[Duns Scotus|John Duns Scotus]] at the turn of the 14th century.<ref name=SEPScot/>

In an accidentally ordered series of causes, earlier members need not continue exerting causal activity (having done so to propagate the chain) for the series to continue. For example, in a generational line, ancestors need no longer exist for their offspring to continue the sequence of descent. In an essential series, prior members must maintain causal interrelationship for the series to continue: If a hand grips a stick that moves a rock along the ground, the rock would stop motion once the hand or stick ceases to exist.<ref name=feser1>{{cite book |last=Feser |first=Edward |year=2009 |title=Aquinas: A Beginner's Guide |publisher=Oneworld Publications |isbn=978-1-851-68690-2}}</ref>

Based upon this distinction [[Frederick Copleston]] (1907–1994) characterises two types of causation: Causes ''in fieri'', which cause an effect's ''becoming'', or coming into existence, and causes ''in esse'', which causally sustain an effect, in ''being'', once it exists.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Joyce|first1=George Hayward|year=1922|title=Principles of Natural Theology|location=New York|publisher=Longmans Green}}</ref>

Two specific properties of an essentially ordered series have significance in the context of the cosmological argument:<ref name=feser1/>

*A first cause is essential: Later members exercise no independent causal power in continuing the series. In the example illustrated above, the rock derives its causal power essentially from the stick, which derives its causal power essentially from the hand.
*All members in the causal series must exist simultaneously in time, or timelessly.

[[Thomism|Thomistic]] philosopher, R. P. Phillips comments on the characteristics of essential ordering:<ref name=RPP>{{cite book |last=Phillips |first=Richard Percival  |title=Modern Thomistic Philosophy, Vol. II |publisher=Editiones Scholasticae |date=2014 |isbn=978-3868385403}} pp 284-285.</ref>

:"Each member of the series of causes possesses being solely by virtue of the actual present operation of a superior cause ... Life is dependent ''inter alia'' on a certain atmospheric pressure, this again on the continual operation of physical forces, whose being and operation depends on the position of the earth in the solar system, which itself must endure relatively unchanged, a state of being which can only be continuously produced by a definite—if unknown—constitution of the material universe. This constitution, however, cannot be its own cause ... We are thus irresistibly led to posit a first efficient cause which, while itself uncaused, shall impart causality to a whole series."

== Versions of the argument ==

=== Aquinas's argument from contingency ===

In the [[scholasticism|scholastic]] era, [[Aquinas]] formulated the "argument from [[Contingency (philosophy)|contingency]]", following [[Aristotle]], in claiming that [[Unmoved mover|there must be something to explain the existence of the universe]]. Since the universe could, under different circumstances, conceivably ''not'' exist (i.e. it is contingent) its existence must have a cause. This cause cannot be embodied in another contingent thing, but something that exists by [[INUS|necessity]] (i.e. that ''must'' exist in order for anything else to exist).<ref name=Aq5w/> It is a form of argument from [[universal causation]], therefore compatible with the conception of a universe that has no beginning in time. In other words, according to Aquinas, even if the universe has always existed, it still owes its continuing existence to an [[Primum movens|uncaused cause]],<ref>Aquinas was an ardent student of Aristotle's works, a significant number of which had only recently been translated into Latin by [[William of Moerbeke]].</ref> he states: "...&nbsp;and this we understand to be God."<ref name=Aq5w/>

Aquinas's argument from contingency is formulated as the [[Five Ways (Aquinas)#Third way: The Argument from Time and Contingency|Third Way]] (Q2, A3) in the ''[[Summa Theologica]]''. It may be expressed as follows:<ref name=Aq5w/>

#There exist contingent things, for which non-existence is possible.
#It is impossible for contingent things to always exist, so at some time they did not exist.
#Therefore, if all things are contingent, then nothing would exist now.
#There exists something rather than nothing.

He concludes thereupon that contingent beings are an insufficient explanation for the existence of other contingent beings. Furthermore, that there must exist a ''[[INUS|necessary]]'' being, whose non-existence is impossible, to explain the origination of all contingent beings.

<ol start="5"><li>Therefore, there exists a necessary being.</li>
<li>It is possible that a necessary being has a cause of its necessity in another necessary being.</li>
<li>The derivation of necessity between beings cannot regress to infinity (being an essentially ordered causal series).</li>
<li>Therefore, there exists a being that is necessary of itself, from which all necessity derives.</li>
<li>That being is whom everyone calls God.</li></ol>

===Leibnizian cosmological argument===

In 1714, German philosopher [[Gottfried Leibniz]] presented a variation of the cosmological argument based upon the [[principle of sufficient reason]]. He writes: "There can be found no fact that is true or existent, or any true proposition, without there being a sufficient reason for its being so and not otherwise, although we cannot know these reasons in most cases." Stating his argument succinctly:<ref>{{cite book |last1=Rescher |first1=Nicholas |year=1991 |title=The Monadology: An Edition for Students|publisher=University of Pittsburgh Press}}</ref>

:"Why is there something rather than nothing? The sufficient reason ... is found in a substance which ... is a necessary being bearing the reason for its existence within itself."

[[Alexander Pruss]] formulates the argument as follows:<ref>{{cite book |last1=Pruss|first1=Alexander R. |author-link=Alexander Pruss |editor1-last=Craig |editor1-first=William Lane |editor2-last=Moreland |editor2-first=J. P. |editor2-link=J. P. Moreland |title=The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology |publisher=Wiley-Blackwell |date=May 18, 2009 |pages=25–26 |chapter=The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument|isbn=978-1405176576}}</ref>

# Every contingent fact has an explanation.
# There is a contingent fact that includes all other contingent facts.
# Therefore, there is an explanation of this fact.
# This explanation must involve a necessary being.
# This necessary being is God.

Premise 1 expresses the [[principle of sufficient reason]]. In premise 2, Leibniz proposes the existence of a [[logical conjunction]] of all contingent facts, referred to in later literature as the ''Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact'' (BCCF), representing the sum total of contingent reality.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Oppy |first1=Graham |title=On 'a new cosmological argument'|journal=Religious Studies|year=2000 |pages=345–353 |volume=36 |issue=3|doi=10.1017/S0034412500005308 |url=https://philarchive.org/rec/OPPOAN }}</ref> Premise 3 applies the principle of sufficient reason to the BCCF, given that it too, as a contingency, has a sufficient explanation. It follows, in statement 4, that the explanation of the BCCF must be necessary, not contingent, given that the BCCF incorporates all contingent facts. Statement 5 proposes that the necessary being explaining the totality of contingent facts is God.

Philosophers Joshua Rasmussen and T. Ryan Byerly have argued in defence of the inference from statement 4 to statement 5.<ref>{{cite journal|title=From a necessary being to God |last1=Rasmussen |first1=Joshua |journal=International Journal for Philosophy of Religion |volume=66 |issue=1 |pages=1–13 |year=2009|doi=10.1007/s11153-008-9191-8 }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|title=From a necessary being to a perfect being |last1=Byerly |first1=Ryan T |journal=Analysis |volume=79 |issue=1 |pages=10–17 |year=2019|doi=10.1093/analys/any009 }}</ref>

===Duns Scotus's metaphysical argument===

At the turn of the 14th century, medieval Christian theologian [[Duns Scotus|John Duns Scotus]] (1265/66–1308) formulated a [[metaphysical]] argument for the existence of God inspired by Aquinas's [[Five Ways (Aquinas)#First way: The Argument of the Unmoved Mover|argument of the unmoved mover]].<ref name= Scotus1>{{cite web |last=Duns Scotus |first=John |title=Ordinatio I/D2/Q2B |year=1300|website=The Logic Museum|url=http://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Duns_Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio_I/D2/Q2B  |access-date=27 September 2024}}</ref> Like other philosophers and theologians, Scotus believed that his statement for God's existence could be considered distinct to that of Aquinas. The form of the argument can be summarised as follows:<ref name= SEPScot>{{cite encyclopedia |last=Williams |first=Thomas |title=John Duns Scotus |year=2019|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/duns-scotus/#ProExiGod |access-date=27 September 2024}}</ref>

#An effect cannot be produced by itself.
#An effect cannot be produced by nothing.
#A circle of causes is impossible.
#Therefore, an effect must be produced by something else.
#An accidentally ordered causal series cannot exist without an essentially ordered series.
<ol style="list-style-type: lower-alpha;margin-left: 5.2em;">
<li>Each member in an accidentally ordered series (except a possible first) exists via causal activity of a prior member.</li>
<li>That causal activity is exercised by virtue of a certain [[substantial form|form]].</li>
<li>Therefore, that form is required by each member to effect causation.</li>
<li>The form itself is not a member of the series.</li>
<li>Therefore [c,d], accidentally ordered causes cannot exist without higher-order (essentially ordered) causes.</li>
</ol>
<ol start="6"><li>An essentially ordered causal series cannot regress to infinity.</li>
<li>Therefore [4,5,6], there exists a first agent.</li></ol>

Scotus affirms, in premise 5, that an [[Cosmological argument#Accidental and essential ordering of causes|accidentally ordered series of causes]] is impossible without higher-order laws and processes that govern the basic principles of accidental causation, which he characterises as essentially ordered causes.<ref>{{harvnb|Duns Scotus|1300}} Paragraph 54: "Such an infinity of succession is impossible save from some nature that endures permanently, on which the whole succession and any part of it depend."</ref>

Premise 6 continues, in accordance with Aquinas's discourses on the [[Five Ways (Aquinas)#Second way: The Argument of the First Cause|Second Way]] and [[Five Ways (Aquinas)#Third way: The Argument from Time and Contingency|Third Way]], that an essentially ordered series of causes cannot be an infinite regress.<ref>{{harvnb|Duns Scotus|1300}} Paragraph 53.</ref> On this, Scotus posits that, if it is merely possible that a first agent exists, then it is [[logical consequence|necessarily]] true that a first agent exists, given that the non-existence of a first agent entails the impossibility of its own existence (by virtue of being a first cause in the chain).<ref name= SEPScot/> He argues further that it is ''not impossible'' for a being to exist that is causeless by virtue of [[ontology|ontological]] perfection.<ref>{{harvnb|Duns Scotus|1300}} Paragraph 53: "... an effective thing does not necessarily posit any imperfection; therefore it can be in something without imperfection. But if no cause is without dependence on something prior, it will not be in anything without imperfection."</ref>

With the formulation of this argument, Scotus establishes the first component of his 'triple primacy': The characterisation of a being that is first in [[Four Causes#Efficient|efficient causality]], [[Four Causes#Final|final causality]] and pre-eminence, or maximal excellence, which he ascribes to God.<ref name=SEPScot/>

=== Kalam cosmological argument ===
{{Main|Kalam cosmological argument}}

The Kalam cosmological argument's central thesis is the impossibility of an infinite [[temporality|temporal]] regress of events (or past-infinite universe). Though a modern formulation that defends the [[temporal finitism|finitude of the past]] through philosophical and scientific arguments, many of the argument's ideas originate in the writings of early Christian theologian [[John Philoponus]] (490–570 AD),<ref>{{cite book |last=Erasmus |first=Jacobus |title=The ''Kalām'' Cosmological Argument: A Reassessment |date=2018 |publisher=Springer |pages=41–52 |isbn=9783319734378}}</ref> developed within the proceedings of medieval [[Islam]]ic [[scholasticism]] through the 9th to 12th centuries, eventually returning to [[Christian theological]] scholarship in the 13th century.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/popular-writings/existence-nature-of-god/the-kalam-cosmological-argument | title=The Kalam Cosmological Argument | author=William Lane Craig | website=Reasonable Faith }}</ref>

These ideas were revitalised for modern discourse by philosopher and theologian [[William Lane Craig]] through publications such as ''[[The Kalām Cosmological Argument]]'' (1979) and the ''Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology'' (2009). The form of the argument popularised by Craig is expressed in two parts, as an initial [[deductive argument|deductive]] [[syllogism]] followed by further philosophical analysis.<ref name="craig-sinclair"/>

==== Initial syllogism ====

#Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
#The universe began to exist.
#Therefore, the universe has a cause.

==== Conceptual analysis of the conclusion ====

Craig argues that the cause of the universe [[logical entailment|necessarily]] embodies specific properties in creating the universe ''[[creatio ex nihilo|ex nihilo]]'' and in effecting creation from a timeless state (implying [[agent causation|free agency]]). Based upon this analysis, he appends a further premise and conclusion:<ref>{{harvnb|Craig|Sinclair|2009|pp=193–194}}</ref>

<ol start="4"><li> If the universe has a cause, then an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists who ''[[wikt:sans#English|sans]] (without)'' the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and enormously powerful.</li>

<li> Therefore, an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists, who ''sans'' the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and enormously powerful.</li>
</ol>

For scientific evidence of the finitude of the past, Craig refers to the [[Borde-Guth-Vilenkin theorem]], which posits a past boundary to [[cosmic inflation]], and the general consensus on the standard model of cosmology, which refers to the origin of the universe in the [[Big Bang]].<ref>{{cite book |last=Kragh |first=Helge |year=1996 |title=Cosmology and Controversy: The Historical Development of Two Theories of the Universe |url=https://archive.org/details/cosmologycontrov00helg |url-access=registration |location=Princeton, NJ |publisher=[[Princeton University Press]] |isbn=978-0-691-02623-7 |page=319}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Reichenbach|2022}} 7.4-7.5</ref>

For philosophical evidence, he cites [[Hilbert's paradox of the grand hotel]] and [[Bertrand Russell]]'s [[The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman#References to Tristram Shandy|tale of Tristram Shandy]] to prove (respectively) the impossibility of actual infinites existing in reality and of forming an actual infinite by successive addition. He concludes that past events, in comprising a series of events that are instantiated in reality and formed by successive addition, cannot extend to an infinite past.<ref>{{harvnb|Reichenbach|2022}} 7.2-7.3</ref>

Craig remarks upon the [[theology|theological]] implications that follow from the conclusion of the argument:<ref>{{cite book|last= Craig|first= William Lane|title=The Kalam Cosmological Argument|year=2000|publisher=Wipf and Stock Publishers|isbn=978-1-57910-438-2}}</ref>

:"... our whole universe was caused to exist by something beyond it and greater than it. For it is no secret that one of the most important conceptions of what theists mean by 'God' is Creator of heaven and earth."

== Criticism and discourse ==
=== "What caused the first cause?" ===
Objections to the cosmological argument may question why a first cause is unique in that it does not require any causes. Critics contend that the concept of a first cause qualifies as [[special pleading]], or that arguing for the first cause's exemption raises the question of why there should be a first cause at all.<ref>{{harvnb|Reichenbach|2022}} 4.5</ref> Defenders maintain that this question is addressed by various formulations of the cosmological argument, emphasizing that none of its major iterations rests on the premise that everything requires a cause.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=07bHgxbG6A4C&q=curious+blind+spot+in+the+anglo+cause+everything&pg=PA49|title=The Creative Retrieval of Saint Thomas Aquinas: Essays in Thomistic Philosophy, New and Old|first=W. Norris|last=Clarke|date=August 25, 2009|publisher=Fordham Univ Press|isbn=9780823229307}}</ref>

Andrew Loke refers to the [[Kalam cosmological argument]], in which the causal premise ("whatever begins to exist has a cause") stipulates that only things which ''begin to exist'' require a cause.<ref name=Loke1>{{cite book|last= Loke|first= Andrew Ter Ern|title= God and Ultimate Origins|year= 2017|publisher= Springer International|isbn= 9783319575476|page= 189}}</ref> [[William Lane Craig]] asserts that—even if one posits a plurality of causes for the existence of the universe—a first uncaused cause is necessary, otherwise an infinite regress of causes would arise, which he argues is impossible.<ref name="craig-sinclair"/><ref name=Reichenbach/> Similarly, [[Edward Feser]] proposes, in accordance with Aquinas's discourses on the [[Five Ways (Aquinas)#Second way: The Argument of the First Cause|Second Way]], that an essentially ordered series of causes cannot regress to infinity, even if it may be theoretically possible for accidentally ordered causes to do so.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Feser |first1=Edward |author1-link=Edward Feser |title=Five Proofs of the Existence of God |date=2017 |publisher=Ignatius Press |isbn=978-1621641339}}</ref>

Various arguments have been presented to demonstrate the metaphysical impossibility of an actually infinite regress occurring in the [[reality|real world]], referring to [[thought experiments]] such as [[Hilbert's paradox of the Grand Hotel|Hilbert's Hotel]], the [[The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman#References to Tristram Shandy|tale of Tristram Shandy]], and variations.<ref>{{harvnb|Loke|2017|loc=Chapters 2-3}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal | author = Waters BV |title=Methuselah's Diary and the Finitude of the Past |journal=Philosophia Christi|volume=15 |issue=2 |pages=463–469 |date=2013|url=http://philpapers.org/archive/WATMDA-2.pdf |doi=10.5840/pc201315240|access-date=}}</ref>

=== "Does the universe need a cause?" ===

Craig maintains that the [[causality|causal principle]] is predicated in the [[metaphysical]] [[Rationalism#Intuition/deduction thesis|intuition]] that ''[[nothing comes from nothing]].'' If such intuitions are false, he argues it would be inexplicable why anything and everything does not randomly come into existence without a cause.<ref name="craig-sinclair"/> Yet, not all philosophers subscribe to the view of causality as ''[[A priori and a posteriori|a priori]]'' in [[Justification (epistemology)|justification]]. [[David Hume]] contends that the principle is rooted in [[experience]], therefore within the category of ''[[Empirical evidence|a posteriori]]'' knowledge and subject to the [[problem of induction]].<ref>{{cite encyclopedia|url=https://iep.utm.edu/hume-causation/ |title=David Hume: Causation |encyclopedia=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=2025-01-14}}</ref>

Whereas [[J. L. Mackie]] argues that cause and effect cannot be extrapolated to the origins of the universe based upon our inductive experiences and intellectual preferences,<ref>{{cite book|last= Mackie|first= J. L.|title= The Miracle of Theism: Arguments For and Against the Existence of God|page=85|year= 1982|publisher= Oxford University Press|isbn= 978-0-19-824682-4}}</ref> Craig proposes that causal laws are unrestricted metaphysical truths that are "not contingent upon the properties, causal powers, and dispositions of the natural kinds of substances which happen to exist".<ref name=CraigPC>{{cite web | url=https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings/scholarly-writings/the-existence-of-god/must-the-beginning-of-the-universe-have-a-personal-cause-a-rejoinder | title=Must the Beginning of the Universe Have a Personal Cause?: A Rejoinder | author=William Lane Craig | website=Reasonable Faith }}</ref>

=== Identifying the first cause ===
Secular philosophers such as [[Michael Lou Martin|Michael Martin]] argue that a cosmological argument may establish the existence of a first cause, but falls short of identifying that cause as [[personhood|personal]], or as God as defined within [[classical theism|classical]] or other specific conceptions of [[theism]].<ref>{{cite book|last= Martin|first= Michael|title= Atheism: A Philosophical Justification|year= 1990|publisher= Temple University Press|page= 103|isbn= 978-0-87722-943-8}}</ref><ref name=Reichenbach />

Defenders of the argument note that most formulations, such as by Aquinas, Duns Scotus and Craig, employ conceptual analysis to establish the identity of the cause. In Aquinas's ''[[Summa Theologica]]'', the ''Prima Pars'' (First Part) is devoted predominantly to establishing the attributes of the cause, such as uniqueness, perfection and intelligence.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Aquinas |first1=Thomas |title=Summa Theologica: Prima Pars |url=https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1.htm |website=New Advent}}</ref> In Scotus's ''Ordinatio'', his metaphysical argument is the first component of the 'triple primacy' through which he characterises the first cause as a being with the attributes of maximal excellence.<ref name=SEPScot/>

===Timeless origin of the universe===

In the topic of [[cosmogony|cosmic origins]] and the standard model of [[cosmology]], the [[initial singularity]] of the [[Big Bang]] is postulated to be the point at which [[space]] and [[time]], as well as all [[matter]] and [[energy]], came into existence.<ref name="sciam">{{cite magazine |last1=Gott III |first1=J. Richard |author1-link=J. Richard Gott |last2=Gunn |first2=James E. |author2-link=James Gunn (astronomer) |last3=Schramm |first3=David N. |author3-link=David Schramm (astrophysicist) |last4=Tinsley |first4=Beatrice M. |author4-link=Beatrice Tinsley |title=Will the Universe Expand Forever? |magazine=[[Scientific American]] |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/24950306 |jstor=24950306 |access-date=December 10, 2023 |page=65 |date=March 1976}}</ref> [[J. Richard Gott]] and [[James Gunn (astronomer)|James E. Gunn]] assert that the question of "What was there before the Universe?" makes no sense and that the concept of ''before'' becomes meaningless when considering a timeless state. They add that questioning what occurred before the Big Bang is akin to questioning what is north of the [[North Pole]].<ref name="sciam"/>

Craig refers to [[Immanuel Kant|Kant]]'s postulate that a cause can be simultaneous with its effect, denoting that this is true of the moment of creation when time itself came into being.<ref>{{cite web |title=Creation and Simultaneous Causation |url=https://www.reasonablefaith.org/question-answer/P650/creation-and-simultaneous-causation |last1=Craig |first1=William Lane |website=Reasonable Faith}}</ref> He affirms that the history of 20th century cosmology belies the proposition that researchers have no strong intuition to pursue a causal explanation of the origin of time and the universe.<ref name=CraigPC /> Accordingly, physicists have sought to examine the causal origins of the Big Bang by  conjecturing such scenarios as the collision of [[Membrane (M-Theory)|membrane]]s.<ref>{{cite web|last=Britt |first=Robert R. |title=Brane-Storm {{pipe}} Challenges Part of Big Bang Theory |publisher=Space.com |date=April 18, 2001 |access-date=June 21, 2008 |url=http://www.space.com/scienceastronomy/astronomy/bigbang_alternative_010413-3.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080511144628/http://www.space.com/scienceastronomy/astronomy/bigbang_alternative_010413-3.html |archive-date=11 May 2008 }}</ref> Feser also notes that versions of the cosmological argument presented by classical philosophers do not require a commitment to the Big Bang, or even to a cosmic origin.<ref>{{cite book |first=Edward |last=Feser |author-link=Edward Feser |title=The Last Superstition |publisher=St. Augustine Press |year=2008 |page=103|isbn=978-1587314520 }}</ref>

=== The Hume-Edwards principle ===
[[William L. Rowe]] characterises the Hume-Edwards principle, referring to arguments presented by [[David Hume]], and later [[Paul Edwards (philosopher)|Paul Edwards]], in their criticisms of the cosmological argument:<ref name=Pruss>Alexander R. Pruss, [https://archive.today/20130202224654/http://www.springerlink.com/content/q134n458307w0125 The Hume-Edwards Principle and the Cosmological Argument], ''International Journal for Philosophy of Religion''</ref>

{{Blockquote|"If the existence of every member of a set is explained, the existence of that set is thereby explained."}}

The principle stipulates that a causal series—even one that regresses to infinity—requires no explanatory causes beyond those that are members within that series. If every member of a series has a causal explanation within the sequence, the series in itself is explanatorily complete.<ref name=Pruss /> Thus, it rejects arguments, such as by Duns Scotus, for the existence of higher-order, efficient causes that govern the basic principles of material causation.<ref name=SEPScot /> Notably, it contradicts Hume's own ''[[Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion]]'', in which the character Demea reflects that, even if a succession of causes is infinite, the very existence of the chain still requires a cause.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Hume |first=David|year=1779 |title= Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion |publisher=Penguin Books |place=London }}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Calvert |first=Brian |title=Another problem about Part IX of Hume's Dialogues |journal=International Journal for Philosophy of Religion |volume=14 |issue=2 |pages=65–70 |doi=10.1007/BF00131845 |year=1983 |s2cid=189828318}}</ref>

=== Causal loop arguments ===

Some objections to the cosmological argument refer to the possibility of loops in the structure of [[causality|cause and effect]] that would avoid the need for a first cause. Gott and Li refer to the curvature of [[spacetime]] and [[closed timelike curve]]s as possible mechanisms by which the universe may bring about its own existence.<ref>{{cite journal |title=Can the Universe Create Itself? |first1=John Richard |last1=Gott III |first2=Li-Xin |last2=Li |journal=Physical Review D |volume=58 |issue=2 |date=1997 |page=023501 |doi=10.1103/PhysRevD.58.023501 |arxiv=astro-ph/9712344}}</ref> [[Richard Hanley]] contends that causal loops are neither logically nor physically impossible, remarking: "[In timed systems] the only possibly objectionable feature that all causal loops share is that coincidence is required to explain them."<ref>{{cite journal |title=No End in Sight: Causal Loops in Philosophy, Physics and Fiction |first=Richard |last=Hanley |journal=Synthese |volume=141 |date=2004 |pages=123–152 |doi=10.1023/B:SYNT.0000035847.28833.4f}}</ref>

Andrew Loke argues that there is insufficient evidence to postulate a causal loop of the type that would avoid a first cause. He proposes that such a mechanism would suffer from the problem of [[temporal paradox#Bootstrap paradox|vicious circularity]], rendering it [[metaphysics|metaphysically]] impossible.<ref>{{cite book |last=Loke |first=Andrew |chapter=Is There a Causal Loop Which Avoids a First Cause? |title=God and Ultimate Origins |date=2017a |publisher=Springer International Publishing AG |location=Switzerland |isbn=9783319861890 |pages=109–123}}</ref>

== See also ==
{{Cols|colwidth=21em}}
* ''[[Creatio ex nihilo]]''
* ''[[Ex nihilo nihil fit]]''
* [[Argument]]
* [[Biblical cosmology]]
* [[Chaos (mythology)|Chaos]]
* [[Cosmogony]]
* [[Creation myth]]
* [[Dating creation|Dating Creation]]
* [[Determinism]]
* [[First Principle]]
* [[First cause]]
* [[Infinitism]]
* [[Logos]]
* [[Present]]
* [[Psychology]]
* [[Quinque viae]]
* [[Semantics]]
* [[Semiotics]]
* [[Temporal finitism]]
* [[Timeline of the Big Bang]]
* [[Transtheism]]
* [[Unmoved mover]]
{{Colend}}

== References ==
{{Reflist}}

== External links ==
* {{Cite SEP|url-id=cosmological-argument |title=Cosmological Argument |last=Reichenbach |first=Bruce}}

{{God arguments}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Cosmological Argument}}
[[Category:Arguments for the existence of God]]
[[Category:Causality]]
[[Category:Christian apologetics]]
[[Category:Concepts in metaphysics]]
[[Category:Philosophy of religion]]