Editing Cox Report

{{about|the 1990s report on the People's Republic of China's covert operations within the United States|the 1952 investigation into non profits|Cox Committee Investigation}}
{{Short description|1999 report on Chinese covert operations in the United States in the 1980s and 90s}}

{{Use American English|date=January 2019}}

{{Use mdy dates|date=January 2019}}
[[Image:ChrisCox.jpg|right|thumb|120px|U.S. Representative Chris Cox (Republican-California) chaired the Committee that produced the report.]]

The '''Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China''', commonly known as the '''Cox Report''' after [[United States Representative|Representative]] [[Christopher Cox]], is a [[Classified information|classified]] [[Federal government of the United States|U.S. government]] [[document]] reporting on the [[People's Republic of China]]'s [[covert]] operations within the [[United States]] during the 1980s and 1990s. The redacted version of the report was released to the public on May 25, 1999.

==Committee created by the U.S. House of Representatives==
The report was the work product of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China. This special committee, created by a 409–10 vote of the [[United States House of Representatives|U.S. House of Representatives]] on June 18, 1998, was tasked with the responsibility of investigating whether technology or information was transferred to the People's Republic of China that may have contributed to the enhancement of the nuclear-armed [[intercontinental ballistic missiles]] or to the manufacture of [[weapons of mass destruction]].

A similar investigation had already begun in the [[United States Senate|U.S. Senate]] under the leadership of [[United States Senator|Senator]] [[Fred Dalton Thompson|Fred Thompson]] (Republican-[[Tennessee]]). Thompson had opened his hearings on China's influence in America's 1996 presidential and congressional elections 11 months earlier (on July 8, 1997).

{| class=wikitable
!Majority
!Minority
|-
| {{party shading/Republican}} valign=top |
* [[Christopher Cox]], California, ''Chairman''
* [[Porter Goss]], Florida, ''Vice Chairman''
* [[Doug Bereuter]], Nebraska
* [[James V. Hansen]], Utah
* [[Curt Weldon]], Pennsylvania
| {{party shading/Democratic}} valign=top |
* [[Norm Dicks]], Washington, ''Ranking Member''
* [[John Spratt]], South Carolina
* [[Lucille Roybal-Allard]], California
* [[Bobby Scott (U.S. politician)|Bobby Scott]], Virginia
|}<ref name="house.gov">{{cite web | url=http://www.house.gov/coxreport/chapfs/app.html | archive-url=https://archive.today/20140309085607/http://www.house.gov/coxreport/chapfs/app.html | archive-date=March 9, 2014 | url-status=dead | title=Appendices | website=U.S. House of Representatives | access-date=December 10, 2014 }}</ref>

The [[Chairperson|Chairman]] of the committee was [[Republican Party (United States)|Republican]] Rep. Christopher Cox of [[California]], whose name became synonymous with the committee's final report. Four other Republicans and Democrats served on the panel, including Representative [[Norm Dicks]], who served as the [[Ranking member|ranking]] [[Democratic Party (United States)|Democratic]] member. The committee's final report was approved unanimously by all 9 members. The [[redaction|redacted]] version of the report was released to the public May 25, 1999.

==Major allegations==
The Cox Report<ref name="house.gov"/> contained five major allegations about China and nuclear weapons.
* China stole design information regarding the United States' seven most advanced thermonuclear weapons.
* These stolen secrets enabled the [[People's Liberation Army|PLA]] to accelerate the design, development and testing of its own nuclear weapons.
* China's next generation of nuclear weapons would contain elements of stolen U.S. design information and would be comparable in effectiveness to the weapons used by the United States.
* Small warheads based on stolen U.S. information could be ready for deployment in 2002 also enabling China to integrate [[MIRV]] technology on its next generation of missiles.
* These thefts were not isolated incidents, but rather the results of decades of intelligence operations against U.S. weapons laboratories conducted by the [[Ministry of State Security of the People's Republic of China|Ministry of State Security]]. In addition, the report described the illegal activity likely persisted despite new security measures implemented as a result of the scandal.

While several groups, including the People's Republic of China, contend that the Report is overstated or inaccurate, its authors and supporters maintain that its gist is undeniable. The report's basic findings were as follows, quoted from the above document's opening summary:

{{quote|The People's Republic of China (PRC) has stolen design information on the United States' most advanced thermonuclear weapons. The Select Committee judges that the PRC's next generation of thermonuclear weapons, currently under development, will exploit elements of stolen U.S. design information. PRC penetration of our national nuclear weapons laboratories spans at least the past several decades and almost certainly continues today.

The PRC has stolen or otherwise illegally obtained U.S. missile and space technology that improves PRC military and intelligence capabilities.}}

==Reactions==
<!-- Deleted image removed: [[Image:W87 Warhead.jpg|thumb|right|300px|The redacted version of the report used this image, published previously by [[U.S. News & World Report]], to illustrate the classified design of the [[W87]] warhead.|{{ifdc|1=W87 Warhead.jpg|log=2009 August 23}}]] -->

===U.S. Government===
The Cox Report's release prompted major [[legislation|legislative]] and [[Administration (government)|administrative]] reforms.  More than two dozen of the Select Committee's recommendations were enacted into law, including the creation of a new [[United States National Nuclear Security Administration|National Nuclear Security Administration]] to take over the nuclear weapons security responsibilities of the [[United States Department of Energy]].  At the same time, no person has ever been [[conviction (law)|convicted]] of providing nuclear information to the PRC, and the one case that was brought in connection to these charges, that of [[Wen Ho Lee]], fell apart.<ref name="WHL">{{cite news|url=http://www.asianweek.com/2000/09/28/wen-ho-lee-to-be-released/|title=Wen Ho Lee to Be Released|author=Sam Chu Lin|publisher=[[AsianWeek]]|date=2000-09-28|accessdate=2009-07-27|url-status=dead|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20110604182655/http://www.asianweek.com/2000/09/28/wen-ho-lee-to-be-released/|archivedate=2011-06-04}}</ref>

In response to the allegations contained in the report, the [[CIA]] appointed retired U.S. Navy Admiral [[David E. Jeremiah]] to review and assess the report's findings. In April 1999, Admiral Jeremiah released a report backing up the Cox Report's main allegation that stolen information had been used to develop or modernize Chinese missiles and/or warheads.<ref name=jeremiah>[http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/dci042199.html "DCI Statement on Damage Assessment"], Central Intelligence Agency, April 21, 1999</ref>

===PRC Government===
The [[Government of the People's Republic of China|Chinese government]] called all allegations "groundless".<ref name=response>[http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/325633.stm "China rejects nuclear spying charge"], [[BBC]], April 22, 1999</ref>

===Academia===
[[Richard L. Garwin]] remarked that stolen information regarding the W-70 and W-88 warhead would not appear to directly impair U.S. national security since to develop weapons based on this technology would require a massive investment in resources and not be in their best strategic interests with regard to their nuclear program.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_04-05/rgam99.asp |title=Arms Control Association: Arms Control Today: Why China Won't Build U.S. Warheads |accessdate=February 7, 2016 |url-status=dead |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20051105021618/http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_04-05/rgam99.asp |archivedate=November 5, 2005 }} Richard Garwin, "Why China Won't Build U.S. Warheads, ''Arms Control Today'', April–May 1999.</ref>

An assessment report that was published by Stanford University's  Center for International Security and Cooperation said that the language of the Cox report "was inflammatory and some allegations did not seem to be well supported."<ref>M.M. May, Editor, Alastair Johnston, W.K.H. Panofsky, Marco Di Capua, and Lewis Franklin, [https://web.archive.org/web/20050220000227/http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/10331/cox.pdf ''The Cox Committee Report: An Assessment''], Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), December 1999.</ref>

===Related prosecutions===
Two of the U.S. companies named in the report &ndash; [[Loral Space and Communications|Loral Space and Communications Corp.]] and [[Hughes Electronics|Hughes Electronics Corp.]] &ndash; were later successfully prosecuted by the federal government for violations of U.S. export control law, resulting in the two largest [[Fine (penalty)|fines]] in the history of the [[Arms Export Control Act]].  Loral paid a $14 million fine in 2002,<ref name="loralfine">Mintz, John, [http://www.loralpresscenter.com/inthenews/020109.html "LORAL AND U.S. GOVERNMENT SETTLE 1996 CHINESE LAUNCH MATTER"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080621185135/http://www.loralpresscenter.com/inthenews/020109.html|date=2008-06-21}}, ''[[Loral Press Center]]'', Jan. 1, 2003</ref> and Hughes paid a $32 million fine in 2003.<ref name="hugehughesfine">{{Cite web |last=GERTH |first=JEFF |date=March 6, 2003 |title=2 Companies Pay Penalties For Improving China Rockets |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/06/world/2-companies-pay-penalties-for-improving-china-rockets.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091002172240/http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/06/world/2-companies-pay-penalties-for-improving-china-rockets.html |archive-date=October 2, 2009 |access-date=April 24, 2025 |website=www.nytimes.com}}</ref>

==Timeline==
{{main|Timeline of Cox Report controversy}}

*June 1995, "Walk-in" agent gives CIA officers classified Chinese document detailing American nuclear designs.
*July 1995, CIA director, Energy Secretary, and chief of staff learn of nuclear espionage for first time.
*October 31, 1995, FBI agents learn of nuclear thefts.
*November 1995, National Security Advisor to the President learns of Chinese nuclear espionage.
*Late 1995, Energy Dept. agents discover theft of nuclear designs while analyzing nuclear tests by China.
*April 1996, Assist. National Security Advisor, Defense Sec., Attorney General, FBI director learn of nuclear thefts.
*July 1997, President learns of Chinese nuclear espionage from National Security Advisor.
*December 1999, four Stanford University professors release a report rebutting the Cox Commission, noting that "...facts are wrong and a number of conclusions are, in our view, unwarranted."

==See also==
* [[Chinese espionage in the United States]]

==References==
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[[Category:Classified documents]]
[[Category:Intelligence reports]]
[[Category:Reports of the United States government]]
[[Category:China–United States relations]]
[[Category:Nuclear program of the People's Republic of China]]
[[Category:1999 documents]]