Editing Dual-use technology

{{Short description|Technology that can be used for both peaceful and military purposes}}

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In [[politics]], [[diplomacy]] and [[export control]], '''dual-use items''' refer to goods, [[software]] and [[technology]] that can be used for both [[civilian]] and [[military]] applications.<ref name="eu_dual-use">[https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/help-exporters-and-importers/exporting-dual-use-goods_en ''Exporting dual-use goods.''] European Commission (accessed Aug 2022)</ref>

More generally speaking, dual-use can also refer to any goods or technology which can satisfy more than one goal at any given time. Thus, expensive technologies originally benefitting only military purposes would in the future also be used to serve civilian commercial interests if they were not otherwise engaged, such as the [[Global Positioning System]] developed by the [[U.S. Department of Defense]].

The "dual-use dilemma" was first noted with the discovery of the process for synthesizing and mass-producing [[ammonia]] which revolutionized agriculture with modern fertilizers but also led to the creation of [[chemical weapons]] during [[World War I]]. The dilemma has long been known in chemistry and physics, and has led to international conventions and treaties, including the [[Chemical Weapons Convention]] and the [[Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons]].<ref>{{cite news |last1=Webb |first1=Amy |title=The Next Pandemic Could Start With a Terrorist Attack |url=https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2022/02/pandemic-terrorist-attack-biowarfare/622067/ |access-date=17 February 2022 |work=The Atlantic |date=14 February 2022 |language=en}}</ref>

== Drones ==
UAVs are considered to be a challenge for military. [[No drone zone]]s are areas where drones or unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) cannot be operated.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Sedletska |first1=Natalie |last2=Savchuk |first2=Maksym |last3=Ovsyaniy |first3=Kyrylo |last4=Schreck |first4=Carl |date=2022-11-04 |title=How Western Tech In Iranian Drones Is Helping Russia Wage War On Ukraine |language=en |work=Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty |url=https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-drones-iran-western-technology/32115733.html |access-date=2023-06-08}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2022-11-05 |title=Drones, Ukraine, Russia, Iran, Western technology {{!}} Homeland Security Newswire |url=https://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20221105-western-tech-in-iranian-drones-is-helping-russia-in-ukraine |access-date=2023-06-08 |website=www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Weaponized drones |url=http://www.aclu.org/documents/weaponized-drones |access-date=2023-06-08 |website=American Civil Liberties Union |language=en-US}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Bajema |first=Natasha |title=To Protect Against Weaponized Drones, We Must Understand Their Key Strengths - IEEE Spectrum |url=https://spectrum.ieee.org/to-protect-against-weaponized-drones-we-must-understand-their-key-strengths |access-date=2023-06-08 |website=[[IEEE]] |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Wright |first=Rebecca |last2=Watson |first2=Ivan |last3=Konovalova |first3=Olha |last4=Booth |first4=Tom |date=2023-03-16 |title=Exclusive: Chinese-made drone, retrofitted and weaponized, downed in eastern Ukraine |url=https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/16/europe/china-made-drone-downed-eastern-ukraine-hnk-intl/index.html |access-date=2023-06-08 |website=CNN |language=en}}</ref>

== Missiles ==
[[File:Neptune cruise missile 05.jpg|thumb|Neptune cruise missile launch]]
Originally developed as weapons during the [[Cold War]], the [[United States]] and the [[Soviet Union]] spent billions of dollars developing rocket technology which could carry humans into space (and eventually to the [[Moon]]). The development of this peaceful rocket technology paralleled the development of [[intercontinental ballistic missile]] technology; and was a way of demonstrating to the other side the potential of one's own rockets.

Those who seek to develop ballistic missiles may claim that their rockets are for peaceful purposes; for example, for commercial satellite launching or [[Sounding rocket|scientific purposes]]. However, even genuinely peaceful rockets may be converted into weapons and provide the technological basis to do so.

Within peaceful rocket programs, different peaceful applications can be seen as having parallel military roles.  For example, the return of scientific payloads safely to earth from orbit would indicate [[Atmospheric entry|re-entry vehicle]] capability and demonstrating the ability to launch multiple satellites with a single launch vehicle can be seen in a military context as having the potential to deploy [[multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle]]s.

== Nuclear ==
Dual-use nuclear technology refers to the possibility of military use of civilian [[nuclear power]] technology. Many technologies and materials associated with the creation of a nuclear power program have a dual-use capability, in that several stages of the [[nuclear fuel cycle]] allow diversion of nuclear materials for [[nuclear weapons]]. When this happens a nuclear power program can become a route leading to the [[atomic bomb]] or a public annex to a secret bomb program. The crisis over [[Nuclear program of Iran|Iran's nuclear activities]] is a case in point.<ref name=dfall2009>{{cite journal |title=Nuclear power without nuclear proliferation? |author=Steven E. Miller & Scott D. Sagan |date=Fall 2009 |journal=Dædalus |volume=138 |issue=4 |pages=7–18 |doi=10.1162/daed.2009.138.4.7 |s2cid=57568427 |doi-access=free }}</ref>

Many UN and US agencies warn that building more nuclear reactors unavoidably increases [[nuclear proliferation]] risks.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/roundtables/nuclear-energy-different-other-energy-sources |title=Cheaper, safer alternatives than nuclear fission |author=Kristin Shrader-Frechette |date=19 August 2011 |work=Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120121132914/http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/roundtables/nuclear-energy-different-other-energy-sources |archive-date=2012-01-21 |author-link=Kristin Shrader-Frechette }}</ref> A fundamental goal for American and global security is to minimize the proliferation risks associated with the expansion of nuclear power. If this development is "poorly managed or efforts to contain risks are unsuccessful, the nuclear future will be dangerous".<ref name=dfall2009/> For nuclear power programs to be developed and managed safely and securely, it is important that countries have domestic “[[good governance]]” characteristics that will encourage proper nuclear operations and management:<ref name=dfall2009/>
<blockquote>
These characteristics include low degrees of corruption (to avoid officials selling materials and technology for their own personal gain as occurred with the [[A.Q. Khan]] smuggling network in Pakistan), high degrees of political stability (defined by the World Bank as “likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including {{Sic|hide=y|politically|-}}motivated violence and terrorism”), high governmental effectiveness scores (a World Bank aggregate measure of “the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures [and] the quality of policy formulation and implementation”), and a strong degree of regulatory competence.<ref name=dfall2009/>
</blockquote>

== Artificial intelligence ==
{{main|Ethics of artificial intelligence}}

As more advances are made towards [[artificial intelligence]] (AI), it garners more and more attention on its capability as a dual-use technology and the security risks it may pose.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web|url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2019/01/07/the-dual-use-dilemma-of-artificial-intelligence/|title=The Dual-Use Dilemma Of Artificial Intelligence|last=Pandya|first=Jayshree|website=Forbes|language=en|access-date=2019-12-07}}</ref> Artificial intelligence can be applied within many different fields and can be easily integrated throughout current technology's [[cyberspace]].<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":1">{{Cite web|url=https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2019/01/we-need-to-get-smart-about-how-governments-use-ai?lang=en|title=We Need to Get Smart About How Governments Use AI|last=Feldstein|first=Steven|website=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace|language=en|access-date=2019-12-10}}</ref> With the use of AI, technology has become capable of running multiple [[algorithm]]s that could solve difficult problems, from detecting anomalies in samples during [[Magnetic resonance imaging|MRI scans]],<ref name=":1" /> to providing surveillance of an entire country's residents.<ref name=":1" /> Within [[Mass surveillance in China|China's mass surveillance]], the government uses AI in order to distinguish citizens with less than satisfactory records among crowds.<ref>{{Cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/08/business/china-surveillance-technology.html|title=Inside China's Dystopian Dreams: A.I., Shame and Lots of Cameras|last=Mozur|first=Paul|date=2018-07-08|work=The New York Times|access-date=2019-12-10|language=en-US|issn=0362-4331}}</ref> Every new invention or application made with AI comes with its own set of positive and negative effects.<ref name=":0" /> Some claim that, as potential uses for AI grow in number, nations need to start regulating it as a dual-use technology.<ref name=":0" />

== Chemical ==
{{main|List of Schedule 3 substances (CWC)}}
The modern history of [[chemical weapons]] can be traced back to the [[Chemical industry|chemical industries]] of the belligerent nations of [[World War I]], especially that of Germany. Many industrial chemical processes produce toxic intermediary stages, final products, and by-products, and any nation with a chemical industry has the potential to create weaponised chemical agents. [[Chlorine]] is a chemical agent found within several household items such as [[Bleach]] and provides various benefits with its wide array of applications.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.chemicalsafetyfacts.org/chlorine/|title=Uses, Benefits, and Safety of Chlorine {{!}} Chemical Safety Facts|date=2014-05-01|website=ChemicalSafetyFacts.org|language=en-US|access-date=2019-12-10}}</ref> However, its gaseous form can also be used as a chemical weapon.<ref name=":5">{{Cite news|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/04/11/chlorine-sarin-or-something-else-the-big-questions-in-alleged-syrian-chemical-weapons-attack/|title=Analysis {{!}} Chlorine, sarin or something else? The big questions in the alleged Syrian chemical weapons attack.|last=Taylor|first=Adam|date=2018-04-11|newspaper=Washington Post|language=en|access-date=2019-12-10}}</ref>

== Biological ==
{{see also|Gain-of-function research}}
The July 2007 [[terrorist]] attacks [[2007 London car bombs|in central London]] and [[2007 Glasgow International Airport attack|at Glasgow airport]] was a recent biosecurity wake-up call when it was discovered that doctors which could have access to [[pathogen]]s were among the suspects. The challenge remains to maintain security without impairing the contributions to progress afforded by research.<ref>
{{cite journal
|author=Daniel Cressey
|date=17 August 2007
|title=Not so secure after all
|journal=[[Nature (journal)|Nature]]
|volume=448
|issue=7155
|pages=732–733
|doi=10.1038/448732a
|pmid=17700663
|bibcode=2007Natur.448..732C
|pmc=7095479
}}</ref>

Reports from the project on building a sustainable culture in dual-use [[bioethics]] suggest that, as a result of perceived changes in both science and security over the past decade, several states and multilateral bodies have underlined the importance of making life scientists aware of concerns over dual-use and the legal obligations underpinning the prevention of biological weapons. One of the key mechanisms that have been identified to achieve this is through the education of life science students, with the objective of building what has been termed a “culture of responsibility”.

At the 2008 Meeting of States Parties to the [[Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention]] (BTWC), it was agreed by consensus that: States Parties recognized the importance of ensuring that those working in the biological sciences are aware of their obligations under the convention and relevant national legislation and guidelines...States Parties noted that formal requirements for seminars, modules or courses, including possible mandatory components, in relevant scientific and engineering training programmes and continuing professional education could assist in raising awareness and in implementing the convention.<ref>UN (2008) "Report of the Meeting of States Parties", BWC/MSP/2008/5, 12 December 2008.</ref>

The [[World Health Organization]] in 2010 developed a "guidance document" for what it called "Dual Use Research of Concern" (DURC) in the life sciences, regarding “research that is intended [to] benefit, but which might easily be misapplied to do harm".<ref name="whodurc">{{cite news |title=Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) |url=https://www.who.int/csr/durc/en/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131029002508/http://www.who.int/csr/durc/en/ |url-status=dead |archive-date=October 29, 2013 |access-date=4 February 2021 |publisher=World Health Organization}}</ref>

Along with several similar stipulations from other states and regional organisations,  [[biosecurity]] education has become more important. Unfortunately, both the policy and academic literature show that life scientists across the globe are frequently uninformed or underinformed about biosecurity, dual-use, the BTWC and national legislation outlawing biological weapons.<ref>Mancini. G & Revill. J (2008) Fostering the Biosecurity Norm: Biosecurity Education for the Next Generation of Life Scientists, November 2008. {{cite web|url=http://www.centrovolta.it/landau/content/binary/Fostering%20the%20Biosecurity%20NormFinal.pdf |title=Centrovolta.it - Informazioni Turistiche |access-date=2010-08-20 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110721161219/http://www.centrovolta.it/landau/content/binary/Fostering%20the%20Biosecurity%20NormFinal.pdf |archive-date=2011-07-21 }}</ref><ref>Minehata. M and D. Friedman (2009) Biosecurity Education in Israeli Research Universities. Research Report for the Wellcome Trust Project on Building a Sustainable Capacity in Dual Use Bioethics. http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/dube/publications/Israel_BioSecReport_Final.pdf</ref> Moreover, despite numerous declarations by states and multilateral organisations, the extent to which statements at the international level have trickled down to multifaceted activity at the level of scientists remains limited.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Revill |first=James |last2=Mancini |first2=G. |last3=Minehata |first3=Masamichi |last4=Shinomiya |first4=N. |date=2009-11-18 |title=Biosecurity education: surveys from Europe and Japan |url=https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Biosecurity-education:-surveys-from-Europe-and-Revill-Mancini/141b1ff94d89ec1af2a97bba03e4d66d1c32bf75 |journal=Conference: Inter Academy Panel Workshop on Promoting Education on Dual Use Issues in the Life Sciences}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Revill |first=James |date=January 2009 |title=Biosecurity and Bioethics Education: A Case Study of the UK Context. |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/202170909_Biosecurity_and_Bioethics_Education_A_Case_Study_of_the_UK_Context |journal=Conference: Research Report for the Wellcome Trust Project on Building a Sustainable Capacity in Dual Use Bioethics}}</ref>

The US federal government (USG) developed several policy documents on DURC. In May 2024, the White House published the "United States Government Policy for Oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern and Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic Potential",<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/ostp/news-updates/2024/05/06/united-states-government-policy-for-oversight-of-dual-use-research-of-concern-and-pathogens-with-enhanced-pandemic-potential/ |title=United States Government Policy for Oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern and Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic Potential |date=May 6, 2024 |publisher=White House Office of Science and Technology Policy }}</ref> "a unified federal oversight framework for conducting and managing certain types of federally funded life sciences research on biological agents and toxins." The policy superseded several prior documents, published in 2012,<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/Documents/us-policy-durc-032812.pdf |title=United States Government Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern |year=2012}}</ref> 2014,<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/documents/durc-policy.pdf |title=United States Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern |year=2014}}</ref> and 2017,<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/Documents/P3CO-FinalGuidanceStatement.pdf |title=Recommended Policy Guidance for Departmental Development of Review Mechanisms for Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight |year=2017}}</ref> and it follows the directives established by the 2022 National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National-Biodefense-Strategy-and-Implementation-Plan-Final.pdf |title=National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan |publisher=White House |year=2022}}</ref>

== Night vision and thermal imaging ==
[[Night-vision device]]s with extraordinary performance characteristics (high [[Gain (electronics)|gain]], specific [[spectral sensitivity]], fine [[Optical resolution|resolution]], low [[Noise (electronics)|noise]]) are heavily export-restricted by the few states capable of producing them, mainly to limit their [[Small arms proliferation issues|proliferation]] to enemy combatants, but also to slow the inevitable [[reverse-engineering]] undertaken by other world powers.

These precision components, such as the [[image intensifiers]] used in [[night vision goggles]] and the [[focal plane array]]s found in [[surveillance satellites]] and [[thermal camera]]s, have numerous civil applications which include [[nature photography]], [[medical imaging]], [[firefighting]], and [[population control]] of predator species.

Night scenes of wild elephants and rhinos in the [[BBC]] nature documentary series [[Africa (BBC documentary series)|Africa]] were shot on a Lunax Starlight HD camera (a custom-built [[digital cinema]] rig encompassing a Generation 3 image intensifier), and recolored digitally.<ref>{{cite magazine|title=Meet the BBC Natural History Unit's kit-hacking specialists|url=https://www.wired.co.uk/article/wired-bbc-natural-history|magazine=Wired UK|access-date=9 December 2016|date=2014-02-06}}</ref>

In the United States, civilians are free to buy and sell American-made night vision and thermal systems, such as those manufactured by defense contractors [[Harris Corporation|Harris]], [[L3 Technologies|L3 Insight]], and [[FLIR Systems]], with very few restrictions. However, American night vision owners may not bring the equipment out of the country, sell it internationally, or even invite non-citizens to examine the technology, per [[International Traffic in Arms Regulations]].<ref>{{cite web|title=FAQ|url=https://tnvc.com/faq/|website=Tactical Night Vision Company|access-date=9 December 2016}}</ref>

Export of American image intensifiers is selectively permitted under license by the [[United States Department of Commerce]] and the [[Department of State|State Department]]. Contributing factors in acquiring a license include diplomatic relations with the destination country, number of pieces to be sold, and the relative quality of the equipment itself, expressed using a [[Night vision device#Figure of merit|Figure Of Merit]] (FOM) score calculated from several key performance characteristics.

Competing international manufacturers (European defense contractor Exosens Group, Japanese scientific instrument giant [[Hamamatsu Photonics]], and Russian state-financed laboratory JSC Katod) have entered the American market through licensed importers. In spite of their foreign origin, re-export of these components outside of the United States is restricted similarly to domestic components.

A 2012 assessment of the sector by the [[Department of Commerce]] and [[Bureau of Industry and Security]] made the case for relaxing export controls in light of the narrowing performance gap and increased competition internationally,<ref>{{cite web|title=Critical Technology Assessment: Night Vision Focal Plane Arrays, Sensors, and Cameras|url=https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-documents/about-bis/newsroom/630-night-vision-assessment/file|website=bis.doc.gov|publisher=US Department of Commerce|access-date=9 December 2016}}</ref> and a review period undertaken by the [[Directorate of Defense Trade Controls]] in 2015 introduced much more granular performance definitions.<ref>{{cite web|title=Export Control Reform Comes to USML Category XII|url=http://www.exportlawblog.com/archives/6910|website=Export Law Blog|access-date=9 December 2016}}</ref>

== Other technologies ==
[[File:CXD2949GB_01.jpg|thumb|PlayStation 2's graphics processor]]
In addition to obvious dual-use technologies there are some less obvious ones, in that many erstwhile peaceful technologies can be used in weapons. One example during the First and Second World War is the role of German toy manufacturers: Germany was one of the leading nations in the production of [[wind-up toy]]s, and the ability to produce large numbers of small and reliable [[clockwork]] motors was converted into the ability to produce shell and bomb [[fuze]]s. During its early stages of release, the [[PlayStation 2]] was considered to be a dual-use technology.<ref name=":6">{{Cite web|url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-apr-17-fi-20482-story.html|title=Sony's High-Tech Playstation2 Will Require Military Export License|date=2000-04-17|website=Los Angeles Times|language=en-US|access-date=2019-12-10}}</ref> The gaming console had to receive special import regulations before being shipped towards the U.S. and European markets.<ref name=":6" /> This is due to the console's and its included GPU's capability to process high quality images at high speeds, a shared trait with [[Missile guidance|missile guidance systems]].<ref name=":6" />

=== HoloLens 2 ===
[[File:HoloLens 2.jpeg|thumb|left|Microsoft's HoloLens 2]]
Early 2019, Microsoft announced the [[HoloLens 2]], smart glasses that will allow consumers to experience [[augmented reality]] within the real world.<ref name=":2">{{Cite web|url=https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/06/microsoft-hololens-2-army-plans-to-customize-as-ivas.html|title=How the Army plans to use Microsoft's high-tech HoloLens goggles on the battlefield|last=Haselton|first=Todd|date=2019-04-06|website=CNBC|language=en|access-date=2019-12-10}}</ref> However, it was revealed Microsoft made a 479 million dollar deal with the U.S. government.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":3">{{Cite web|url=https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/25/tech/augmented-reality-microsoft-us-military/index.html|title=Microsoft CEO defends US military contract that some employees say crosses a line|author=Charles Riley and Samuel Burke|website=CNN|date=25 February 2019|access-date=2019-12-10}}</ref><ref name=":4">{{Cite web|url=https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5746790-Microsoft-HoloLens-Letter.html|title=Microsoft HoloLens Letter|last=NBC|date=2019-02-23|website=www.documentcloud.org|language=en|access-date=2019-12-10}}</ref> This contract would have Microsoft create and supply the U.S. Army a separate version of the HoloLens smart glasses called the [[Integrated Visual Augmentation System]] (IVAS).<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":3" /><ref name=":4" /> The IVAS would be used to train soldiers, as well as field medics with battlefield experience within a virtual environment.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":3" /><ref name=":4" /> This version of the HoloLens allowed the soldiers to have a virtual map of their current environment, friendly units' locations, and much more.<ref name=":2" /> An anonymous Microsoft employee published an open letter demanding that Microsoft terminate the IVAS contract.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":3" /><ref name=":4" /> Microsoft president [[Brad Smith (American lawyer)|Brad Smith]] had previously made a public blog post<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2018/10/26/technology-and-the-us-military/|title=Technology and the US military|date=26 October 2018}}</ref> outlining the company's stance on "how technology companies should work with the government, and specifically whether companies should supply digital technology to the military."

== Control ==
{{main|Export control}}
Most industrial countries have [[export control]]s on certain types of designated dual-use technologies, and they are required by a number of treaties as well. These controls restrict the export of certain commodities and technologies without the permission of the government.

In the context of sanctions regimes, dual-use can be construed broadly because there are few things which do not have the potential for both military and civilian uses.<ref>{{Cite book |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1345216431 |title=Sanctions as War: Anti-Imperialist Perspectives on American Geo-Economic Strategy |date=2023 |publisher= |isbn=978-1-64259-812-4 |location= |pages=27–28 |oclc=1345216431 |last1=Davis |first1=Stuart }}</ref>

=== United States ===
The principal agency for investigating violations of dual-use export controls in the United States is the [[Bureau of Industry and Security]] (BIS) [[Office of Export Enforcement]] (OEE).<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/oee |title = OEE Home Page}}</ref>  Interagency coordination of export control cases are conducted through the Export Enforcement Coordination Center (E2C2). The [[International Traffic in Arms Regulations]] is the US regime that the BIS OEE enforces.

=== Canada ===
The Canadian legislation to govern the trade in dual-use technology is known as the [[Export and Imports Permits Act]].

=== European Union ===
The [[European Union]] governs dual-use technology through the [[Control List of Dual Use Items]].<ref name="lscbc">{{cite news |last1=Servunts |first1=Levon |title=Bombardier Recreational Products suspends delivery of aircraft engines used on military drones |url=https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/turkey-armenia-azerbaijan-drones-bombardier-1.5775350 |publisher=CBC |date=25 October 2020}}</ref>

=== International regimes ===
There are several international arrangements among countries which seek to harmonize lists of dual-use (and military) technologies to control. These include the [[Nuclear Suppliers Group]], the [[Australia Group]], which looks at chemical and biological technologies, the [[Missile Technology Control Regime]], which covers delivery systems for [[Weapon of mass destruction|weapons of mass destruction]], and the [[Wassenaar Arrangement]], which covers conventional arms and dual-use technologies.

== See also ==
*[[General-purpose technology]]
*[[Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons]]

== References ==
{{reflist}}

== External links ==
*{{cite web | title=Biosecurity 101| website=[[National Academy of Sciences]]| url=http://nas-sites.org/biosecurity/biosecurity-101/ }}
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20190319191520/https://www.bis.doc.gov/ U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security]
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20110804232242/http://www.dtic.mil/mctl/ Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL)] from the US Government's [[Defense Technical Information Center]]
*[https://fas.org/biosecurity/education/dualuse/index.html Federation of American Scientists Case Studies in Dual-Use Research]
*[http://www.bradford.ac.uk/bioethics/  University of Bradford Disarmament Research Centre Dual Use Bioethics Homepage.]
*[https://web.archive.org/web/20130512111049/http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/september/tradoc_140595.pdf European Commission, List of Dual-use items and technologies]
**[http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1166 Commission updates EU control list on dual use items] (22 October 2014)
*[http://www.vieuws.eu/foreign-affairs/dual-use-surveillance-technology-marietje-schaake-mep-alde/ European Parliament Rapporteur Marietje Schaake on Dual-Use / Surveillance Technology]
{{Authority control}}

[[Category:Military technology]]
[[Category:Nuclear proliferation]]