Editing Enforcement

{{Short description|Process of ensuring compliance with laws, regulations, rules, standards, or social norms}}
[[File:SEC-enforcement-flowchart.png|thumb|right|Enforcement is a stage in the proceedings of the [[U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission|SEC]]]]
{{about|the socio-political concept|other uses|Enforcement (disambiguation)}}
'''Enforcement''' is the proper execution of the process of ensuring compliance with [[law]]s, regulations, rules, standards, and [[Norm (social)|social norm]]s.<ref>See {{smallcaps|Black's Law Dictionary}}, ''Enforcement'' (2d ed. 1910).</ref> 

Governments attempt to effectuate successful implementation of policies by enforcing laws and regulations.<ref>Kate Andrias, ''[http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-88-4-Andrias.pdf The President's Enforcement Power] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161104021200/http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-88-4-Andrias.pdf |date=2016-11-04 }}'', 88 {{smallcaps|N.Y.U. L. Rev.}} 1031, 1034 (2013); Avlana Eisenberg, ''[http://www.uclalawreview.org/pdf/61-4-1.pdf Expressive Enforcement]'', 61 {{smallcaps|UCLA L. Rev.}} 858, 901 (2014) (discussing "gaps" between the enactment and enforcement of legislation).</ref>
Enactment refers to application of a law or regulation, or carrying out of an executive or judicial order.

==Theories of enforcement==
Enforcement serves a number of functions; the enforcement of social norms can ensure conformity within insular communities,<ref>Amalia D. Kessler, ''Enforcing Virtue: Social Norms and Self-Interest in an Eighteenth-Century Merchant Court'', 22 {{smallcaps|L. & Hist. Rev.}} 71 (2011).</ref> the enforcements of laws can maximize social benefits and protect the public interest,<ref>John T. Scholz, ''Voluntary Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement'', 6 {{small
|L. & Pol'y}} 385-88 (1984); see also Margaret H. Lemos, ''[http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5183&context=faculty_scholarship State Enforcement of Federal Law]'', 86 {{smallcaps|N.Y.U. L. Rev.}} 698, 701 (2011) ("The public interest promoted by state enforcement is the interest of the state and its citizens, while federal enforcement purports to serve the broader national interest.").</ref> and enforcement may also serve the self-interest of the institutions that oversee enforcement.<ref>Margaret H. Lemos and Max Minzner, ''[http://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/vol127_lemos_minzner_online.pdf For-Profit Public Enforcement]'', 127 Harv. L. Rev. 853, 886 (2014).</ref> Enforcement can be effectuated by both public institutions and private, non-governmental actors.<ref>Zachary D. Clopton, ''[https://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2016/03/Redundant-Public-Private-Enforcement.pdf Redundant Public-Private Enforcement]'', 69 {{smallcaps|Vand. L. Rev.}} 285, 288 (2016); Michael Selmi, ''Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment'', 45 {{smallcaps|UCLA L. Rev.}} 1401, 1456 (1998).</ref> Enforcement is often accomplished through coercive means or by utilizing power disparities to constrain action.<ref>See Scott A. Anderson, ''[http://www.jesp.org/PDF/TheEnforcementApproachFinal.pdf The Enforcement Approach to Coercion]'', 5 J. of Ethics &Soc. Phil. 1 (2010).</ref> Some scholars, such as [[Kate Andrias]], have also argued that institutions enforce rules when deciding "when and how to apply" laws and regulations.<ref>Kate Andrias, ''[http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-88-4-Andrias.pdf The President's Enforcement Power] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161104021200/http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-88-4-Andrias.pdf |date=2016-11-04 }}'', 88 {{smallcaps|N.Y.U. L. Rev.}} 1031, 1040 (2013) (comparing "enforcement" with "rulemaking").</ref> 

===Delegation of enforcement powers===
Some governments will [[delegation|delegate]] enforcement powers to subordinate governmental entities or private parties.<ref>Kurt T. Lash, [http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/LashPDF_dkt69ak6.pdf ''The Sum of All Delegated Power: A Response to Richard Primus'', The Limits of Enumeration], 124 {{smallcaps|Yale L. J. F.}} 180, 184 (2014) (discussing enforcement powers in federalist systems of government); John F. Manning, ''[http://cdn.harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/vol128_manning_foreword.pdf The Means of Constitutional Power]'', 128 {{smallcaps|Harv. L. Rev.}} 1, 44 (2014) (citing specific examples of delegation of enforcement powers to agencies in the United States); Kate Andrias, ''[http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-88-4-Andrias.pdf The President's Enforcement Power] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161104021200/http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-88-4-Andrias.pdf |date=2016-11-04 }}'', 88 {{smallcaps|N.Y.U. L. Rev.}} 1031, 1040 (2013) (noting that enforcement powers can be delegated to "private parties").</ref> In the [[United States]], for example, the federal government and state governments often delegate a range of enforcement powers to [[government agency|administrative agencies]].<ref>Robert F. Durant, {{smallcaps|The Oxford Handbook of American Bureaucracy}} 379 (2010) (discussing agencies' "compliance and enforcement" powers).</ref> There has been considerable debate in legal scholarship about the degree to which governments should oversee and supervise institutions to which enforcement powers have been delegated.<ref>Compare, e.g., Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn, and Glen O. Robinson, ''[http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4292&context=clr Theory of Legislative Delegation]'', 68 {{smallcaps|Cornell L. Rev.}} 1 (1982) with Gillian E. Metzger, ''[http://www.yalelawjournal.org/article/the-constitutional-duty-to-supervise The Constitutional Duty To Supervise]'', 124 Yale L. J. 124 (2015).</ref>

==Enforcement mechanisms==
{{See also|Standardization}}
{{Excerpt|Public policy|Enforcement}}
In 2017, of 265 policies for [[Ocean#Protection|ocean protection]] only 13% had specific enforcement mechanisms.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Al-Abdulrazzak |first1=Dalal |last2=Galland |first2=Grantly R. |last3=McClenachan |first3=Loren |last4=Hocevar |first4=John |title=Opportunities for improving global marine conservation through multilateral treaties |journal=Marine Policy |date=1 December 2017 |volume=86 |pages=247–252 |doi=10.1016/j.marpol.2017.09.036 |bibcode=2017MarPo..86..247A |language=en |issn=0308-597X}}</ref>

Enforcement mechanisms are major component of [[governance]] structures.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Aliberti |first1=Marco |last2=Krasner |first2=Stephen D. |chapter=Governance in Space |title=Yearbook on Space Policy 2014 |journal=Yearbook on Space Policy 2014: The Governance of Space |date=2016 |pages=143–166 |doi=10.1007/978-3-7091-1899-3_3 |publisher=Springer |isbn=978-3-7091-1898-6 |language=en}}</ref> It has been suggested that an effective [[global health|global]] public [[health policy|health]] security convention would require a governing body (or bodies) to enforce the framework with appropriate enforcement mechanisms.<ref name="10.1016/S2468-2667(21)00070-0">{{cite journal |last1=Duff |first1=Johnathan H |last2=Liu |first2=Anicca |last3=Saavedra |first3=Jorge |last4=Batycki |first4=Jacob N |last5=Morancy |first5=Kendra |last6=Stocking |first6=Barbara |last7=Gostin |first7=Lawrence O |last8=Galea |first8=Sandro |last9=Bertozzi |first9=Stefano |last10=Zuniga |first10=Jose M |last11=Alberto-Banatin |first11=Carmencita |last12=Dansua |first12=Akua Sena |last13=del Rio |first13=Carlos |last14=Kulzhanov |first14=Maksut |last15=Lee |first15=Kelley |last16=Scaglia |first16=Gisela |last17=Shahpar |first17=Cyrus |last18=Ullmann |first18=Andrew J |last19=Hoffman |first19=Steven J |last20=Weinstein |first20=Michael |last21=Szapocznik |first21=José |title=A global public health convention for the 21st century |journal=The Lancet Public Health |date=1 June 2021 |volume=6 |issue=6 |pages=e428–e433 |doi=10.1016/S2468-2667(21)00070-0 |pmid=33964227 |pmc=8099565 |language=en |issn=2468-2667}}</ref> Similar approaches include the concept of "climate clubs" of [[polity|polities]] for [[climate change mitigation]]. In such, "border adjustments [...] have to be introduced to target those states that do not participate [...] to avoid shifting effects with ecologically and economically detrimental consequences", with such "border adjustments or [[eco-tariff]]s" incentivizing other countries to adjust their standards and domestic production to join the climate club.<ref name="10.3390/su14074365">{{cite journal |last1=Stubenrauch |first1=Jessica |last2=Garske |first2=Beatrice |last3=Ekardt |first3=Felix |last4=Hagemann |first4=Katharina |title=European Forest Governance: Status Quo and Optimising Options with Regard to the Paris Climate Target |journal=Sustainability |date=January 2022 |volume=14 |issue=7 |pages=4365 |doi=10.3390/su14074365 |language=en |issn=2071-1050|doi-access=free }}</ref> The [[Paris Agreement]] may lack enforcement mechanisms.<ref name="10.1007/s10584-021-03082-4">{{cite journal |last1=King |first1=Lewis C. |last2=van den Bergh |first2=Jeroen C. J. M. |title=Potential carbon leakage under the Paris Agreement |journal=Climatic Change |date=17 April 2021 |volume=165 |issue=3 |pages=52 |doi=10.1007/s10584-021-03082-4 |bibcode=2021ClCh..165...52K |s2cid=233279743 |language=en |issn=1573-1480|url=https://ddd.uab.cat/record/239163 |hdl=1871.1/63469f15-e0ce-4899-9b7b-b95b3fe88177 |hdl-access=free }}</ref>

On a national level, penalties for non-complying countries could include:
* public reprimands
* [[economic sanction]]s
* denial of benefits, such as those related to travel, trade, and tourism
* public disclosures of compliance, which could act either as an incentive or penalty<ref name="10.1016/S2468-2667(21)00070-0"/>
* tariffs<ref name="10.3390/su14074365"/>
Benefits for countries could include:
* tangible resources, such as financial aid or technical assistance
* other support
* access to data and information, recommendations and guidance, or other services provided by a governing body<ref name="10.1016/S2468-2667(21)00070-0"/>
* tariffs

==Selective enforcement==
{{main|Selective enforcement}}

Institutions may choose to exercise discretion, thereby enforcing laws, regulations, or norms only in selective circumstances.<ref>See Kenneth Culp Davis, ''Dialogue on Police Rulemaking: Police Rulemaking on Selective Enforcement: A Reply'', 125 {{smallcaps|U. Penn. L. Rev.}} 1167 (1977).</ref> Some scholars, such as Joseph H. Tieger, have suggested that selective enforcement is an inherent component of all enforcement regimes, because it is impossible for enforcers to observe and catch every violation.<ref>Joseph H. Tieger, ''[http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2345&context=dlj Police Discretion and Discriminatory Enforcement]'', 1971 {{smallcaps|Duke L. J.}} 717, 743 (1971) ("The exigencies of police work are such that even the most elaborate set of statutory or regulatory directives could not succeed in removing all occasion for the exercise of judgment.").</ref> Other scholars, such as [[Margaret H. Lemos]] and Alex Stein, have suggested that "strategic" enforcement is a cost-effective method of achieving social benefits; by focusing enforcement on the worst violators, other violators will "downscale" their activities so that they do not appear to be the worst offender.<ref>[[Margaret H. Lemos]] and Alex Stein, ''[http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Lemos-Stein_MLR.pdf Strategic Enforcement]'', 95 {{smallcaps|Minn. L. Rev.}} 9, 9-10 (2010).</ref>

==See also==
*[[Law enforcement]]
*[[Primary and secondary legislation]]
*[[State capacity]]

==References==
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[[Category:Governance]]
[[Category:Statutory law]]
[[Category:Law enforcement]]
[[Category:Legal procedure]]