Editing Europe first

{{Short description|Allied grand strategy policy in World War II}}
'''Europe first''', also known as '''Germany first''', was the key element of the [[grand strategy]] agreed upon by the [[United States]] and the [[United Kingdom]] during [[World War II]] after the United States joined the war in December 1941. According to this policy, the United States and the United Kingdom would use the preponderance of their resources to subdue [[Nazi Germany]] in [[Europe]] first. Simultaneously, they would fight a holding action against [[Empire of Japan|Japan]] in the [[Pacific Ocean|Pacific]], using fewer resources. After the defeat of Germany—considered the greatest threat to the UK and the Soviet Union<ref>Hornfischer p. 151-153, 383</ref>—all [[Allies of World War II|Allied]] forces could be concentrated against Japan.

At the December 1941 [[Arcadia Conference]] between President [[Franklin Roosevelt]] and Prime Minister [[Winston Churchill]] in Washington, shortly after the United States entered the War, the decision for the "Europe First" strategy was affirmed. However, U.S. statistics show that the United States devoted more resources in the early part of the war to stopping the advance of Japan, and not until 1944 was a clear preponderance of U.S. resources allocated toward the defeat of Germany.

==Grand strategy==
Germany was the United Kingdom's primary threat, especially after the [[Battle of France|Fall of France]] in 1940, which saw Germany overrun most of the countries of Western Europe, leaving the United Kingdom alone to combat Germany.  Germany's threatened invasion of the UK, [[Operation Sea Lion]], was averted by its failure to establish air superiority in the [[Battle of Britain]], and by its marked inferiority in naval power. At the same time, war with Japan in East Asia seemed increasingly likely.  Although the U.S. was not yet at war, it met with the UK on several occasions to formulate joint strategies.  In the March 29, 1941 report of the [[ABC-1]] conference, the Americans and British agreed that their strategic objectives were: (1) "The early defeat of Germany as the predominant member of the [[Axis powers|Axis]] with the principal military effort of the United States being exerted in the Atlantic and European area;" and (2) "A strategic defensive in the Far East."<ref>Morton, Louis. ''Strategy and Command: The First Two Years.  The United States Army in World War II.'' Washington: GPO, 1962, p. 88</ref>

Thus, the Americans concurred with the British in the grand strategy of "Europe first" (or "Germany first") in carrying out military operations in World War II.  The UK feared that, if the United States was diverted from its main focus in Europe to the Pacific (Japan), [[Adolf Hitler|Hitler]] might crush the Soviet Union, and would then become an unconquerable fortress in Europe. The wound inflicted on the United States by [[Attack on Pearl Harbor|Japan's attack on the US at Pearl Harbor]] on December 7, 1941, did not result in a change in U.S. policy. Churchill hastened to Washington shortly after Pearl Harbor for the [[Arcadia Conference]] to ensure that the Americans didn't have second thoughts about Europe First. In 1941, Roosevelt appointed [[John Gilbert Winant]] ambassador to Britain, and Winant remained in that post until he resigned in March 1946. In a 2010 book, ''Citizens of London: The Americans Who Stood with Britain in Its Darkest, Finest Hour'', author [[Lynne Olson]] described Winant as dramatically changing the U.S. stance as ambassador when succeeding pro-appeasement ambassador [[Joseph P. Kennedy Sr.]] In the spring of 1941, [[W. Averell Harriman]] served President Franklin D. Roosevelt as a special envoy to Europe and helped coordinate the [[Lend-Lease]] program. The two countries reaffirmed that, "notwithstanding the entry of Japan into the War, our view remains that Germany is still the prime enemy and her defeat is the key to victory. Once Germany is defeated the collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must follow."<ref>Morton, p. 158</ref>

==United States==

The Europe first strategy, in conjunction with a "holding action" against Japan in the Pacific, had originally been proposed to Roosevelt by the U.S. military in 1940.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Stoler|first1=Mark A.|title=George C. Marshall and the "Europe-First" Strategy, 1939–1951: A Study in Diplomatic as well as Military History|url=http://marshallfoundation.org/marshall/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2014/04/EDStoler.pdf|access-date=4 April 2016}}</ref> When [[German declaration of war against the United States|Germany declared war on the United States]] on December 11, 1941, the United States faced a decision about how to allocate resources between these two separate theaters of war. On the one hand, Japan had attacked the United States directly at Pearl Harbor, and the [[Imperial Japanese Navy|Japanese Navy]] threatened United States territory in a way that Germany, with a limited surface fleet, was not in a position to do. On the other hand, Germany was considered the stronger and more dangerous threat to Europe; and Germany's geographical proximity to the UK and the Soviet Union was a much greater threat to their survival.<ref>Hornfischer p. 11-15, 130, 151–153, 382, 383</ref>

Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, American planners foresaw the possibility of a two-front war. [[Chief of Naval Operations]] [[Harold Rainsford Stark]] authored the [[Plan Dog memo]], which advocated concentrating on victory in Europe while staying on the defensive in the Pacific. However, the U.S. reassurance to the UK notwithstanding, the U.S.'s immediate concern was with Japan. As the [[Chief of Staff of the United States Army|Army Chief of Staff]] General [[George Marshall]] later said, "we had a fair understanding of what we had best do rather than the necessity of engaging in prolonged conversations... This understanding, which included a recognition that Germany was the main enemy and that the major effort would be made initially in Europe, was obviously not applicable in the present situation. Of first importance now was the necessity to check the Japanese."<ref>Morton, 141–142</ref> Nonetheless, Marshall and other U.S. generals advocated the invasion of northern Europe in 1943, which the British rejected.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Husen|first1=editor, David T. Zabecki ; assistant editors, Carl O. Schuster, Paul J. Rose, William H. Van|title=World War II in Europe : an encyclopedia|date=1999|publisher=Garland Pub.|isbn=9780824070298|page=1270|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=gYDN-UfehEEC&pg=PA1270}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last1=Mackenzie|first1=S.P.|title=The Second World War in Europe: Second Edition|date=2014|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1317864714|pages=54–55|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=GsUFBAAAQBAJ&pg=PA55}}</ref> After Churchill pressed for a landing in [[French North Africa]] in 1942, Marshall suggested instead to Roosevelt that the U.S. abandon the Germany-first strategy and take the offensive in the Pacific. Roosevelt "disapproved" the proposal saying it would do nothing to help Russia.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Ward|first1=Geoffrey C.|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=V73CAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA402|title=The Roosevelts: An Intimate History|last2=Burns|first2=Ken|date=2014|publisher=Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group|isbn=978-0385353069|pages=402|chapter=The Common Cause: 1939-1944}}</ref> With Roosevelt's support, and Marshall unable to persuade the British to change their minds, in July 1942 [[Operation Torch]] was scheduled for later that year.<ref name=":0">{{cite book|title=Routledge Handbook of US Military and Diplomatic History|date=2013|publisher=Taylor and Francis|location=Hoboken|isbn=9781135071028|page=135|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=VRiYAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA135}}</ref>

The Europe First strategy remained in effect throughout the war but the terms "holding action" and "limited offensive" in the Pacific were subject to interpretation and modification by U.S. senior military commanders and at allied leaders conferences. The strategic situation in the Pacific and related logistical requirements dominated the United States' actions after its entry into the war and led to an initial focus on the Pacific. Even in the later stages of the war, there was intense competition for resources as operations in both regions were scaled up.<ref name=":0" /><ref name=Gray/>

==Opposition==
The "Europe First" strategy was not well received by factions of the US military, driving a wedge between the Navy and the Army. While USN Fleet Admiral [[Ernest King]] was a strong believer in "Europe First", contrary to British perceptions, his natural aggression did not permit him to leave resources idle in the Atlantic that could be utilized in the Pacific, especially when "it was doubtful when—if ever—the British would consent to a cross-Channel operation".<ref name=Morison1957_pp13-14>{{Cite book |first=Samuel Eliot |last=Morison |title=History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol. XI: Invasion of France & Germany: 1944–1945 |pages=13–14 |publisher= [[Little, Brown and Company]] |year=1957 |isbn=0-316-58311-1}}</ref> King once complained that the Pacific deserved 30% of Allied resources but was getting only 15%, perhaps partly because the two men did not get along,<ref>{{cite web
 |access-date  = 2007-12-30
 |url         = http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWkingE.htm
 |title       = Ernest King
 |author      = Simkin, John
 |publisher   = Spartacus Educational
 |url-status     = dead
 |archive-url  = https://web.archive.org/web/20071229093558/http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWkingE.htm
 |archive-date = 2007-12-29
}}</ref> the combined influence of King and General [[Douglas MacArthur]] increased the allocation of resources to the Pacific War.<ref name=Gray>{{cite book
|access-date=2007-12-30
|url=http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/BigL/BigL-6.html
|chapter=Chapter 6: Joint Logistics in the Pacific Theater
|author=Gray, Anthony W. Jr.
|title=The Big 'L' — American Logistics in World War II
|editor=Alan Gropman
|year=1997
|publisher=National Defense University Press
|location=Washington, D.C.
}}</ref>

General [[Hastings Ismay]], chief of staff to [[Winston Churchill]], described King as:
<blockquote>tough as nails and carried himself as stiffly as a poker. He was blunt and stand-offish, almost to the point of rudeness. At the start, he was intolerant and suspicious of all things British, especially the [[Royal Navy]]; but he was almost equally intolerant and suspicious of the [[United States Army|American Army]]. War against Japan was the problem to which he had devoted the study of a lifetime, and he resented the idea of American resources being used for any other purpose than to destroy Japanese. He mistrusted Churchill's powers of advocacy, and was apprehensive that he would wheedle President Roosevelt into neglecting the war in the Pacific.{{Cn|date=May 2024}}</blockquote>

At the January 1943 [[Casablanca Conference]], King was accused by Field Marshal Sir [[Alan Brooke, 1st Viscount Alanbrooke|Alan Brooke]], [[Chief of the General Staff (United Kingdom)|Chief of the Imperial General Staff]], of favoring the Pacific war, and the argument became heated. The combative US general [[Joseph Stilwell]] wrote: "Brooke got nasty, and King got good and sore. King almost climbed over the table at Brooke. God, he was mad. I wished he had socked him."<ref name=Pogue1973_p305>{{Cite book |first=Forrest C. |last= Pogue |title=George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory 1943–1945 |pages=305 |publisher=Viking Adult |year=1973 |isbn=0-670-33694-7}}</ref>

The American people favored early action against Japan. In one of the few public opinion polls taken during the war, in February 1943, 53% of Americans said that Japan was the "chief enemy" compared to 34% choosing Germany. A later poll showed that 82% of Americans believed that the Japanese were more "cruel at heart" than Germans.<ref>Gallup, George H. ''The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935–1971.'' New York: Random House, 1972, pp. 370,509</ref> As a consequence of the immediate threat and the need to contain Japan's advance across the Pacific, American resources allocated to the defeat of Japan initially exceeded those allocated to Europe. In the first six months the U.S. was in the war, the U.S. army deployed more than 300,000 soldiers overseas to the Pacific while less than 100,000 were sent to Europe.<ref>Leighton, Richard M. and Coakley, Robert W. ''Global Logistics and Strategy: 1940–1943'', Vol 1, Part 5 of ''The U.S. Army in World War II'' Washington: GPO, 1995, p. 716</ref>  The U.S.'s first major offensive during World War II was in the Pacific: [[Guadalcanal campaign|Guadalcanal]] in August 1942. Concurrently, Australian forces attacked and pushed back the Japanese in the [[Kokoda Track Campaign]] in New Guinea.

==Analysis==

Three U.S. Army divisions were deployed to Australia and New Zealand in February and March 1942 at the request of Churchill so that divisions from those countries could remain on operations in the Middle East. Through this sizeable deployment to the Pacific, the U.S. aided the Europe First strategy by defending Australia and New Zealand and thus enabling experienced troops from those countries to remain deployed against German forces.<ref name=Gray/> Nonetheless, the inability of the two allies to mount an invasion of German-controlled northern Europe in 1943 permitted the U.S. to maintain more military forces arrayed against Japan than Germany during the first two years the U.S. was in the war. As late as December 1943, the balance was nearly even. Against Japan, the U.S. had deployed 1,873,023 men, 7,857 aircraft, and 713 warships. Against Germany the totals were 1,810,367 men, 8,807 airplanes, and 515 warships.<ref>Matloff, Maurice, ''Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943–1944'', Vol. 1, Part 4, ''The U.S. Army in World War II'' Washington: GPO, 1955, p. 398</ref> In early 1944, the military buildup of American forces for the invasion of France shifted the balance of American resources toward the European theater and made Europe First a reality. However, despite the majority of American resources going into Europe in 1944, the U.S. still had sufficient resources to mount several major military operations in the Pacific that year: [[Battle of Saipan|Saipan]] (June 1944); [[Battle of Guam (1944)|Guam]] (July 1944); [[Battle of Peleliu|Peleliu]] (September 1944); and the liberation of the Philippines at [[Battle of Leyte|Leyte]] in October 1944.

In 1944 and 1945, the balance of U.S. resources shifted heavily toward Europe as the Europe First strategy became a reality rather than just a stated objective. At war's end in Europe, the U.S. Army had 47 divisions in Europe and 21 divisions, plus 6 Marine Corps divisions, in the Pacific. 78% of Army and Army Air Force manpower was deployed against Germany versus 22% deployed in the Pacific. [[Operation Downfall|The plan to invade Japan]] envisioned that 15 of the European divisions (and the Eighth Air Force) would be transferred to the Pacific.<ref>Frank, Richard B. ''Downfall: The End of the Japanese Empire'' New York: Random House, 1999, p 123</ref123</ref>

The uncritical view that "Europe First" dictated the allocation of resources throughout the war has caused many scholars to underestimate the resources required to defeat Japan. For example, historian H. P. Willmott stated that the United States "allocated little more than one-quarter of her total war effort to the struggle against Japan."<ref>Willmott, H. P. ''Empires in the Balance.'' Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1982, p. xv</ref> That may be an underestimate which does not take into account that, according to official U.S. statistics, 70% of the U.S. Navy and all the Marine Corps were deployed in the Pacific as well as the 22% of the Army deployed to the Pacific at the time of Germany's surrender in May 1945.<ref>Leighton, Richard M. and Coakley, Robert W. ''Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943–1945'', of ''The U.S. Army in World War II'' Washington: GPO, 1995, p. 834</ref>

==See also==
*[[Asia First]]
*[[Declarations of war during World War II]]
*[[Diplomatic history of World War II]]
*[[List of Allied World War II conferences]]
*[[Military history of the United Kingdom during World War II]]
*[[Military history of the United States during World War II]]
*[[Plan Dog memo]]
*Theaters of World War II
**[[European theatre of World War II|European]]
**[[Mediterranean and Middle East theatre of World War II|Mediterranean and Middle East]]
**[[Pacific War|Pacific]]

== Bibliography ==
{{Reflist|2}}

== References ==
*Hornfischer, James D. ''Neptune's Inferno: The US Navy at Guadalcanal.'' New York: Bantam Books, 2011.  {{ISBN|978-0-553-80670-0}}.

{{Winston Churchill}}
{{Franklin D. Roosevelt}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Europe First}}
[[Category:Politics of World War II]]
[[Category:United Kingdom–United States relations]]