Editing Foundationalism

{{Short description|Epistemological theory}}
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'''Foundationalism''' concerns [[epistemology|philosophical theories of knowledge]] resting upon non-inferential [[knowledge|justified belief]], or some secure foundation of certainty such as a conclusion inferred from a basis of sound premises.<ref name=foundationalism>Simon Blackburn, ''The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy'', 2nd (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), [https://books.google.com/books?id=5wTQtwB1NdgC&pg=PA139&dq=foundationalism p 139].</ref> The main rival of the '''foundationalist theory of justification'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> is the [[coherence theory of justification]], whereby a body of knowledge, not requiring a secure foundation, can be established by the interlocking strength of its components, like a puzzle solved without prior certainty that each small region was solved correctly.<ref name=foundationalism/>

Identifying the alternatives as either [[circular reasoning]] or [[infinite regress]], and thus exhibiting the [[regress problem]], [[Aristotle]] made foundationalism his own clear choice, positing [[basic belief]]s underpinning others.<ref name=Poston>Ted Poston, [http://www.iep.utm.edu/found-ep "Foundationalism"] (Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)</ref> [[René Descartes|Descartes]], the most famed foundationalist, discovered a foundation in the fact of his own existence and in the "clear and distinct" ideas of reason,<ref name=foundationalism/><ref name=Poston/> whereas [[John Locke|Locke]] found a foundation in [[experience]].  Differing foundations may reflect differing [[epistemological]] emphases—[[empiricist]]s emphasizing ''experience'', [[rationalist]]s emphasizing ''reason''—but may blend both.<ref name=foundationalism/>

In the 1930s, debate over foundationalism revived.<ref name=Poston/> Whereas [[Moritz Schlick]] viewed scientific knowledge like a pyramid where a special class of statements does not require [[verificationism|verification]] through other beliefs and serves as a foundation, [[Otto Neurath]] argued that scientific knowledge lacks an ultimate foundation and acts like a raft.<ref name=Poston/> In the 1950s, the dominance of foundationalism was challenged by a number of philosophers such as [[Willard Van Orman Quine]] and [[Wilfrid Sellars]].<ref name=Poston/> Quine's [[ontological relativity]] found any belief networked{{clarification needed|date=May 2021}} to one's beliefs on all of reality, while auxiliary beliefs somewhere in the vast network are readily modified to protect desired beliefs.

Classically, foundationalism had posited [[infallibility]] of basic beliefs and [[deductive reasoning]] between beliefs—a strong foundationalism.<ref name=Poston/> Around 1975, weak foundationalism emerged.<ref name=Poston/> Thus recent foundationalists have variously allowed [[fallibilism|fallible]] basic beliefs, and [[inductive reasoning]] between them, either by [[enumerative induction]] or by [[inference to the best explanation]].<ref name=Poston/> And whereas [[internalism|internalists]] require [[cognitive]] access to justificatory means, [[externalism|externalists]] find justification without such access.

==History==
{{Descartes}}
Foundationalism was initiated by French [[Early modern philosophy|early modern philosopher]] [[René Descartes]].<ref name=GF2001>Grenz & Franke 2001, p. 31</ref> In his ''[[Meditations on First Philosophy|Meditations]]'', Descartes challenged the contemporary principles of philosophy by arguing that everything he knew he learnt from or through his senses. He used various arguments to challenge the reliability of the senses, citing previous errors and the possibilities that he was dreaming or being deceived by an [[Evil Demon]] which rendered all of his beliefs about the external world false.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia | url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/descartes/#HowDoOurMinKno | title=René Descartes | encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | date=3 December 2008 | access-date=28 March 2013 | author=Hatfield, Gary}}</ref> Descartes attempted to establish the secure foundations for knowledge to avoid [[scepticism]]. He contrasted the information provided by senses, which is unclear and uncertain, with the truths of [[geometry]], which are clear and distinct. Geometrical truths are also certain and indubitable; Descartes thus attempted to find truths which were clear and distinct because they would be indubitably true and a suitable foundation for knowledge.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia | url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/descarte/#H3 | title=René Descartes (1596—1650): Overview | encyclopedia=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy | date=13 September 2008 | access-date=28 March 2013 | author=Skirry, Justin}}</ref> His method was to question all of his beliefs until he reached something clear and distinct that was indubitably true. The result was his ''[[cogito ergo sum]]'' – 'I think therefore I am', or the belief that he was thinking – as his indubitable belief suitable as a foundation for knowledge.<ref name=GF2001/> This resolved Descartes' problem of the Evil Demon. Even if his beliefs about the external world were false, his beliefs about what he was experiencing were still indubitably true, even if those perceptions do not relate to anything in the world.<ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/introspe/#SH1a | title=Introspection | publisher=internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy | date=18 November 2005 | access-date=28 March 2013 | author=Kind, Amy}}</ref>

Several other philosophers of the early modern period, including [[John Locke]], [[G. W. Leibniz]], [[George Berkeley]], [[David Hume]], and [[Thomas Reid]], accepted foundationalism as well.<ref name=SEP/> [[Baruch Spinoza]] was interpreted as [[metaphysical]] foundationalist by [[G. W. F. Hegel]], a proponent of [[coherentism]].<ref>[[James Kreines]], ''Reason in the World: Hegel's Metaphysics and Its Philosophical Appeal'', Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 25: "Spinoza's foundationalism (Hegel argues) threatens to eliminate all determinate reality, leaving only one indeterminate substance."</ref> [[Immanuel Kant]]'s foundationalism rests on his theory of [[Category (Kant)|categories]].<ref>[[Tom Rockmore]], ''On Foundationalism: A Strategy for Metaphysical Realism'', Rowman & Littlefield, 2004, p. 65.</ref>

In [[late modern philosophy]], foundationalism was defended by [[J. G. Fichte]] in his book ''[[Foundations of the Science of Knowledge|Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre]]'' (1794/1795),<ref>[[Frederick C. Beiser]], ''German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism, 1781–1801'', Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002, p. 236.</ref> [[Wilhelm Windelband]] in his book ''Über die Gewißheit<!--[sic]--> der Erkenntniss'' (1873),<ref>[[Frederick C. Beiser]] (2014), ''The Genesis of Neo-Kantianism, 1796–1880'' (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 517.</ref> and [[Gottlob Frege]] in his book ''[[The Foundations of Arithmetic|Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik]]'' (1884).<ref>[[Tom Rockmore]], ''On Foundationalism: A Strategy for Metaphysical Realism'', Rowman & Littlefield, 2004, p. 111.</ref>

In [[contemporary philosophy]], foundationalism has been defended by [[Edmund Husserl]],<ref>[[Barry Smith (ontologist)|Barry Smith]] and David Woodruff Smith, eds., ''The Cambridge Companion to Husserl'', Cambridge University Press, p. 292.</ref> [[Bertrand Russell]]<ref>Carlo Cellucci, ''Rethinking Knowledge: The Heuristic View'', Springer, 2017, p. 32.</ref> and [[John McDowell]].<ref>John McDowell, ''Mind and World''. Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 29.</ref><ref name=Gibson>Roger F. Gibson, "McDowell's Direct Realism and Platonic Naturalism", ''Philosophical Issues'' Vol. 7, ''Perception'' (1996), pp. 275–281.</ref>

==Definition==
Foundationalism is an attempt to respond to the [[regress problem]] of justification in epistemology. According to this argument, every proposition requires [[theory of justification|justification]] to support it, but any justification also needs to be justified itself. If this goes on ''[[ad infinitum]]'', it is not clear how anything in the chain could be justified. Foundationalism holds that there are 'basic beliefs' which serve as foundations to anchor the rest of our beliefs.<ref>O'Brien 2006, pp. 61–62</ref> Strong versions of the theory assert that an indirectly justified belief is completely justified by basic beliefs; more moderate theories hold that indirectly justified beliefs require basic beliefs to be justified, but can be further justified by other factors.<ref>Audi 2003, p. 194</ref>

Since [[ancient Greece]], [[Western philosophy]] has pursued a solid foundation as the ultimate and eternal reference system for all [[knowledge]]. This foundation serves not only as a starting point but also as the fundamental basis for understanding the truth of existence. Thinking is the process of proving the validity of knowledge, not proving the rationality of the foundation from which knowledge is shaped. This means, with ultimate cause, the foundation is true, absolute, entire and impossible to prove. [[Neopragmatism|Neopragmatist]] philosopher [[Richard Rorty]], a proponent of [[anti-foundationalism]], said that the fundamentalism confirmed the existence of the ''privileged representation''<ref>Rorty, Richard (1979). Philosophy and the mirror of nature. Princeton University Press. pp.&nbsp;165–173</ref> which constitutes the foundation, from which dominates epistemology.{{clarify|from which dominates|date=September 2020}} The earliest foundationalism is [[Plato]]'s [[theory of Forms]], which shows the general [[concept]] as a model for the release of existence, which is only the faint copy of the Forms of eternity, that means, understanding the expression of objects leads to acquiring all knowledge, then acquiring knowledge accompanies achieving the truth. Achieving the truth means understanding the foundation. This idea still has some appeal in for example [[international relations]] studies.<ref>Smith, Steve, Ownens Patrica, "Alternative approaches to international relations theory" in "The Globalisation of World Politics", Baylis, Smith and Owens, OUP, 4th ed, p177</ref>

===Classical foundationalism===
Foundationalism holds basic beliefs exist, which are justified without reference to other beliefs, and that nonbasic beliefs must ultimately be justified by basic beliefs. Classical foundationalism maintains that basic beliefs must be [[Infallibility#In philosophy|infallible]] if they are to justify nonbasic beliefs, and that only [[deductive reasoning]] can be used to transfer justification from one belief to another.<ref>Lemos 2007, pp. 50–51</ref> [[Laurence BonJour]] has argued that the classical formulation of foundationalism requires basic beliefs to be infallible, incorrigible, indubitable, and certain if they are to be adequately justified.<ref>BonJour 1985, p. 27</ref> Mental states and immediate experience are often taken as good candidates for basic beliefs because it is argued that beliefs about these do not need further support to be justified.<ref>Dancy 1985, pp. 53–54</ref>

===Modest foundationalism===
As an alternative to the classic view, modest foundationalism does not require that basic perceptual beliefs are infallible, but holds that it is reasonable to assume that perceptual beliefs are justified unless evidence to the contrary exists.<ref name=OB>O'Brien 2006, pp. 72–74</ref> This is still foundationalism because it maintains that all non-basic beliefs must be ultimately justified by basic beliefs, but it does not require that basic beliefs are infallible and allows [[inductive reasoning]] as an acceptable form of inference.<ref>Lemos 2007, p.55</ref> For example, a belief that 'I see red' could be defeated with psychological evidence showing my mind to be confused or inattentive. Modest foundationalism can also be used to avoid the problem of inference. Even if perceptual beliefs are infallible, it is not clear that they can infallibly ground empirical knowledge (even if my belief that the table looks red to me is infallible, the inference to the belief that the table actually is red might not be infallible). Modest foundationalism does not require this link between perception and reality to be so strong; our perception of a table being yellow is adequate justification to believe that this is the case, even if it is not infallible.<ref name=OB/>

[[Reformed epistemology]] is a form of modest foundationalism which takes religious beliefs as basic because they are non-inferentially justified: their justification arises from [[religious experience]], rather than prior beliefs. This takes a modest approach to foundationalism – religious beliefs are not taken to be infallible, but are assumed to be ''[[prima facie]]'' justified unless evidence arises to the contrary.<ref>O'Brien 2006, p. 184</ref>

===Internalism and externalism<!--Linked from 'Alvin_Goldman'-->===
Foundationalism can take [[internalism|internalist]] and [[externalism|externalist]] forms. Internalism requires that a believer's justification for a belief must be accessible to them for it to be justified.<ref>O'Brien 2006, p.87</ref> Foundationalist internalists have held that basic beliefs are justified by [[mental event]]s or states, such as experiences, that do not constitute beliefs. Alternatively, basic beliefs may be justified by some special property of the belief itself, such as its being [[self-evident]] or [[infallible]]. Externalism maintains that it is unnecessary for the means of justification of a belief to be accessible to the believer.<ref>O'Brien 2006, p. 88</ref>

[[Reliabilism]] is an externalist foundationalist theory, initially proposed by [[Alvin Goldman]], which argues that a belief is justified if it is reliably produced, meaning that it will be probably true. Goldman distinguished between two kinds of justification for beliefs: belief-dependent and belief-independent. A belief-dependent process uses prior beliefs to produce new beliefs; a belief-independent process does not, using other stimuli instead. Beliefs produced this way are justified because the processes that cause them are reliable; this might be because we have evolved to reach good conclusions when presented with [[sense-data]], meaning the conclusions we draw from our senses are usually true.<ref name=SEP>{{cite encyclopedia | url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-foundational/#4 | title=Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification | encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | date=21 February 2000 | access-date=19 August 2018 | author=Fumerton, Richard}}</ref>

==Criticisms==
{{See also|Anti-foundationalism}}
Critics of foundationalism often argue that for a belief to be justified it must be supported by other beliefs;<ref name=SEP/> in [[Donald Davidson (philosopher)|Donald Davidson]]'s phrase, "only a belief can be a reason for another belief". For instance, [[Wilfrid Sellars]] argued that non-[[doxastic logic|doxastic]] mental states cannot be reasons, and so noninferential warrant cannot be derived from them. Similarly, critics of [[externalist]] foundationalism argue that only mental states or properties the believer is aware of could make a belief justified.

[[Postmodernists]] and [[post-structuralism|post-structuralists]] such as [[Richard Rorty]] and [[Jacques Derrida]] have attacked foundationalism on the grounds that the truth of a statement or discourse is only verifiable in accordance with other statements and discourses. Rorty in particular elaborates further on this, claiming that the individual, the community, the human body as a whole have a 'means by which they know the world' (this entails language, culture, semiotic systems, mathematics, science etc.). In order to verify particular means, or particular statements belonging to certain means (e.g., the propositions of the natural sciences), a person would have to 'step outside' the means and critique them neutrally, in order to provide a foundation for adopting them. However, this is impossible. The only way in which one can know the world is through the means by which they know the world; a method cannot justify itself. This argument can be seen as directly related to [[Wittgenstein]]'s theory of language, drawing a parallel between postmodernism and late [[logical positivism]] that is united in critique of foundationalism.<ref>{{Citation |last=Rorty |first=Richard |title=Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the reification of language |date=1993 |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-heidegger/wittgenstein-heidegger-and-the-reification-of-language/9678EE30FC5FD89BD254AAE72730D0BF |work=The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger |pages=337–357 |editor-last=Guignon |editor-first=Charles |access-date=2023-03-09 |series=Cambridge Companions to Philosophy |place=Cambridge |publisher=Cambridge University Press |doi=10.1017/ccol0521385709.014 |isbn=978-1-139-00051-2|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

==See also==
* [[Constructivist epistemology]]
* [[Ethical intuitionism]]
* [[Evidentialism]]
* [[Foundherentism]]
* [[Panrationalism]]
* [[Pragmatism]]

==References==
{{Reflist}}

== Bibliography ==
*{{cite book | title=Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge | author=Audi, Robert | publisher=Routledge | year=2003 | isbn=978-0-415-28109-6}}
*{{cite book | title=The Structure of Empirical Knowledge | url=https://archive.org/details/structureofempir00bonj | url-access=registration | author=BonJour, Laurence | publisher=Harvard University Press | year=1985 | isbn=978-0-67484-381-3}}
*{{cite encyclopaedia | title=Foundationalism | encyclopaedia=[[ACPI Encyclopaedia of Philosophy]] | author=Coelho, Ivo | editor=Puthenpurackal, Johnson J. | publisher=Asian Trading Corporation | year=2010 | isbn=978-8-17086-574-2}}
*{{cite book | title=Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology | author=Dancy, Jonathan | publisher=Blackwell | year=1985 | isbn=0-631-13622-3}}
*{{cite book | title=Beyond Foundationalism: Shaping Theology in a Postmodern Context | last1=Franke | first1=John R. | last2=Grenz | first2=Stanley James | publisher=Westminster John Knox Press | year=2001 | isbn=9780664257699}}
*{{cite book | author=Greco, John | title=Putting Skeptics in Their Place | year=2000 | publisher=Cambridge University Press | location=Cambridge, UK | isbn=978-0-521-04553-7}}
*{{cite book | title=An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge | author=Lemos, Noah Mercelino | publisher=Cambridge University Press | year=2007 | isbn=978-1-13946-185-6}}
*{{cite book | title=An introduction to the Theory of Knowledge | author=O'Brien, Dan | publisher=Polity | year=2006 | isbn=978-0-74563-316-9}}

== External links ==
*{{cite SEP |url-id=justep-foundational/ |title=Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification |last=Fumerton |first=Richard}}
*{{PhilPapers|category|foundationalism}}
*{{InPho|taxonomy|2385}}
*{{cite IEP |url-id=found-ep/}}

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