Editing Hyatt Regency walkway collapse

{{Short description|1981 structural collapse in Kansas City, Missouri}}
{{More citations needed|date=August 2023}}
{{Use mdy dates|date=February 2025}}
{{Use American English|date=July 2018}}

{{Infobox event
| title = 
| image = Hyatt Regency collapse end view.PNG
| image_name = 
| image_size = 
| caption = Original location of second- and fourth-story walkways
| date = {{Start date and age|1981|7|17}}
| time = 19:05 CDT (UTC−5)
| place = {{Indented_plainlist|
*[[Sheraton Kansas City Hotel at Crown Center|Hyatt Regency Kansas City]]
*2345 McGee Street
*[[Kansas City, Missouri|Kansas City]], [[Missouri]] 64108
}}
| coordinates = {{Coord|39.085|N|94.580|W|region:US-MO_type:event|display=title,inline}}
| also known as = 
| cause = Structural overload resulting from design flaws<ref name=nbs>{{cite journal |last1=Marshall |first1=Richard D. |last2=Pfrang |first2=E. O. |last3=Leyendecker |first3=E. V. |last4=Woodward |first4=K. A. |last5=Reed |first5=R. P. |last6=Kasen |first6=M. B. |last7=Shives |first7=T. R. |display-authors=1 |title=Investigation of the Kansas City Hyatt Regency Walkways Collapse |journal=NIST |series=Building Science Series |volume=143 |publisher=U.S. Dept. of Commerce, National Bureau of Standards |date=May 31, 1982 |url=https://www.nist.gov/publications/investigation-kansas-city-hyatt-regency-walkways-collapse-nbs-bss-143?pub_id=908286 |access-date=July 14, 2021 |archive-date=July 17, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210717073810/https://www.nist.gov/publications/investigation-kansas-city-hyatt-regency-walkways-collapse-nbs-bss-143?pub_id=908286 |url-status=live }}</ref>{{rp|iii}}
| outcome = 
| reported death(s) = 114
| reported injuries = 216
| reported missing = 
| reported property damage = 
| burial = 
| coroner = 
| charges = 
| verdict = 
| convictions = 
| litigation = 
| awards = 
| url = 
| website = 
| notes = 
}}

On July 17, 1981, two overhead walkways in the [[Sheraton Kansas City Hotel at Crown Center|Hyatt Regency Hotel]] in [[Kansas City, Missouri]] collapsed, killing 114 people and injuring 216. Loaded with partygoers, the concrete and glass platforms crashed onto a [[tea dance]] in the lobby. The collapse resulted in billions of dollars of insurance claims, legal investigations, and city government reforms.

The hotel had been built just a few years before, during a nationwide pattern of [[Fast-track construction|fast-tracked]] large construction with reduced oversight and major failures. Its roof had partially collapsed during construction, and the ill-conceived skywalk design progressively degraded due to a miscommunication loop of corporate neglect and irresponsibility. An investigation concluded that it would have failed even under one-third of the weight it held that night. Convicted of gross negligence, misconduct and unprofessional conduct, the engineering company lost its national affiliation and all engineering licenses in four states, but was acquitted of criminal charges. Company owner and engineer of record Jack D. Gillum eventually claimed full responsibility for the collapse and its obvious, but unchecked, design flaws, and he became an engineering disaster lecturer.

The disaster contributed many lessons and reforms to engineering ethics and safety, and to [[emergency management]]. It was the deadliest non-deliberate structural failure since the [[Pemberton Mill|collapse of Pemberton Mill]] over 120 years earlier, and remained the second deadliest structural collapse<ref name="petroski">{{cite book| title=To Engineer Is Human: The Role of Failure in Structural Design| first=Henry| last=Petroski| author-link=Henry Petroski | year=1992| orig-year=1985 | oclc=493623634 | isbn=978-0-679-73416-1| publisher=Vintage| url=https://archive.org/details/toengineerishuma00petr}}</ref>{{rp|4}} in the United States until the [[collapse of the World Trade Center]] towers [[September 11 attacks|20 years later]].

==Background==
''[[The Kansas City Star]]'' described the national climate of the late 1970s as "high unemployment, inflation and double-digit interest rates [that added] pressure on builders to win contracts and complete projects swiftly".<ref name="20 years later">{{cite news | url=http://skywalk.kansascity.com/articles/20-years-later-many-are-continuing-learn-skywalk-collapse/ | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160108175310/http://skywalk.kansascity.com/articles/20-years-later-many-are-continuing-learn-skywalk-collapse/ | url-status=dead | archive-date=January 8, 2016 |title=20 years later: Many are continuing to learn from skywalk collapse| work=[[The Kansas City Star]]| date=July 15, 2001|access-date=May 4, 2020 |first=Rick |last=Montgomery|page=A1}}</ref> Described by the newspaper as [[Fast-track construction|fast-tracked]], construction began in May 1978 on the 40-story [[Hyatt Regency Kansas City]]. There were numerous delays and setbacks, including the collapse of {{convert|2700|ft2}} of the roof. The newspaper observed that "Notable structures around the country were failing at an alarming rate", which included the [[Hy-Vee Arena#1979 roof collapse|1979 Kemper Arena roof collapse]]<ref name="20 years later"/> and the [[XL Center#Early history and roof collapse|1978 Hartford Civic Center roof collapse]]. The hotel officially opened on July 1, 1980.<ref name="NYT">{{cite news |author=Staff |access-date=July 17, 2019 |title=45 Killed at Hotel in Kansas City, Mo., as Walkways Fall |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1981/07/18/us/45-killed-at-hotel-in-kansas-city-mo-as-walkways-fall.html |newspaper=The New York Times |date=July 18, 1981 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=July 17, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190717123725/https://www.nytimes.com/1981/07/18/us/45-killed-at-hotel-in-kansas-city-mo-as-walkways-fall.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

The hotel's lobby was its defining feature, with a multi-story atrium spanned by elevated walkways suspended from the ceiling. These steel, glass and concrete crossings connected the second, third and fourth floors between the north and south wings. The walkways were about {{convert|120|ft}} long<ref name="nbs"/>{{rp|28}} and weighed about {{convert|64000|lb}}.<ref name="kcpl">{{cite web| title=Hotel Horror| url=https://kchistory.org/week-kansas-city-history/hotel-horror| first=Jason| last=Roe| publisher=[[Kansas City Public Library]]| access-date=April 30, 2019| archive-date=April 30, 2019| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190430150635/http://www.kchistory.org/week-kansas-city-history/hotel-horror| url-status=live}}</ref> The fourth-level walkway was directly above the second-level walkway.

==Collapse==
[[File:Hyatt Kansas City Collapse.gif|thumb|Lobby floor, during the first day of the investigation. The third-floor walkway shows the comparable three pairs of tie-rods holding its support beams, which failed on the fourth-floor walkway.]]
[[File:Hyatt Regency collapse floor view.PNG|thumb|The landing of the concrete fourth-floor walkway, atop the crowded second-floor walkway]]
About 1,600 people gathered in the atrium for a [[tea dance]] on the evening of Friday, July 17, 1981.<ref name="Ramroth">{{cite book |title=Planning for disaster: how natural and man-made disasters shape the built environment |last=Ramroth |first=William |year=2007 |publisher=Kaplan Business |isbn=978-1-4195-9373-4 |page=177 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ATZUAAAAMAAJ |access-date=2017-01-30 |archive-date=2017-02-15 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170215172915/https://books.google.com/books?id=ATZUAAAAMAAJ |url-status=live }}</ref> The second-level walkway held about 40 people at about 7:05&nbsp;p.m., with more on the third and an additional 16 to 20 on the fourth.<ref name="nbs"/>{{rp|54}} The fourth-floor bridge was suspended directly over the second-floor bridge, with the third-floor walkway offset several yards from the others. Guests heard popping noises and a loud crack moments before the fourth-floor walkway dropped several inches, paused, then fell completely onto the second-floor walkway. Both walkways then fell to the crowded lobby floor.<ref name="Friedman"/><ref name="ap"/> A diner at the 42nd-floor revolving restaurant atop the Hyatt said it felt like an explosion.<ref name="Disaster made">{{cite news |author=Staff writers |title=Disaster made heroes of the helpers |url=http://skywalk.kansascity.com/articles/disaster-made-heroes-helpers/ |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141016022336/http://skywalk.kansascity.com/articles/disaster-made-heroes-helpers/ |archive-date=October 16, 2014 |access-date=July 17, 2019 |work=[[The Kansas City Star]] |df=dmy-all}}</ref>

The rescue operation lasted 14 hours,<ref name="ap">{{cite news| title=Lives forever changed by skywalk collapse| work=[[Lawrence Journal-World]]| date=July 15, 2001| access-date=January 28, 2011| agency=Associated Press| url=http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2001/jul/15/lives_forever_changed/| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100614000956/http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2001/jul/15/lives_forever_changed/| archive-date=June 14, 2010| url-status=dead}}</ref> directed by Kansas City emergency medical director [[Joseph Waeckerle]].<ref name="KCPitch">{{cite news |title=Former Chiefs doctor Joseph Waeckerle – a veteran of the NFL's concussion wars – is on a mission to protect young players |first=David |last=Martin |url=http://www.pitch.com/gyrobase/former-chiefs-doctor-joseph-waeckerle-a-veteran-of-the-nfls-concussion-wars-is-on-a-mission-to-protect-young-players/Content?oid=2200821&showFullText=true |work=[[The Pitch (newspaper)|The Pitch]] |location=Kansas City |date=September 14, 2011 |access-date=July 14, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121020145912/http://www.pitch.com/gyrobase/former-chiefs-doctor-joseph-waeckerle-a-veteran-of-the-nfls-concussion-wars-is-on-a-mission-to-protect-young-players/Content?oid=2200821&showFullText=true |archive-date=October 20, 2012 |url-status=dead }}</ref> Survivors were buried beneath the walkways' many tons of steel, concrete and glass, which the fire department's jacks could not move. Volunteers responded to an appeal and brought jacks, flashlights, compressors, jackhammers, concrete saws and generators from construction companies and suppliers.<ref name="Take what you want">{{cite magazine |last=D'Aulairey|first=Emily|author2=Per Ola D'Aulairey|magazine=Reader's Digest|title=There Wasn't Time To Scream|date=July 1982|pages=49–56}}</ref> They also brought cranes and forced the booms through the lobby windows to lift debris.<ref name="20YearsLater">{{cite news |last=McGuire |first=Donna |title=20 years later: Fatal disaster remains impossible to forget |url=http://skywalk.kansascity.com/articles/20-years-later-fatal-disaster-remains-impossible-forget/ |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110822141834/http://skywalk.kansascity.com/articles/20-years-later-fatal-disaster-remains-impossible-forget/ |archive-date=August 22, 2011 |access-date=December 3, 2011 |newspaper=[[The Kansas City Star]]}}</ref> Deputy Fire Chief Arnett Williams recalled this immediate outpouring from the industrial community: "They said 'take what you want'. I don't know if all those people got their equipment back. But no one has ever asked for an accounting and no one has ever submitted a bill."<ref name="Take what you want"/>

The dead were taken to a ground-floor exhibition area as a makeshift morgue,<ref name="APLib">{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ecgOAQAAMAAJ&q=morgue+hyatt |title=The Associated Press Library of Disasters: Nuclear and Industrial Disasters |publisher=Grolier Academic Reference |year=1997 |isbn=978-0-7172-9176-2 |page=67 |access-date=2016-10-11 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200221224721/https://books.google.com/books?id=ecgOAQAAMAAJ&q=morgue+hyatt |archive-date=2020-02-21 |url-status=live |agency=}}</ref> and the hotel's driveway and lawn were used as a triage area.<ref name=NEJM_1991>{{cite journal|last=Waeckerle|first=Joseph F.|title=Disaster Planning and Response|journal=New England Journal of Medicine|volume=324|date=March 21, 1991|issue=12|pages=815–821|doi=10.1056/nejm199103213241206 |pmid=1997854}}</ref> Able survivors were instructed to leave the hotel to simplify the rescue effort, and morphine was given to the mortally injured.<ref name="Friedman">{{cite book |title=Everyday crisis management: how to think like an emergency physician |last=Friedman |first=Mark |year=2002 |publisher=First Decision Press |isbn=978-0-9718452-0-6 |pages=134–136 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JH_0wEY8E6QC&pg=PA134 |access-date=June 14, 2019 |via=Google Books |archive-date=April 17, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210417171124/https://books.google.com/books?id=JH_0wEY8E6QC&pg=PA134 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=amednews>{{cite magazine |last=O'Reilly |first=Kevin |title=Disaster medicine dilemmas examined |magazine=American Medical News |date=January 2, 2012 |volume=55 |issue=1 |url=http://www.amednews.com/article/20120102/profession/301029949/2/ |access-date=August 9, 2013 |archive-date=April 5, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190405154442/https://amednews.com/article/20120102/profession/301029949/2/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Blood centers quickly received lineups of hundreds of donors.<ref name="Reverberating"/> The Life Line helicopter pilot compared the carnage to the [[Vietnam War]] but in greater numbers.<ref name="Disaster made"/>

Visibility was poor because of dust and because the power had been cut to prevent fires.<ref name="20YearsLater" /><ref name="KCStar30">{{cite news |last=Murphy |first=Kevin |date=July 9, 2011 |title=Hyatt skywalks collapse changed lives forever |url=https://www.grandforksherald.com/entertainment/2158730-kc-hyatt-skywalks-collapse-changed-many-lives-forever |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210714105157/https://www.grandforksherald.com/entertainment/2158730-kc-hyatt-skywalks-collapse-changed-many-lives-forever |archive-date=July 14, 2021 |access-date=July 14, 2021 |newspaper=[[The Kansas City Star]]}}</ref> Water from the hotel's ruptured sprinkler system flooded the lobby and put trapped survivors at risk of drowning. The final rescued victim, Mark Williams, spent more than nine hours pinned underneath the lower skywalk with both legs dislocated and having nearly drowned before the water was shut off.

== Casualties ==
A total of 114 were killed and 216 injured,<ref name="KCPitch" /><ref name="KCStar30" /> 29 of whom were rescued from the rubble.<ref name="FEMA">{{cite book|title=Incident Command System for Structural Collapse Incidents; ICSSCI-Student Manual|year=2006|publisher=FEMA|pages=SM 1–7|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_1d4kLEo1wEC&pg=SA1-PA7|edition=FEMA P-702|access-date=October 10, 2011|archive-date=April 17, 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210417172549/https://books.google.com/books?id=_1d4kLEo1wEC&pg=SA1-PA7|url-status=live}}</ref> Rescuers often had to dismember bodies to reach survivors among the wreckage.<ref name="Friedman" /> A surgeon spent 20 minutes amputating one victim's pinned and unsalvageable leg with a chainsaw; that victim later died.<ref name="Disaster made" />

==Investigation==
[[File:HRWalkway.svg|thumb|The original design vis-à-vis the final construction of the fourth-floor walkway support system. The revised design doubled the force on the nut, and hence on the welded joint of the beams which split.]]
[[File:Hyatt Regency collapse support.PNG|thumb|A cross-section of the fourth-floor support beam that fell, together with the second-floor support rod passing through its left and right halves vertically]]

''[[The Kansas City Star]]'' hired architectural engineer Wayne G. Lischka<ref name="20 years later"/><ref>{{Cite web| title=History & Education | url=http://lischka.com/Top5.html | url-status=dead | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050207031122/http://lischka.com/Top5.html | archive-date=February 7, 2005 | access-date=April 30, 2019}}</ref> and national engineering firm Simpson, Gumpertz, and Heger Inc. to investigate the collapse, and Lischka discovered a change to the original design of the walkways.<ref name="Reverberating"/> Within days, a laboratory at [[Lehigh University]] began testing box beams on behalf of the steel fabrication source.<ref name="20 years later"/> The Missouri licensing board, the state attorney general and [[Jackson County, Missouri|Jackson County]] investigated the collapse over the following years.<ref name="Reverberating">{{cite news | title=Collapse of Hotel's 'Skywalks' in 1981 is still Reverberating; in Kansas City | first=Paul J. | last=Haskins | date=March 29, 1983 | newspaper=[[The New York Times]] | url=https://www.nytimes.com/1983/03/29/us/collapse-of-hotel-s-skywalks-in-1981-is-still-reverberating-in-kansas-city.html | access-date=May 4, 2020 | archive-date=August 27, 2020 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200827233017/https://www.nytimes.com/1983/03/29/us/collapse-of-hotel-s-skywalks-in-1981-is-still-reverberating-in-kansas-city.html | url-status=live }}</ref> Edward Pfrang, lead investigator for the [[National Bureau of Standards]], characterized the neglectful corporate culture surrounding the entire Hyatt construction project as "everyone wanting to walk away from responsibility".<ref name="20 years later"/> The NBS's final report cited structural overload resulting from design flaws where "the walkways had only minimal capacity to resist their own weight".<ref name=nbs/>{{rp|6}} Pfrang concluded they would have failed with one-third of the occupants' weight.<ref name="ap"/>

Investigators found that the collapse was the result of changes to the design of the walkway's steel [[tie rod|hanger rod]]s. The two walkways were suspended from a set of {{convert|1.25|in|mm|adj=mid|-diameter}} steel hanger rods,<ref name=Baura>{{cite book |last=Baura |first=Gail |title=Engineering ethics: an industrial perspective |publisher=Academic Press |isbn=978-0-12-088531-2 |year=2006 |page=55 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=543gDMmaaZQC&q=hyatt+regency+hotel+Kansas+City&pg=PA55 |access-date=2020-10-23 |archive-date=2021-04-17 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210417172042/https://books.google.com/books?id=543gDMmaaZQC&q=hyatt+regency+hotel+Kansas+City&pg=PA55 |url-status=live }}</ref> with the second-floor walkway hanging directly under the fourth-floor walkway. The fourth-floor walkway platform was supported on three cross-beams suspended by the steel rods retained by nuts. The cross-beams were [[box girder]]s made from {{convert|8|in|mm|adj=mid|-wide}} C-channel strips welded together lengthwise, with a hollow space between them. The original design by Jack D. Gillum and Associates specified three pairs of rods running from the second-floor walkway to the ceiling, passing through the beams of the fourth-floor walkway, with a nut at the middle of each tie rod tightened up to the bottom of the fourth-floor walkway, and a nut at the bottom of each tie rod tightened up to the bottom of the second-floor walkway. Even this original design supported only 60% of the minimum load required by Kansas City building codes.<ref name="ua">{{cite web| title=Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse| publisher=School of Engineering, University of Alabama| url = http://www.eng.uab.edu/cee/faculty/ndelatte/case_studies_project/Hyatt%20Regency/hyatt.htm#Causes|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070814044511/http://www.eng.uab.edu/cee/faculty/ndelatte/case_studies_project/Hyatt%20Regency/hyatt.htm|archive-date=August 14, 2007|access-date=January 29, 2017|url-status=dead}}</ref>

Havens Steel Company had manufactured the rods, and the company objected that the whole rod below the fourth floor would have to be threaded in order to screw on the nuts to hold the fourth-floor walkway in place. These threads would be subject to damage as the fourth-floor structure was hoisted into place. Havens Steel proposed that two separate and offset sets of rods be used: the first set suspending the fourth-floor walkway from the ceiling, and the second set suspending the second-floor walkway from the fourth-floor walkway.<ref name="whitbeck">{{cite book| last=Whitbeck| first=Caroline| year=1998| title=Ethics in Engineering Practice and Research| publisher=Cambridge University Press| location=New York| isbn=0-521-47944-4| page=116| url=https://books.google.com/books?id=pp3OIzJFB5QC&pg=PA115| access-date=2016-10-11| archive-date=2021-04-17| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210417183119/https://books.google.com/books?id=pp3OIzJFB5QC&pg=PA115| url-status=live}}</ref>

This design change would be fatal. In the original design, the beams of the fourth-floor walkway had to support only the weight of the fourth-floor walkway, with the weight of the second-floor walkway supported completely by the rods. In the revised design, however, the fourth-floor beams supported both the fourth- and second-floor walkways, but were strong enough only for 30% of that load.<ref name="ua"/>

The serious flaws of the revised design were compounded by the fact that both designs placed the bolts directly through a welded joint connecting two C-channels, the weakest structural point in the box beams. Photographs of the wreckage show excessive deformations of the cross-section.<ref name="engineering">{{cite web| publisher=Engineering.com| access-date=June 1, 2006| url=http://www.engineering.com/Library/ArticlesPage/tabid/85/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/175/Walkway-Collapse.aspx| title=Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse| date=October 24, 2006| archive-date=April 3, 2019| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190403123942/https://www.engineering.com/Library/ArticlesPage/tabid/85/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/175/Walkway-Collapse.aspx| url-status=live}}</ref> During the failure, the box beams split along the weld and the nut supporting them slipped through the resulting gap, which was consistent with reports that the upper walkway at first fell several inches, after which the nut was held only by the upper side of the box beams; then the upper side of the box beams failed as well, allowing the entire walkway to fall in a [[cascading failure]].<ref>NIST, p. 244</ref> A court order was required to retrieve the skywalk pieces from storage for examination.<ref name="Surviving the Hyatt">{{cite news | title=From the archives: Surviving the Hyatt skywalk disaster | first=Kevin | last=Murphy | date=July 17, 2014 | newspaper=[[The Kansas City Star]] | url=https://www.kansascity.com/news/local/article748398.html | access-date=May 4, 2020 | archive-date=August 18, 2020 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200818023400/https://www.kansascity.com/news/local/article748398.html | url-status=live }}</ref>

Investigators concluded that the underlying problem was a lack of proper communication between Jack D. Gillum and Associates and Havens Steel. In particular, the drawings prepared by Gillum and Associates were only preliminary sketches, but Havens Steel interpreted them as finalized drawings. Gillum and Associates failed to review the initial design thoroughly, and engineer Daniel M. Duncan accepted Havens Steel's proposed plan via a phone call without performing necessary calculations or viewing sketches that would have revealed its serious intrinsic flaws—in particular, doubling the load on the fourth-floor beams.<ref name="ua"/> Reports and court testimony cited a feedback loop of architects' unverified assumptions, each having believed that someone else had performed calculations and checked reinforcements but without any actual root in documentation or review channels. Onsite workers had neglected to report noticing beams bending,<ref name="20 years later"/> and instead rerouted their heavy wheelbarrows around the unsteady walkways.<ref name="petroski"/>{{rp|103}}

Jack D. Gillum would later reflect that the design flaw was so obvious that "any first-year engineering student could figure it out," if only it had been checked.<ref name="20 years later"/>

== Legal ==
The Missouri Board of Architects, Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors found the engineers at Jack D. Gillum and Associates who had approved the final drawings to be culpable of gross negligence, misconduct, and unprofessional conduct in the practice of engineering. They were acquitted of all the crimes with which they were initially charged, but the company lost its engineering licenses in Missouri, Kansas and Texas, and lost its membership with the [[American Society of Civil Engineers]].<ref name="20 years later" /><ref name="ua" /><ref name="engineering" />

In the months after the disaster, more than 300 lawsuits sought a cumulative total of {{nowrap|$3 billion}} (equivalent to ${{formatprice|{{inflation|US|3000000000|1981|r=0}}}} in {{Inflation-year|USD}}).<ref name="Reverberating" /> Of this, at least {{nowrap|$140 million}} (equivalent to ${{formatprice|{{inflation|US|140000000|1981|r=0}}}} in {{Inflation-year|USD}}) was actually awarded to victims and their families, under hotel owner Crown Center Redevelopment Corporation.<ref name="ThinkCase">{{cite web |title=Hyatt Regency Disaster {{!}} ThinkReliability, Case Studies |url=https://www.thinkreliability.com/case_studies/root-cause-analysis-of-the-hyatt-regency-disaster-cautionary-tale-about-assumptions/ |website=ThinkReliability |access-date=December 15, 2022 |archive-date=July 6, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190706010253/https://www.thinkreliability.com/case_studies/root-cause-analysis-of-the-hyatt-regency-disaster-cautionary-tale-about-assumptions/}}</ref> The single largest award was about {{nowrap|$12 million}}, for a victim who required full-time medical care.<ref name="ap" /> A class-action lawsuit seeking punitive damages was won against Crown Center Corporation, a subsidiary of [[Hallmark Cards]].<ref>{{cite news |title=The Hyatt Regency disaster 20 years later |url=http://faculty.washington.edu/bconbear/cm500/class/djc010718.html |author=Staff writers |work=[[Seattle Daily Journal of Commerce]] |date=July 18, 2001 |access-date=December 15, 2022 |archive-date=July 25, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190725015623/http://faculty.washington.edu/bconbear/cm500/class/djc010718.html |url-status=live }}</ref> That lawsuit yielded $10 million, including $6.5 million dedicated as donations to charitable and civic endeavors that Hallmark called a "healing gesture to help Kansas City put the tragedy of the skywalks' collapse behind it." Each of the approximately 1,600 hotel occupants from that night was unconditionally offered {{US$|1000|long=no}}, of which 1,300 accepted by the deadline. Every defendant{{mdash}}including Hallmark Cards, Crown Center Corporation, architects, engineers, and the contractor{{mdash}}denied all legal liability, including that of the egregious engineering faults.<ref name="Reverberating" />

==Aftermath==
The hotel reopened three months after the tragedy.<ref name="ap"/> In 1983, local authorities reported that the $5 million hotel reconstruction made the building "possibly the safest in the country."<ref name="Reverberating" /> The hotel was renamed the Hyatt Regency Crown Center in 1987, and the Sheraton Kansas City at Crown Center in 2011. It has been renovated numerous times since, though the lobby retains the same layout and design.

''[[The New York Times]]'' said the victims were soon overshadowed by the community's daily preoccupation with the disaster and its polarized attitude of blame-seeking and "vendetta" that soon targeted even the local newspapers, judges and lawyers: "Seldom has a city's establishment been so emotionally torn by catastrophe as Kansas City's was". The owner of the Kansas City Star Company guessed that the huge victim count ensured that "virtually half the town was affected directly or indirectly by the horror of the tragedy". The newspaper generated 16 months' worth of [[Pulitzer Prize]]-winning investigative coverage of the disaster{{mdash}}putting the newspaper at odds with the Kansas City community in general, including the management of Hallmark Cards, the parent company of the hotel's owner.<ref name="Reverberating"/>

Several rescuers suffered considerable stress due to their experience and later relied upon each other in an informal support group.<ref name="KCStar30" />

== Legacy ==
The world responded to the Hyatt disaster by upgrading the culture and academic curriculum of engineering ethics and [[emergency management]]. In this respect, the event joins the legacies of the 1984 [[Bhopal disaster]], the 1986 [[Space Shuttle Challenger disaster|Space Shuttle ''Challenger'' disaster]] and the 1986 [[Chernobyl disaster]].<ref name="20 years later"/><ref>{{cite book|last=Auf der Heide|first=Erik|title=Disaster Response: Principles of Preparation and Coordination|url=https://archive.org/details/disasterresponse00erik|url-access=limited|year=1989|publisher=C.V. Mosby Company|location=St. Louis MO|isbn=0-8016-0385-4|pages=[https://archive.org/details/disasterresponse00erik/page/n278 3], 72, 76, 82}}</ref>

The disaster provides a case study teaching first responders the "[[emergency management|all-hazards approach]]" to multiple disciplines across jurisdictions, and teaching university students in engineering ethics classes how the smallest personal responsibility can impact the biggest projects with the worst possible results.<ref name="Why Engineers">{{cite news | title=Why Engineers Must Remember the Kansas City Hyatt Tragedy | date=December 16, 2015 | publisher=Engineering News-Record | url=https://www.enr.com/articles/38400-why-engineers-must-remember-the-kansas-city-hyatt-tragedy | first=Robynn | last=Andracsek | access-date=May 4, 2020 | archive-date=August 1, 2020 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200801203737/https://www.enr.com/articles/38400-why-engineers-must-remember-the-kansas-city-hyatt-tragedy | url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Engineering Ethics">{{cite web | title=Negligence And The Professional "Debate" Over Responsibility For Design | publisher=Texas A&M University | url=https://ethics.tamu.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2017/04/HyattRegency.pdf | date=February 22, 2009 | access-date=May 4, 2020 | archive-date=August 1, 2020 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200801170219/https://ethics.tamu.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2017/04/HyattRegency.pdf | url-status=live }}</ref>

{{blockquote | quote=[The skywalk design] is one of the worst examples of people trying to push off their responsibilities to other parts of the team ... Since the Hyatt, there has been a lot of activity in the engineering profession to address quality, the final product and how you attain quality. The steps taken after the Hyatt helped the industry recover from failure. | source=Paul Munger, chairman of the Missouri architectural board<ref name="ap"/>}}

The [[American Society of Civil Engineers]] adopted a clear policy—which carries weight in court—that structural engineers are now ultimately responsible for reviewing shop drawings by fabricators.<ref name="ap"/> Trade groups such as the ASCE issued investigations, improved standards of [[peer review]], sponsored seminars and created trade manuals for the improvement of professional standards and public confidence. The Kansas City Codes Administration became its own department, doubling its staff and dedicating a single engineer comprehensively to all aspects of each reviewed building.<ref name="20 years later"/> Kansas City politics and government were colored for years with investigations against corruption.<ref name="Reverberating"/> In 1983, the disaster was cited in the argument against the Reagan administration's attempt to eliminate an agency of the [[National Bureau of Standards]].<ref name="Reverberating"/>

''[[The Kansas City Star]]'' and its associated publication the ''[[Kansas City Times]]'' won a [[Pulitzer Prize]] in 1982 for their 16 months of investigative coverage of the collapse.<ref name="pulitzer">{{cite web| url=http://www.pulitzer.org/bycat/Local-General-or-Spot-News-Reporting| title=The Pulitzer Prizes – Local General or Spot News Reporting| access-date=July 30, 2010| publisher=Pulitzer.org| archive-date=December 28, 2015| archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151228223905/http://www.pulitzer.org/bycat/Local-General-or-Spot-News-Reporting| url-status=live}}</ref>

A memorial was dedicated by Skywalk Memorial Foundation, a nonprofit organization established for victims of the collapse, on November 12, 2015, in [[Hospital Hill]] Park across the street from the hotel.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.kansascity.com/news/local/article44479488.html|title=Memorial to Kansas City skywalk disaster finally a reality|work=The Kansas City Star|first=Matt|last=Campbell|date=November 12, 2015|access-date=August 27, 2016|archive-date=September 21, 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160921065012/http://www.kansascity.com/news/local/article44479488.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |access-date=July 17, 2019 |title=Skywalk Memorial Plaza Dedicated |date=November 13, 2015 |url=https://kcparks.org/skywalk-memorial-plaza-dedicated/ |website=Kansas City Parks & Recreation |archive-date=July 17, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190717144512/https://kcparks.org/skywalk-memorial-plaza-dedicated/ |url-status=live }}</ref> It included a $25,000 donation from Hallmark Cards.<ref name="Surviving the Hyatt"/>

Jack D. Gillum (1928–2012),<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://horancares.com/obits/jack-d-gillum/ |title=Obituary: Jack D. Gillum |publisher=Horan & McConaty Funeral Home |date=July 5, 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131217104420/http://www.horancares.com/obituary?id=1086628 |archive-date=December 17, 2013 |url-status=live | access-date=May 4, 2020}}</ref> the owner of the engineering company and an engineer of record for the Hyatt project, occasionally lectured at engineering conferences for years after the tragedy. Claiming full responsibility and disturbed by his memories "365 days a year", he said he wanted "to scare the daylights out of them" in the hope of preventing future mistakes.<ref name="20 years later"/>

==See also==
{{Portal|1980s}}
* [[Engineering disasters]]
* [[List of structural failures and collapses]]

==References==
{{Reflist}}

==Further reading==
* {{cite book
 |title=Why Buildings Fall Down: How Structures Fail
 |author=Levy, M.
 |author2=Salvadori, M.
 |author3=Woest, K.
 |publisher=W. W. Norton & Company
 |year=1994
 |isbn=978-0-393-31152-5
 |url=https://archive.org/details/whybuildingsfall00levy_0
 }}

==External links==
{{Commons category}}
* {{cite video | title=KMBC 9 Chronicle: The Skywalk Tapes | date=July 13, 2021 | publisher=KMBC | url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dde0cnOG5rU | via=[[YouTube]] | access-date=July 14, 2021}}
* [https://ethics.tamu.edu/hyatt-regency-photos/ Civil Engineering Ethics Site] photos of the failed walkway components
* [https://edoc.site/failure-by-design-hyatt-regency-pdf-free.html Failure By Design] – physics presentation 
* [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gKojuChxNt8 Network news feature from July 23, 1981, including interviews]

{{DEFAULTSORT:Hyatt Regency Walkway Collapse}}
[[Category:1981 disasters in the United States]]
[[Category:1981 in Missouri]]
[[Category:Box girder bridges in the United States]]
[[Category:Bridge disasters in the United States]]
[[Category:Building and structure collapses in the United States]]
[[Category:Corporate scandals]]
[[Category:Disasters in hotels]]
[[Category:Disasters in Missouri]]
[[Category:History of Kansas City, Missouri]]
[[Category:Hyatt Hotels and Resorts]]
[[Category:July 1981 in the United States]]
[[Category:Pedestrian bridges in the United States]]
[[Category:Building and structure collapses in 1981]]