Editing Neorealism (international relations)

{{Short description|Theory of international relations}}
{{Redirect|Structural realism|the position in the philosophy of science|Structural realism (philosophy of science)}}
{{International relations theory sidebar|expanded=Realism}}
'''Neorealism''' or '''structural realism''' is a theory of [[international relations]] that emphasizes the role of [[Power (international relations)|power politics]] in international relations, sees competition and conflict as enduring features and sees limited potential for cooperation.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Jervis|first=Robert|date=1999|title=Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate|url=https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8FB5DMF/download|journal=International Security|volume=24|issue=1|pages=42–63|doi=10.1162/016228899560040|jstor=2539347|s2cid=57572295|issn=0162-2889|url-access=}}</ref> The [[Anarchy (international relations)|anarchic]] state of the international system means that states cannot be certain of other states' intentions and their security, thus prompting them to engage in power politics.

It was first outlined by [[Kenneth Waltz]] in his 1979 book ''[[Theory of International Politics]]''.<ref>According to {{Harvnb|Sagan|2004|p={{Nowrap|91 n.4}}}}, Waltz's book remains "the seminal text of neorealism".</ref> Alongside [[Neoliberalism (international relations)|neoliberalism]], neorealism is one of the two most influential contemporary approaches to international relations; the two perspectives dominated international relations theory from the 1960s to the 1990s.<ref name="Powell 1994 313">{{Harvnb|Powell|1994|p=313}}.</ref> 

Neorealism emerged from the North American discipline of [[political science]], and reformulates the classical [[Realism (international relations)|realist]] tradition of [[E. H. Carr]], [[Hans Morgenthau]], [[George Kennan]], and [[Reinhold Niebuhr]]. Neorealism is subdivided into [[Defensive realism|defensive]] and [[Offensive realism|offensive neorealism]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=Security Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Reconsidered |url=https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/isa/taj01/ |access-date=2023-07-31 |website=ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu}}</ref>

==Origins==
Neorealism is an ideological departure from [[Hans Morgenthau]]'s writing on [[Classical realism (international relations)|classical realism]]. Classical realism originally explained the machinations of [[international politics]] as being based on [[human nature]] and therefore subject to the ego and emotion of world leaders.<ref>Morgenthau, Hans J. ''Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace'', 5th Edition, Revised. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, pp. 4–15)</ref> Neorealist thinkers instead propose that [[Structure|structural]] constraints—not strategy, [[egoism]], or motivation—will determine behavior in international relations. [[John Mearsheimer]] made significant distinctions between his version of [[offensive neorealism]] and Morgenthau in his book titled ''[[The Tragedy of Great Power Politics]]''.

==Theory==
Structural realism holds that the nature of the international structure is defined by its ordering principle (anarchy), units of the system (states), and by the distribution of capabilities (measured by the number of [[Great power|great powers]] within the international system), with only the last being considered an [[Independent Variable|independent variable]] with any meaningful change over time.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last=Waltz|first=Kenneth|date=2003|title=The Anarchic Structure of World Politics|url=https://www.pearson.com/us/higher-education/product/Art-International-Politics-Enduring-Concepts-and-Contemporary-Issues-6th-Edition/9780321088741.html?tab=contents|journal=International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, 6th Edition}}</ref> The anarchic ordering principle of the international structure is [[decentralized]], meaning there is no formal central [[authority]]; every sovereign state is formally equal in this system. These states act according to the logic of [[egoism]], meaning states seek their own interest and will not subordinate their interest to the interests of other states.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|title=The Tragedy of Great Power Politics|last=Mearsheimer|first=John J.|publisher=Norton|year=2014|isbn=978-0393020250|location=New York, NY|pages=[https://archive.org/details/tragedyofgreatpo00mear/page/3 3]|quote=Three features of the international system combine to cause states to fear one another: 1) The absence of a central authority that sits above states and can protect them from each other (anarchy), 2) the fact that states always have some offensive military capability, and 3) the fact that states can never be certain about other states' intentions. Given this fear - which can never be wholly eliminated - states recognize that the more powerful they are relative to their rivals, the better their chances of survival.|url=https://archive.org/details/tragedyofgreatpo00mear/page/3}}</ref>

States are assumed at a minimum to want to ensure their own survival as this is a prerequisite to pursue other goals.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last=Waltz|first=Kenneth|date=2003|title=The Anarchic Structure of World Politics|url=https://www.pearson.com/us/higher-education/product/Art-International-Politics-Enduring-Concepts-and-Contemporary-Issues-6th-Edition/9780321088741.html?tab=contents|journal=International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, 6th Edition}}</ref> This driving force of survival is the primary factor influencing their behavior and in turn ensures states develop [[Offensive (military)|offensive]] [[military]] capabilities for [[foreign interventionism]] and as a means to increase their relative power. Because states can never be certain of other states' future intentions, there is a lack of [[Trust (sociology)|trust]] between states which requires them to be on guard against relative losses of power which could enable other states to threaten their survival.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Rosato|first=Sebastian|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv1k03gb9|title=Intentions in Great Power Politics: Uncertainty and the Roots of Conflict|date=2021|publisher=Yale University Press|doi=10.2307/j.ctv1k03gb9|jstor=j.ctv1k03gb9|isbn=978-0-300-25302-3|s2cid=233588498}}</ref> This lack of trust, based on uncertainty, is called the [[security dilemma]].<ref name=":0" /> 

States are deemed similar in terms of needs but not in capabilities for achieving them. The positional placement of states in terms of abilities determines the distribution of capabilities. The structural distribution of capabilities then limits [[cooperation]] among states through fears of [[relative gain (international relations)|relative gains]] made by other states, and the possibility of dependence on other states. The desire and relative abilities of each state to maximize relative power constrain each other, resulting in a [[Balance of power in international relations|balance of power]], which shapes international relations. It also gives rise to the [[security dilemma]] that all nations face. There are two ways in which states balance power: internal balancing and external balancing. Internal balancing occurs as states grow their own capabilities by increasing economic growth and/or increasing military spending. External balancing occurs as states enter into alliances to check the power of more powerful states or alliances.<ref>{{Harvnb|Waltz|2000}}</ref>

Neorealism sees states as [[Black box|black boxes]], as the structure of the international system is emphasized rather than the units and their unique characteristics within it as being causal.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Kapstein |first=Ethan B. |date=1995 |editor-last=de Mesquita |editor-first=Bruce Bueno |editor2-last=Lalman |editor2-first=David |editor3-last=Rosecrance |editor3-first=Richard |editor4-last=Stein |editor4-first=Arthur A. |editor5-last=Snyder |editor5-first=Jack |title=Is Realism Dead? The Domestic Sources of International Politics |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706925 |journal=International Organization |volume=49 |issue=4 |pages=751–774 |doi=10.1017/S0020818300028502 |jstor=2706925 |s2cid=143895142 |issn=0020-8183|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

Neorealists contend that there are essentially three possible systems according to changes in the distribution of capabilities, defined by the number of great powers within the international system. A [[unipolarity|unipolar system]] contains only one great power, a bipolar system contains two great powers, and a multipolar system contains more than two great powers. Neorealists conclude that a bipolar system is more stable (less prone to great power war and systemic change) than a multipolar system because balancing can only occur through internal balancing as there are no extra great powers with which to form alliances.<ref name="Waltz 1979 132_133">{{Harvnb|Waltz|1979|pp=132–3}}.</ref> Because there is only internal balancing in a bipolar system, rather than external balancing, there is less opportunity for miscalculations and therefore less chance of great power war.<ref name="Waltz 1979 133">{{Harvnb|Waltz|1979|p=133}}.</ref> That is a simplification and a theoretical ideal.<ref name="Humphreys 2012">{{Harvnb|Humphreys|2012}}.</ref>

Neorealists argue that processes of emulation and competition lead states to behave in the aforementioned ways. Emulation leads states to adopt the behaviors of successful states (for example, those victorious in war), whereas competition leads states to vigilantly ensure their security and survival through the best means possible.{{sfn|Waltz|1979}}<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Posen|first=Barry R.|date=1993|title=Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539098|journal=International Security|volume=18|issue=2|pages=80–124|doi=10.2307/2539098|jstor=2539098|s2cid=154935234|issn=0162-2889|url-access=subscription}}</ref> Due to the anarchic nature of the international system and the inability of states to rely on other states or organizations, states have to engage in "[[self-help]]."<ref name=":1" /><ref name="Mearsheimer 2001" />

For neorealists, social norms are considered largely irrelevant.<ref>{{Cite book|last1=Sandholtz|first1=Wayne|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=cgcmAQAAIAAJ|title=International Norms and Cycles of Change|last2=Stiles|first2=Kendall W.|date=2009|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-538008-8|pages=2|language=en}}</ref><ref name="Mearsheimer 1995">{{Cite journal|last=Mearsheimer|first=John J.|date=1994|title=The False Promise of International Institutions|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539078|journal=International Security|volume=19|issue=3|pages=5–49|doi=10.2307/2539078|jstor=2539078|s2cid=153472054|issn=0162-2889|url-access=subscription}}</ref> This is in contrast to some classical realists which did see norms as potentially important.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Carr|first=Edward H.|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=w6fBzdPffHsC|title=Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939|date=1939|publisher=Harper Collins |isbn=978-0-06-131122-2|language=en}}</ref> Neorealists are also skeptical of the ability of international organizations to act independently in the international system and facilitate cooperation between states.<ref name=":1" /><ref name="Mearsheimer 1995" />

===Defensive realism===
{{main|Defensive realism}}
Structural realism has become divided into two branches, defensive and offensive realism, following the publication of Mearsheimer's ''The Tragedy of Great Power Politics'' in 2001. Waltz's original formulation of neorealism is now sometimes called defensive realism, while Mearsheimer's modification of the theory is referred to as offensive realism. Both branches agree that the structure of the system is what causes states to compete, but defensive realism posits that most states concentrate on maintaining their security (i.e. states are security maximizers), while offensive realism claims that all states seek to gain as much power as possible (i.e. states are power maximizers).<ref name="Mearsheimer 2001">{{Harvnb|Mearsheimer|2001}}.</ref> A foundational study in the area of defensive realism is [[Robert Jervis]]' classic 1978 article on the "security dilemma." It examines how uncertainty and the offense-defense balance may heighten or soften the security dilemma.<ref>Jervis, Robert (1978). "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma." ''World Politics'' 30 (2): 167–214.</ref> Building on Jervis, [[Stephen Van Evera]] explores the causes of war from a defensive realist perspective.<ref>Van Evera, Stephen (1999). ''Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict''. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.</ref>

===Offensive realism===
{{main|Offensive realism}}
Offensive realism, developed by Mearsheimer differs in the amount of power that states desire. Mearsheimer proposes that states maximize relative power ultimately aiming for regional hegemony.<ref name="Mearsheimer 2001"/>

In addition to Mearsheimer, a number of other scholars have sought to explain why states expand when opportunities to do so arise. For instance, [[Randall Schweller]] refers to states' revisionist agendas to account for their aggressive military action.<ref>Schweller, Randall L. (1994). "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In." ''International Security'' 19 (1): 72–107.</ref> Eric Labs investigates the expansion of war aims during wartime as an example of offensive behavior.<ref>Labs, Eric J. (1997). "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims." ''Security Studies'' 6 (4): 1–49.</ref> [[Fareed Zakaria]] analyzes the history of [[US foreign relations]] from 1865 to 1914 and asserts that foreign interventions during this period were not motivated by worries about external threats but by a desire to expand US influence.<ref>Zakaria, Fareed (1998). ''From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role''. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.</ref>

==Scholarly debate==

===Within realist thought===
While neorealists agree that the structure of the international relations is the primary impetus in seeking security, there is disagreement among neorealist scholars as to whether states merely aim to survive or whether states want to maximize their relative power.<ref>{{Harvnb|Mearsheimer|1995|p={{Nowrap|11 n.27}}, {{Nowrap|16 n.27}}}}.</ref><ref name="Mearsheimer 2001"/> The former represents the ideas of [[Kenneth Waltz]], while the latter represents the ideas of [[John Mearsheimer]] and offensive realism.
Other debates include the extent to which states balance against power (in Waltz's original neorealism and classic realism), versus the extent to which states balance against threats (as introduced in [[Stephen Walt]]'s 'The Origins of Alliances' (1987)), or balance against competing interests (as introduced in Randall Schweller's 'Deadly Imbalances' (1998)).

===With other schools of thought===
Neorealists conclude that because war is an effect of the anarchic structure of the [[international relations|international system]], it is likely to continue in the future. Indeed, neorealists often argue that the ordering principle of the international system has not fundamentally changed from the time of [[Thucydides]] to the advent of [[nuclear warfare]]. The view that long-lasting [[peace]] is not likely to be achieved is described by other theorists as a largely pessimistic view of [[international relations]]. One of the main challenges to neorealist theory is the [[democratic peace theory]] and supporting research, such as the book ''[[Never at War]]''. Neorealists answer this challenge by arguing that democratic peace theorists tend to pick and choose the definition of [[democracy]] to achieve the desired empirical result. For example, the Germany of [[Kaiser Wilhelm II]], the [[Dominican Republic]] of [[Juan Bosch (politician)|Juan Bosch]], and the [[Chile]] of [[Salvador Allende]] are not considered to be "democracies of the right kind" or the conflicts do not qualify as wars according to these theorists. Furthermore, they claim several wars between democratic states have been averted only by causes other than ones covered by [[democratic peace theory]].<ref name="Waltz 2001 5_41">{{Harvnb|Waltz|2001|pp=5–41}}.</ref> 

Advocates of democratic peace theory see the spreading of democracy as helping to mitigate the effects of [[anarchy]].<ref name="Waltz 2000 4">{{Harvnb|Waltz|2000|p=4}}.</ref> With enough democracies in the world, [[Bruce Russett]] thinks that it "may be possible in part to supersede the 'realist' principles (anarchy, the security dilemma of states) that have dominated practice {{Nowrap|...}} since at least the seventeenth century."<ref name="Russett 1993 24">{{Harvnb|Russett|1993|p=24}}.</ref> [[John Mueller]] believes that it is not the spreading of democracy but rather other conditions (e.g., power) that bring about democracy and peace.<ref name="Waltz 2000 9">{{Harvnb|Waltz|2000|p=9}}.</ref> In consenting with Mueller's argument, Kenneth Waltz notes that "some of the major democracies—Britain in the nineteenth century and the United States in the twentieth century—have been among the most powerful states of their eras."<ref name="Waltz 2000 9"/>

One of the most notable schools contending with neorealist thought, aside from neoliberalism, is the [[Constructivism (international relations)|constructivist]] school, which is often seen to disagree with the neorealist focus on power and instead emphasises a focus on ideas and identity as an explanatory point for international relations trends. Recently, however, a school of thought called the English School merges neo-realist tradition with the constructivist technique of analyzing social norms to provide an increasing scope of analysis for international relations.

==Criticism==
Neorealism has been criticized from various directions. Other major paradigms of international relations scholarship, such as liberal and constructivist approaches have criticized neorealist scholarship in terms of theory and empirics. Within realism, classical realists<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Kirshner|first=Jonathan|date=2015|title=The Economic Sins of Modern IR Theory and the Classical Realist Alternative|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/world-politics/article/abs/economic-sins-of-modern-ir-theory-and-the-classical-realist-alternative/14910D4D31BFB60C2CBCF8D8FF8FB553|journal=World Politics|language=en|volume=67|issue=1|pages=155–183|doi=10.1017/S0043887114000318|s2cid=146756741|issn=0043-8871|url-access=subscription}}</ref> and neoclassical realists<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Rose|first=Gideon|date=1998|title=Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/25054068|journal=World Politics|volume=51|issue=1|pages=144–172|doi=10.1017/S0043887100007814|jstor=25054068|s2cid=154361851|issn=0043-8871|url-access=subscription}}</ref> have also challenged some aspects of neorealism.

Among the issues that neorealism has been criticized over is the neglect of domestic politics,<ref>{{Cite book|last=Milner|first=Helen V.|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=r9LgDwAAQBAJ|title=Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations|date=2020-06-30|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=978-0-691-21449-8|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Milner|first=Helen|date=1991|title=The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/20097244|journal=Review of International Studies|volume=17|issue=1|pages=67–85|doi=10.1017/S026021050011232X|jstor=20097244|s2cid=145793567 |issn=0260-2105|url-access=subscription}}</ref> race,<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Freeman|first1=Bianca|last2=Kim|first2=D.G.|last3=Lake|first3=David A.|date=2022-05-11|title=Race in International Relations: Beyond the "Norm Against Noticing"|url=https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051820-120746|journal=Annual Review of Political Science|language=en|volume=25|issue=1|pages=annurev–polisci–051820-120746|doi=10.1146/annurev-polisci-051820-120746|s2cid=244446582|issn=1094-2939|url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Maass |first=Richard W. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=mhWTxgEACAAJ |title=The Picky Eagle: How Democracy and Xenophobia Limited U.S. Territorial Expansion |date=2020 |publisher=Cornell University Press |isbn=978-1-5017-4875-2 |language=en}}</ref> gains from trade,<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Moravcsik|first=Andrew|date=1997|title=Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/abs/taking-preferences-seriously-a-liberal-theory-of-international-politics/04527E00D02130C6DCCB57A98EFB6AD3|journal=International Organization|language=en|volume=51|issue=4|pages=513–553|doi=10.1162/002081897550447|s2cid=7058364 |issn=1531-5088|url-access=subscription}}</ref> the pacifying effects of institutions,<ref>{{Cite book|last=Keohane|first=Robert O.|url=https://muse.jhu.edu/book/61836|title=After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy|date=2005|publisher=Princeton University Press|isbn=978-1-4008-2026-9|location=Princeton}}</ref> and the relevance of regime type for foreign policy behavior.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Owen|first=John M|date=2004|title=Democratic Peace Research: Whence and Whither?|url=https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800096|journal=International Politics|language=en|volume=41|issue=4|pages=605–617|doi=10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800096|s2cid=144053631|issn=1740-3898|url-access=subscription}}</ref> 

David Strang argues that neorealist predictions fail to account for transformations in [[sovereignty]] over time and across regions. These transformations in sovereignty have had implications for cooperation and competition, as polities that were recognized as sovereign have seen considerably greater stability.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Strang|first=David|date=1991|title=Anomaly and commonplace in European political expansion: realist and institutional accounts|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/abs/anomaly-and-commonplace-in-european-political-expansion-realist-and-institutional-accounts/65EF381DF3E4331E2A4FA924343A65DD|journal=International Organization|language=en|volume=45|issue=2|pages=143–162|doi=10.1017/S002081830003304X|s2cid=154734299 |issn=1531-5088|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

In response to criticisms that neorealism lacks relevance for contemporary international policy and does a poor job explaining the foreign policy behavior of major powers, [[Charles L. Glaser|Charles Glaser]] wrote in 2003, "this is neither surprising nor a serious problem, because scholars who use a realist lens to understand international politics can, and have, without inconsistency or contradiction also employed other theories to understand issues that fall outside realism's central focus."<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Glaser|first=Charles L.|date=2003|title=Structural Realism in a more complex world|url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-of-international-studies/article/abs/structural-realism-in-a-more-complex-world/2B8EDA394F25DFCF323F7E435BCF6853|journal=Review of International Studies|language=en|volume=29|issue=3|pages=403–414|doi=10.1017/S0260210503004030|s2cid=36248283|issn=1469-9044|url-access=subscription}}</ref>

In 2025, Anthony Heron proposed ‘regional neorealism’, which emerged as a theoretical framework that reinterprets neorealism through a regional lens, emphasizing geography as a primary driver of geopolitical competition and state behavior <ref>{{Cite web |last=Heron |first=Anthony |date=2025 |title=Regional Neorealism: Rethinking Geography and Geopolitical Competition |url=https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/107910 }}</ref>

==Notable neorealists==
* [[Robert J. Art]]
* [[Richard K. Betts]]
* [[Robert Gilpin]]
* [[Robert W. Tucker]]
* [[Joseph Grieco]]
* [[Robert Jervis]]
* [[Christopher Layne]]
* [[Jack Snyder (academic)|Jack Snyder]]
* [[John Mearsheimer]]
* [[Stephen Walt]]
* [[Kenneth Waltz]]
* [[Stephen Van Evera]]
* [[Barry Posen]]
* [[Charles L. Glaser]]
* [[Marc Trachtenberg]]

==See also==
{{Portal|Politics}}
* [[Foreign interventionism]]
* [[International relations theory]]
* [[Mercantilism]]
* [[Neofunctionalism]]
* [[Neoliberalism (international relations)|Neoliberalism]]
* [[Realpolitik]]

==Notes==
{{Reflist|30em}}

==References==
{{Refbegin}}
* {{cite journal |last=Humphreys |first=Adam R. C. |year=2012 |title=Another Waltz? Methodological Rhetoric and Practice in Theory of International Politics |url=https://www.academia.edu/2309090 |journal=[[International Relations (journal)|International Relations]] |volume=26 |issue=4 |pages=389–408 |doi=10.1177/0047117812466817 |s2cid=144275279 }}
* {{cite journal |last=Mearsheimer |first=John J. |author-link=John Mearsheimer |year=1995 |title=The False Promise of International Institutions |url=http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0021.pdf |journal=[[International Security]] |volume=19 |issue=3 |pages=5–49 |doi=10.2307/2539078 |jstor=2539078 |s2cid=153472054 }}
* {{cite book |last=Mearsheimer |first=John J. |author-mask=2 |year=2001 |title=The Tragedy of Great Power Politics |location=New York,&nbsp;NY |publisher=Norton |isbn=0-393-02025-8 |url=https://archive.org/details/tragedyofgreatpo00mear }}
* {{cite journal |last=Powell |first=Robert |year=1994 |title=Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate |url=http://woc.uc.pt/feuc/getFile.do?tipo=2&id=4546&ei=LRxvUdW4DciNO-DOgIgN |journal=[[International Organization]] |volume=48 |issue=2 |pages=313–344 |doi=10.1017/s0020818300028204 |s2cid=45773252 |url-access=subscription }}
* {{cite book |last=Russett |first=Bruce |author-link=Bruce Russett |year=1993 |title=Grasping Democratic Peace |url=https://archive.org/details/graspingdemocrat00russ |location=Princeton,&nbsp;NJ |publisher=[[Princeton University Press]] |isbn=0-691-03346-3 }}
* {{cite book |last=Sagan |first=Scott |author-link=Scott Sagan |year=2004 |chapter=Realist Perspectives on Ethical Norms and Weapons of Mass Destruction |chapter-url=http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20590/Ethical_Norms_and_WMD.pdf |title=''In Sohail Hashmi and Steven Lee, eds.,'' Ethics and weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives |location=New York,&nbsp;NY |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |pages=73–95 |isbn=978-0-521-83671-5 |access-date=2013-04-05 |archive-date=2007-06-11 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070611192227/http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20590/Ethical_Norms_and_WMD.pdf |url-status=dead }}
* {{cite book |last=Waltz |first=Kenneth  |author-link=Kenneth Waltz |year=1979 |title=Theory of International Politics |title-link=Theory of International Politics |location=Reading,&nbsp;MA |publisher=[[Addison-Wesley]] |isbn=0-201-08349-3 }}
* {{cite journal |last=Waltz |first=Kenneth |author-mask=2 |year=2001 |title=Structural Realism after the Cold War |url=http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/waltz_kenneth_v25n1.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130925042449/http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/waltz_kenneth_v25n1.pdf |archive-date=2013-09-25 |journal=[[International Security]] |volume=25 |issue=1 |pages=5–41 |access-date=17 April 2013 |doi=10.1162/016228800560372 |s2cid=57560180 }}
* {{cite book |last1=Barkin |first1=Samuel |title=Realist Constructivism |date=7 September 2010 |publisher=Cambridge University Press}}
{{Refend}}

==Further reading==
{{Library resources box}}

===Books===
* Waltz, Kenneth N. (1959). ''Man, The State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis'' {{ISBN|978-0231125376}}.
* Walt, Stephen (1990). ''The Origins of Alliances'' {{ISBN|978-0801494185}}
* Van Evera, Stephen. (2001). ''Causes of War'' {{ISBN|978-0801482953}}
* Waltz, Kenneth N. (2008). ''Realism and International Politics'' {{ISBN|978-0415954785}}
* Art, Robert J. (2008). ''America's Grand Strategy and World Politics'' {{ISBN|978-0415952347}}
* Glaser, Charles L. (2010). ''Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation'' {{ISBN|978-0691143729}}

===Articles===
* Jervis, Robert (1978). ''Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma'' (''[[World Politics]]'', Vol. 30, No.2, 1978)
* Art, Robert J. (1998). ''Geopolitics Updated: The Strategy of Selective Engagement'' (''[[International Security]]'', Vol. 23, No. 3, 1998–99)
* Farber, Henry S.; Gowa, Jeanne (1995). ''Polities and Peace'' (''[[International Security]]'', Vol. 20, No. 2, 1995)
* Gilpin, Robert (1988). ''The Theory of Hegemonic War'' (''[[The Journal of Interdisciplinary History]]'', Vol. 18, No. 4, 1988)
* Posen, Barry (2003). ''Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of U.S. Hegemony'' (''[[International Security]]'', Vol. 28, No. 1, 2003)

==External links==
{{Refbegin}}
* {{usurped|1=[https://web.archive.org/web/20190727194120/http://www.theory-talks.org/2011/06/theory-talk-40.html ''Theory Talks'']}} Interview with Kenneth Waltz, founder of neorealism (May 2011)
* {{usurped|1=[https://web.archive.org/web/20081023202211/http://www.theory-talks.org/2008/07/theory-talk-12.html ''Theory Talks'']}} Interview with neorealist Robert Jervis (July 2008)
* {{Cite news|url=http://www.popularsocialscience.com/2013/11/06/neorealism-in-international-relations-kenneth-waltz/|title=Neorealism in International Relations – Kenneth Waltz|date=2013-11-06|work=POPULAR SOCIAL SCIENCE|access-date=2018-07-13|language=en-US|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181012102851/http://www.popularsocialscience.com/2013/11/06/neorealism-in-international-relations-kenneth-waltz/|archive-date=2018-10-12|url-status=dead}}
{{Refend}}

{{International relations theories}}
{{Authority control}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Neorealism (International Relations)}}
[[Category:Political realism| ]]
[[Category:International relations theory]]