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Normativity
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{{short description|Relating to an evaluative standard}} {{Redirect|Normative}} {{Redirect|Prescriptive||Prescription (disambiguation)}} '''Normativity''' is the phenomenon in human societies of designating some actions or outcomes as good, desirable, or permissible, and others as bad, undesirable, or impermissible. A [[Norm (philosophy)|norm]] in this sense means a standard for evaluating or making judgments about behavior or outcomes. "Normative" is sometimes also used, somewhat confusingly, to mean relating to a descriptive standard: doing what is normally done or what most others are expected to do in practice. In this sense a norm is not evaluative, a basis for judging behavior or outcomes; it is simply a fact or observation about behavior or outcomes, without judgment. Many researchers in [[science]], [[law]], and [[philosophy]] try to restrict the use of the term "normative" to the evaluative sense and refer to the description of behavior and outcomes as positive, descriptive, predictive, or [[empirical]].<ref>{{Cite book|title=The Grammar of Society:The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms|last=Bicchieri|first=Cristina|author-link=Cristina Bicchieri|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2005|isbn=978-0521574907}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|title=Norms in the Wild: How to Diagnose, Measure, and Change Social Norms|last=Bicchieri|first=Cristina|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2017|isbn=9780190622053}}</ref> ''Normative'' has specialized meanings in different academic disciplines such as [[philosophy]], [[social sciences]], and [[law]]. In most contexts, normative means 'relating to an evaluation or value judgment.' Normative propositions tend to evaluate some object or some course of action. Normative content differs from descriptive content.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|title=Normativity|last=Jarvis|first=Thomson Judith|date=2008|publisher=Open Court|isbn=9780812696585|location=Chicago, Ill.|oclc=227918828}}</ref> == Philosophy == {{main|Fact–value distinction|Normative ethics}} A '''normative''' or '''prescriptive''' statement is one that evaluates certain kinds of words, decisions, or actions as either correct or incorrect, or one that sets out guidelines for what a person "should" do. In [[philosophy]], normative theory aims to make moral judgments on events, focusing on preserving something they deem as morally good, or preventing a change for the worse.<ref>{{Citation|last=Strauss|first=Leo|title=What Is Political Philosophy? The Problem of Political Philosophy|date=2017-09-08|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781351314367-5|work=Behavioralism in Political Science|pages=93–108|publisher=Routledge|doi=10.4324/9781351314367-5 |isbn=978-1-351-31436-7|access-date=2020-12-14|url-access=subscription}}</ref> The theory has its origins in Greece.<ref>{{Citation|last=Bauböck|first=Rainer|title=Normative political theory and empirical research|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511801938.004|work=Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences|year=2008 |pages=40–60|place=Cambridge|publisher=Cambridge University Press|doi=10.1017/cbo9780511801938.004 |isbn=978-0-511-80193-8|access-date=2020-12-14|url-access=subscription}}</ref> Normative statements of such a type make claims about how institutions should or [[Is-ought problem|ought]] to be designed, how to [[Value theory|value]] them, which things are [[goodness and value theory|good]] or bad, and which [[Action (philosophy)|action]]s are [[right]] or [[wrong]].<ref>{{Cite book|last=Leftwich|first=Adrian|title=What is politics?: the activity and its study|publisher=Polity|year=2004|location=Oxford}}</ref> Claims are usually contrasted with [[Positive statement|positive]] (i.e. descriptive, [[explanation|explanatory]], or [[constative]]) claims when describing types of [[theory|theories]], [[belief]]s, or [[proposition]]s. Positive statements are (purportedly) factual, empirical statements that attempt to describe [[reality]].{{citation needed|date=November 2019}} For example, "children should eat vegetables", and "those who would sacrifice liberty for security deserve neither" are philosophically normative claims. On the other hand, "vegetables contain a relatively high proportion of vitamins", and "a common consequence of sacrificing liberty for security is a loss of both" are positive claims. Whether a statement is philosophically normative is logically independent of whether it is verified, verifiable, or popularly held. There are several schools of thought regarding the status of philosophically normative statements and whether they can be [[reason|rationally]] discussed or defended. Among these schools are the tradition of [[practical reason]] extending from [[Aristotle]] through [[Immanuel Kant|Kant]] to [[Jürgen Habermas|Habermas]], which asserts that they can, and the tradition of [[emotivism]], which maintains that they are merely expressions of emotions and have no cognitive content. There is large debate in philosophy surrounding whether one can get a normative statement of such a type from an empirical one (i.e. whether one can get an 'ought' from an 'is', or a 'value' from a 'fact'). Aristotle is one scholar who believed that one could in fact get an ought from an is. He believed that the universe was [[teleological]] and that everything in it has a purpose. To explain why something is a certain way, Aristotle believed one could simply say that it is trying to be what it ought to be.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Gray|first=J. W.|date=July 19, 2011|title=The Is/Ought Gap: How Do We Get "Ought" from "Is?"|url=https://ethicalrealism.wordpress.com/2011/07/19/the-isought-gap-how-do-we-get-ought-from-is/|access-date=December 14, 2020|website=Ethical realism}}</ref> On the contrary, [[David Hume]] believed one cannot get an ought from an is because no matter how much one thinks something ought to be a certain way it will not change the way it is. Despite this, Hume used empirical [[experiment]]al methods whilst looking at the philosophically normative. Similar to this was [[Henry Home, Lord Kames|Kames]], who also used the study of facts and the objective to discover a correct system of morals.<ref>Shaver, Robert. "Hume's Moral Theory?" History of Philosophy Quarterly, vol. 12, no. 3, 1995, pp. 317–331., www.jstor.org/stable/27744669. Accessed 14 Dec. 2020.</ref> <!--last sentence/statement: i.e., objectivity vs. subjectivity(?)--> The assumption that 'is' can lead to 'ought' is an important component of the philosophy of [[Roy Bhaskar]].<ref>Leigh Price (2019) Introduction to the special issue: normativity, Journal of Critical Realism, 18:3, 221–238 [https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14767430.2019.1638133]</ref> Philosophically normative statements and [[norm (philosophy)|norms]], as well as their meanings, are an integral part of human life. They are fundamental for prioritizing goals and organizing and planning. [[Thought]], [[belief]], [[emotion]], and [[Action (philosophy)|action]] are the basis of much ethical and political discourse; indeed, normativity of such a type is arguably the key feature distinguishing ethical and political discourse from other discourses (such as natural science).{{citation needed|date=November 2019}} Much modern moral/ethical philosophy takes as its starting point the apparent variance between peoples and cultures regarding the ways they define what is considered to be appropriate/desirable/praiseworthy/valuable/good etc. (In other words, variance in how individuals, groups and societies define what is in accordance with their philosophically normative standards.) This has led philosophers such as [[A. J. Ayer]] and [[J.L. Mackie]] (for different reasons and in different ways) to cast doubt on the meaningfulness of normative statements of such a type. However, other philosophers, such as [[Christine Korsgaard]], have argued for a source of philosophically normative value which is independent of individuals' subjective morality and which consequently attains (a lesser or greater degree of) objectivity.<ref>Korsgaard, C. (1992). "[https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/k/korsgaard94.pdf The Sources of Normativity]" (PDF). ''The Tanner Lectures on Human Value''.</ref> == Social sciences == {{See also|Normative economics}} In the [[social sciences]], the term "normative" has broadly the same meaning as its usage in philosophy, but may also relate, in a [[sociological]] context, to the role of cultural '[[norm (social)|norms]]'; the shared values or institutions that [[structural functionalist]]s regard as constitutive of the [[social structure]] and [[social cohesion]]. These values and units of [[socialization]] thus act to encourage or enforce social activity and outcomes that ''ought'' to (with respect to the [[norm (sociology)|norms]] implicit in those structures) occur, while discouraging or preventing social activity that ''ought not'' occur. That is, they promote social activity that is socially ''valued'' (see [[normative#Philosophy|philosophy]] above). While there are always anomalies in social activity (typically described as "[[crime]]" or [[anti-social behaviour]], see also [[normality (behavior)]]) the normative effects of popularly endorsed beliefs (such as "[[family values]]" or "[[common sense]]") push most social activity towards a generally homogeneous set. From such reasoning, however, functionalism shares an affinity with ideological [[conservatism]]. [[Normative economics]] deals with questions of what sort of economic policies should be pursued, in order to achieve desired (that is, valued) economic outcomes. === Politics === {{See also|Political philosophy}} The use of normativity and normative theory in the study of politics has been questioned, particularly since the rise in popularity of [[logical positivism]]. It has been suggested by some that normative theory is not appropriate to be used in the study of politics, because of its [[Value judgment|value based]] nature, and a positive, value neutral approach should be taken instead, applying theory to what is, not to what ought to be.<ref name="Normative Political Theory">{{cite journal |last1=Pietrzyk-Reeves |first1=Dorota |title=Normative Political Theory |journal=Teoria Polityki |date=2017 |volume=1 |doi=10.4467/00000000tp.17.009.6588 |s2cid=150007680 |doi-access=free }}</ref> Others have argued, however, that to abandon the use of normative theory in politics is misguided, if not pointless, as not only is normative theory more than a projection of a theorist's views and values, but also this theory provides important contributions to political debate.<ref name="Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective">{{cite book |last1=Della Porta |first1=D |last2=Keating |first2=M |title=Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences: A Pluralist Perspective |date=2008 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |location=Cambridge |url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=304674&authtype=sso&custid=s8993828&site=ehost-live |access-date=1 December 2022}}</ref> Pietrzyk-Reeves discussed the idea that political science can never truly be value free, and so to not use normative theory is not entirely helpful. Furthermore, perhaps the normative dimension political study has is what separates it from many branches of social sciences.<ref name="Normative Political Theory"/> ==== International relations ==== In the academic discipline of [[International relations]], Smith, Baylis & Owens in the ''Introduction'' to their 2008 <ref>''The Globalization of World Politics: An introduction to international relations'', New York, Oxford University Press {{ISBN|9780199297771}}, Fourth edition, pp.2-13</ref> book make the case that the normative position or normative theory is to make the world a better place and that this theoretical [[worldview]] aims to do so by being aware of [[Tacit assumption|implicit assumption]]s and [[explicit assumption]]s that constitute a non-normative position, and align or position the normative towards the [[:wikt:loci|loci]] of other key socio-political theories such as political [[liberalism]], [[Marxism]], political [[Constructivism (international relations)|constructivism]], political [[Realism (international relations)|realism]], political [[idealism]] and [[political globalization]]. == Law == {{See also|Normative jurisprudence}} In [[law]], as an academic discipline, the term "normative" is used to describe the way something ought to be done according to a value position. As such, normative arguments can be conflicting, insofar as different values can be inconsistent with one another. For example, from one normative value position the purpose of the criminal process may be to repress crime. From another value position, the purpose of the criminal justice system could be to protect individuals from the moral harm of wrongful conviction. == Standards documents == The CEN-CENELEC Internal Regulations describe "normative" as applying to a document or element "that provides rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or their results" which are mandatory.<ref name='cen-cenelec'>{{cite web|url=https://boss.cen.eu/media/BOSS%20CENELEC/ref/ir3_e.pdf|title=Internal Regulations, Part 3: Principles and rules for the structure and drafting of CEN and CENELEC documents|publisher=[[European Committee for Standardization|CEN]]-[[European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization|CENELEC]]|date=2022|access-date=2023-05-13}}</ref> Normative elements are defined in [[International Organization for Standardization]] Directives Part 2 as "elements that describe the scope of the document, and which set out provisions".<ref name='iso-iec'>{{cite web|url=https://www.iso.org/sites/directives/current/part2/index.xhtml |title=ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2, Principles and rules for the structure and drafting of ISO and IEC documents|publisher=[[International Organization for Standardization|ISO]] [[International Electrotechnical Commission|IEC]]|date=2021|access-date=2023-05-17}}</ref> Provisions include "requirements", which are criteria that must be fulfilled and cannot be deviated from, and "recommendations" and "statements", which are not necessary to comply with. == See also == {{wiktionary}} {{div col|colwidth=22em}} * [[Conformity]] * [[Decision theory]] * [[Economics]] * [[Hypothesis]] * [[Is-ought problem]] * [[Linguistic prescription]] * [[Norm (philosophy)]] * [[Normative economics]] * [[Normative ethics]] * [[Normative science]] * [[Philosophy of law]] * [[Political science]] * [[Scientific method]] * [[Value theory|Value]] {{div col end}} ==References== {{Reflist}} == Further reading == * [[Georges Canguilhem|Canguilhem, Georges]], ''The Normal and the Pathological'', {{ISBN|0-942299-59-0}}. * Andreas Dorschel, 'Is there any normative claim internal to stating facts?', in: ''Communication & Cognition'' XXI (1988), no. 1, pp. 5–16. [[Category:Concepts in ethics]] [[Category:Social sciences]] [[Category:Philosophy of law]]
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