Editing Philosophical realism

{{short description|Philosophical concept}}

'''Philosophical realism'''{{Mdash}}usually not treated as a position of its own but as a stance towards other subject matters{{Mdash}}is the view that a certain kind of thing (ranging widely from [[abstract object]]s like [[Mathematical realism|numbers]] to [[Moral realism|moral statements]] to the physical world itself) has ''mind-independent existence'', i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any [[mind]] perceiving it or that its [[existence]] is not just a mere [[Illusion|appearance]] in the eye of the beholder.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Craig |first1=Edward |title=Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy |date=1996 |publisher=Routledge |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/BEAREO |chapter=Realism and antirealism}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Miller |first1=Alexander |title=Realism |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=30 December 2020 |date=2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Honderich |first1=Ted |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |date=2005 |publisher=Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HONTOC-2 |chapter=realism and anti-realism}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Elkana |first=Yehuda |date=1978 |title=Two-Tier-Thinking: Philosophical Realism and Historical Relativism |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/284907 |journal=Social Studies of Science |volume=8 |issue=3 |pages=309–326 |doi=10.1177/030631277800800304 |jstor=284907 |issn=0306-3127|url-access=subscription }}</ref> This includes a number of positions within [[epistemology]] and [[metaphysics]] which express that a given thing instead exists independently of [[knowledge]], [[thought]], or [[understanding]].<ref>{{cite encyclopedia|last=Khlentzos|first=Drew|title=Challenges to Metaphysical Realism|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|date=2016 |edition=Winter 2016|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/realism-sem-challenge/ }}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Kasavin |first=Ilya |date=2015-10-02 |title=Philosophical Realism: The Challenges for Social Epistemologists |url=http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02691728.2014.971913 |journal=Social Epistemology |language=en |volume=29 |issue=4 |pages=431–444 |doi=10.1080/02691728.2014.971913 |issn=0269-1728|url-access=subscription }}</ref> This can apply to items such as the [[physical world]], the [[past]] and [[future]], [[The problem of other minds|other minds]], and the [[self]], though may also apply less directly to things such as [[Universal (metaphysics)|universals]], [[mathematical truth]]s, [[moral|moral truth]]s, and [[thought]] itself. However, realism may also include various positions which instead reject [[metaphysical]] treatments of reality altogether.<ref>{{cite book|last=Conway|first=Daniel|year=1999|chapter=Beyond Truth and Appearance: Nietzsche’s Emergent Realism|editor-last=Babich|editor-first=Babette E.|title=Nietzsche, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Science|series=Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science|volume=204|pages=109–122|publisher=Springer|location=Dordrecht|doi=10.1007/978-94-017-2428-9_9|isbn=978-90-481-5234-6}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|title='Strike out, right and left!': a conceptual-historical analysis of 1860s Russian nihilism and its notion of negation|first=Kristian|last=Petrov|year=2019|journal=Stud East Eur Thought|volume=71|issue=2|pages=73–97|doi-access=free|doi=10.1007/s11212-019-09319-4|s2cid=150893870}}</ref>

Realism can also be a view about the properties of reality in general, holding that reality exists independent of the [[mind]], as opposed to non-realist views (like some forms of [[philosophical skepticism|skepticism]] and [[solipsism]]) which question the [[certainty]] of anything beyond one's own mind. Philosophers who profess realism often claim that [[truth]] consists in a [[correspondence theory of truth|correspondence]] between cognitive representations and reality.<ref>The statement ''[[veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus]]'' ("truth is the adequation of thought and thing") was defended by [[Thomas Aquinas]].</ref>

Realists tend to believe that whatever we believe now is only an approximation of reality but that the accuracy and fullness of understanding can be improved.<ref>Blackburn p. 188</ref> In some contexts, realism is contrasted with [[idealism]]. Today it is more often contrasted with [[anti-realism]], for example in the [[philosophy of science]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Ronen |first=Ruth |date=1995 |title=Philosophical Realism and Postmodern Antirealism |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/42946277 |journal=Style |volume=29 |issue=2 |pages=184–200 |jstor=42946277 |issn=0039-4238}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Boyd |first=Richard |title=Realism, approximate truth, and philosophical method |url=https://core.ac.uk/reader/83127690 |journal=University of Minnesota Digital Conservancy}}</ref>

The oldest use of the term "realism" appeared in [[Medieval philosophy|medieval]] [[Scholasticism|scholastic]] interpretations and adaptations of [[ancient Greek philosophy]].

The position was also held among many ancient Indian philosophies.<ref>Sinha, Jadunath ''Indian Realism'' p. 15. Routledge, 2024.</ref>

==Etymology==
The term comes from [[Late Latin]] ''realis'' "real" and was first used in the abstract metaphysical sense by [[Immanuel Kant]] in 1781 (''[[Critique of Pure Reason|CPR]]'' A 369).<ref>Heidemann, D. [https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-019-02502-4 "Kant and the forms of realism"]. ''Synthese'' (2019).</ref>

==Varieties==
===Metaphysical realism<!--'Metaphysical realism' redirects here-->===
{{also|Metaphysical anti-realism|Mathematical Platonism}}
'''Metaphysical realism'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> maintains that "whatever exists does so, and has the properties and relations it does, independently of deriving its existence or nature from being thought of or experienced."<ref>Laird Addis, Greg Jesson, Erwin Tegtmeier (eds.), ''Ontology and Analysis: Essays and Recollections about Gustav Bergmann'', Walter de Gruyter, 2007, p. 107.</ref> In other words, an [[objectivity and subjectivity|objective]] reality exists (not merely one or more subjective realities).

===Naive or direct realism===
{{Main|Naive realism}}
{{also|Indirect realism}}
[[Naive realism]], also known as direct realism, is a [[philosophy of mind]] rooted in a [[common sense]] [[theory]] of [[perception]] that claims that the [[senses]] provide us with direct [[awareness]] of the external world.

{{Blockquote|text=Direct Realism

Perceptual realism is the common sense view that tables, chairs and cups of coffee exist independently of perceivers. Direct realists also claim that it is with such objects that we directly engage. The objects of perception include such familiar items as paper clips, suns and olive oil tins. It is these things themselves that we see, smell, touch, taste and listen to. There are, however, two versions of direct realism: naïve direct realism and scientific direct realism. They differ in the properties they claim the objects of perception possess when they are not being perceived. Naïve realism claims that such objects continue to have all the properties that we usually perceive them to have, properties such as yellowness, warmth, and mass. Scientific realism, however, claims that some of the properties an object is perceived as having are dependent on the perceiver, and that unperceived objects should not be conceived as retaining them. Such a stance has a long history:

By convention sweet and by convention bitter, by convention hot, by convention cold, by convention colour; in reality atoms and void. [Democritus, c. 460-370 BCE, quoted by Sextus Empiricus in Barnes, 1987, pp. 252-253.]<ref>{{cite web | url=https://iep.utm.edu/perc-obj/#H1 | title=Perception, Objects of &#124; Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy }}</ref>}}

In contrast, some forms of [[idealism]] assert that no world exists apart from mind-dependent ideas and some forms of [[skepticism]] say we cannot trust our senses. The naive realist view is that [[Object (philosophy)|object]]s have properties, such as texture, smell, taste and colour, that are usually [[Perception|perceived]] absolutely correctly. We perceive them as they ''really'' are.

=== Immanent realism ===
{{Main|Immanent realism}}
[[Immanent realism]] is the ontological understanding which holds that universals are [[Immanent realism|immanently real]] within particulars themselves, not in a separate realm, and not mere names.  Most often associated with [[Aristotle]] and the [[Aristotelianism|Aristotelian]] tradition.

===Scientific realism===
{{Main|Scientific realism}}
[[Scientific realism]] is, at the most general level, the view that the world described by science is the real world, as it is, independent of what we might take it to be.  Within [[philosophy of science]], it is often framed as an answer to the question "how is the success of science to be explained?" The debate over what the success of science involves centers primarily on the status of [[unobservable|unobservable entities]] apparently talked about by scientific [[theory|theories]]. Generally, those who are scientific realists assert that one can make reliable claims about unobservables (viz., that they have the same [[Ontology|ontological]] status) as observables. [[Analytic philosopher]]s generally have a commitment to scientific realism, in the sense of regarding the scientific method as a reliable guide to the nature of reality. The main alternative to scientific realism is [[instrumentalism]].<ref>[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/ Scientific Realism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)]</ref>

====Scientific realism in physics====
[[Realism in physics]] (especially [[quantum mechanics]]) is the claim that the world is in some sense mind-independent: that even if the results of a possible measurement do not pre-exist the act of measurement, that does not require that they are the creation of the observer (contrary to the "[[consciousness causes collapse]]" [[interpretation of quantum mechanics]]). That interpretation of quantum mechanics, on the other hand, states that the [[wave function]] is already the full description of reality. The different possible realities described by the wave function are equally true. The observer collapses the wave function into their own reality. One's reality can be mind-dependent under this interpretation of quantum mechanics.

===Moral realism===
{{Main|Moral realism}}

[[Moral realism]] is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world.

===Aesthetic realism<!--'Aesthetic realism (metaphysics)' redirects here-->===
'''Aesthetic realism'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> (not to be confused with Aesthetic Realism, the philosophy developed by [[Eli Siegel]], or [[Realism (arts)|"realism" in the arts]]) is the view that there are mind-independent aesthetic facts.<ref>Nick Zangwill, [https://books.google.com/books?id=Vp2c0LOPjB8C&vq= ''The Metaphysics of Beauty''], Cornell University Press, 2001, p. 3.</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|journal=[[Mind (journal)|Mind]]|author=Gavin McIntosh|title=Review: The Metaphysics of Beauty|year=2004|volume=113|issue=449|pages=221–226|doi=10.1093/mind/113.449.221}} {{Subscription required}}</ref>

==History of metaphysical realism<!--'History of metaphysical realism' redirects here-->==
{{also|History of naturalism}}
===Ancient Greek philosophy===
{{Main article|Platonic realism}}
[[File:Sanzio 01 Plato Aristotle.jpg|thumb|Plato (left) and Aristotle (right), a detail of ''[[The School of Athens]]'', a fresco by [[Raphael]]. In Plato's metaphysics, ever-unchanging [[Theory of Forms|Forms]], or Ideas, exist apart from particular physical things, and are related to them as their [[prototype]] or [[wikt:exemplar|exemplar]]. Aristotle's philosophy of reality also aims at the [[Universality (philosophy)|universal]]. Aristotle finds the universal, which he calls [[Essences|essence]], in the commonalities of [[particular]] things.]]
In [[ancient Greek philosophy]], [[Problem of universals#Realism|realist doctrines]] about [[universals (metaphysics)|universals]] were proposed by [[Plato]] and [[Aristotle]].<ref name=B>[https://www.britannica.com/topic/realism-philosophy Realism – philosophy – Britannica.com]</ref>

[[Platonic realism]] is a radical form of realism regarding the existence of [[abstract object]]s, including [[universal (metaphysics)|universals]], which are often translated from Plato's works as "Forms". Since Plato frames Forms as ideas that are literally real (existing even outside of human minds), this stance is also called [[Platonic idealism]]. This should not be confused with "idealistic" in the ordinary sense of "optimistic" or with other types of [[philosophical idealism]], as presented by philosophers such as [[George Berkeley]]. As Platonic [[abstraction]]s are not spatial, temporal, or subjectively mental, they are arguably not compatible with the emphasis of Berkeley's idealism grounded in mental existence. Plato's Forms include numbers and geometrical figures, making his theory also include [[mathematical realism]]; they also include the [[Form of the Good]], making it additionally include [[ethical realism]].

In Aristotle's more modest view, the existence of universals (like "blueness") is dependent on the particulars that exemplify them (like a particular "blue bird", "blue piece of paper", "blue robe", etc.), and those particulars exist independent of any minds: classic [[metaphysical realism]].

===Ancient Indian Philosophy===
There were many ancient Indian realist schools, such as the Mimamsa, Vishishtadvaita, Dvaita, Nyaya, Yoga, Samkhya, Sauntrantika, Jain, Vaisesika, and others. They argued for their realist positions, and heavily criticized idealism, like that of the [[Yogachara]], and composed refutations of the Yogacara position.<ref>Sinha, Jadunath ''Indian Realism'' p. 15. Routledge, 2024.</ref>

===Medieval philosophy<!--'Medieval realism' redirects here-->===
'''Medieval realism'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> developed out of debates over the [[problem of universals]].<ref>John Marenbon, ''Medieval Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction'', Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 72.</ref> Universals are terms or properties that can be applied to many things, such as "red", "beauty", "five", or "dog". Realism (also known as [[exaggerated realism]]) in this context, contrasted with [[conceptualism]] and [[nominalism]], holds that such universals really exist, independently and somehow prior to the world. [[Moderate realism]] holds that they exist, but only insofar as they are instantiated in specific things; they do not exist ''separately'' from the specific thing. Conceptualism holds that they exist, but only in the mind, while nominalism holds that universals do not "exist" at all but are no more than words (''[[flatus vocis]]'') that describe specific objects.

Proponents of moderate realism included [[Thomas Aquinas]], [[Bonaventure]], and [[Duns Scotus]] (cf. [[Scotist realism]]).<ref>[[s:Catholic Encyclopedia (1913)/Nominalism, Realism, Conceptualism|Nominalism, Realism, Conceptualism – ''Catholic Encyclopedia'' (1913)]]</ref>

===Early modern philosophy===
In [[early modern philosophy]], [[Scottish Common Sense Realism]] was a school of [[philosophy]] which sought to defend naive realism against philosophical paradox and [[scepticism]], arguing that matters of [[common sense]] are within the reach of common understanding and that common-sense beliefs even govern the lives and thoughts of those who hold non-commonsensical beliefs. It originated in the ideas of the most prominent members of the Scottish School of Common Sense, [[Thomas Reid]], [[Adam Ferguson]] and [[Dugald Stewart]], during the 18th century [[Scottish Enlightenment]] and flourished in the late 18th and early 19th centuries in Scotland and America.

The roots of Scottish Common Sense Realism can be found in responses to such philosophers as [[John Locke]], [[George Berkeley]], and [[David Hume]]. The approach was a response to the "ideal system" that began with Descartes' concept of the limitations of [[empirical evidence|sense experience]] and led Locke and Hume to a skepticism that called religion and the evidence of the senses equally into question. The common sense realists found skepticism to be absurd and so contrary to common experience that it had to be rejected. They taught that ordinary experiences provide intuitively certain assurance of the existence of the self, of real objects that could be seen and felt and of certain "first principles" upon which sound morality and religious beliefs could be established. Its basic principle was enunciated by its founder and greatest figure, Thomas Reid:<ref>Cuneo and Woudenberg, eds. ''The Cambridge companion to Thomas Reid'' (2004) p 85</ref>

:If there are certain principles, as I think there are, which the constitution of our nature leads us to believe, and which we are under a necessity to take for granted in the common concerns of life, without being able to give a reason for them—these are what we call the principles of common sense; and what is manifestly contrary to them, is what we call absurd.

===Late modern philosophy<!--'Austrian realism' redirects here-->===
{{also|Objective idealism|Transcendental realism (Schelling)|Transcendental realism (Schopenhauer)}}
In [[late modern philosophy]], a notable school of thought advocating metaphysical realism was '''Austrian realism'''.<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> Its members included [[Franz Brentano]],<ref name=GT/> [[Alexius Meinong]],<ref name=GT/> [[Vittorio Benussi]],<ref name=GT/> [[Ernst Mally]],<ref>Liliana Albertazzi, Dale Jacquette, ''The School of Alexius Meinong'', Routledge, 2017, p. 191.</ref> and early [[Edmund Husserl]].<ref name=GT>''Gestalt Theory: Official Journal of the Society for Gestalt Theory and Its Applications (GTA)'', '''22''', Steinkopff, 2000, p. 94: "Attention has varied between Continental Phenomenology (late Husserl, Merleau-Ponty) and Austrian Realism (Brentano, Meinong, Benussi, early Husserl)".</ref> These thinkers stressed the objectivity of truth and its independence of the nature of those who judge it.<ref>Mark Textor, ''The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy'', Routledge, 2006, pp. 170–1:<br>"[Husserl argues in the ''Logical Investigations'' that the rightness of a judgement or proposition] shows itself in our experience of self-evidence (''Evidenz''), which term Husserl takes from Brentano, but makes criterial not of truth per se but of our most secure awareness that things are as we take them to be, when the object of judgement, the [[State of affairs (philosophy)|state of affairs]], is given most fully or adequately. ... In his struggle to overcome relativism, especially psychologism, Husserl stressed the objectivity of truth and its independence of the nature of those who judge it ... A proposition is true not because of some fact about a thinker but because of an objectively existing abstract proposition's relation to something that is not a proposition, namely a state of affairs."</ref> (See also ''[[Graz School]]''.)

[[Dialectical materialism]], a [[philosophy of nature]] based on the writings of late modern philosophers [[Karl Marx]] and [[Friedrich Engels]], is interpreted to be a form of ontological realism.<ref>Sean Creaven, ''Marxism and Realism: A Materialistic Application of Realism in the Social Sciences'', Routledge, 2012, p. 33.</ref>

According to [[Michael Resnik]], [[Gottlob Frege]]'s work after 1891 can be interpreted as a contribution to realism.<ref>[[Michael Resnik]], "II. Frege as Idealist and then Realist," ''Inquiry'' 22 (1–4):350–357 (1979).</ref>

===Contemporary philosophy<!--'Conceptualist realism' and 'Conceptual realism' redirects here-->===
{{also|Structural realism (philosophy of science)|Australian realism|Modal realism|Critical realism (philosophy of the social sciences)|New realism (philosophy)}}
In [[Contemporary philosophy|contemporary]] [[analytic philosophy]], [[Bertrand Russell]],<ref name=R>Bertrand Russell, ''Philosophy of Logical Atomism'', Open Court, 1998 [1918].</ref> [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]],<ref name=W>Ludwig Wittgenstein, ''Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus'', Routledge 2001 [1921].</ref> [[J. L. Austin]],<ref name=A>Austin, J. L., 1950, "Truth", reprinted in ''Philosophical Papers'', 3rd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press 1979, 117–33.</ref> [[Karl Popper]],<ref>[[Karl Popper]], ''Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge'', 1963.</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/popper/|title=Karl Popper|last=Thornton|first=Stephen|date=2015-01-01|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Winter 2015}} ("Popper professes to be anti-conventionalist, and his commitment to the correspondence theory of truth places him firmly within the realist's camp.")</ref> and [[Gustav Bergmann]]<ref>[[Gustav Bergmann]], ''Logic and Reality'', Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964; Gustav Bergmann, ''Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong'', Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967.</ref> espoused metaphysical realism. [[Hilary Putnam]] initially espoused metaphysical realism,<ref>Putnam, H., ''Realism and Reason. Philosophical Papers, vol. 3.'' Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.</ref> but he later embraced a form of anti-realism that he termed "[[internal realism]]."<ref>Putnam, H. ''Realism with a Human Face''. Edited by James Conant. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990, p. vii.</ref> '''Conceptualist realism'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> (a view put forward by [[David Wiggins]]) is a form of realism, according to which our conceptual framework maps reality.<ref>A. M. Ferner, ''Organisms and Personal Identity: Individuation and the Work of David Wiggins'', Routledge, 2016, p. 28.</ref>

[[Speculative realism]] is a movement in contemporary [[Continental philosophy|Continental]]-inspired philosophy<ref>Paul John Ennis, ''Post-continental Voices: Selected Interviews'', John Hunt Publishing, 2010, p. 18.</ref> that defines itself loosely in its stance of metaphysical realism against the dominant forms of [[post-Kantian philosophy]].<ref>{{cite journal | url=http://www.urbanomic.com/pub_collapse2.php | title=Editorial Introduction | author=Mackay, Robin | journal=Collapse |date=March 2007 | volume=2 | issue=1 | pages=3–13}}</ref>

==See also==
* [[Anti-realism]]
* [[Critical realism (philosophy of perception)|Critical realism]]
* [[Dialectical realism]] 
* [[Epistemological realism]]
* [[Extended modal realism]]
* [[Legal realism]]
* [[Modal realism]]
* [[Objectivism]]
* [[Philosophy of social science]]
* [[Principle of bivalence]]
* [[Problem of future contingents]]
* [[Realism (disambiguation)]]
* [[Truth-value link realism]]
* [[Speculative realism]]
* [[Direct and indirect realism]]

==Notes==
{{Reflist}}

==References==
* {{Cite book |author=Blackburn, Simon |year=2005 |title=Truth: A Guide |publisher=Oxford University Press, Inc |isbn=978-0-19-516824-2 |author-link=Simon Blackburn |url-access=registration |url=https://archive.org/details/truthguide00simo }}

==External links==
* [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/ Miller, Alexander, "Realism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP)]
* [http://www.iep.utm.edu/perc-obj/ O'Brien, Daniel, "Objects of Perception", The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (IEP)]
* [http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v446/n7138/abs/nature05677.html An experimental test of non-local realism]. Physics research paper in [[Nature (journal)|Nature]] which gives negative experimental results for certain classes of realism in the sense of physics.

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[[Category:Philosophical realism| ]]