Editing Philosophy of science

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'''Philosophy of science''' is the branch of [[philosophy]] concerned with the foundations, [[methodology|methods]], and implications of [[science]]. Amongst its central questions are [[Demarcation problem|the difference between science and non-science]], the [[reliabilism|reliability]] of scientific theories, and the ultimate purpose and meaning of science as a human endeavour. Philosophy of science focuses on [[Metaphysics|metaphysical]], [[Epistemology|epistemic]] and [[Semantics|semantic]] aspects of scientific practice, and overlaps with [[metaphysics]], [[ontology]], [[logic]], and [[epistemology]], for example, when it explores the relationship between science and the concept of [[truth]]. Philosophy of science is both a theoretical and [[Empirical research|empirical discipline]], relying on philosophical theorising as well as [[metatheory|meta-studies]] of scientific practice. Ethical issues such as [[bioethics]] and [[scientific misconduct]] are often considered [[ethics]] or [[science studies]] rather than the philosophy of science.

Many of the central problems concerned with the philosophy of science lack contemporary consensus, including whether science can infer [[scientific realism|truth about unobservable entities]] and [[problem of induction|whether inductive reasoning can be justified]] as yielding definite scientific knowledge. Philosophers of science also consider philosophical problems within particular sciences (such as [[philosophy of biology|biology]], [[philosophy of physics|physics]] and social sciences such as [[economics]] and [[psychology]]). Some philosophers of science also use contemporary results in science to reach conclusions about [[metaphilosophy|philosophy itself]].

While philosophical thought pertaining to science dates back at least to the time of [[Aristotle]], the general philosophy of science emerged as a distinct discipline only in the 20th century following the [[logical positivist]] movement, which aimed to formulate criteria for ensuring all philosophical statements' meaningfulness and objectively assessing them. [[Karl Popper]] criticized logical positivism and helped establish a modern set of standards for [[scientific method]]ology. [[Thomas Kuhn]]'s 1962 book ''[[The Structure of Scientific Revolutions]]'' was also formative, challenging the view of [[scientific progress]] as the steady, cumulative acquisition of knowledge based on a fixed method of systematic experimentation and instead arguing that any progress is relative to a "[[paradigm]]", the set of questions, concepts, and practices that define a scientific discipline in a particular historical period.

Subsequently, the [[Coherentism|coherentist]] approach to science, in which a theory is validated if it makes sense of observations as part of a coherent whole, became prominent due to [[Willard Van Orman Quine|W. V. Quine]] and others. Some thinkers such as [[Stephen Jay Gould]] seek to ground science in [[axiomatic]] assumptions, such as the [[uniformity of nature]]. A vocal minority of philosophers, and [[Paul Feyerabend]] in particular, argue against the existence of the "[[scientific method]]", so all approaches to science should be allowed, including explicitly [[supernatural]] ones. Another approach to thinking about science involves studying how [[Constructivist epistemology|knowledge is created]] from a [[Sociology|sociological]] perspective, an approach represented by scholars like [[David Bloor]] and [[S. Barry Barnes|Barry Barnes]]. Finally, a tradition in [[continental philosophy]] approaches science from the perspective of a rigorous analysis of human experience.

Philosophies of the particular sciences range from questions about the nature of [[Philosophy of space and time|time]] raised by Einstein's [[general relativity]], to the implications of [[Philosophy and economics|economics]] for [[public policy]]. A central theme is whether the terms of one scientific theory can be intra- or intertheoretically [[Reductionism|reduced]] to the terms of another. Can chemistry be reduced to physics, or can sociology be reduced to individual [[Philosophy of psychology|psychology]]? The general questions of philosophy of science also arise with greater specificity in some particular sciences. For instance, the question of the validity of scientific reasoning is seen in a different guise in the [[foundations of statistics]]. The question of what counts as science and what should be excluded arises as a life-or-death matter in the [[philosophy of medicine]]. Additionally, the philosophies of biology, psychology, and the [[Philosophy of social science|social sciences]] explore whether the scientific studies of [[human nature]] can achieve objectivity or are inevitably shaped by [[Value (personal and cultural)|values]] and by social relations.

==Introduction==

===Defining science===
{{Main|Demarcation problem}}
[[File:Allan Ramsay - David Hume, 1711 - 1776. Historian and philosopher - PG 3521 - National Galleries of Scotland.jpg|thumb|upright|In formulating 'the problem of induction', David Hume devised one of the most pervasive puzzles in the philosophy of science. ]]
[[File:Karl Popper.jpg|thumb|Karl Popper in the 1980s. Popper is credited with formulating 'the demarcation problem', which considers the question of how we distinguish between science and pseudoscience. |upright]]
Distinguishing between science and [[non-science]] is referred to as the demarcation problem. For example, should [[psychoanalysis]], [[creation science]], and [[historical materialism]] be considered pseudosciences? [[Karl Popper]] called this the central question in the philosophy of science.<ref name="Thornton2006">{{cite web|url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/|title = Karl Popper|access-date = 2007-12-01|last = Thornton|first = Stephen|year = 2006|website = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20070627013103/http://plato.stanford.edu//entries///popper/|archive-date = 2007-06-27|url-status = live}}</ref> However, no unified account of the problem has won acceptance among philosophers, and some regard the problem as unsolvable or uninteresting.<ref>{{cite encyclopedia |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/#NonSciPosSci |title=Science and Pseudo-science |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150905091332/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/#NonSciPosSci |archive-date=2015-09-05 |date=2008 |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref><ref name="Laudan1983">{{cite book | last = Laudan | first = Larry | editor-first1 = Adolf |editor-last1=Grünbaum |editor-first2=Robert Sonné |editor-last2=Cohen |editor-first3=Larry |editor-last3=Laudan | title = Physics, Philosophy, and Psychoanalysis: Essays in Honor of Adolf Grünbaum | year = 1983 | publisher = Springer | isbn = 978-90-277-1533-3 | chapter = The Demise of the Demarcation Problem}}</ref> [[Martin Gardner]] has argued for the use of a [[Potter Stewart standard]] ("I know it when I see it") for recognizing pseudoscience.<ref>{{cite book|url = https://books.google.com/books?id=SqOPw9Yq-MEC&q=pseudoscience+potter+stewart&pg=PA13|pages = 12–13|title = The Pseudoscience Wars: Immanuel Velikovsky and the Birth of the Modern Fringe|first = Michael D.|last = Gordin|publisher = University of Chicago Press|year = 2012|isbn = 978-0-226-30442-7}}</ref>

Early attempts by the [[logical positivists]] grounded science in observation while non-science was non-observational and hence meaningless.<ref name="Uebel2006">{{cite web|url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vienna-circle/|title = Vienna Circle|access-date = 2007-12-01|last = Uebel|first = Thomas|year = 2006|website = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20070626224948/http://plato.stanford.edu//entries///vienna-circle/|archive-date = 2007-06-26|url-status = live}}</ref> Popper argued that the central property of science is [[falsifiability]]. That is, every genuinely scientific claim is capable of being proven false, at least in principle.<ref name="Popper1959">{{cite book | last = Popper | first = Karl | author-link = Karl Popper | title = The logic of scientific discovery | year = 2004|edition=reprint| publisher = Routledge Classics | location = London & New York | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Yq6xeupNStMC&q=the+logic+of+scientific+discovery | isbn=978-0-415-27844-7 | postscript=First published 1959 by Hutchinson & Co.}}</ref>

An area of study or speculation that masquerades as science in an attempt to claim a legitimacy that it would not otherwise be able to achieve is referred to as [[pseudoscience]], [[fringe science]], or [[junk science]].<ref>{{cite dictionary |title=Pseudoscientific&nbsp;– pretending to be scientific, falsely represented as being scientific |dictionary=Oxford American Dictionary |publisher=[[Oxford English Dictionary]]}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last=Hansson |first=Sven Ove |date=1996 |title=Defining Pseudoscience |journal=Philosophia Naturalis |volume=33 |pages=169–176}}, as cited in {{cite encyclopedia |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/#NonSciPosSci |title= Science and Pseudo-science |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150905091332/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/#NonSciPosSci |archive-date=2015-09-05 |date= 2008 |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}. The Stanford article states: "Many writers on pseudoscience have emphasized that pseudoscience is non-science posing as science. The foremost modern classic on the subject (Gardner 1957) bears the title [[Fads and Fallacies in the Name of Science]]. According to Brian Baigrie (1988, 438), "[w]hat is objectionable about these beliefs is that they masquerade as genuinely scientific ones." These and many other authors assume that to be pseudoscientific, an activity or a teaching has to satisfy the following two criteria (Hansson 1996): (1) it is not scientific, and (2) its major proponents try to create the impression that it is scientific".</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Hewitt |first1=Paul G. |last2=Suchocki |first2=John |last3=Hewitt |first3=Leslie A. |title=Conceptual Physical Science |publisher= Addison Wesley |edition=3rd |date=2003 |isbn=0-321-05173-4}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Bennett |first=Jeffrey O. |title=The Cosmic Perspective |edition=3rd |publisher=Addison Wesley |date=2003 |isbn=0-8053-8738-2}}</ref><ref>Gauch HG Jr. ''Scientific Method in Practice'' (2003).</ref><ref>A 2006 [[National Science Foundation]] report on Science and engineering indicators quoted [[Michael Shermer]]'s (1997) definition of pseudoscience: '"claims presented so that they appear [to be] scientific even though they lack supporting evidence and plausibility"(p. 33). In contrast, science is "a set of methods designed to describe and interpret observed and inferred phenomena, past or present, and aimed at building a testable body of knowledge open to rejection or confirmation" (p. 17)'. {{Cite book|last=Shermer |first=Michael |year=1997|title=Why People Believe Weird Things: Pseudoscience, Superstition, and Other Confusions of Our Time|location=New York|publisher=W.H. Freeman and Company|isbn=978-0-7167-3090-3}} as cited by {{Cite book|title=Science and engineering indicators 2006|chapter=Science and Technology: Public Attitudes and Understanding|chapter-url=https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind06/c7/c7s2.htm|year=2006 |author1 = National Science Foundation|author2 = Division of Science Resources Statistics|author-link1=National Science Foundation}}</ref><ref>"A pretended or spurious science; a collection of related beliefs about the world mistakenly regarded as being based on scientific method or as having the status that scientific truths now have," from the ''[[Oxford English Dictionary]]'', second edition 1989.</ref> Physicist [[Richard Feynman]] coined the term "[[cargo cult science]]" for cases in which researchers believe they are doing science because their activities have the outward appearance of it but actually lack the "kind of utter honesty" that allows their results to be rigorously evaluated.<ref name='cargocultscience'>{{cite web |url=http://calteches.library.caltech.edu/51/2/CargoCult.pdf |title=Cargo Cult Science |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131201231202/http://calteches.library.caltech.edu/51/2/CargoCult.pdf |archive-date=2013-12-01 |author-link=Richard Feynman |last=Feynman |first=Richard |access-date=2015-10-25}}</ref>

===Scientific explanation===
{{Main|Scientific explanation}}

A closely related question is what counts as a good scientific explanation. In addition to providing predictions about future events, society often takes scientific theories to provide [[explanation]]s for events that occur regularly or have already occurred. Philosophers have investigated the criteria by which a scientific theory can be said to have successfully explained a phenomenon, as well as what it means to say a scientific theory has [[explanatory power]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Rapoport |first1=Anatol |title=Explanatory power and explanatory appeal of theories |journal=Synthese |date=1972 |volume=24 |issue=3–4 |pages=321–342 |doi=10.1007/BF00413651}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Schupbach |first1=Jonah |last2=Sprenger |first2=Jan |title=The logic of explanatory power |journal=Philosophy of Science |date=2011 |volume=78 |issue=1 |pages=105–27 |doi=10.1086/658111 |url=https://fitelson.org/few/few_10/schupbach_sprenger.pdf}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Brössel |first1=Peter |title=On the Role of Explanatory and Systematic Power in Scientific Reasoning |journal=Synthese |date=2015 |volume=192 |issue=12 |pages=3877–3913 |doi=10.1007/s11229-015-0870-6 |url=https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16528/1/IBE%20Final.pdf}}</ref>

One early and influential account of scientific explanation is the [[deductive-nomological]] model. It says that a successful scientific explanation must deduce the occurrence of the phenomena in question from a [[scientific law]].<ref name="Hempel1948">{{cite journal
 | last1 = Hempel
 | first1 = Carl G.
 | author-link = Carl Hempel
 |first2=Paul
|last2=Oppenheim
 | year = 1948
 | title = Studies in the Logic of Explanation
 | journal = Philosophy of Science
 | volume = 15
 | pages = 135–175
 | doi = 10.1086/286983
 | issue = 2| citeseerx = 10.1.1.294.3693
 | s2cid = 16924146
 }}</ref> This view has been subjected to substantial criticism, resulting in several widely acknowledged counterexamples to the theory.<ref name="Salmon1992">{{cite book
 | last1 = Salmon
 | first1 = Merrilee
 | first2 = John |last2=Earman |first3=Clark |last3=Glymour |first4=James G. |last4=Lenno |first5=Peter |last5=Machamer |first6=J.E. |last6=McGuire |first7=John D. |last7=Norton |first8=Wesley C. |last8=Salmon |first9=Kenneth F. |last9=Schaffner
 | title = Introduction to the Philosophy of Science
 | year = 1992
 | publisher = Prentice-Hall
 | isbn = 978-0-13-663345-7}}</ref> It is especially challenging to characterize what is meant by an explanation when the thing to be explained cannot be deduced from any law because it is a matter of chance, or otherwise cannot be perfectly predicted from what is known. [[Wesley C. Salmon|Wesley Salmon]] developed a model in which a good scientific explanation must be statistically relevant to the outcome to be explained.<ref name="Salmon1971">{{cite book
 | last = Salmon
 | first = Wesley
 | title = Statistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance
 | url = https://archive.org/details/statisticalexpla0000unse
 | url-access = registration
 | year = 1971
 | location = Pittsburgh
 | publisher = University of Pittsburgh Press| isbn = 9780822974116
 }}</ref><ref name="Woodward2003">{{cite web
|url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-explanation/
|title = Scientific Explanation
|access-date = 2007-12-07
|last = Woodward
|first = James
|year = 2003
|website = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20070706080422/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-explanation/
|archive-date = 2007-07-06
|url-status = live
|author1-link=James Woodward (philosopher)
}}</ref> Others have argued that the key to a good explanation is unifying disparate phenomena or providing a causal mechanism.<ref name="Woodward2003" />

===Justifying science===
{{Main|Problem of induction}}

Although it is often taken for granted, it is not at all clear how one can infer the validity of a general statement from a number of specific instances or infer the truth of a theory from a series of successful tests.<ref name="StanInduction">{{cite web|url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/|title = The Problem of Induction|access-date = 2014-02-25|last1 = Vickers|first1 = John|year = 2013|website = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20140407014814/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/|archive-date = 2014-04-07|url-status = live}}</ref> For example, a chicken observes that each morning the farmer comes and gives it food, for hundreds of days in a row. The chicken may therefore use [[inductive reasoning]] to infer that the farmer will bring food ''every'' morning. However, one morning, the farmer comes and kills the chicken. How is scientific reasoning more trustworthy than the chicken's reasoning?

One approach is to acknowledge that induction cannot achieve certainty, but observing more instances of a general statement can at least make the general statement more [[Probability|probable]]. So the chicken would be right to conclude from all those mornings that it is likely the farmer will come with food again the next morning, even if it cannot be certain. However, there remain difficult questions about the process of interpreting any given evidence into a probability that the general statement is true. One way out of these particular difficulties is to declare that all beliefs about scientific theories are [[Bayesian probability|subjective]], or personal, and correct reasoning is merely about how evidence should change one's subjective beliefs over time.<ref name=StanInduction/>

Some argue that what scientists do is not inductive reasoning at all but rather [[abductive reasoning]], or inference to the best explanation. In this account, science is not about generalizing specific instances but rather about hypothesizing explanations for what is observed. As discussed in the previous section, it is not always clear what is meant by the "best explanation". [[Ockham's razor]], which counsels choosing the [[Simplicity|simplest]] available explanation, thus plays an important role in some versions of this approach. To return to the example of the chicken, would it be simpler to suppose that the farmer cares about it and will continue taking care of it indefinitely or that the farmer is fattening it up for slaughter? Philosophers have tried to make this [[heuristic]] principle more precise regarding theoretical [[Occam's razor|parsimony]] or other measures. Yet, although various measures of simplicity have been brought forward as potential candidates, it is generally accepted that there is no such thing as a theory-independent measure of simplicity. In other words, there appear to be as many different measures of simplicity as there are theories themselves, and the task of choosing between measures of simplicity appears to be every bit as problematic as the job of choosing between theories.<ref name="StanSimple">{{cite web|url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/simplicity/|title = Simplicity|access-date = 2014-02-25|last1 = Baker|first1 = Alan|year = 2013|website = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20140326180129/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/simplicity/|archive-date = 2014-03-26|url-status = live}}</ref> [[Nicholas Maxwell]] has argued for some decades that unity rather than simplicity is the key non-empirical factor in influencing the choice of theory in science, persistent preference for unified theories in effect committing science to the acceptance of a metaphysical thesis concerning unity in nature. In order to improve this problematic thesis, it needs to be represented in the form of a hierarchy of theses, each thesis becoming more insubstantial as one goes up the hierarchy.<ref>[[Nicholas Maxwell]] (1998) [https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-comprehensibility-of-the-universe-9780199261550?lang=en&cc=gb The Comprehensibility of the Universe] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180227214410/https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-comprehensibility-of-the-universe-9780199261550?lang=en&cc=gb |date=2018-02-27 }} Clarendon Press; (2017) [http://www.paragonhouse.com/xcart/Understanding-Scientific-Progress-Aim-Oriented-Empiricism.html Understanding Scientific Progress: Aim-Oriented Empiricism] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180220210819/http://www.paragonhouse.com/xcart/Understanding-Scientific-Progress-Aim-Oriented-Empiricism.html |date=2018-02-20 }}, Paragon House, St. Paul</ref>

===Observation inseparable from theory===
[[Image:Einstein cross.jpg|thumb|right|Seen through a telescope, the [[Einstein cross]] seems to provide evidence for five different objects, but this observation is theory-laden. If we assume the theory of [[general relativity]], the image only provides evidence for two objects.|alt=Five balls of light are arranged in a cross shape.|263x263px]]
When making observations, scientists look through telescopes, study images on electronic screens, record meter readings, and so on. Generally, on a basic level, they can agree on what they see, e.g., the thermometer shows 37.9 degrees C. But, if these scientists have different ideas about the theories that have been developed to explain these basic observations, they may disagree about what they are observing. For example, before [[Albert Einstein]]'s [[General relativity|general theory of relativity]], observers would have likely interpreted an image of the [[Einstein cross]] as five different objects in space. In light of that theory, however, astronomers will tell you that there are actually only two objects, one in the center and [[Gravitational lens|four different images]] of a second object around the sides. Alternatively, if other scientists suspect that something is wrong with the telescope and only one object is actually being observed, they are operating under yet another theory. Observations that cannot be separated from theoretical interpretation are said to be [[theory-laden]].<ref name="StanTheoryObs">{{cite web|url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/science-theory-observation/|title = Theory and Observation in Science|access-date = 2014-02-25|last1 = Bogen|first1 = Jim|year = 2013|website = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20140227105420/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/science-theory-observation/|archive-date = 2014-02-27|url-status = live}}</ref>

All observation involves both [[philosophy of perception|perception]] and [[cognitive process|cognition]]. That is, one does not make an observation passively, but rather is actively engaged in distinguishing the phenomenon being observed from surrounding sensory data. Therefore, observations are affected by one's underlying understanding of the way in which the world functions, and that understanding may influence what is perceived, noticed, or deemed worthy of consideration. In this sense, it can be argued that all observation is theory-laden.<ref name=StanTheoryObs/>

===The purpose of science===
{{See also|Scientific realism|Instrumentalism}}

Should science aim to determine ultimate truth, or are there questions that science [[Empirical limits in science|cannot answer]]? ''Scientific realists'' claim that science aims at truth and that one ought to regard [[scientific theories]] as true, approximately true, or likely true. Conversely, ''scientific anti-realists'' argue that science does not aim (or at least does not succeed) at truth, especially truth about [[unobservable]]s like electrons or other universes.<ref name="Levin1984">{{cite book
 | last = Levin
 | first = Michael
 | editor = Jarrett Leplin
 | title = Scientific Realism
 | year = 1984
 | publisher = University of California Press
 | location = Berkeley
 | isbn = 978-0-520-05155-3
 | pages = [https://archive.org/details/scientificrealis0000unse/page/124 124–1139]
 | chapter = What Kind of Explanation is Truth?
 | chapter-url = https://archive.org/details/scientificrealis0000unse/page/124
 }}
</ref> [[Instrumentalism|Instrumentalists]] argue that scientific theories should only be evaluated on whether they are useful. In their view, whether theories are true or not is beside the point, because the purpose of science is to make predictions and enable effective technology.

Realists often point to the success of recent scientific theories as evidence for the truth (or near truth) of current theories.<ref name="Boyd2002"/><ref>Specific examples include:
* {{cite book
 | last = Popper
 | first = Karl
 | author-link = Karl Popper
 | title = Conjectures and Refutations
 | year = 2002
 | publisher = Routledge Classics
 | location = London & New York
 | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=fZnrUfJWQ-YC&q=conjectures+and+refutations
 |isbn=978-0-415-28594-0
 |postscript=First published 1963 by Routledge and Kegan Paul}}
* {{cite book
 | last = Smart
 | first = J.J.C.
 | title = Between Science and Philosophy
 | url = https://archive.org/details/betweenscienceph0000smar
 | url-access = registration
 | year = 1968
 | publisher = Random House
 | location = New York}}
* {{cite book
 | last = Putnam
 | first = Hilary
 | author-link = Hilary Putnam
 | title = Mathematics, Matter and Method (Philosophical Papers, Vol. I)
 | year = 1975
 | publisher = Cambridge University Press
 | location = London}}
* {{cite book
 | last = Putnam
 | first = Hilary
 | author-link = Hilary Putnam
 | title = Meaning and the Moral Sciences
 | year = 1978
 | publisher = Routledge and Kegan Paul
 | location = London}}
* {{cite book
 | last = Boyd
 | first = Richard
 | editor = Jarrett Leplin
 | title = Scientific Realism
 | year = 1984
 | publisher = University of California Press
 | location = Berkeley
 | isbn = 978-0-520-05155-3
 | pages = [https://archive.org/details/scientificrealis0000unse/page/41 41–82]
 | chapter = The Current Status of Scientific Realism
 | chapter-url = https://archive.org/details/scientificrealis0000unse/page/41
 }}</ref> Antirealists point to either the many false theories in the [[history of science]],<ref name="Stanford2006">{{cite book
 | last = Stanford
 | first = P. Kyle
 | title = Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives
 | year = 2006
 | publisher = Oxford University Press
 | isbn = 978-0-19-517408-3}}</ref><ref name="Laudan1981">{{cite journal
 | last = Laudan
 | first = Larry
 | author-link = Larry Laudan
 | year = 1981
 | title = A Confutation of Convergent Realism
 | journal = Philosophy of Science
 | volume = 48
 | pages = 218–249
 | doi = 10.1086/288975| citeseerx = 10.1.1.594.2523
 | s2cid = 108290084
 }}</ref> epistemic morals,<ref name="vanFraassen1980"/> the success of false [[Scientific modelling|modeling]] assumptions,<ref name="Winsberg2006">{{cite journal
 | last = Winsberg
 | first = Eric
 | s2cid = 18275928
 |date=September 2006
 | title = Models of Success Versus the Success of Models: Reliability without Truth
 | journal = Synthese
 | volume = 152
 | pages = 1–19
 | doi = 10.1007/s11229-004-5404-6}}</ref> or widely termed [[postmodern]] criticisms of objectivity as evidence against scientific realism.<ref name="Boyd2002">{{cite web
|url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/
|title = Scientific Realism
|access-date = 2007-12-01
|last = Boyd
|first = Richard
|year = 2002
|website = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20070706080354/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/
|archive-date = 2007-07-06
|url-status = live
}}</ref> Antirealists attempt to explain the success of scientific theories without reference to truth.<ref name="Stanford2000">{{cite journal
 | last = Stanford
 | first = P. Kyle
 | s2cid = 35878807
 |date=June 2000
 | title = An Antirealist Explanation of the Success of Science
 | journal = Philosophy of Science
 | volume = 67
 | pages = 266–284
 | doi = 10.1086/392775
 | issue = 2}}</ref> Some antirealists claim that scientific theories aim at being accurate only about observable objects and argue that their success is primarily judged by that criterion.<ref name="vanFraassen1980">
{{cite book
 | last = van Fraassen
 | first = Bas
 | author-link = Bas van Fraassen
 | title = The Scientific Image
 | year = 1980
 | publisher = The Clarendon Press
 | location = Oxford
 | isbn = 978-0-19-824424-0 }}</ref>

==== Real patterns ====
The notion of [[real patterns]] has been propounded, notably by philosopher [[Daniel Dennett|Daniel C. Dennett]], as an intermediate position between strong realism and [[eliminative materialism]].{{technical inline|please define|date=May 2025}} This concept delves into the investigation of patterns observed in scientific phenomena to ascertain whether they signify underlying truths or are mere constructs of human interpretation. Dennett provides a unique ontological account concerning real patterns, examining the extent to which these recognized patterns have predictive utility and allow for efficient compression of information.<ref>Dennett, D. (1991). Real Patterns. The Journal of Philosophy.</ref>

The discourse on real patterns extends beyond philosophical circles, finding relevance in various scientific domains. For example, in biology, inquiries into real patterns seek to elucidate the nature of biological explanations, exploring how recognized patterns contribute to a comprehensive understanding of biological phenomena.<ref>Burnston, D. C. (2017). Real Patterns in Biological Explanation. Philosophy of Science.</ref> Similarly, in chemistry, debates around the reality of chemical bonds as real patterns continue.<ref>Seifert, V. A. (2022). The Chemical Bond is a Real Pattern. Philosophy of Science.</ref>

Evaluation of real patterns also holds significance in broader scientific inquiries. Researchers, like Tyler Millhouse, propose criteria for evaluating the realness of a pattern, particularly in the context of universal patterns and the human propensity to perceive patterns, even where there might be none.<ref>Millhouse, T. (2020). Really real patterns. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.</ref> This evaluation is pivotal in advancing research in diverse fields, from climate change to machine learning, where recognition and validation of real patterns in scientific models play a crucial role.<ref>Santa Fe Institute. (2022). Real patterns in science & cognition. https://www.santafe.edu/news-center/news/real-patterns-science-cognition</ref>

===Values and science===
Values intersect with science in different ways. There are epistemic values that mainly guide the scientific research. The scientific enterprise is embedded in particular culture and values through individual practitioners. Values emerge from science, both as product and process and can be distributed among several cultures in the society. When it comes to the justification of science in the sense of general public participation by single practitioners, science plays the role of a mediator between evaluating the standards and policies of society and its participating individuals, wherefore science indeed falls victim to vandalism and sabotage adapting the means to the end.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Rosenstock|first1=Linda|last2=Lee|first2=Lore Jackson|date=January 2002|title=Attacks on Science: The Risks to Evidence-Based Policy|journal=American Journal of Public Health|volume=92|issue=1|pages=14–18|doi=10.2105/ajph.92.1.14|issn=0090-0036|pmc=1447376|pmid=11772749}}</ref>

[[File:Thomas-kuhn-portrait.png|thumb|upright|Thomas Kuhn is credited with coining the term "[[paradigm shift]]" to describe the creation and evolution of scientific theories.]]
If it is unclear what counts as science, how the process of confirming theories works, and what the purpose of science is, there is considerable scope for values and other social influences to shape science. Indeed, [[Value (personal and cultural)|values]] can play a role ranging from determining which research gets funded to influencing which theories achieve scientific consensus.<ref name="StanSocial">{{cite web|url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-knowledge-social/|title = The Social Dimensions of Scientific Knowledge|access-date = 2014-03-06|last1 = Longino|first1 = Helen|year = 2013|website = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20140326140904/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-knowledge-social/|archive-date = 2014-03-26|url-status = live}}</ref> For example, in the 19th century, cultural values held by scientists about race shaped research on [[evolution]], and values concerning [[social class]] influenced debates on [[phrenology]] (considered scientific at the time).<ref>Douglas Allchin, "Values in Science and in Science Education," in International Handbook of Science Education, B.J. Fraser and K.G. Tobin (eds.), 2:1083–1092, Kluwer Academic Publishers (1988).</ref> [[Feminist epistemology|Feminist philosophers of science]], sociologists of science, and others explore how social values affect science.

==History==
{{See also|History of scientific method|History of science|History of philosophy}}

===Pre-modern===
The origins of philosophy of science trace back to [[Plato]] and [[Aristotle]],<ref>
[[Aristotle]], "[[Prior Analytics]]", Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in ''Aristotle, Volume&nbsp;1'', [[Loeb Classical Library]], William Heinemann, London, 1938.
</ref> who distinguished the forms of approximate and exact reasoning, set out the threefold scheme of [[abductive reasoning|abductive]], [[deductive reasoning|deductive]], and [[inductive reasoning|inductive]] inference, and also analyzed reasoning by [[analogy]]. The eleventh century Arab polymath [[Ibn al-Haytham]] (known in Latin as [[Alhazen]]) conducted his research in optics by way of controlled experimental testing and applied [[geometry]], especially in his investigations into the images resulting from the [[Catoptrics|reflection]] and [[Dioptrics|refraction]] of light. [[Roger Bacon]] (1214–1294), an English thinker and experimenter heavily influenced by al-Haytham, is recognized by many to be the father of modern scientific method.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Lindberg|first1=David C.|title=Science in the Middle Ages|date=1980|publisher=University of Chicago Press|isbn=978-0-226-48233-0|pages=350–351|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=lOCriv4rSCUC&q=alhazen+philosophy+of+science&pg=PA351}}</ref> His view that mathematics was essential to a correct understanding of natural philosophy is considered to have been 400 years ahead of its time.<ref name="First Scientist, Clegg">{{cite book|last = Clegg|first= Brian|title=The First Scientist: A Life of Roger Bacon|publisher= Da Capo Press|date=2004|page= 2|isbn = 978-0786713585}}</ref>

===Modern===
[[File:Francis Bacon statue, Gray's Inn.jpg|thumb|Francis Bacon's statue at [[Gray's Inn]], South Square, London|350x350px]]
[[File:Hierarchy of the Sciences - diagram.svg|thumb|left|Theory of Science by Auguste Comte]]
[[Francis Bacon]] (no direct relation to [[Roger Bacon]], who lived 300 years earlier) was a seminal figure in philosophy of science at the time of the [[Scientific revolution|Scientific Revolution]]. In his work ''[[Novum Organum]]'' (1620){{mdash}}an allusion to Aristotle's ''[[Organon]]''{{mdash}}Bacon outlined a new [[system of logic]] to improve upon the old philosophical process of [[syllogism]]. Bacon's method relied on experimental ''histories'' to eliminate alternative theories.<ref>[[Francis Bacon (philosopher)|Bacon, Francis]] ''[[Novum Organum]] (The New Organon)'', 1620. Bacon's work described many of the accepted principles, underscoring the importance of empirical results, data gathering and experiment.  ''Encyclopædia Britannica'' (1911), "[[s:1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/Bacon, Francis|Bacon, Francis]]" states: [In Novum Organum, we ] "proceed to apply what is perhaps the most valuable part of the Baconian method, the process of exclusion or rejection. This elimination of the non-essential,&nbsp;..., is the most important of Bacon's contributions to the logic of induction, and that in which, as he repeatedly says, his method differs from all previous philosophies."</ref> In 1637, [[René Descartes]] established a new framework for grounding scientific knowledge in his treatise, ''[[Discourse on Method]]'', advocating the central role of [[rationalism|reason]] as opposed to sensory experience. By contrast, in 1713, the 2nd edition of [[Isaac Newton]]'s ''[[Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica]]'' argued that "...&nbsp;hypotheses&nbsp;... have no place in experimental philosophy. In this philosophy[,] propositions are deduced from the phenomena and rendered general by induction."<ref name="www.paricenter.com mullin02">{{cite web |url= http://www.paricenter.com/library/papers/mullin02.php |title= The Impact of Newton's Principia on the Philosophy of Science |last1= McMullin |first1= Ernan |website= paricenter.com |publisher= Pari Center for New Learning |access-date= 29 October 2015 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20151024002127/http://www.paricenter.com/library/papers/mullin02.php |archive-date= 24 October 2015 |url-status= dead }}</ref> This passage influenced a "later generation of philosophically-inclined readers to pronounce a ban on causal hypotheses in natural philosophy".<ref name="www.paricenter.com mullin02"/> In particular, later in the 18th century, [[David Hume]] would famously articulate [[skepticism]] about the ability of science to determine [[causality]] and gave a definitive formulation of the [[problem of induction]], though both theses would be contested by the end of the 18th century by Immanuel Kant in his [[Critique of Pure Reason]] and [[Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science]]. In 19th century [[Auguste Comte]] made a major contribution to the theory of science. The 19th century writings of [[John Stuart Mill]] are also considered important in the formation of current conceptions of the scientific method, as well as anticipating later accounts of scientific explanation.<ref name="mill"> {{cite web
|url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mill/#SciMet
|title=John Stuart Mill (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
|publisher=plato.stanford.edu
|access-date=2009-07-31
|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100106122801/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mill/#SciMet
|archive-date=2010-01-06
|url-status=live
}}</ref>

===Logical positivism===
{{Main|Logical positivism}}
[[Instrumentalism]]{{technical inline|date=May 2025}} became popular among physicists around the turn of the 20th century, after which logical positivism defined the field for several decades. Logical positivism accepts only testable statements as meaningful, rejects metaphysical interpretations, and embraces [[verificationism]] (a set of [[epistemology|theories of knowledge]] that combines [[logicism]], [[empiricism]], and [[linguistics]] to ground philosophy on a basis consistent with examples from the [[empirical sciences]]). Seeking to overhaul all of philosophy and convert it to a new ''scientific philosophy'',<ref name=Friedman-pxiv>Michael Friedman, ''Reconsidering Logical Positivism'' (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), [https://books.google.com/books?id=e9TjZc9wNUAC&pg=PR14 p. xiv] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160628112455/https://books.google.com/books?id=e9TjZc9wNUAC&pg=PR14 |date=2016-06-28 }}.</ref> the [[Berlin Circle (philosophy)|Berlin Circle]] and the [[Vienna Circle]] propounded logical positivism in the late 1920s.

Interpreting [[Ludwig Wittgenstein]]'s early [[Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus|philosophy of language]], logical positivists identified a verifiability principle or criterion of cognitive meaningfulness. From [[Bertrand Russell]]'s logicism they sought reduction of mathematics to logic. They also embraced Russell's [[logical atomism]], [[Ernst Mach]]'s [[phenomenalism]]—whereby the mind knows only actual or potential sensory experience, which is the content of all sciences, whether physics or psychology—and [[Percy Bridgman]]'s [[operationalism]]. Thereby, only the ''verifiable'' was scientific and ''cognitively meaningful'', whereas the unverifiable was unscientific, cognitively meaningless "pseudostatements"—metaphysical, emotive, or such—not worthy of further review by philosophers, who were newly tasked to organize knowledge rather than develop new knowledge.{{cn|date=March 2025}}

Logical positivism is commonly portrayed as taking the extreme position that scientific language should never refer to anything unobservable—even the seemingly core notions of causality, mechanism, and principles—but that is an exaggeration. Talk of such unobservables could be allowed as metaphorical—direct observations viewed in the abstract—or at worst metaphysical or emotional. ''Theoretical laws'' would be reduced to ''empirical laws'', while ''theoretical terms'' would garner meaning from ''observational terms'' via ''correspondence rules''. Mathematics in physics would reduce to [[symbolic logic]] via logicism, while [[rational reconstruction]] would convert [[natural language|ordinary language]] into standardized equivalents, all networked and united by a [[logical syntax]]. A scientific theory would be stated with its method of verification, whereby a [[logical calculus]] or [[operationalism|empirical operation]] could verify its falsity or truth.{{cn|date=March 2025}}

In the late 1930s, logical positivists fled Germany and Austria for Britain and America. By then, many had replaced Mach's phenomenalism with [[Otto Neurath]]'s [[physicalism]], and [[Rudolf Carnap]] had sought to replace ''verification'' with simply ''confirmation''. With [[World War II]]'s close in 1945, logical positivism became milder, ''logical empiricism'', led largely by [[Carl Gustav Hempel|Carl Hempel]], in America, who expounded the [[covering law model]] of scientific explanation as a way of identifying the logical form of explanations without any reference to the suspect notion of "causation". The logical positivist movement became a major underpinning of [[analytic philosophy]],<ref name="autogenerated1">See [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vienna-circle "Vienna Circle"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150810041731/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vienna-circle |date=2015-08-10 }} in ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''.</ref> and dominated [[Anglosphere]] philosophy, including philosophy of science, while influencing sciences, into the 1960s. Yet the movement failed to resolve its central problems,<ref name="Smith1986">{{cite book |first=L.D. |last=Smith |year=1986 |title=Behaviorism and Logical Positivism: A Reassessment of the Alliance |publisher=Stanford University Press |isbn=978-0-8047-1301-6 |lccn=85030366 |url=https://archive.org/details/behaviorismlogic0000smit |url-access=registration |page=[https://archive.org/details/behaviorismlogic0000smit/page/314 314] |quote=The secondary and historical literature on logical positivism affords substantial grounds for concluding that logical positivism failed to solve many of the central problems it generated for itself. Prominent among the unsolved problems was the failure to find an acceptable statement of the verifiability (later confirmability) criterion of meaningfulness. Until a competing tradition emerged (about the late 1950s), the problems of logical positivism continued to be attacked from within that tradition. But as the new tradition in the philosophy of science began to demonstrate its effectiveness—by dissolving and rephrasing old problems as well as by generating new ones—philosophers began to shift allegiances to the new tradition, even though that tradition has yet to receive a canonical formulation. |access-date=2016-01-27 }}</ref><ref name="Bunge1996">{{cite book |first=M.A. |last=Bunge |year=1996 |title=Finding Philosophy in Social Science |publisher=Yale University Press |isbn=978-0-300-06606-7 |lccn=lc96004399 |url=https://archive.org/details/findingphilosoph0000bung |url-access=registration |page=[https://archive.org/details/findingphilosoph0000bung/page/317 317] |quote=To conclude, logical positivism was progressive compared with the classical positivism of [[Ptolemy]], [[David Hume|Hume]], [[Jean le Rond d'Alembert|d'Alembert]], [[Auguste Comte|Comte]], [[John Stuart Mill]], and [[Ernst Mach]]. It was even more so by comparison with its contemporary rivals—[[neo-Thomism]], [[neo-Kantianism]], [[intuitionism]], dialectical materialism, phenomenology, and [[existentialism]]. However, neo-positivism failed dismally to give a faithful account of science, whether natural or social. It failed because it remained anchored to sense-data and to a phenomenalist metaphysics, overrated the power of induction and underrated that of hypothesis, and denounced realism and materialism as metaphysical nonsense. Although it has never been practiced consistently in the advanced natural sciences and has been criticized by many philosophers, notably Popper (1959 [1935], 1963), logical positivism remains the tacit philosophy of many scientists. Regrettably, the anti-positivism fashionable in the metatheory of social science is often nothing but an excuse for sloppiness and wild speculation. |access-date=2016-01-27 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.drury.edu/ess/philsci/popper.html |title=Popper, Falsifiability, and the Failure of Positivism |date=7 August 2000 |access-date=7 January 2014 |quote=The upshot is that the positivists seem caught between insisting on the V.C. [Verifiability Criterion]—but for no defensible reason—or admitting that the V.C. requires a background language, etc., which opens the door to relativism, etc. In light of this dilemma, many folk—especially following Popper's "last-ditch" effort to "save" empiricism/positivism/realism with the falsifiability criterion—have agreed that positivism is a dead-end. |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140107230818/http://www.drury.edu/ess/philsci/popper.html |archive-date=January 7, 2014 }}</ref> and its doctrines were increasingly assaulted. Nevertheless, it brought about the establishment of philosophy of science as a distinct subdiscipline of philosophy, with Carl Hempel playing a key role.<ref name=Friedman-pxii>Friedman, ''Reconsidering Logical Positivism'' (Cambridge U P, 1999), [https://books.google.com/books?id=e9TjZc9wNUAC&pg=PR12 p. xii] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160628220109/https://books.google.com/books?id=e9TjZc9wNUAC&pg=PR12 |date=2016-06-28 }}.</ref>

[[File:Epicycle and deferent.svg|thumb|For [[Thomas Kuhn|Kuhn]], the addition of [[Deferent and epicycle|epicycles]] in Ptolemaic astronomy was "normal science" within a paradigm, whereas the [[Copernican Revolution]] was a paradigm shift.|261x261px]]

===Thomas Kuhn===
{{Main|The Structure of Scientific Revolutions}}

In the 1962 book ''[[The Structure of Scientific Revolutions]]'', [[Thomas Kuhn]] argued that the process of observation and evaluation takes place within a "paradigm", which he describes as "universally recognized achievements that for a time provide model problems and solutions to community of practitioners."<ref>{{cite book|
last=Kuhn|first=Thomas|title=[[The Structure of Scientific Revolutions]]|year=1972|edition = 2nd| publisher=The University of Chicago|isbn=0-226-45803-2}}, p. viii</ref> A paradigm implicitly identifies the objects and relations under study and suggests what experiments, observations or theoretical improvements need to be carried out to produce a useful result.<ref>Kuhn clarified that these are two related senses of "paradigm": (1) "the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques" and (2) "the set of puzzle-examples which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis" and are used to illustrate the field for beginners. {{harvnb|Kuhn|1972|p=175}}</ref> He characterized [[normal science]] as the process of observation and "puzzle solving" which takes place within a paradigm, whereas [[revolutionary science]] occurs when one paradigm overtakes another in a [[paradigm shift]].<ref>{{cite journal
|url = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/thomas-kuhn/
|title = Thomas Kuhn
|access-date = 2015-10-26
|last = Bird
|first = Alexander
|year = 2013
|website = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
|editor1-last = Zalta
|editor1-first = Edward N.
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20170713100633/https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/thomas-kuhn/
|archive-date = 2017-07-13
|url-status = live
}}</ref>

Kurn was a historian of science, and his ideas were inspired by the study of older paradigms that have been discarded, such as [[Aristotelian mechanics]] or [[aether theory]]. These had often been portrayed by historians as using "unscientific" methods or beliefs. But careful examination showed that they were no less "scientific" than modern paradigms. Both were based on valid evidence, both failed to answer every possible question.{{sfn|Kuhn|1972|p=1-7}} 

A paradigm shift occurred when a significant number of observational anomalies arose in the old paradigm and efforts to resolve them within the paradigm were unsuccessful. A new paradigm was available that handled the anomalies with less difficulty and yet still covered (most of) the previous results. Over a period of time, often as long as a generation, more practitioners began working within the new paradigm and eventually the old paradigm was abandoned.{{sfn|Kuhn|1972}} For Kuhn, acceptance or rejection of a paradigm is a social process as much as a logical process. 

Kuhn's position, however, is not one of [[relativism]]; he wrote "terms like 'subjective' and 'intuitive' cannot be applied to [paradigms]."{{sfn|Kuhn|1972|p=175}} Paradigms are grounded in objective, observable evidence, but our use of them is psychological and our acceptance of them is social.

==Current approaches==
===Naturalism's axiomatic assumptions===
{{transcluded section|source=Naturalism (philosophy)#Providing assumptions required for science}}
{{trim|{{#section-h:Naturalism (philosophy)|Providing assumptions required for science}}}}

===Coherentism===
{{main|Coherentism}}
[[File:JeremiahHorrocks.jpg|thumb|[[Jeremiah Horrocks]] makes the first observation of the transit of Venus in 1639, as imagined by the artist [[William Richard Lavender|W.&nbsp;R.&nbsp;Lavender]] in 1903.]]

In contrast to the view that science rests on foundational assumptions, coherentism asserts that statements are justified by being a part of a coherent system. Or, rather, individual statements cannot be validated on their own: only coherent systems can be justified.<ref>{{cite journal|url = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/justep-coherence/|title = Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification|access-date = 2015-10-26|last = Olsson|first = Erik|year = 2014|website = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor1-last = Zalta|editor1-first = Edward N.|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20180914115858/https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/justep-coherence/|archive-date = 2018-09-14|url-status = live}}</ref> A prediction of a [[transit of Venus]] is justified by its being coherent with broader beliefs about celestial mechanics and earlier observations. As explained above, observation is a cognitive act. That is, it relies on a pre-existing understanding, a systematic set of beliefs. An observation of a transit of Venus requires a huge range of auxiliary beliefs, such as those that describe the [[optics]] of telescopes, the [[mechanics]] of the telescope mount, and an understanding of [[celestial mechanics]]. If the prediction fails and a transit is not observed, that is likely to occasion an adjustment in the system, a change in some auxiliary assumption, rather than a rejection of the theoretical system.{{citation needed|date=December 2017}}

According to the [[Duhem–Quine thesis]], after [[Pierre Duhem]] and [[Willard Van Orman Quine|W.V. Quine]], it is impossible to test a theory in isolation.<ref name="Harding1976">{{cite book|author=Sandra Harding|title=Can theories be refuted?: essays on the Dunhem–Quine thesis|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Uwit8JTcLfAC&pg=PR9|year=1976|publisher=Springer Science & Business Media|isbn=978-90-277-0630-0|pages=9–|access-date=2016-01-27|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160628144135/https://books.google.com/books?id=Uwit8JTcLfAC&pg=PR9|archive-date=2016-06-28|url-status=live}}</ref> One must always add auxiliary hypotheses in order to make testable predictions. For example, to test [[Newton's law of universal gravitation|Newton's Law of Gravitation]] in the solar system, one needs information about the masses and positions of the Sun and all the planets. Famously, the failure to predict the orbit of [[Uranus]] in the 19th century led not to the rejection of Newton's Law but rather to the rejection of the hypothesis that the [[Solar System]] comprises only seven planets. The investigations that followed led to the discovery of an eighth planet, [[Neptune]]. If a test fails, something is wrong. But there is a problem in figuring out what that something is: a missing planet, badly calibrated test equipment, an unsuspected curvature of space, or something else.{{citation needed|date=January 2018}}

One consequence of the Duhem–Quine thesis is that one can make any theory compatible with any empirical observation by the addition of a sufficient number of suitable ''ad hoc'' hypotheses. [[Karl Popper]] accepted this thesis, leading him to reject [[Falsifiability#Naive falsificationism|naïve falsification]]. Instead, he favored a "survival of the fittest" view in which the most falsifiable scientific theories are to be preferred.<ref name="Popper 2005ch3-4">{{cite book| last1 = Popper| first1 = Karl| title = The Logic of Scientific Discovery| edition = Taylor & Francis e-Library| year = 2005| publisher = Routledge / Taylor & Francis e-Library| location = London and New York| isbn = 978-0-203-99462-7| at = chapters 3–4}}</ref>

===Anything goes methodology===

[[File:Paul Feyerabend Berkeley.jpg|thumb|right|[[Paul Karl Feyerabend]]]]

[[Paul Feyerabend]] (1924–1994) argued that no description of scientific method could possibly be broad enough to include all the approaches and methods used by scientists, and that there are no useful and exception-free [[methodology|methodological rules]] governing the progress of science. He argued that "the only principle that does not inhibit progress is: ''anything goes''".<ref name="contra">{{cite book |last=Feyerabend |first=Paul |author-link=Paul Feyerabend |date=1993 |orig-year=1974 |title=Against Method |edition=3rd |location=London; New York |publisher=[[Verso Books|Verso]] |isbn=086091481X |oclc=29026104 |url=https://archive.org/details/againstmethod0000feye |url-access=registration}}</ref>

Feyerabend said that science started as a liberating movement, but that over time it had become increasingly dogmatic and rigid and had some oppressive features, and thus had become increasingly an [[ideology]]. Because of this, he said it was impossible to come up with an unambiguous way to distinguish science from [[religion]], [[magic (paranormal)|magic]], or [[mythology]]. He saw the exclusive dominance of science as a means of directing society as [[authoritarian]] and ungrounded.<ref name="contra"/> Promulgation of this epistemological anarchism earned Feyerabend the title of "the worst enemy of science" from his detractors.<ref name="sep">
{{cite SEP |url-id=feyerabend  |title=Paul Feyerabend  |last=Preston   |first=John |date=2007-02-15}}
</ref>

===Sociology of scientific knowledge methodology===
{{Main|Sociology of scientific knowledge}}
According to Kuhn, science is an inherently communal activity which can only be done as part of a community.<ref name="KuhnPostParadigm">{{cite book | author = Kuhn, T.S.| chapter = [Postscript] | title = The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd. ed | publisher = [Univ. of Chicago Pr] | year = 1996 | isbn = 978-0-226-45808-3 | author-link = Thomas Samuel Kuhn|page = 176|quote = A paradigm is what the members of a community of scientists share, ''and'', conversely, a scientific community consists of men who share a paradigm.}}</ref> For him, the fundamental difference between science and other disciplines is the way in which the communities function. Others, especially Feyerabend and some post-modernist thinkers, have argued that there is insufficient difference between social practices in science and other disciplines to maintain this distinction. For them, social factors play an important and direct role in scientific method, but they do not serve to differentiate science from other disciplines. On this account, science is socially constructed, though this does not necessarily imply the more radical notion that reality itself is a [[Social constructionism|social construct]].

[[Michel Foucault]] sought to analyze and uncover how disciplines within the social sciences developed and adopted the methodologies used by their practitioners. In works like ''[[The Archaeology of Knowledge]]'', he used the term ''human sciences''. The human sciences do not comprise mainstream academic disciplines; they are rather an interdisciplinary space for the reflection on ''man'' who is the subject of more mainstream scientific knowledge, taken now as an object, sitting between these more conventional areas, and of course associating with disciplines such as [[anthropology]], [[psychology]], [[sociology]], and even [[history]].<ref>{{Cite encyclopedia | url=https://iep.utm.edu/foucault/#H3 | title=Foucault, Michel |encyclopedia=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=29 August 2022}}</ref> Rejecting the [[scientific realism|realist]] view of scientific inquiry, Foucault argued throughout his work that scientific discourse is not simply an objective study of phenomena, as both [[natural science|natural]] and [[social science|social scientist]]s like to believe, but is rather the product of systems of power relations struggling to construct scientific disciplines and knowledge within given societies.<ref>{{Cite magazine | url=https://philosophynow.org/issues/127/Foucaults_Elephant | title=Foucault's Elephant |issue=127 |magazine=Philosophy Now |last=Morrison |first=Thomas |date=2018 |access-date=29 August 2022}}</ref> With the advances of scientific disciplines, such as psychology and anthropology, the need to separate, categorize, normalize and institutionalize populations into constructed social identities became a staple of the sciences. Constructions of what were considered "normal" and "abnormal" stigmatized and ostracized groups of people, like the mentally ill and sexual and gender minorities.<ref>{{cite journal |url=http://www.worldscientificnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/WSN-7-2015-15-29.pdf |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221009/http://www.worldscientificnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/WSN-7-2015-15-29.pdf |archive-date=2022-10-09 |url-status=live |title='Disciplining' Truth and Science: Michel Foucault and the Power of Social Science |last=Power |first=Jason L. |journal=World Scientific News |date=2015 |volume=7 |pages=15–29 |issn=2392-2192}} </ref>

However, some (such as Quine) do maintain that scientific reality is a social construct:
<blockquote>
Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries not by definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer&nbsp;... For my part I do, qua lay physicist, believe in physical objects and not in Homer's gods; and I consider it a scientific error to believe otherwise. But in point of epistemological footing, the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conceptions only as ''cultural posits''.<ref>{{cite book | author = Quine, Willard Van Orman| chapter = Two Dogmas of Empiricism | title = From a Logical Point of View | publisher = [[Harvard University Press]] | year = 1980 | isbn = 978-0-674-32351-3 | chapter-url = http://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html}}</ref></blockquote>
The public backlash of scientists against such views, particularly in the 1990s, became known as the [[science wars]].<ref>{{cite book|editor1-last= Ashman|editor1-first= Keith M.|editor2-last= Barringer|editor2-first= Philip S.|title= After the Science Wars|date= 2001|publisher= Routledge|location= London|isbn= 978-0-415-21209-0|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=XImEAgAAQBAJ&q=After+the+science+wars&pg=PR1|access-date= 29 October 2015|quote= The 'war' is between scientists who believe that science and its methods are objective, and an increasing number of social scientists, historians, philosophers, and others gathered under the umbrella of Science Studies.}}</ref>

A major development in recent decades has been the study of the formation, structure, and evolution of scientific communities by sociologists and anthropologists – including [[David Bloor]], [[Harry Collins]], [[Bruno Latour]], [[Ian Hacking]] and [[Anselm Strauss]]. Concepts and methods (such as rational choice, social choice or game theory) from [[Economics of scientific knowledge|economics have also been applied]]{{by whom|date=October 2017}} for understanding the efficiency of scientific communities in the production of knowledge. This interdisciplinary field has come to be known as [[science and technology studies]].<ref>
Woodhouse, Edward. Science Technology and Society. Spring 2015 ed. n.p.: U Readers, 2014. Print.
</ref>
Here the approach to the philosophy of science is to study how scientific communities actually operate.

===Continental philosophy===
Philosophers in the [[continental philosophy|continental philosophical tradition]] are not traditionally categorized{{by whom|date=March 2019}} as philosophers of science. However, they have much to say about science, some of which has anticipated themes in the analytical tradition. For example, in [[On the Genealogy of Morality|''The Genealogy of Morals'']] (1887) [[Friedrich Nietzsche]] advanced the thesis that the motive for the search for truth in sciences is a kind of ascetic ideal.<ref>{{cite journal|last= Hatab|first= Lawrence J.|title= How Does the Ascetic Ideal Function in Nietzsche's ''Genealogy''?|journal= The Journal of Nietzsche Studies|volume= 35|date= 2008|issue= 35/36|pages= 106–123|doi= 10.2307/jnietstud.35.2008.0106|s2cid= 170630145|url= https://scholarlypublishingcollective.org/psup/nietzsche-studies/article-pdf/35-36/1/106/1334121/jnietstud_35_2008_106.pdf|access-date= 2019-10-22|doi-access= free}}</ref>

In general, continental philosophy views science from a [[World history (field)|world-historical]] perspective. Philosophers such as [[Pierre Duhem]] (1861–1916) and [[Gaston Bachelard]] (1884–1962) wrote their works with this world-historical approach to science, predating Kuhn's 1962 work by a generation or more. All of these approaches involve a historical and sociological turn to science, with a priority on lived experience (a kind of Husserlian [[Lifeworld|"life-world"]]), rather than a progress-based or anti-historical approach as emphasised in the analytic tradition. One can trace this continental strand of thought through the [[Phenomenology (philosophy)|phenomenology]] of [[Edmund Husserl]] (1859–1938), the late works of [[Maurice Merleau-Ponty|Merleau-Ponty]] (''Nature: Course Notes from the Collège de France'', 1956–1960), and the [[hermeneutics]] of [[Martin Heidegger]] (1889–1976).<ref name="Gutting">Gutting, Gary (2004), ''Continental Philosophy of Science'', Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge, MA.</ref>

The largest effect on the continental tradition with respect to science came from Martin Heidegger's critique of the [[present-at-hand|theoretical attitude]] in general, which of course includes the scientific attitude.<ref name="Wheeler2015">{{cite web |url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heidegger/ |title = Martin Heidegger |access-date = 2015-10-29 |last = Wheeler |first = Michael |year = 2015 |website = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20151016055622/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heidegger/ |archive-date = 2015-10-16 |url-status = live }}</ref> For this reason, the continental tradition has remained much more skeptical of the importance of science in [[human life (disambiguation)|human life]] and in philosophical inquiry. Nonetheless, there have been a number of important works: especially those of a Kuhnian precursor, [[Alexandre Koyré]] (1892–1964). Another important development was that of [[Michel Foucault]]'s analysis of historical and scientific thought in ''[[The Order of Things]]'' (1966) and his study of power and corruption within the "science" of [[Insanity|madness]].<ref>{{cite book
 | last1 = Foucault
 | first1 = Michel
 | author-link1 = Michel Foucault
 | year = 1961
 | translator1-last = Murphy
 | translator1-first = Jonathan
 | translator2-last = Khalfa
 | translator2-first = Jean
 | editor1-last = Khalfa
 | editor1-first = Jean
 | title = History of Madness
 | trans-title = Folie et Déraison: Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique
 | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=OT-VBQAAQBAJ
 | location = London
 | publisher = Routledge
 | publication-date = 2013
 | isbn = 9781134473809
 | access-date = 3 Mar 2019
 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20190715083016/https://books.google.com/books?id=OT-VBQAAQBAJ
 | archive-date = 15 July 2019
 | url-status = live
 }}</ref> Post-Heideggerian authors contributing to continental philosophy of science in the second half of the 20th century include [[Jürgen Habermas]] (e.g., ''Truth and Justification'', 1998), [[Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker]] (''The Unity of Nature'', 1980; {{langx |de| Die Einheit der Natur}} (1971)), and [[Wolfgang Stegmüller]] (''Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und Analytischen Philosophie'', 1973–1986).
{{clear}}

==Other topics==
===Reductionism===

[[Analysis]] involves breaking an observation or theory down into simpler concepts in order to understand it. [[Reductionism]] can refer to one of several philosophical positions related to this approach. One type of reductionism suggests that phenomena are amenable to scientific explanation at lower levels of analysis and inquiry. Perhaps a historical event might be explained in sociological and psychological terms, which in turn might be described in terms of human physiology, which in turn might be described in terms of chemistry and physics.<ref name="StanUnity">{{cite web |url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-unity/ |title = The Unity of Science |access-date = 2014-03-01 |last1 = Cat |first1 = Jordi |year = 2013 |website = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20140407014121/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-unity/ |archive-date = 2014-04-07 |url-status = live}}</ref> [[Daniel Dennett]] distinguishes legitimate reductionism from what he calls ''[[greedy reductionism]],'' which denies real complexities and leaps too quickly to sweeping generalizations.<ref>{{cite book|last1= Levine|first1= George|title= Darwin Loves You: Natural Selection and the Re-enchantment of the World|date= 2008|publisher= Princeton University Press|isbn= 978-0-691-13639-4|page= 104|url= https://books.google.com/books?id=koy-zqecyewC&q=dennett+%22greedy+reductionism%22+%22bad+science%22&pg=PA104|access-date= 28 October 2015}}</ref>

===Social accountability===
{{See also|The Mismeasure of Man}}
A broad issue affecting the neutrality of science concerns the areas which science chooses to explore{{mdash}}that is, what part of the world and of humankind are studied by science. [[Philip Kitcher]] in his ''Science, Truth, and Democracy''<ref>
{{cite book
 | last = Kitcher
 | first = Philip
 | author-link = Philip Kitcher
 | title = Science, Truth, and Democracy
 | url = https://books.google.com/books?id=frrhdqnMNzsC
 | series = Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Science
 | location = New York
 | publisher = Oxford University Press
 | date = 2001
 | isbn = 9780198033356
 | access-date = 26 September 2020
}}
</ref>
argues that scientific studies that attempt to show one segment of the population as being less intelligent, less successful, or emotionally backward compared to others have a political feedback effect which further excludes such groups from access to science. Thus such studies undermine the broad consensus required for good science by excluding certain people, and so proving themselves in the end to be unscientific.

==Philosophy of particular sciences==
{{blockquote|There is no such thing as philosophy-free science; there is only science whose philosophical baggage is taken on board without examination.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Dennett|first1=Daniel|title=Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life|date=1995|publisher=Simon and Schuster|isbn=978-1-4391-2629-5|page=21|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Y77BAwAAQBAJ&q=%22there+is+only+science+whose+philosophical+baggage+is+taken+on+board%22&pg=PA21}}</ref>|Daniel Dennett|''[[Darwin's Dangerous Idea]]'', 1995}}
In addition to addressing the general questions regarding science and induction, many philosophers of science are occupied by investigating foundational problems in particular sciences. They also examine the implications of particular sciences for broader philosophical questions. The late 20th and early 21st century has seen a rise in the number of practitioners of philosophy of a particular science.<ref name="StanPhilNeuro">{{cite web|url = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/neuroscience/|title = The Philosophy of Neuroscience|last1 = Bickle|first1 = John|last2 = Mandik|first2 = Peter|last3 = Landreth|first3 = Anthony|year = 2010|website = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|postscript = (Summer 2010 Edition)|editor1-last = Zalta|editor1-first = Edward N.|access-date = 2015-12-28|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20131202064113/http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/neuroscience/|archive-date = 2013-12-02|url-status = live}}</ref>

===Philosophy of statistics===
{{Main|Philosophy of statistics}}
The problem of induction discussed above is seen in another form in debates over the [[foundations of statistics]].<ref>{{cite journal
|url = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/statistics/
|title = Philosophy of Statistics
|access-date = 2015-10-29
|last = Romeijn
|first = Jan-Willem
|year = 2014
|website = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
|editor1-last = Zalta
|editor1-first = Edward N.
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20180914115858/https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/statistics/
|archive-date = 2018-09-14
|url-status = live
}}</ref> The standard approach to [[statistical hypothesis testing]] avoids claims about whether evidence supports a hypothesis or makes it more probable. Instead, the typical test yields a [[p-value]], which is the probability of the ''evidence'' being such as it is, under the assumption that the [[null hypothesis]] is true. If the ''p''-value is too high, the hypothesis is rejected, in a way analogous to falsification. In contrast, [[Bayesian inference]] seeks to assign probabilities to hypotheses. Related topics in philosophy of statistics include [[probability interpretations]], [[overfitting]], and the difference between [[Correlation does not imply causation|correlation and causation]].

===Philosophy of mathematics===
{{Main|Philosophy of mathematics}}
Philosophy of mathematics is concerned with the philosophical foundations and implications of [[mathematics]].<ref>{{cite journal
|url = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/philosophy-mathematics/
|title = Philosophy of Mathematics
|access-date = 2015-10-29
|last = Horsten
|first = Leon
|year = 2015
|website = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
|editor1-last=Zalta
|editor1-first= Edward N.}}</ref> The central questions are whether [[number]]s, [[triangle]]s, and other mathematical entities exist independently of the human [[mind]] and what is the nature of mathematical [[proposition]]s. Is asking whether "1 + 1 = 2" is true fundamentally different from asking whether a ball is red? Was [[calculus]] invented or discovered? A related question is whether learning mathematics requires [[A priori and a posteriori|experience or reason alone]]. What does it mean to prove a mathematical [[theorem]] and how does one know whether a [[mathematical proof]] is correct? Philosophers of mathematics also aim to clarify the relationships between mathematics and [[logic]], human capabilities such as [[Intuition (psychology)|intuition]], and the [[material universe]].

===Philosophy of physics===
{{Main|Philosophy of physics}}
Philosophy of physics is the study of the fundamental, [[philosophy|philosophical]] questions underlying modern [[physics]], the study of [[matter]] and [[energy]] and how they interact. The main questions concern the nature of [[Philosophy of space and time|space and time]], [[atom]]s and [[atomism]]. Also included are the predictions of [[physical cosmology|cosmology]], the [[interpretation of quantum mechanics]], the foundations of [[statistical mechanics]], [[causality (physics)|causality]], [[determinism]], and the nature of [[physical law]]s.<ref>{{cite web
|url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm/
|title = Quantum Mechanics
|access-date = 2015-10-29
|last = Ismael
|first = Jenann
|year = 2015
|website = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
|editor1-last = Zalta
|editor1-first = Edward N.
|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20151106193537/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm/
|archive-date = 2015-11-06
|url-status = live
}}</ref> Classically, several of these questions were studied as part of [[metaphysics]] (for example, those about causality, determinism, and space and time).

===Philosophy of chemistry===
{{Main|Philosophy of chemistry}}
Philosophy of chemistry is the philosophical study of the [[methodology]] and content of the science of [[chemistry]]. It is explored by philosophers, chemists, and philosopher-chemist teams. It includes research on general philosophy of science issues as applied to chemistry. For example, can all chemical phenomena be explained by [[quantum mechanics]] or is it not possible to reduce chemistry to physics? For another example, chemists have discussed the philosophy of [[Philosophy of science#Confirmation of theories|how theories are confirmed]] in the context of confirming [[reaction mechanism]]s. Determining reaction mechanisms is difficult because they cannot be observed directly. Chemists can use a number of indirect measures as evidence to rule out certain mechanisms, but they are often unsure if the remaining mechanism is correct because there are many other possible mechanisms that they have not tested or even thought of.<ref name="WeisbergEtal2011">{{cite web|url = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chemistry/|title = Philosophy of Chemistry|access-date = 2014-02-14|last1 = Weisberg|first1 = Michael|last2 = Needham|first2 = Paul|last3 = Hendry|first3 = Robin|year = 2011|website = Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20140407013224/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chemistry/|archive-date = 2014-04-07|url-status = live}}</ref> Philosophers have also sought to clarify the meaning of chemical concepts which do not refer to specific physical entities, such as [[chemical bonds]].

===Philosophy of astronomy===
The philosophy of astronomy seeks to understand and analyze the methodologies and technologies used by experts in the discipline, focusing on how observations made about [[space]] and [[astrophysics|astrophysical phenomena]] can be studied. Given that astronomers rely and use theories and formulas from other scientific disciplines, such as chemistry and physics, the pursuit of understanding how knowledge can be obtained about the cosmos, as well as the relation in which Earth and the [[Solar System]] have within personal views of humanity's place in the universe, philosophical insights into how facts about space can be scientifically analyzed and configure with other established knowledge is a main point of inquiry.

===Philosophy of Earth sciences===
The philosophy of Earth science is concerned with how humans obtain and verify knowledge of the workings of the Earth system, including the [[atmosphere]], [[hydrosphere]], and [[geosphere]] (solid earth). Earth scientists' ways of knowing and habits of mind share important commonalities with other sciences, but also have distinctive attributes that emerge from the complex, heterogeneous, unique, long-lived, and non-manipulatable nature of the Earth system.

===Philosophy of biology===
{{Main|Philosophy of biology}}
[[File:P1160335 peter godfrey-smith reading.jpg|thumb|upright|right|Peter Godfrey-Smith was awarded the [[Lakatos Award]]<ref>{{Cite web | url=http://www2.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/LakatosAward/lakatosawardarchive/lakatosaward2010announcement.aspx | title=Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method | access-date=2018-07-03 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120802034342/http://www2.lse.ac.uk/philosophy/LakatosAward/lakatosawardarchive/lakatosaward2010announcement.aspx | archive-date=2012-08-02 | url-status=live }}</ref> for his 2009 book ''Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection'', which discusses the philosophical foundations of the theory of [[evolution]].<ref name="Gewertz2007">{{Cite journal|title=The philosophy of evolution: Godfrey-Smith takes an ingenious evolutionary approach to how the mind works|journal=Harvard University Gazette|url=http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2007/02.08/03-godfreysmith.html|date=February 8, 2007|first=Ken|last=Gewertz|access-date=July 3, 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081011132246/http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2007/02.08/03-godfreysmith.html|archive-date=October 11, 2008|url-status=dead}}.</ref><ref>Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection. Oxford University Press. 2010.</ref>]]
Philosophy of biology deals with [[epistemology|epistemological]], [[metaphysics|metaphysical]], and [[ethics|ethical]] issues in the [[Biology|biological]] and [[Medical research|biomedical]] sciences. Although philosophers of science and philosophers generally have long been interested in biology (e.g., [[Aristotle]], [[Descartes]], [[Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz|Leibniz]] and even [[Immanuel Kant|Kant]]), philosophy of biology only emerged as an independent field of philosophy in the 1960s and 1970s.<ref>Hull D. (1969), What philosophy of biology is not, Journal of the History of Biology, 2, pp.&nbsp;241–268.</ref> Philosophers of science began to pay increasing attention to developments in biology, from the rise of the [[Modern synthesis (20th century)|modern synthesis]] in the 1930s and 1940s to the discovery of the structure of [[deoxyribonucleic acid]] (DNA) in 1953 to more recent advances in [[genetic engineering]]. Other key ideas such as the [[Reduction (philosophy)|reduction]] of all life processes to [[biochemical]] reactions as well as the incorporation of [[psychology]] into a broader [[neuroscience]] are also addressed. Research in current philosophy of biology includes investigation of the foundations of evolutionary theory (such as [[Peter Godfrey-Smith]]'s work),<ref>Recent examples include Okasha S. (2006), ''Evolution and the Levels of Selection''. Oxford: Oxford University Press, and Godfrey-Smith P. (2009), ''Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection''. Oxford: Oxford University Press.</ref> and the role of viruses as persistent symbionts in host genomes. As a consequence, the evolution of genetic content order is seen as the result of competent genome editors {{explanation needed|date=June 2020}} in contrast to former narratives in which error replication events (mutations) dominated.

===Philosophy of medicine===
{{Main|Philosophy of medicine}}
[[File:Papyrus text; fragment of Hippocratic oath. Wellcome L0034090.jpg|thumb|upright|left|A fragment of the [[Hippocratic Oath]] from [[Oxyrhynchus Papyri|the third century]]]]
Beyond [[medical ethics]] and [[bioethics]], the philosophy of medicine is a branch of philosophy that includes the [[epistemology]] and [[ontology]]/[[metaphysics]] of medicine. Within the epistemology of medicine, [[evidence-based medicine]] (EBM) (or evidence-based practice (EBP)) has attracted attention, most notably the roles of randomisation,<ref name="Papineau 1994">{{cite journal | last1 = Papineau | first1 = D | year = 1994 | title = The Virtues of Randomization | journal = British Journal for the Philosophy of Science | volume = 45 | issue = 2| pages = 437–450 | doi=10.1093/bjps/45.2.437| s2cid = 123314067 }}</ref><ref name="Worrall 2002">{{cite journal | last1 = Worrall | first1 = J | year = 2002 | title = What Evidence in Evidence-Based Medicine? | journal = Philosophy of Science | volume = 69 | issue = 3| pages = S316–330 | jstor = 3081103 | doi = 10.1086/341855 | s2cid = 55078796 }}</ref><ref name="Worrall 2007">{{cite journal | last1 = Worrall | first1 = J. | year = 2007 | title = Why there's no cause to randomize | journal = British Journal for the Philosophy of Science | volume = 58 | issue = 3| pages = 451–488 | doi=10.1093/bjps/axm024| citeseerx = 10.1.1.120.7314 | s2cid = 16964968 }}</ref> [[Blind experiment|blinding]] and [[placebo]] controls. Related to these areas of investigation, ontologies of specific interest to the philosophy of medicine include [[Cartesian dualism]], the monogenetic conception of disease<ref name="Lee 2012">Lee, K., 2012. ''The Philosophical Foundations of Modern Medicine'', London/New York, Palgrave/Macmillan.</ref> and the conceptualization of 'placebos' and 'placebo effects'.<ref name="Grünbaum 1981">{{cite journal | last1 = Grünbaum | first1 = A | year = 1981 | title = The Placebo Concept | journal = Behaviour Research and Therapy | volume = 19 | issue = 2| pages = 157–167 | doi=10.1016/0005-7967(81)90040-1| pmid = 7271692 }}</ref><ref name="Gøtzsche 1994">{{cite journal | last1 = Gøtzsche | first1 = P.C. | s2cid = 33650340 | year = 1994 | title = Is there logic in the placebo? | doi = 10.1016/s0140-6736(94)92273-x | pmid = 7934350 | journal = Lancet | volume = 344 | issue = 8927| pages = 925–926 }}</ref><ref name="Nunn 2009">Nunn, R., 2009. It's time to put the placebo out of our misery" ''British Medical Journal'' 338, b1568.</ref><ref name="Turner 2012">{{cite journal | last1 = Turner | first1 = A | s2cid = 4488616 | year = 2012 | title = Placebos" and the logic of placebo comparison | journal = Biology & Philosophy | volume = 27 | issue = 3 | pages = 419–432 | doi = 10.1007/s10539-011-9289-8 | hdl = 1983/6426ce5a-ab57-419c-bc3c-e57d20608807 | url = https://research-information.bristol.ac.uk/en/publications/placebos-and-the-logic-of-placebo-comparison(6426ce5a-ab57-419c-bc3c-e57d20608807).html | access-date = 2018-12-29 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20181229075454/https://research-information.bristol.ac.uk/en/publications/placebos-and-the-logic-of-placebo-comparison(6426ce5a-ab57-419c-bc3c-e57d20608807).html | archive-date = 2018-12-29 | url-status = live | hdl-access = free }}</ref> There is also a growing interest in the metaphysics of medicine,<ref name="Worrall 2011">{{cite journal | last1 = Worrall | first1 = J | year = 2011 | title = Causality in medicine: getting back to the Hill top| journal = Preventive Medicine | volume = 53 | issue = 4–5| pages = 235–238 | doi=10.1016/j.ypmed.2011.08.009 | pmid=21888926}}</ref> particularly the idea of causation. Philosophers of medicine might not only be interested in how medical knowledge is generated, but also in the nature of such phenomena. Causation is of interest because the purpose of much medical research is to establish causal relationships, e.g. what causes disease, or what causes people to get better.<ref name="Cartwright 2009">{{cite journal | last1 = Cartwright | first1 = N | s2cid = 56203659 | year = 2009 | title = What are randomised controlled trials good for? | journal = Philosophical Studies | volume = 147 | issue = 1 | pages = 59–70 | doi = 10.1007/s11098-009-9450-2 | url = https://cloudfront.escholarship.org/dist/prd/content/qt42v4w8k1/qt42v4w8k1.pdf | access-date = 2019-09-01 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20180724112810/https://cloudfront.escholarship.org/dist/prd/content/qt42v4w8k1/qt42v4w8k1.pdf | archive-date = 2018-07-24 | url-status = live | doi-access = free }}</ref>

===Philosophy of psychiatry===
{{main|Philosophy of psychiatry}}
Philosophy of psychiatry explores philosophical questions relating to [[psychiatry]] and [[mental illness]]. The philosopher of science and medicine Dominic Murphy identifies three areas of exploration in the philosophy of psychiatry. The first concerns the examination of psychiatry as a science, using the tools of the philosophy of science more broadly. The second entails the examination of the concepts employed in discussion of mental illness, including the experience of mental illness, and the normative questions it raises. The third area concerns the links and discontinuities between the [[philosophy of mind]] and [[psychopathology]].<ref>Murphy, Dominic (Spring 2015). "[http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/psychiatry/ Philosophy of Psychiatry] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190318031208/https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/psychiatry/ |date=2019-03-18 }}". ''[[The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]'', edited by Edward N. Zalta. Accessed 18 August 2016.</ref>

===Philosophy of psychology===
{{Main|Philosophy of psychology}}
[[File:Wundt-research-group.jpg|thumb|[[Wilhelm Wundt]] (seated) with colleagues in his psychological laboratory, the first of its kind]]
Philosophy of psychology refers to issues at the theoretical foundations of modern [[psychology]]. Some of these issues are epistemological concerns about the methodology of psychological investigation. For example, is the best method for studying psychology to focus only on the response of [[behaviorism|behavior]] to external stimuli or should psychologists focus on [[mentalism (psychology)|mental perception and thought processes]]?<ref name="Routpsych">{{cite book|last1 = Mason|first1 = Kelby|first2 = Chandra Sekhar|last2 = Sripada|first3 = Stephen|last3 = Stich|title = Routledge Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophy|chapter = Philosophy of Psychology|chapter-url = http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~stich/Publications/Papers/PHILOSOPHYofPSYCHOLOGY.pdf|editor-last = Moral|editor-first = Dermot|publisher = Routledge|location = London|year = 2010|access-date = 2014-02-20|archive-date = 2017-05-17|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20170517012459/http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~stich/Publications/Papers/PHILOSOPHYofPSYCHOLOGY.pdf|url-status = dead}}</ref> If the latter, an important question is how the internal experiences of others can be measured. Self-reports of feelings and beliefs may not be reliable because, even in cases in which there is no apparent incentive for subjects to intentionally deceive in their answers, self-deception or selective memory may affect their responses. Then even in the case of accurate self-reports, how can responses be compared across individuals? Even if two individuals respond with the same answer on a [[Likert scale]], they may be experiencing very different things.

Other issues in philosophy of psychology are philosophical questions about the nature of mind, brain, and cognition, and are perhaps more commonly thought of as part of [[cognitive science]], or [[philosophy of mind]]. For example, are humans [[rationality|rational]] creatures?<ref name="Routpsych" /> Is there any sense in which they have [[free will]], and how does that relate to the experience of making choices? Philosophy of psychology also closely monitors contemporary work conducted in [[cognitive neuroscience]], [[psycholinguistics]], and [[artificial intelligence]], questioning what they can and cannot explain in psychology.

Philosophy of psychology is a relatively young field, because psychology only became a discipline of its own in the late 1800s. In particular, [[neurophilosophy]] has just recently become its own field with the works of [[Paul Churchland]] and [[Patricia Churchland]].<ref name=StanPhilNeuro/> Philosophy of mind, by contrast, has been a well-established discipline since before psychology was a field of study at all. It is concerned with questions about the very nature of mind, the qualities of experience, and particular issues like the debate between [[Mind-body dualism|dualism]] and [[monism]].

===Philosophy of social science===
{{Main|Philosophy of social science}}
The philosophy of social science is the study of the logic and method of the [[social sciences]], such as [[sociology]] and [[cultural anthropology]].<ref>{{cite book |first=Martin |last=Hollis |author-link=Martin Hollis (philosopher)|year=1994 |title=The Philosophy of Social Science: An Introduction|publisher=Cambridge|isbn=978-0-521-44780-5 }}</ref> Philosophers of social science are concerned with the differences and similarities between the social and the [[natural science]]s, causal relationships between social phenomena, the possible existence of social laws, and the [[ontology|ontological]] significance of [[structure and agency]].

The French philosopher, [[Auguste Comte]] (1798–1857), established the epistemological perspective of [[positivism]] in ''The Course in Positivist Philosophy'', a series of texts published between 1830 and 1842. The first three volumes of the ''Course'' dealt chiefly with the [[natural sciences]] already in existence ([[geoscience]], [[astronomy]], [[physics]], [[chemistry]], [[biology]]), whereas the latter two emphasised the inevitable coming of [[social science]]: "''[[sociology|sociologie]]''".<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/comte/ |title=Stanford Encyclopaedia: Auguste Comte |access-date=2010-01-10 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171011041841/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/comte/ |archive-date=2017-10-11 |url-status=live }}</ref> For Comte, the natural sciences had to necessarily arrive first, before humanity could adequately channel its efforts into the most challenging and complex "Queen science" of human society itself. Comte offers an evolutionary system proposing that society undergoes three phases in its quest for the truth according to a general '[[law of three stages]]'. These are (1) the ''theological'', (2) the ''metaphysical'', and (3) the ''positive''.<ref>{{cite book|last=Giddens|title=Positivism and Sociology|first = Anthony|publisher = Heinemann |date = 1974|isbn = 978-0435823405}}</ref>

Comte's positivism established the initial philosophical foundations for formal sociology and [[social research]]. [[Durkheim]], [[Marx]], and [[Max Weber|Weber]] are more typically cited as the fathers of contemporary social science. In [[psychology]], a positivistic approach has historically been favoured in [[behaviourism]]. Positivism has also been espoused by '[[Technocracy (bureaucratic)|technocrats]]' who believe in the inevitability of [[social progress]] through science and technology.<ref>Schunk, ''Learning Theories: An Educational Perspective'', 5th, 315</ref>

The positivist perspective has been associated with '[[scientism]]'; the view that the methods of the natural sciences may be applied to all areas of investigation, be it philosophical, social scientific, or otherwise. Among most social scientists and historians, orthodox positivism has long since lost popular support. Today, practitioners of both social and physical sciences instead take into account the distorting effect of observer [[bias]] and structural limitations. This scepticism has been facilitated by a general weakening of deductivist accounts of science by philosophers such as [[Thomas Kuhn]], and new philosophical movements such as [[critical realism (philosophy of the social sciences)|critical realism]] and [[neopragmatism]]. The philosopher-sociologist [[Jürgen Habermas]] has critiqued pure [[instrumental rationality]] as meaning that scientific-thinking becomes something akin to [[ideology]] itself.<ref>Outhwaite, William, 1988 ''Habermas: Key Contemporary Thinkers'', Polity Press (Second Edition 2009), {{ISBN|978-0-7456-4328-1}} p. 68</ref>

===Philosophy of technology===
{{Main|Philosophy of technology}}
The philosophy of technology is a sub-field of [[philosophy]] that studies the nature of [[technology]]. Specific research topics include study of the role of tacit and explicit knowledge in creating and using technology, the nature of functions in technological artifacts, the role of values in design, and ethics related to technology. Technology and engineering can both involve the application of scientific knowledge. The [[philosophy of engineering]] is an emerging sub-field of the broader philosophy of technology.

==See also==
{{Portal|Philosophy|Science}}
{{cols|colwidth=18em}}
* [[All models are wrong]]
* [[Criticism of science]]
* [[History and philosophy of science]]
* [[List of philosophers of science]]
* [[Logology (science)|Logology]]
* [[Metaphysical naturalism]]
* [[Metascience]]
* [[Objectivity (philosophy)]]
* [[Philosophy of engineering]]
* [[Science policy]]
{{colend}}

==References==
{{Reflist|24em}}

===Sources===
{{refbegin|30em}}
* {{cite journal
|first         = Christina S.
|last          = Chen
|title         = Atheism and the Assumptions of Science and Religion
|url           = http://lyceumphilosophy.com/?q=node/117
|archive-url   = https://web.archive.org/web/20130525055133/http://www.lyceumphilosophy.com/?q=node/117
|url-status    = usurped
|archive-date  = May 25, 2013
|journal       = Lyceum
| volume       = X
|issue         = 2
|year          = 2009
|editor1-first = Thomas
|editor1-last  = Larson
|pages         = 1–10
}}
* {{cite web
|title = The nature of reality and knowledge
|url   = http://lambda-diode.com/opinion/the-nature-of-reality-and-knowledge
|first = Antoine Berke
|last  = Durak
|date  = 6 June 2008
}}
* {{Cite book
 | last=Gauch
 | first=Hugh G.
 | year=2002
 | title=Scientific Method in Practice
 | publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]]
 }}
* {{cite journal
|last      = Gould
|first     = Stephen J
|title     = Is uniformitarianism necessary?|journal =American Journal of Science
|year=1965|volume=263|issue = 3
|url=https://ajsonline.org/article/61297|pages=223–228|doi=10.2475/ajs.263.3.223|bibcode = 1965AmJS..263..223G
}}
* {{cite book
|last      = Gould
|first     = Stephen J|year=1984|chapter= Toward the vindication of punctuational change in catastrophes and earth history|title=Catastrophes and Earth History|page= 9–34|publisher=Princeton University Press}}
* {{cite book
|last      = Gould
|first     = Stephen J
|title     = Time's Arrow, Time's Cycle: Myth and Metaphor in the Discovery of Geological Time
|publisher = Harvard University Press
|year      = 1987
|location  = Cambridge
|page      = [https://archive.org/details/timesarrowtimesc00step_0/page/120 120]
|isbn      = 978-0-674-89199-9
|url       = https://archive.org/details/timesarrowtimesc00step_0
|url-access = registration
|quote     = You first assume.
}}
* {{cite book| editor-last= Heilbron |editor-first= J.L. | author-link=J. L. Heilbron| year= 2003 |title= The Oxford Companion to the History of Modern Science |location= New York |publisher= Oxford University Press |isbn= 978-0-19-511229-0 }}
* {{cite book|last=Hooykaas|first= R|year= 1963|title= The principle of uniformity in geology, biology, and theology, 2nd impression|publisher=London: E.J. Brill}}
* {{cite book
|last         = Simpson
|first        = G.G.
|year         = 1963
|contribution = Historical science
|title        = Fabric of geology
|editor-first = C.C.
|editor-last  = Albritton, Jr.
|pages        = 24–48
|location     = Stanford, California
|publisher    = Freeman, Cooper, and Company
}}
* {{cite web
|url   = https://www.stillnessspeaks.com/images/uploaded/file/Sobottka.pdf
|first = Stanley
|last  = Sobottka
|title = Consciousness
|year  = 2005
|page  = 11
}}
* {{cite book
|first     = A.N.
|last      = Whitehead
|year      = 1997
|orig-year  = 1920
|title     = Science and the Modern World
|series    = Lowell Lectures
|location  = New York
|publisher = Free Press
|isbn      = 978-0-684-83639-3
|lccn      = 67002244
|url       = https://books.google.com/books?id=L6kZPLbCrScC&pg=PA135
|page      = 135
}}
{{refend}}

==Further reading==
{{refbegin|30em}}
* Bovens, L. and Hartmann, S. (2003), ''[[Bayesian Epistemology]]'', Oxford University Press, Oxford.
* Gutting, Gary (2004), ''Continental Philosophy of Science'', Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge, MA.
* Godfrey-Smith, Peter (2003), ''Theory and Reality: An Introduction the Philosophy of Science'', University of Chicago Press.
* {{cite book | author = Kuhn, T. S. | title = The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd. ed | publisher = Univ. of Chicago Press | year = 1970 | isbn = 978-0-226-45804-5 | author-link = Thomas Samuel Kuhn | url = https://archive.org/details/structureofscie000kuhn }}
* Losee, J. (1998), ''A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science'', Oxford University Press, Oxford.
* Papineau, David (2005) ''Problems of the Philosophy of Science''. Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Oxford.
* {{cite book | last1=Salmon | first1=Merrilee H. | last2=Science | first2=University of Pittsburgh. Department of the History and Philosophy of | title=Introduction to the Philosophy of Science | publisher=Prentice Hall | publication-place=Upper Saddle River, N.J | date=1992 | isbn=978-0-13-663345-7 | page=}}
* Popper, Karl, (1963) ''[[Conjectures and Refutations]]: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge'', {{ISBN|0-415-04318-2}}.
* {{cite book
 | last = van Fraassen
 | first = Bas
 | author-link = Bas van Fraassen
 | title = The Scientific Image
 | year = 1980
 | publisher = The Clarendon Press
 | location = Oxford
 | isbn = 978-0-19-824424-0 }}
* Ziman, John (2000). ''Real Science: what it is, and what it means''. Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press.
{{refend}}

==External links==
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* {{cite IEP |url-id=category/s-l-m/science/ |title=Philosophy of science}}

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