Editing Physicalism

{{Short description|Metaphysical thesis}}

In [[philosophy]], '''physicalism''' is the view that "everything is [[physics|physical]]", that there is "nothing over and above" the physical,<ref>See Smart, 1959</ref> or that everything [[supervenience|supervenes]] on the physical.<ref name="DStoljar" /> It is opposed to [[idealism]], according to which the world arises from mind. Physicalism is a form of ontological [[monism]]—a "one [[Substance theory|substance]]" view of the nature of [[reality]], unlike "two-substance" ([[mind–body dualism]]) or "many-substance" ([[Pluralism (philosophy)|pluralism]]) views. Both the definition of "physical" and the meaning of physicalism have been debated.

Physicalism is closely related to [[materialism]], and has evolved from materialism with advancements in the [[physical sciences]] in explaining observed phenomena. The terms "physicalism" and "materialism" are often used interchangeably, but can be distinguished on the basis that physics describes more than just matter. Physicalism encompasses [[matter]], but also [[energy]], [[physical laws]], [[space]], [[time]], [[structure]], physical processes, [[information]], state, and [[forces]], among other things, as described by physics and other sciences, all within a monistic framework.<ref name="auto1">{{Citation|last=Stoljar|first=Daniel|title=Physicalism|date=2022|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/physicalism/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|edition=Summer 2022|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|access-date=2022-09-20}}</ref>

According to a 2020 survey, physicalism holds a slight majority view among philosophers at 51.9%,<ref>{{Cite web | url=https://philpapers.org/archive/BOUPOP-3.pdf | page=7| title=Philosophers on philosophy: the 2020 philpapers survey}}</ref> while there also remains significant opposition to physicalism.

Outside of philosophy, physicalism can also refer to the preference or viewpoint that [[physics]] should be considered the best and only way to render truth about the world or reality.<ref name="auto1"/>

== Definition of physicalism in philosophy ==
The word "physicalism" was introduced into philosophy in the 1930s by [[Otto Neurath]] and [[Rudolf Carnap]].<ref>{{cite book|chapter-url = https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/|title = Physicalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)|chapter = Physicalism|year = 2022|publisher = Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}}</ref>

The use of "physical" in physicalism is a philosophical concept and can be distinguished from alternative definitions found in the literature (e.g., [[Karl Popper]] defined a physical proposition as one that can at least in theory be denied by observation<ref name="Popper2002" />). A "physical property", in this context, may be a metaphysical or logical combination of properties which are not physical in the ordinary sense. It is common to express the notion of "metaphysical or logical combination of properties" using the notion of supervenience. Supervenience is the idea that there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental respect, or that an object cannot alter in some mental respect without altering in some physical respect.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Davidson |first=Donald |title="Mental Events," reprinted in Donald Davidson (ed.) 1980, 207–225. |date=1970}}</ref><ref>See Bennett and McLaughlin, 2011</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Davidson |first=Donald |title="Mental Events" |date=1970}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Davidson |first=Donald |date=1995 |title="Laws and Cause" |journal=Dialectica, 49: 2–4: 263–279.}}</ref><ref>Davidson D., 1993, “Thinking Causes”, in Heil and Mele.</ref> The reason to introduce supervenience is that physicalists usually suppose the existence of various abstract concepts that are non-physical in the ordinary sense of the word.

=== Type physicalism ===
{{See also|Type physicalism}}

[[Type physicalism]], also known as mind-body identity theory, holds that [[Mental event|mental events]] can be grouped into types that correlate with types of physical events.<ref name="DStoljar" /> For instance, one type of mental events, such as pain, correlates with a particular type of physical events, such as C-fiber firings. On this account, all instances of pain correspond to situations where C-fibers are firing. Type physicalism can be understood as the position that there is an identity between types: any mental type is identical with some physical type.

A common argument against type physicalism is the problem of [[multiple realizability]]. Multiple realizability posits that the same mental state can be realized by different physical states. Another way to put it is that there is a many-to-one mapping from physical states to mental states.<ref name="BechtelMundale19992">{{Cite journal |last1=Bechtel |first1=William |author-link1=William Bechtel |last2=Mundale |first2=Jennifer |date=1999 |title=Multiple Realizability Revisited: Linking Cognitive and Neural States |journal=Philosophy of Science |volume=66 |issue=2 |pages=175–207 |doi=10.1086/392683 |issn=0031-8248 |jstor=188642 |s2cid=122093404}}</ref><ref name="Kim1993" /><ref name="Fodor1974" />

=== Token physicalism ===
{{See also|Anomalous monism}}

Token physicalism is the proposition that every particular mental event is a particular physical event (token physical event) but that there is no type-to-type mapping between mental events and physical events.<ref name="DStoljar" /> The most common example of token physicalism is Davidson's anomalous monism.<ref>Davidson, D. (1970) "Mental Events", in ''Actions and Events'', Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980.</ref> One of token physicalism's strengths is that it is compatible with multiple realizability. Mental states such as pain may be realized in any number of widely different physical events, without any type-like similarity between these physical events.

== Reductive and non-reductive physicalism ==

=== Reductionism ===
{{See also|Reductionism}}
In [[philosophy of mind]], [[reductionism]] is commonly understood as the reduction of psychological phenomena to physics and chemistry. In a simplified form, reductionism implies that a system is nothing but the sum of its parts.<ref>Thomas Nagel (2012). ''Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False''. Oxford University Press. pp. 4–5. {{ISBN|978-0199919758}}.</ref> There are both reductive and non-reductive versions of physicalism (reductive physicalism and non-reductive physicalism). Reductive physicalism is the view that mental states are nothing over and above physical states and are reducible to physical states.

=== Emergence ===
{{main|Emergentism}}

[[Emergentism]] is a theory that became popular in the early 20th century.<ref>Van Gulick, Robert. "Emergence". ''Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. University of Tennessee.</ref> Notions of strong emergence are commonly found in accounts of non-reductive physicalism. A property of a [[system]] is said to be emergent if it is a new outcome of some of the system's other properties and their interaction while it is itself different from them. Emergentism emphasizes that the whole is more than the sum of its parts.<ref>O'Connor, Timothy and Wong, Hong Yu (eds.), "Emergent Properties", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)</ref> In the context of philosophy of mind, emergence is often thought to entail [[property dualism]].<ref>Bratcher, Daniel (1999). "David Chalmers' Arguments for Property Dualism". ''Philosophy Today''. '''43''' (3): 292–301. [[Doi (identifier)|doi]]:10.5840/philtoday199943319</ref>

== Arguments against physicalism ==

=== Knowledge argument ===
{{See also|Mary's room}}
Though there have been many objections to physicalism throughout its history, many of them are concerned with the apparent contradiction of the existence of [[qualia]] in an entirely physical world. The most popular argument of this kind is the so-called knowledge argument as formulated by [[Frank Cameron Jackson|Frank Jackson]], titled "[[Mary's room]]".<ref>Jackson, Frank (1982). "Epiphenomenal Qualia". ''Philosophical Quarterly''. '''32''' (127): 127–136. [[Doi (identifier)|doi]]:10.2307/2960077. [[JSTOR (identifier)|JSTOR]] 2960077.</ref>

The argument asks us to consider Mary, a girl who has been forced to discover the world from a black-and-white room via a black-and-white television monitor throughout her life. She has access to books containing all physical knowledge. During her time in the room, she learns all the physical facts about the world, including all the physical facts about color. To a physicalist, it would seem that this entails Mary knowing everything about the world. But once she is let out of the room and into the world, it becomes apparent that there were things Mary did not know about the world, such as the ''feeling'' or ''experience'' of seeing color. If Mary did not have such knowledge, how can it be said that everything supervenes upon the physical?

==== Physicalist response ====
One response, developed by [[Lawrence Nemerow]] and [[David Kellogg Lewis|David Lewis]], is known as the ability hypothesis. The ability hypothesis distinguishes between propositional knowledge, such as "Mary knows that the sky is typically blue during the day", and knowledge-how, such as "Mary knows how to climb a mountain", and says that all Mary gains from seeing the world in color is knowledge-how. According to this response, Mary does gain knowledge from her experience, but it is not the propositional knowledge required for the knowledge argument to be logically sound.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/|title=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|first=Daniel|last=Stoljar|chapter=Physicalism |editor-first1=Edward N.|editor-last1=Zalta|editor-first2=Uri|editor-last2=Nodelman|date=March 31, 2024|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University|via=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}</ref>

=== Argument from philosophical zombies ===
One commonly issued challenge to a priori physicalism and physicalism in general is the "conceivability argument", or [[zombie argument]].<ref>See Chalmers, 2009.</ref> The conceivability argument runs roughly as follows:

# According to physicalism, everything in our world (including consciousness) is physical.
# Thus, if physicalism is true, a metaphysically possible world in which all physical facts are the same as in the actual world contains everything that exists in the actual world. In particular, conscious experience exists in such a world.
# We can conceive of a world physically indistinguishable from our world but in which there is no consciousness (a zombie world). From this it follows that such a world is metaphysically possible.
# Therefore, physicalism is false. (This [[Logical consequence|follows from]] (2) and (3) by ''[[modus tollens]]''.)<ref>See Chalmers, 2009</ref>

The possibility of philosophical zombies (p-zombies) entails that mental states do not supervene upon physical states, and thus that physicalism is false. Australian philosopher [[David Chalmers]] argues that the conceivability of a zombie entails a metaphysical possibility.<ref>{{cite book |author=Chalmers, David |title=The Conscious Mind |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=1996 |location=Oxford, England}}</ref> 

==== Physicalist response ====
[[Galen Strawson]] argues that it is impossible to establish the conceivability of zombies, so the argument, lacking its first premise, fails.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Strawson |first1=Galen |author-link1=Galen Strawson |title=Towards a Science of Consciousness III |date=1999 |editor1-last=Hameroff |editor1-first=S. |editor2-last=Kaszniak |editor2-first=A. |editor3-last=Chalmers |editor3-first=D.}}</ref>

[[Daniel Dennett]] argues that "when philosophers claim that zombies are conceivable, they invariably underestimate the task of conception (or imagination), and end up imagining something that violates their own definition".<ref name="Dennett1991">{{cite book |last=Dennett |first=Daniel C. |url=https://archive.org/details/consciousnessexp00denn |title=Consciousness Explained |publisher=Little, Brown and Co. |year=1991 |isbn=0-316-18065-3 |location=Boston, Toronto, London}}</ref><ref name="Dennett1995">{{cite book |last=Dennett |first=Daniel C. |url=https://archive.org/details/darwinsdangerous0000denn |title=Darwin's Dangerous Idea |publisher=Simon & Schuster |year=1995 |isbn=0-684-82471-X |location=New York |page=[https://archive.org/details/darwinsdangerous0000denn/page/322 322] |url-access=registration}}</ref> He coined the term "zimboes"—p-zombies that have [[Second-order logic|second-order beliefs]]—in arguing that p-zombies are incoherent:<ref>Dennett 1995; 1999</ref> "Zimboes think<sup>Z</sup> they are conscious, think<sup>Z</sup> they have qualia, think<sup>Z</sup> they suffer pains—they are just 'wrong' (according to this lamentable tradition), in ways that neither they nor we could ever discover!"<ref name="Dennett1995" /> In ''The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies'' (1995), Dennett compares consciousness to [[health]].

{{Quotation|Supposing that by an act of stipulative imagination you can remove consciousness while leaving all cognitive systems intact—a quite standard but entirely bogus feat of imagination—is like supposing that by an act of stipulative imagination, you can remove health while leaving all bodily functions and powers intact. … Health isn't that sort of thing, and neither is consciousness.}}[[Michael P. Lynch|Michael Lynch]] argues that the zombie conceivability argument forces us to either question whether we actually have consciousness or accept that zombies are impossible. If zombies falsely believe they are conscious, how can we be sure we are not zombies? We may believe we have conscious mental states when in fact we merely hold a false belief. Lynch thinks denying the possibility of zombies is more reasonable than questioning our own consciousness.<ref>Lynch, Michael P. (2006). Zombies and the case of the phenomenal pickpocket. Synthese 149 (1):37-58.</ref>

[[Daniel Stoljar]] has proposed what he calls "the [[phenomenal concept strategy]]".<ref>See Stoljar, 2005</ref> Roughly, the phenomenal concept strategy attempts to show that only the ''concept'' of consciousness—not the ''property''—is in some way "special" or [[sui generis]].<ref>cf. Stoljar, 2005</ref> 

=== Hempel's Dilemma ===
{{Main|Hempel's Dilemma}}
Physicalists have traditionally opted for a "theory-based" characterization of the physical in terms of either current physics<ref>See e.g., Smart, 1978; Lewis, 1994.</ref> or a future (ideal) physics.<ref>See e.g., Poland, 1994; Chalmers, 1996; Wilson, 2006.</ref> Hempel's Dilemma (named after the philosopher of science [[Carl Gustav Hempel]]) attacks physicalism by arguing that both of these approaches are problematic. If, on the one hand, we define the physical by reference to current physics, then physicalism is very likely to be false because it is very likely (by pessimistic meta-induction<ref>see Vincente, 2011</ref>) that much of current physics is false. If, on the other hand, we define the physical in terms of a future (ideal) or completed physics, then physicalism is hopelessly vague or indeterminate.<ref>See Hempel, 1969, pp.180-183; Hempel, 1980, pp.194-195.</ref>

==== Physicalist response ====
Some physicalists, like Andre Melnyk, accept the dilemma's first horn: they accept that the current definition of physicalism is very likely false as long it is more plausible than any currently formulated rival proposition, such as dualism. Melnyk maintains that this is the attitude most scientists hold toward scientific theories anyway. For example, a defender of evolutionary theory may well accept that its current formulation is likely to be revised in the future but defend it because they believe current evolutionary theory is more likely than any current rival idea, such as creationism. Thus Melnyk holds that one should define physicalism in relation to current physics and have a similar attitude toward its truth as most scientists have toward the truth of currently accepted scientific theories.<ref name="Melnyk1997" />

Some physicalists defend physicalism via alternative characterizations of physicalism. [[Frank Cameron Jackson|Frank Jackson]], for example, has argued for an "object-based" conception of the physical.<ref>See Jackson, 1998, p.7; Lycan, 2003.</ref> [[David Papineau]]<ref>See Papineau, 2002</ref> and Barbara Montero<ref>See Montero, 1999</ref> have argued for a "via negativa" characterization of the physical.<ref>See Montero and Papineau, 2005</ref> The gist of this approach is characterize the physical in terms of what it is not: the mental. In other words, the via negativa strategy understands the physical as the non-mental. 

=== Argument from overdetermination ===
[[File:Figure1.gif|right|thumb|Figure demonstration how M1 and M2 are not reduced to P1 and P2.]]
[[Jaegwon Kim]] objects to non-reductive physicalism based on the problem of [[overdetermination]].<ref name="auto">(2005) ''Physicalism, or Something Near Enough'', Princeton University Press</ref> He proposes (using the chart on the right) that ''M1'' causes ''M2'' (these are mental events) and ''P1'' causes ''P2'' (these are physical events). ''M1'' has ''P1'' as its supervenience base (P1 realizes M1), and ''M2'' has ''P2'' as its supervenience base (P2 realizes M2). If ''P1'' causes ''P2'' and M1 causes M2, then we have a case of causal overdetermination. To avoid this causal overdetermination, either M1 or P1 must be eliminated as a cause of P2. Because of the principle of the [[causal closure]] of the physical, M1 is excluded. The non-reductive physicalist is then forced to choose between two unappealing options: accept overdetermination or embrace [[epiphenomenalism]]. Kim thus argues that mental causation can be preserved only by embracing a reductionist view, whereby mental properties are considered causally efficacious by being reduced to physical properties.<ref name="auto"/>

=== Argument from first-person perspectives ===
[[Christian List]] argues that the existence of first-person perspectives, i.e., one existing as oneself and not as someone else, refutes physicalism. He argues that since first-personal facts cannot supervene on physical facts, this refutes not only physicalism, but also most forms of dualism that have purely third-personal metaphysics.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/LISTFA |title=The first-personal argument against physicalism |last=List |first=Christian |date=2023 |website= |publisher= |access-date=19 May 2025 |quote=}}</ref> List also argues that there is a "quadrilemma" for theories of consciousness: that at most three of the following metaphysical claims can be true: "first-person [[Philosophical realism|realism]]", "non-[[solipsism]]", "non-fragmentation", and "one world"—and thus at least one of them must be false.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://philarchive.org/rec/LISAQF |title=A quadrilemma for theories of consciousness |last=List |first=Christian |date=2023 |website= |publisher=The Philosophical Quarterly |access-date=19 May 2025 |quote=}}</ref> He has proposed a model he calls the "many-worlds theory of consciousness" to reconcile the subjective nature of consciousness without lapsing into solipsism.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://philarchive.org/rec/LISTMT-2 |title=The many-worlds theory of consciousness |last=List |first=Christian |date=2023 |website= |publisher=The Philosophical Quarterly |access-date=19 May 2025 |quote=}}</ref> These ideas are related to the [[vertiginous question]] proposed by Benj Hellie.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Hellie |first1=Benj |last2= |first2= |date=2013 |title=Against Egalitarianism |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/HELCFC |journal=Analysis |volume=73 |issue= |publisher= |pages=304–320 |doi=10.1093/analys/ans101 |access-date=}}</ref>

== Other views ==

=== Realistic physicalism<!--'Realistic physicalism' and 'Realistic monism' redirect here--> ===
[[Galen Strawson]]'s '''realistic physicalism'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--> or '''realistic monism'''<!--boldface per WP:R#PLA--><ref>[[Galen Strawson|Strawson, Galen]] (2006). "Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism". ''[[Journal of Consciousness Studies]]''. Volume 13, No 10–11, Exeter, Imprint Academic pp. 3–31.</ref> is the view that physicalism entails [[panpsychism]] – or at least [[wikt:micropsychism|micropsychism]].<ref name="Strawson2006">{{cite book
|author      = Strawson, Galen
|author-link  = Galen Strawson
|title       = Consciousness and Its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism?
|publisher   = Imprint Academic
|year        = 2006
|pages       = 4, 7
|isbn        = 978-1845400590
|url         = http://www.utsc.utoronto.ca/~seager/strawson_on_panpsychism.doc
|quote       = I don't define the physical as concrete reality, as concrete-reality-whatever-it-is; obviously I can't rule out the possibility that there could be other non-physical (and indeed non-spatiotemporal) forms of concrete reality. I simply fix the reference of the term 'physical' by pointing at certain items and invoking the notion of a general kind of stuff. It is true that there is a sense in which this makes my use of the term vacuous, for, relative to our universe, 'physical stuff' is now equivalent to 'real and concrete stuff', and cannot be anything to do with the term 'physical' that is used to mark out a position in what is usually taken to be a substantive debate about the ultimate nature of concrete reality (physicalism vs immaterialism vs dualism vs pluralism vs…). But that is fine by me. If it's back to Carnap, so be it.
|url-status     = live
|archive-url  = https://web.archive.org/web/20120111170934/http://www.utsc.utoronto.ca/~seager/strawson_on_panpsychism.doc
|archive-date = 2012-01-11
}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author     = Lockwood, Michael
|author-link = Michael Lockwood (philosopher)
|title      = Mind, Brain and the Quantum: The Compound 'I'
|publisher  = Blackwell Pub
|year       = 1991
|isbn       = 978-0631180319
|pages      = [https://archive.org/details/mindbrainquantum0000lock/page/4 4, 7]
|url        = https://archive.org/details/mindbrainquantum0000lock/page/4
|url-access = registration
}}</ref><ref name="Skrbina2009">{{cite book|first=D.|last=Skrbina|year=2009|title=Mind That Abides: Panpsychism in the New Millennium|series=Advances in Consciousness Research|publisher=John Benjamins Publishing Company|isbn=9789027290038|lccn=2008042603|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zZU5AAAAQBAJ&pg=PA322|page=322}}</ref> Strawson argues that "many—perhaps most—of those who call themselves physicalists or materialists [are mistakenly] committed to the thesis that physical stuff is, in itself, in its fundamental nature, something wholly and utterly non-experiential... even when they are prepared to admit with Eddington that physical stuff has, in itself, 'a nature capable of manifesting itself as mental activity', i.e. as experience or consciousness".<ref name="Strawson2006"/> Because experiential phenomena allegedly [[Panpsychism#Non-emergentism|cannot be emergent]] from wholly non-experiential phenomena, philosophers are driven to [[substance dualism]], [[property dualism]], [[eliminative materialism]] and "all other crazy attempts at wholesale mental-to-non-mental reduction".<ref name="Strawson2006"/>
{{blockquote|Real physicalists must accept that at least some ultimates are intrinsically experience-involving.  They must at least embrace ''micropsychism''. Given that everything concrete is physical, and that everything physical is constituted out of physical ultimates, and that experience is part of concrete reality, it seems the only reasonable position, more than just an 'inference to the best explanation'... Micropsychism is not yet panpsychism, for as things stand realistic physicalists can conjecture that only some types of ultimates are intrinsically experiential.  But they must allow that panpsychism may be true, and the big step has already been taken with micropsychism, the admission that at least some ultimates must be experiential. 'And were the inmost essence of things laid open to us' I think that the idea that some but not all physical ultimates are experiential would look like the idea that some but not all physical ultimates are spatio-temporal (on the assumption that spacetime is indeed a fundamental feature of reality). I would bet a lot against there being such radical heterogeneity at the very bottom of things. In fact (to disagree with my earlier self) it is hard to see why this view would not count as a form of dualism... So now I can say that physicalism, i.e. real physicalism, entails panexperientialism or panpsychism. All physical stuff is energy, in one form or another, and all energy, I trow, is an experience-involving phenomenon. This sounded crazy to me for a long time, but I am quite used to it, now that I know that there is no alternative short of 'substance dualism'... Real physicalism, realistic physicalism, entails panpsychism, and whatever problems are raised by this fact are problems a real physicalist must face.<ref name="Strawson2006"/>|[[Galen Strawson]]|''Consciousness and Its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism?''}}

==See also==
* [[Empiricism]]
* [[Metaphysical naturalism]]
* [[Cognitive science]]
* [[Consciousness]]
* [[Epiphenomenalism]]
* [[Hempel's Dilemma]]
* [[Monism]]
* [[Ontological pluralism]]
* [[Mary's Room]]
* [[Philosophy of mind]]
* [[Reductionism]]
* [[Supervenience]]
* [[Multiple realizability]]

== Notes ==
{{Reflist|refs=
<ref name="DStoljar">{{cite encyclopedia|author=Stoljar, Daniel|title=Physicalism|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition)|editor=Edward N. Zalta|url= http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/entries/physicalism/|date=2009|access-date=2014-08-07}}</ref>

<!-- <ref name="Chalmers, D. 1996">Chalmers, D. (1996): The Conscious Mind, Oxford University Press, New York.</ref> -->
<!-- <ref name="Lewis1983">{{cite journal|last1=Lewis|first1=David|title=New work for a theory of universals|journal=Australasian Journal of Philosophy|volume=61|issue=4|year=1983|pages=343–377|issn=0004-8402|doi=10.1080/00048408312341131}}</ref>-->

<ref name="Kim1993">{{cite book|author=Jaegwon Kim|title=Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=0iQAqQLd0AgC|date=26 November 1993|publisher=Cambridge University Press|isbn=978-0-521-43996-1}}</ref>

<!-- <ref name="Horgan1982">{{cite journal|last1=Horgan|first1=Terence|title=Supervenience and Microphysics|journal=Pacific Philosophical Quarterly|volume=63|year=1982|number=January|pages=29–43|doi=10.1111/j.1468-0114.1982.tb00084.x}}</ref> -->

<ref name="Fodor1974">{{cite journal|last1=Fodor|first1=J. A.|title=Special sciences (or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis)|journal=Synthese|volume=28|issue=2|year=1974|pages=97–115|issn=0039-7857|doi=10.1007/BF00485230|s2cid=46979938|url=https://philpapers.org/rec/FODSSO-2 }}</ref>

<ref name="Melnyk1997">{{cite journal|last1=Melnyk|first1=Andrew|title=How to Keep the 'Physical' in Physicalism|journal=The Journal of Philosophy|volume=94|issue=12|year=1997|pages=622–637|issn=0022-362X|doi=10.2307/2564597|jstor=2564597}}</ref>
<!-- <ref name="Smart1959">{{cite journal|last1=Smart|first1=J. J. C.|title=Sensations and Brain Processes|journal=The Philosophical Review|volume=68|issue=2|year=1959|pages=141–156|issn=0031-8108|doi=10.2307/2182164|jstor=2182164}}</ref> -->
<!-- <ref name="Nagel1961">{{cite book|author=Ernest Nagel|title=The structure of science: problems in the logic of scientific explanation|url=https://archive.org/details/structureofscien0000nage|url-access=registration|year=1961|publisher=Harcourt, Brace & World}}</ref> -->
<ref name="Popper2002">{{cite book|author=Karl Raimund Popper|title=The Logic of Scientific Discovery|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Yq6xeupNStMC|year=2002|publisher=Psychology Press|isbn=978-0-415-27844-7}}</ref>}}

== References ==
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* Chalmers, D. 1996. ''The Conscious Mind''. New York: Oxford University Press.
* {{cite journal|last1 = Chalmers|first1 = D.|last2 = Jackson|first2 = F.|year = 2001|title = Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation|journal = Philosophical Review|volume = 110|issue = 3|pages = 315–361|doi=10.1215/00318108-110-3-315|citeseerx = 10.1.1.143.7688 }}
* Chalmers, D. 2009. "The Two-Dimensional Argument Against Materialism." In ''Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind,'' ed. B. McLaughlin. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.&nbsp;313–335.
* {{cite journal|last1 = Hawthorne|first1 = J|year = 2002|title = Blocking Definitions of Materialism|journal = Philosophical Studies|volume = 110|issue = 2|pages = 103–113|doi=10.1023/a:1020200213934|s2cid = 170039410 }}
* Hempel, C. 1969. "Reduction: Ontological and Linguistic Facets." In ''Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel.'' eds. S. Morgenbesser, et al. New York: St Martin's Press.
* {{cite journal|last1 = Hempel|first1 = C|year = 1980|title = Comment on Goodman's ''Ways of Worldmaking.''|doi = 10.1007/bf00413558|journal = Synthese|volume = 45|issue = 2|pages = 193–199|s2cid = 46953839 }}
* Jackson, F. 1998. ''From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis.'' New York: Oxford University Press.
* {{cite journal|last1 = Judisch|first1 = N|year = 2008|title = Why 'non-mental won't work: On Hempel's dilemma and the characterization of the 'physical.'|journal = Philosophical Studies|volume = 140|issue = 3|pages = 299–318|doi=10.1007/s11098-007-9142-8|s2cid = 515956 }}
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== External links ==
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