Editing Preemptive war

{{Short description|Armed conflict to thwart or gain an advantage over imminent invasion or offensive}}
{{distinguish|text=[[preventive war]], namely an '''anticipatory war''' in the face of a less immediate threat}}
{{Redirect|Preemptive strike||Preemptive strike (disambiguation)}}
{{War}}
A '''preemptive war''' is a [[war]] that is commenced in an attempt to repel or defeat a perceived imminent offensive or invasion, or to gain a strategic advantage in an impending (allegedly unavoidable) war ''shortly before'' that attack materializes.<ref>{{cite book |title=A Dictionary of Aviation |first=David W. |last=Wragg |isbn=9780850451634 |edition=first |publisher=Osprey |year=1973 |page=215}}</ref> It is a war that preemptively 'breaks the peace' before an impending attack occurs. 

Preemptive war is sometimes confused with [[preventive war]]: the difference is that a preventive war is launched to destroy the potential threat of the targeted party, when an attack by that party is not [[Imminent threat|imminent]] or known to be planned. The U.S. Department of Defense defines a preventive war as an armed conflict "initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risk."<ref>{{cite book |title=Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms |year=2002 |page=413}}</ref> A preemptive war is launched in anticipation of immediate aggression by another party.<ref>{{citation|volume=20|publisher=Hofstra L. Rev.|pages=321|date=1991–1992|title=On Assassination as Anticipatory Self-Defense: The Case of Israel|author=Beres, Louis Rene|url=http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/hoflr20&section=16}}</ref> Most contemporary scholarship equates preventive war with aggression, and therefore argues that it is illegitimate.<ref name=shue>Shue, Henry and Rhodin, David (2007). ''Preemption: Military Action and Moral Justification''. Oxford University Press. p. 116. {{ISBN|978-0-19-923313-7}}</ref> The waging of a preemptive war has less stigma attached than does the waging of a preventive war.<ref>Shue and Rodin 2007, p. 118.</ref>

Article 2 (4) of the [[UN Charter]] requires that states refrain from the initiation of armed conflict, that is being the first to 'break the peace' unless authorized by the UN Security Council as an enforcement action under Article 42. Some authors have claimed that when a presumed adversary first appears to be beginning confirmable preparations for a possible future attack, but has not yet actually attacked, that the attack has in fact 'already begun', however this opinion has not been upheld by the UN.<ref name = "colin gray">{{cite web
| year = 2007
| url = http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub789.pdf
| title = The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: a Reconsideration
| access-date = 2010-12-02
| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20170216102004/http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB789.pdf
| archive-date = 2017-02-16
| url-status = dead
}} A US Army sponsored discussion of various justifications for preemptive, preventive and 'precautionary' war.</ref><ref name = "kofi annan">{{cite web
| year = 2003
| url = https://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/stories/statments_search_full.asp?statID=27
| title= Adoption of Policy of Pre-emption Could Result in Proliferation of Uniliteral, Lawless Use of Force: By Kofi Annan
| access-date = 2010-12-02}} Kofi Annan discusses his unwillingness to accept proposed new changes in UN policy towards the use of preemptive force, and why.
</ref>

==Theory and practice==
===Prior to World War I===

As early as 1625, Dutch jurist [[Hugo Grotius]] characterized a state's right of self-defense to include the right to forestall an attack forcibly.<ref>{{citation|volume=5|publisher=Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J.|pages=231|year=1991|title=Permissibility of State-Sponsored Assassination during Peace and War, The|author=Beres, Louis R.|url=http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-cgi-bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/tclj5&section=15}}</ref> In 1685, the [[Kingdom of Scotland|Scottish government]] conducted a preemptive military strike against [[Clan Campbell]].<ref>{{cite book|author=Thomas Heyck|title=A History of the Peoples of the British Isles: From 1688 to 1914|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=beQDAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA29|date=27 September 2013|publisher=Routledge|isbn=978-1-134-41521-2|page=29}}</ref> In 1837, a certain legal precedent regarding preemptive wars was established in the [[Caroline affair|''Caroline'' affair]], during which an Anglo-Canadian force from [[Upper Canada]] crossed the [[Niagara River]] into the [[United States]] and captured and burnt the ''Caroline'', a ship owned by [[Reform movement (Upper Canada)|Reformist rebels]]. During the affair, an American citizen was killed by a Canadian sheriff.  

The British asserted that their actions were permissible under the international law of self-defense. The United States did not deny that preemptive force might be lawful under some circumstances but claimed the facts did not support its use in this case. [[United States Secretary of State|U.S. Secretary of State]] [[Daniel Webster]] wrote that when a nation uses force "within the territory of a power at peace, nothing less than a clear and absolute necessity can afford ground of justification" and that the necessity for the use of armed force must be "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation," which conditions did not apply in this case.<ref>"The Diplomatic and Official Papers of Daniel Webster While Secretary of State" pp. 105, 110 (Harper & Bros. 1848).</ref> That formulation is part of the [[Caroline test|''Caroline'' test]], which "is broadly cited as enshrining the appropriate [[international customary law|customary law]] standard."<ref>Duffy, Helen (2005). ''The 'War on Terror' and the Framework of International Law''. Cambridge University Press. p. 157.{{ISBN|978-0521547352}}</ref>

===World War I (1914–1918)===
{{Main|World War I}}
The [[Austro-Hungarian]] Chief of the General Staff, [[Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf]], argued for a preemptive war against [[Kingdom of Serbia|Serbia]] in 1913.<ref name="DiNardo2015">{{cite book|author=Richard L. DiNardo|title=Invasion: The Conquest of Serbia, 1915: The Conquest of Serbia, 1915|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6ZeIBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA13|date=14 April 2015|publisher=ABC-CLIO|isbn=978-1-4408-0093-1|pages=13–}}</ref> There is however no agreement among historians that Conrad's proposals were preemptive and not preventive. According to other historians, Conrad (a [[social Darwinist]]) proposed a ''preventive'' war against Serbia more than 20 times before, starting in [[Bosnian Crisis|1909]].<ref>Preemption: Military Action and Moral Justification, OUP 2007, p. 31</ref> Serbia had the image of an aggressive and expansionist power and was seen as a threat to Austria-Hungary in [[Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina|Bosnia and Herzegovina]].<ref name="DiNardo2015" /> The [[assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand]] (June 1914) was used as an excuse for Austria-Hungary [[Serbian Campaign of World War I|to attack Serbia]], leading to [[World War I]].<ref name="Neiberg2007">{{cite book|author=Michael S. Neiberg|author-link=Michael S. Neiberg|title=The World War I Reader|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BGaKxNWlFBwC&pg=PA7|year=2007|publisher=NYU Press|isbn=978-0-8147-5832-8|pages=7}}</ref>

During the course of the destructive and costly World War I, for the first time in history, the concept of "[[the war to end war]]" began to be seriously considered.<ref name="woodrow wilson's idea">{{cite web|year=2010|url=http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1108.html|title=United States History: Woodrow Wilson}} Discussion of Woodrow Wilson's desire to make World War I the War to End All Wars.</ref> As a further expression of that hope, upon the conclusion of the war, the [[League of Nations]] was formed. Its primary aim was to prevent war, as all signatories to the [[Covenant of the League of Nations|League of Nations Covenant]] were required to agree to desist from the initiation of all wars, preemptive or otherwise. All of the victorious nations emerging out of World War I eventually signed the agreement, with the notable exception of the United States.<ref name="league of nations summary">{{cite web|year=2010|url=http://www.nps.gov/archive/elro/glossary/league-of-nations.htm|title=Eleanor Roosevelt National Historic Site: League of Nations article|access-date=2010-11-30}} Article summarizing the primary objective of the League of Nations.</ref>

===League of Nations period (1919–1939)===
{{Main|Causes of World War II|Interwar period|Invasion of Poland}}
[[File:193109 mukden incident railway sabotage.jpg|thumb|Japanese experts inspect the scene of the "railway sabotage" at [[Mukden]] of the [[South Manchurian Railway]].]]
In the 1920s, the League peaceably settled numerous international disputes and was generally perceived as succeeding in its primary purpose. It was only in the 1930s that its effectiveness in preventing wars began to come into question. Such questions began to arise when it first became apparent in 1931 that it was incapable of halting aggression by [[Empire of Japan|Imperial Japan]] in [[Manchuria]]. In the [[Mukden Incident]], Japan claimed to be fighting a "defensive war" in [[Manchuria]], attempting to "preempt" supposedly-aggressive Chinese intentions towards the Japanese. According to the Japanese, the [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|Republic of China]] had started the war by blowing up a [[South Manchuria Railway|South Manchurian Railway]] line near [[Shenyang|Mukden]] and that since the Chinese were the aggressors, the Japanese were merely "defending themselves."' A predominance of evidence has since indicated that the railway had actually been blown up by Japanese operatives.<ref name="mukden incident">{{cite web|year=2010|url=http://ww2db.com/battle_spec.php?battle_id=18|title=Mukden Incident and Manchukuo: C. Peter Chen|access-date=2010-11-30}} Details of the Mukden Incident</ref>
[[File:Glivice radio tower.JPG|thumb|upright|[[Gliwice Radio Tower]] today. It was the scene of the [[Gleiwitz incident]] in September 1939]]
In 1933, the impotency of the League became more pronounced when notices were provided by Japan and [[Nazi Germany]] that they would be terminating their memberships in the League. [[Fascist Italy (1922–1943)|Fascist Italy]] shortly followed suit by exiting the League in 1937.<ref name="lon timeline">{{cite web|year=2006|url=http://www.indiana.edu/~league/timeline.htm|title=League of Nations Timeline|access-date=2010-11-30|archive-date=2016-08-27|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160827161853/http://www.indiana.edu/~league/timeline.htm|url-status=dead}} A timeline of all major League events.</ref> Soon, Italy and Germany also began engaging in militaristic campaigns designed to either enlarge their borders or to expand their sphere of military control, and the League was shown to be powerless to stop them.<ref name="lon timeline"/> The perceived impotency of the League was a contributing factor to the full outbreak of [[World War II]] in 1939.<ref name="lon impotence precipitates wwii">{{cite web|year=2010|url=http://www.factmonster.com/ce6/history/A0859217.html|title=Factmonster Encyclopedia— League of Nations: Successes and Failures|access-date=2010-11-30}} Description of the demise of the League of Nations.</ref> The start of World War II is generally dated from the event of [[Invasion of Poland|Germany's invasion of Poland]]. It is noteworthy that Germany claimed at the time that its invasion of [[Second Polish Republic|Poland]] was in fact a "defensive war," as it had allegedly been invaded by a group of Polish saboteurs, signaling a potentially-larger invasion of Germany by Poland that was soon to be under way. Thus, Germany was left with no option but to preemptive invade Poland to halt the alleged Polish plans to invade Germany. It was later discovered that Germany had fabricated the evidence for the alleged Polish saboteurs as a part of the [[Gleiwitz incident]].

===World War II (1939–1945)===
{{See also|World War II|Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran|German invasion of Norway}}
Once again, during the course of the even more widespread and lethal World War II, the hope of somehow definitively ending all war, including preemptive war, was seriously discussed. That dialogue ultimately resulted in the establishment of the successor organization to the League, the [[United Nations]] (UN). As with the League, the primary aim and hope of the UN was to prevent all wars, including preemptive wars. Unlike the League, the UN had the United States as a member.

In analyzing the many components of World War II, which one might consider as separate individual wars, the various attacks on previously-neutral countries, and the attacks against Iran and Norway might be considered to have been preemptive wars.

As for the 1940 [[German invasion of Norway]], during the 1946 [[Nuremberg trials]], the German defense argued that Germany had been "compelled to attack [[Norway]] by the need to forestall an Allied invasion and that her action was therefore preemptive."<ref>Myres Smith McDougal, Florentino P. Feliciano, ''The International Law of War: Transnational Coercion and World Public Order" pp. 211, 212</ref> The German defence referred to [[Plan R 4]] and its predecessors. Norway was vital to Germany as a transport route for iron ore from [[Sweden]], a supply that Britain was determined to stop. One adopted British plan was to go through Norway and occupy cities in [[Sweden]].<ref>"COMMAND DECISIONS", CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 2000. [http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_0.htm URL] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071230145455/http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_0.htm |date=2007-12-30 }} p. 59 "The British plan which was adopted was more modest. While ostensibly intended to bring Allied troops to the Finnish front, it laid its main emphasis on operations in northern Norway and Sweden. The main striking force was to land at Narvik and advance along the railroad to its eastern terminus at Lulea, occupying Kiruna and Gallivare along the way. By late April two Allied brigades were to be established along that line."</ref><ref>"COMMAND DECISIONS", CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 2000. [http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_0.htm URL] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071230145455/http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_0.htm |date=2007-12-30 }} p. 66, 67 "The British held back two divisions from France, intending to put them into the field in Norway, and planned to expand their force eventually to 100,000 men. The French intended to commit about 50,000. The British and French staffs agreed that the latter half of March would be the best time for going into Norway;"</ref> An Allied invasion was ordered on March 12, and the Germans intercepted radio traffic setting March 14 as deadline for the preparation.<ref>"COMMAND DECISIONS", CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 2000. [http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_0.htm URL] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071230145455/http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_0.htm |date=2007-12-30 }} p.67,68 "The objectives were to take Narvik, the railroad, and the Swedish ore fields;" "an intercepted radio message setting 14 March as the deadline for preparation of transport groups indicated that the Allied operation was getting under way. But another message, intercepted on the 15th, ordering the submarines to disperse revealed that the peace [in Finland] had disrupted the Allied plan."</ref> Peace in Finland interrupted the Allied plans, but Hitler became rightly convinced that the Allies would try again and ordered Operation [[Weserübung]].

The new Allied plans were [[Operation Wilfred|Wilfred]] and [[Plan R 4]] to provoke a German reaction by laying mines in Norwegian waters, and once Germany showed signs of taking action, Allied forces would occupy [[Narvik]], [[Trondheim]] and [[Bergen]] and launch a raid on [[Stavanger]] to destroy [[Stavanger Airport, Sola|Sola airfield]]. However, "the mines were not laid until the morning of 8 April, by which time the German ships were advancing up the Norwegian coast."<ref>"COMMAND DECISIONS", CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 2000. [http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_0.htm URL] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071230145455/http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_0.htm |date=2007-12-30 }} p. 68</ref> However, the Nuremberg trials determined that no Allied invasion was imminent and therefore rejected Germany's argument of being entitled to attack Norway.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/winter03/lawregulatingresorttoforce.html|title=Law Regulating Resort to Force|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20091014101219/http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/winter03/lawregulatingresorttoforce.html|archive-date=2009-10-14}}</ref>

In August 1941, Soviet and British forces jointly [[Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran|invaded Iran]] with the aim of preempting an Axis coup.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Tabatabai|first=Ariane M.|title=No conquest, no defeat: Iran's national security strategy|year=2020|publisher=Oxford University Press|isbn=978-0-19-753460-1|location=New York |page=91}}</ref>

===Six Day War (1967)===
{{see also|Six-Day War}}
[[File:IsraeliNavalCommandosCaptured Alexandria9061967.jpg|thumb|Egyptian Forces captured Israeli invaders near Alexandria (shown above) during the conflict.]]
Israel incorporates preemptive war in its strategic doctrine to maintain a credible deterrent posture, based on its lack of [[strategic depth]].<ref>{{cite web |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a115647.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190827193757/https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a115647.pdf |url-status=live |archive-date=August 27, 2019 |title=Israel's Strategic Doctrine |work=[[Rand Corporation]] |date=September 1981 |access-date=27 August 2019 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Memo187_11.pdf|date=February 2019|title=Israel's National Security Doctrine: The Report of the Committee on the Formulation of the National Security Doctrine (Meridor Committee), Ten Years Later.|work=[[Institute for National Security Studies (Israel)]]|access-date=27 August 2019}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/doctrine/|title=Strategic Doctrine - Israel|date=25 May 2000|publisher=[[Federation of American Scientists]]|access-date=27 January 2014}}</ref> The Six-Day War, which began when Israel launched mass attacks against [[Egypt]] on June 5, 1967, has been widely described as a preemptive war<ref>The Six Day War is, "A classic example of preemptive war." Henry Shue, David Rodin [https://books.google.com/books?id=9XhpuXKhcVIC&dq=preemptive+%22six+day+war%22&pg=PA215 Preemption: military action and moral justification]</ref><ref>"Classic examples of preemptive wars include the July Crisis of 1914 and the Six Day War of 1967 in which Israel preemptively attacked Egypt...." Karl P. Mueller [https://books.google.com/books?id=xbbaP2ouMV4C&dq=preemptive+%22six+day+war%22&pg=PA22 Striking first: preemptive and preventive attack in U.S. national security]</ref><ref>"The Six Day War between Israel and alliance of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq was an example of preemption." And, "It exemplifies preemption." Charles W. Kegley, Gregory A. Raymond [https://books.google.com/books?id=acjT-tK9blgC&dq=preemptive+%22six+day+war%22&pg=PA219 The Global Future: A Brief Introduction to World Politics]</ref><ref>"Preemptive attack is morally justified when three conditions are fulfilled: The existence of an intention to injure, the undertaking of military preparations that increase the level of danger, and the need to act immediately because of a higher degree of risk. Since these conditions were met in Israel's Six Day War, Israel's preemptive attack on Egypt on June 5, 1967 was a legitimate act of self-defense." Mark R. Amstutz ''[https://archive.org/details/internationaleth0000amst_w8u3/page/122 <!-- quote=preemptive "six day war". --> International Ethics: Concepts, Theories, and Cases in Global Politics]''</ref> and is, according to the [[United States State Department]], "perhaps the most cited example [of preemption]."<ref>"The United States has often walked a fine line between preemption and prevention. In fact there have only been a handful of clear-cut cases of military preemption by any states in the last 200 years. (Israeli preemption in the Six Day War of 1967 is perhaps the most cited example)."''[https://books.google.com/books?id=yz03f8UURuAC&dq=preemptive+%22six+day+war%22&pg=PA33 U.S. National Security Strategy: a New Era]'' U.S. Department of State (2002)</ref> Others have alternatively referred to it as a [[preventive war]].<ref>[https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/10/magazine/10wwln-safire-t.html?_r=1 Choice or Necessity (''New York Times'', May 8, 2009)]</ref> Some have referred to the war as an act of "interceptive self-defense."<ref>Distein, Yoram, ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=LbB3lUhzX10C&q=1967 War, Aggression and Self-Defense]'' p. 192, Cambridge University Press (2005)</ref> According to that view, no single Egyptian step may have qualified as an armed attack, but some perceive [[Egypt]]'s collective actions as clear that it was bent on an armed attack on Israel.<ref>Distein, Yoram, [https://books.google.com/books?id=LbB3lUhzX10C&q=1967 War, aggression and self-defense] p. 192, Cambridge University Press (2005)</ref> One academic has claimed that Israel's attack was not permissible under the [[Caroline test|''Caroline'' test]]; he claims that there was no overwhelming threat to Israel's survival.<ref>"The closest case that might have, but is now regarded as not having met the ''Caroline'' test, was Israel's first strike against Egypt in 1967. Few regarded it as a good example of a permissible anticipatory attack under the ''Caroline'' test, especially after it became clear following the attack that there was no overwhelming threat that justified the attack to ensure Israel's survival. Gathii, James Thuo. "Assessing Claims of a New Doctrine of Preemptive War Under the Doctrine of Sources." ''Osgoode Hall Law Journal'', Vol. 43, No. 1, pp. 1–34, 2005.</ref>

===Invasion of Iraq (2003)===
{{See also|2003 Invasion of Iraq}}
The doctrine of preemption gained renewed interest following the [[2003 invasion of Iraq|American-led invasion of Iraq]]. The [[George W. Bush administration]] claimed that it was necessary to intervene to prevent [[Saddam Hussein]] from deploying [[Weapon of mass destruction|WMDs]]. At the time, American decision-makers claimed that Saddam's [[weapons of mass destruction]] might be given to militant groups and that the nation's security was at a great risk. Congress passed its [[Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002|joint resolution]]
in October 2002, authorizing the American president to use military force against Saddam's government.<ref name="George">George, and [[Jens David Ohlin|Jens Ohlin]]. ''Defending Humanity''. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Print.</ref> However, The [[Iraq Intelligence Commission#Findings|Iraq Intelligence Commission confirmed in its 2005 report]] that no [[nuclear weapon]]s or [[biological weapon]]s capability existed. [[Rationale for the Iraq War#Criticisms of the rationale for the Iraq war|Many critics have questioned the true intention of the administration for invading Iraq]], based on possibility of [[retaliation]] in the [[September 11 attacks]].

====Arguments for preemptive war during Bush administration====
=====Sofaer's four elements=====
The scholar [[Abraham David Sofaer]] identified four key elements for justification of preemption:<ref>{{cite journal | author = Sofaer Abraham D | year = 2003 | title = On the Necessity of Pre-emption | journal = European Journal of International Law | volume = 14 | issue = 2| page = 220 | doi = 10.1093/ejil/14.2.209 | doi-access = free }}</ref>
# The nature and magnitude of the threat involved;
# The likelihood that the threat will be realized unless preemptive action is taken;
# The availability and exhaustion of alternatives to using force;
# Whether using preemptive force is consistent with the terms and purposes of the UN Charter and other applicable international agreements.

=====Walzer's three elements=====
Professor Mark R. Amstutz, citing [[Michael Walzer]], adopted a similar but slightly-varied set of criteria and noted three factors to evaluate the justification of a preemptive strike.<ref>Mark R. Amstutz, ''[https://archive.org/details/internationaleth0000amst_w8u3/page/122 <!-- quote=preemptive "six day war". --> International Ethics: Concepts, Theories, and Cases in Global Politics]''</ref>
# The existence of an intention to injure;
# The undertaking of military preparations that increase the level of danger; and
# The need to act immediately because of a higher degree of risk.

=====Counter proliferation self-help paradigm=====
[[File:F-16netz002.jpg|thumb|right|Israeli Air Force F-16A ''[[Netz 107]]'' with 6.5 aerial victory marks and [[Operation Opera|Osirak]] bombing mark]]
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by [[rogue nations]] gave rise to a certain argument by scholars on preemption.<ref>Colonel Guy Roberts, USMC (Ret) 27 ''Denver Journal of International Law & Policyy'' 483</ref><ref>Steven C. Welsh, [http://www.cdi.org/news/law/preemptive-war.cfm Preemptive War and International Law] Center for Defense Information, 5 December 2003</ref><ref>Kacerauskis pp. 84–85</ref> They argued that the threat need not be "imminent" in the classic sense and that the illicit acquisition of the weapons, with their capacity to unleash massive destruction, by rogue states, created the requisite threat to peace and stability as to have justified the use of preemptive force. [[NATO]]'s Deputy Assistant Secretary General for WMD, [[Guy Roberts]], cited the 1962 [[Cuban Missile Crisis]], the 1998 US [[Operation Infinite Reach|attack]] on a [[Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory|Sudanese pharmaceutical plant]], (identified by US intelligence to have been a chemical weapons facility) and the [[Operation Opera|1981 Israeli attack on Iraq's nuclear facility at Osirak]] as examples of the counterproliferation self-help paradigm.<ref>Roberts, n. 528–536</ref> Regarding the Osirak attack, Roberts noted that at the time, few legal scholars argued in support of the Israeli attack, but he noted further that "subsequent events demonstrated the perspicacity of the Israelis, and some scholars have re-visited that attack arguing that it was justified under anticipatory self-defense."<ref>Roberts n. 530–532</ref> After the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, US forces captured a number of documents detailing conversations that Saddam had with his inner sanctum.<ref name="hussein">{{cite news|title=Papers From Iraqi Archive Reveal Conspiratorial Mind-Set of Hussein|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/26/world/middleeast/archive-offers-rare-glimpse-inside-mind-of-saddam-hussein.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=Saadam%20Hussein&st=cse|author=Gordon, Michael R.|date=25 October 2011|work=New York Times}}</ref> The archive of documents and recorded meetings confirm that [[Saddam Hussein]] was indeed aiming to strike at Israel.<ref name=hussein/> In a 1982 conversation Hussein stated, "Once Iraq walks out victorious, there will not be any Israel." Of Israel's anti-Iraqi endeavors he noted, "Technically, they [the Israelis] are right in all of their attempts to harm Iraq."<ref name=hussein/>

==== Post–Bush administration period (2009–present) ====
After the departure of the Bush administration, the Obama administration adopted and continued many policies of the [[Bush Doctrine]].<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.chicagotribune.com/2011/05/23/obama-adopts-the-bush-doctrine/|work=Chicago Tribune|first=Charles|last=Krauthammer|title=Obama adopts the Bush Doctrine|date=23 May 2011}}</ref>

==Intention==
{{More citations needed section|date=July 2017}}

The intention with a preemptive strike is to gain the advantage of initiative and to harm the enemy at a moment of minimal protection, for instance, while vulnerable during transport or [[mobilization]].

In his "Rationalist Explanations for War," James Fearon attributes the use of preemptive strikes by rational states to both offensive advantages and commitment problems between states.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Fearon|first=James|date=1995|title=Rationalist Explanations for War|url=http://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/505e/d8c92f0b1ca9afdccdf4890f4e79415ee788.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200625045154/http://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/505e/d8c92f0b1ca9afdccdf4890f4e79415ee788.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-date=2020-06-25|journal=International Organization|volume=49|issue=3|pages=379–414|doi=10.1017/s0020818300033324|s2cid=38573183}}</ref> When a nation possesses a first strike advantage and believes itself to have a high probability of winning a war, there is a narrower ''de facto'' bargaining range between it and an opposing country for peaceful settlements. In extreme cases, if the probability of winning minus the probable costs of war is high enough, no self-enforcing peaceful outcome exists. In his discussion of preventative war arising from a commitment problem, Fearon builds an infinite-horizon model expected payoffs from period t on are (pt/(l - δ)) - Ca for state A and ((1 -pt)/(l - δ)) - Cb for
state B, where Ca and Cb are costs incurred the respective states and δ is the state discount of the future period payoffs.

The model shows that a peaceful settlement can be reached at any period that both states prefer, but strategic issues arise when there is no credible third-party guaranteer of the two states committing to a peaceful foreign policy. If there is going to be a shift in the military power between states in the future, and no credible restraint is placed on the rising military power not to exploit its future advantage, it is rational for the state with declining military power to use a preventative attack while it has a higher chance of winning the war. Fearon points out that the declining state attacks are caused not by fear of a future attack but because the future peace settlement would be worse for it than in the current period. The lack of trust that leads to a declining power's preemptive strike stems not from uncertainty about intentions of different nations but from "the situation, the structure of preferences and opportunities, that gives one party incentive to renege" on its peaceful cooperation and exploit its increased military potential in the future to win a more profitable peace settlement for itself. Thus, Fearon shows that preemptive military action is taken by nations when there is an unfavorable shift in military potential in the future that leads to a shrinking bargain range for a peaceful settlement in the current period but with no credible commitment by the other party to avoid exploiting its improved military potential in the future.

==Legality==
{{Further|War of aggression|Jus ad bellum|UN Charter}}
[[UN Charter#Article 2|Article 2, Section 4]] of the [[UN Charter]] is generally considered to be ''jus cogens'' (literally "compelling law" but in practice "higher international law") and prohibits all UN members from exercising "the ''threat'' or ''use'' of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state". However, in the modern framework of the UN Charter, it is the phrase "if an armed attack occurs" in Article 51<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090505055751/http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml|url-status=dead|archive-date=May 5, 2009|title=UN Charter: Article 51}} </ref> that draws the line between legitimate and illegitimate military force.<ref name="George"/> Some scholars believe it is reasonable to assume that if no armed attack has yet occurred that no automatic justification for preemptive 'self-defense' has yet been made 'legal' under the UN Charter. Others conclude that the "inherent right of collective or individual self-defense" in Article 51 includes the preemptive, or anticipatory, self-defense recognized under customary international law, as articulated in the ''Caroline test'''' noted above. (See [[Self-defence in international law]] for additional discussion.) In order to be justified as an act of self-defense, two conditions must be fulfilled which are widely regarded as necessary for its justification. The first of these is that actor must have believed that the threat is real, as opposed to (merely) perceived. The second condition is that the force used in self-defense must be proportional to the harm which the actor is threatened.<ref>David, and Henry Shue. ''Preemption: Military Action and Moral Justification''. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Print.</ref>

==See also==
{{div col}}
* [[Controversies relating to the Six-Day War]]
* [[A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm]]
* ''[[Battleplan]]'' (documentary TV series)
* [[Bush Doctrine]]
* [[Caroline affair|''Caroline'' affair]]
* [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] [[q:Dwight D. Eisenhower|statements]] on '[[preventive war]]' in WikiQuote
* ''[[Jus ad bellum]]''
* [[War of aggression]]
* [[Pre-emptive nuclear strike]] ([[counterforce]])
* [[Soviet offensive plans controversy]]
* [[Hobbesian trap]]
* [[The best defense is a good offense]]
{{div col end}}

==References==
{{Reflist|30em}}

==External links==
{{wiktionary|prevenge}}
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20170328180228/http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/ksil212.pdf Preemptive warfare: A viable strategic option]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20091222083603/http://vaidila.vdu.lt/~teise/IJBL/tom2/nr1/07-Kacerauskis.pdf Can a member of The United Nations unilaterally decide to use preemptive force against another state without violating the UN Charter?] Vytautas Kacerauskis, International Journal of Baltic Law Volume 2, No. 1 (January, 2005) ISSN 1648-9349
* [http://www.washingtontimes.com/world/20041006-012158-7663r.htm Washington Times]
* [http://thoughtcast.org/casts/alan-dershowitz-on-preemption-and-the-hezbollah ThoughtCast] speaks with Alan Dershowitz about his book "Preemption: A Knife that Cuts Both Ways"...
* [https://ssrn.com/abstract=397601 The American Strategy of Preemptive War and International Law]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20100407172024/http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf The Myth of Preemptive Self-Defense] Mary Ellen O’Connell Professor of Law
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20090916024816/http://www.polsis.uq.edu.au/dialogue/vol-1-2-6.pdf Pre-emptive Self-Defence, International Law and US Policy] Chris Richter
* [https://books.google.com/books?id=yz03f8UURuAC&dq=preemptive+%22six+day+war%22&pg=PA33 U.S. National Security Strategy: a New Era] U.S. Department of State
{{Authority control}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Preemptive War}}
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