Editing Reductionism

{{Distinguish|text=the [[Reductionism (music)|reductionist]] experimental music genre}}
{{For|term used phenomenological tradition in Western philosophy|phenomenological reduction}}
{{Short description|Philosophical view explaining systems in terms of smaller parts}}

[[File:Digesting Duck.jpg|300px|thumb|right|[[René Descartes]], in [[The World (Descartes)|De homine]] (1662), claimed that non-human animals could be explained reductively as [[automaton|automata]]; meaning essentially as more mechanically complex versions of this [[Digesting Duck]].]]

'''Reductionism''' is any of several related [[Philosophy|philosophical]] ideas regarding the associations between [[Phenomenon|phenomena]] which can be described in terms of simpler or more fundamental phenomena.<ref name=MerriamWebster /> It is also described as an intellectual and philosophical position that interprets a [[complex system]] as the sum of its parts.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|last=Kricheldorf|first=Hans R.|title=Getting It Right in Science and Medicine: Can Science Progress through Errors? Fallacies and Facts|publisher=Springer|year=2016|isbn=978-3319303864|location=Cham|pages=63|language=en}}</ref> Reductionism tends to focus on the small, predictable details of a system and is often associated with various philosophies like [[emergence]], [[materialism]], and [[determinism]].

== Definitions ==
''[[The Oxford Companion to Philosophy]]'' suggests that reductionism is "one of the most used and abused terms in the philosophical lexicon" and suggests a three-part division:<ref name=Ruse>{{cite book |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy |author=Michael Ruse |editor=Ted Honderich |isbn=978-0191037474 |year=2005 |edition=2nd |chapter=Entry for "reductionism" |publisher=Oxford University Press |page=793 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bJFCAwAAQBAJ&pg=PT1884}}</ref>
# '''Ontological reductionism''': a belief that the whole of reality consists of a minimal number of parts.
# '''Methodological reductionism''': the scientific attempt to provide an explanation in terms of ever-smaller entities.
# '''Theory reductionism''': the suggestion that a newer theory does not replace or absorb an older one, but reduces it to more basic terms. Theory reduction itself is divisible into three parts: translation, derivation, and explanation.<ref name=Ney />

Reductionism can be applied to any [[phenomenon]], including [[object (philosophy)|objects]], problems, [[explanation]]s, [[theory|theories]], and meanings.<ref name=Ney /><ref name=Polkinghorne>{{cite encyclopedia |title=Reductionism  |author=John Polkinghorne |url=http://www.disf.org/en/Voci/104.asp |encyclopedia=Interdisciplinary Encyclopedia of Religion and Science|date=2002 |publisher=Advanced School for Interdisciplinary Research; Pontifical University of the Holy Cross}}</ref><ref>For reductionism referred to [[explanation]]s, [[theory|theories]], and meanings, see [[Willard Van Orman Quine]]'s ''[[Two Dogmas of Empiricism]]''. Quine objected to the [[positivism|positivistic]], reductionist "belief that each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical construct upon terms which refer to immediate experience" as an intractable problem.</ref>

For the sciences, application of methodological reductionism attempts explanation of entire systems in terms of their individual, constituent parts and their interactions. For example, the temperature of a gas is reduced to nothing beyond the average kinetic energy of its molecules in motion. [[Thomas Nagel]] and others speak of 'psychophysical reductionism' (the attempted reduction of psychological phenomena to physics and chemistry), and 'physico-chemical reductionism' (the attempted reduction of biology to physics and chemistry).<ref name=Nagel /> In a very simplified and sometimes contested form, reductionism is said to imply that a system is nothing but the sum of its parts.<ref name=Polkinghorne /><ref name=GodfreySmith />

However, a more nuanced opinion is that a system is composed entirely of its parts, but the system will have features that none of the parts have (which, in essence is the basis of [[emergentism]]).<ref name=Jones /> "The point of mechanistic explanations is usually showing how the higher level features arise from the parts."<ref name=GodfreySmith />

Other definitions are used by other authors. For example, what [[John Polkinghorne]] terms 'conceptual' or 'epistemological' reductionism<ref name=Polkinghorne /> is the definition provided by [[Simon Blackburn]]<ref name=Blackburn>{{cite book |author=Simon Blackburn |title= Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy |chapter=Entry on ‘reductionism’ |date= 2005 |page=311 |publisher= Oxford University Press, UK |isbn= 978-0198610137 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5wTQtwB1NdgC&pg=PA311}}</ref> and by [[Jaegwon Kim]]:<ref name=Kim>{{cite book |author=Jaegwon Kim |title=The Oxford Companion to Philosophy  |editor=Ted Honderich |isbn=978-0191037474 |year=2005 |edition=2nd |chapter=Entry for ‘mental reductionism’ |publisher=Oxford University Press |page=794 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bJFCAwAAQBAJ&pg=PT1885}}</ref> that form of reductionism which concerns a program of replacing the facts or entities involved in one type of discourse with other facts or entities from another type, thereby providing a relationship between them. Richard Jones distinguishes ontological and epistemological reductionism, arguing that many ontological and epistemological reductionists affirm the need for different concepts for different degrees of complexity while affirming a reduction of theories.<ref name=Jones />

The idea of reductionism can be expressed by "levels" of explanation, with higher levels reducible if need be to lower levels. This use of levels of understanding in part expresses our human limitations in remembering detail. However, "most philosophers would insist that our role in conceptualizing reality [our need for a hierarchy of "levels" of understanding] does not change the fact that different levels of organization in reality do have different 'properties'."<ref name=Jones />

Reductionism does not preclude the existence of what might be termed [[Emergence|emergent phenomena]], but it does imply the ability to understand those phenomena completely in terms of the processes from which they are composed. This reductionist understanding is very different from ontological or strong [[emergentism]], which intends that what emerges in "emergence" is more than the sum of the processes from which it emerges, respectively either in the ontological sense or in the epistemological sense.<ref>Axelrod and Cohen "Harnessing Complexity"</ref> 

=== Ontological reductionism ===
Richard Jones divides ontological reductionism into two: the reductionism of substances (e.g., the reduction of mind to matter) and the reduction of the number of structures operating in nature (e.g., the reduction of one physical force to another). This permits scientists and philosophers to affirm the former while being anti-reductionists regarding the latter.<ref>Richard H. Jones (2000), ''Reductionism: Analysis and the Fullness of Reality'', pp. 24—26, 29–31. Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press.</ref>

[[Nancey Murphy]] has claimed that there are two species of ontological reductionism: one that claims that wholes are nothing more than their parts; and atomist reductionism, claiming that wholes are not "really real". She admits that the phrase "really real" is apparently senseless but she has tried to explicate the supposed difference between the two.<ref>Nancey Murphy, "Reductionism and Emergence. A Critical Perspective." In ''Human Identity at the Intersection of Science, Technology and Religion''. Edited by Nancey Murphy, and Christopher C. Knight. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010. P. 82.</ref>

Ontological reductionism denies the idea of ontological [[emergence]], and claims that emergence is an [[Epistemology|epistemological]] phenomenon that only exists through analysis or description of a system, and does not exist fundamentally.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Silberstein|first1=Michael|last2=McGeever|first2=John|date=April 1999|title=The Search for Ontological Emergence|url=https://academic.oup.com/pq/article-lookup/doi/10.1111/1467-9213.00136|journal=The Philosophical Quarterly|language=en|volume=49|issue=195|pages=201–214|doi=10.1111/1467-9213.00136|issn=0031-8094}}</ref>

In some scientific disciplines, ontological reductionism takes two forms: '''token-identity theory''' and '''type-identity theory'''.<ref>{{cite book | chapter-url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-reduction/#TypIdeThe | title=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | chapter=Scientific Reduction | year=2019 | publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University }}</ref> In this case, "token" refers to a biological process.<ref>{{cite book | chapter-url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reduction-biology/ | title=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy | chapter=Reductionism in Biology | year=2022 | publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University }}</ref> 

Token ontological reductionism is the idea that every item that exists is a sum item. For perceivable items, it affirms that every perceivable item is a sum of items with a lesser degree of complexity. Token ontological reduction of biological things to chemical things is generally accepted.

Type ontological reductionism is the idea that every type of item is a sum type of item, and that every perceivable type of item is a sum of types of items with a lesser degree of complexity. Type ontological reduction of biological things to chemical things is often rejected.

[[Michael Ruse]] has criticized ontological reductionism as an improper argument against [[vitalism]].<ref>{{cite journal|url=http://icb.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/29/3/1061.pdf |first=Michael |last=Ruse |title=Do Organisms Exist? |journal=Am. Zool. |volume=29 |pages=1061–1066 |year=1989 |issue=3 |doi=10.1093/icb/29.3.1061|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081002163413/http://icb.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/29/3/1061.pdf |archive-date=2008-10-02 }}</ref>

=== Methodological reductionism ===
In a biological context, methodological reductionism means attempting to explain all biological phenomena in terms of their underlying biochemical and molecular processes.<ref>{{Cite encyclopedia |title=Reductionism in Biology |encyclopedia=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/reduction-biology/ |last1=Brigandt |first1=Ingo |date=2017 |editor-last=Zalta |editor-first=Edward N. |last2=Love |first2=Alan |access-date=2019-04-28}}</ref>

=== In religion ===
Anthropologists [[Edward Burnett Tylor]] and [[James George Frazer]] employed some [[Metatheories of religion in the social sciences#Edward Burnett Tylor and James George Frazer|religious reductionist arguments]].<ref>Strenski, Ivan. "Classic Twentieth-Century Theorist of the Study of Religion: Defending the Inner Sanctum of Religious Experience or Storming It." pp. 176–209 in ''Thinking About Religion: An Historical Introduction to Theories of Religion''. Malden: Blackwell, 2006.</ref>

=== Theory reductionism ===
Theory reduction is the process by which a more general theory absorbs a special theory.<ref name=":0" /> It can be further divided into translation, derivation, and explanation.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://iep.utm.edu/red-ism/#SH1b | title=Reductionism &#124; Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy }}</ref> For example, both [[Johannes Kepler|Kepler's]] laws of the motion of the [[planet]]s and [[Galileo Galilei|Galileo]]'s theories of motion formulated for terrestrial objects are reducible to Newtonian theories of mechanics because all the explanatory power of the former are contained within the latter. Furthermore, the reduction is considered beneficial because [[Newtonian mechanics]] is a more general theory—that is, it explains more events than Galileo's or Kepler's. Besides scientific theories, theory reduction more generally can be the process by which one explanation subsumes another.

=== In mathematics ===
In [[mathematics]], reductionism can be interpreted as the philosophy that all mathematics can (or ought to) be based on a common foundation, which for modern mathematics is usually [[axiomatic set theory]]. [[Ernst Zermelo]] was one of the major advocates of such an opinion; he also developed much of axiomatic set theory. It has been argued that the generally accepted method of justifying mathematical [[axioms]] by their usefulness in common practice can potentially weaken Zermelo's reductionist claim.<ref>{{cite journal |doi=10.1305/ndjfl/1093633905 |first=R. Gregory |last=Taylor |title=Zermelo, Reductionism, and the Philosophy of Mathematics |journal=Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic |volume=34 |issue=4 |year=1993 |pages=539–563 |doi-access=free }}</ref>

Jouko Väänänen has argued for [[second-order logic]] as a foundation for mathematics instead of set theory,<ref>{{cite journal |first=J. |last=Väänänen |title=Second-Order Logic and Foundations of Mathematics |journal=Bulletin of Symbolic Logic |volume=7 |issue=4 |pages=504–520 |year=2001 |doi=10.2307/2687796 |jstor=2687796 |s2cid=7465054 }}</ref> whereas others have argued for [[category theory]] as a foundation for certain aspects of mathematics.<ref>{{cite journal |first=S. |last=Awodey |title=Structure in Mathematics and Logic: A Categorical Perspective |journal=Philos. Math. |series=Series III |volume=4 |issue=3 |year=1996 |pages=209–237 |doi=10.1093/philmat/4.3.209 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |first=F. W. |last=Lawvere |chapter=The Category of Categories as a Foundation for Mathematics |title=Proceedings of the Conference on Categorical Algebra (La Jolla, Calif., 1965) |pages=1–20 |publisher=Springer-Verlag |location=New York |year=1966 }}</ref>

The [[Gödel's incompleteness theorems|incompleteness theorems]] of [[Kurt Gödel]], published in 1931, caused doubt about the attainability of an axiomatic foundation for all of mathematics. Any such foundation would have to include axioms powerful enough to describe the arithmetic of the natural numbers (a subset of all mathematics). Yet Gödel proved that, for any ''consistent'' recursively enumerable axiomatic system powerful enough to describe the arithmetic of the natural numbers, there are (model-theoretically) ''true'' propositions about the natural numbers that cannot be proved from the axioms. Such propositions are known as formally [[Undecidable problem|undecidable propositions]]. For example, the [[continuum hypothesis]] is undecidable in the [[Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory]] as shown by [[Forcing (mathematics)|Cohen]].

=== In science ===
Reductionist thinking and methods form the basis for many of the well-developed topics of modern [[science]], including much of [[physics]], [[chemistry]] and [[molecular biology]]. [[Classical mechanics]] in particular is seen as a reductionist framework. For instance, the [[Solar System]] is understood in terms of its components (the Sun and the planets) and their interactions.<ref>{{Cite book|last=McCauley|first=Joseph L.|title=Dynamics of Markets: The New Financial Economics, Second Edition|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2009|isbn=978-0521429627|location=Cambridge|pages=241}}</ref> [[Statistical mechanics]] can be considered as a reconciliation of [[macroscopic]] [[thermodynamic laws]] with the reductionist method of explaining macroscopic properties in terms of [[microscopic]] components, although it has been argued that reduction in physics 'never goes all the way in practice'.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Simpson |first1=William M. R. |last2=Horsley |first2=Simon A.H. |series=Synthese Library |date=29 March 2022 |volume=451 |editor1-last=Austin |editor1-first=Christopher J.|editor2-last=Marmodoro |editor2-first=Anna |editor3-last=Roselli |editor3-first=Andrea |title=Powers, Time and Free Will |chapter-url=https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-030-92486-7_2 |publisher=Synthese Library |via=Springer |pages=17–50 |chapter=Toppling the Pyramids: Physics Without Physical State Monism |isbn=9781003125860 |doi=10.1007/978-3-030-92486-7_2}}</ref>

=== In computer science ===
The role of reduction in [[computer science]] can be thought as a precise and unambiguous mathematical formalization of the philosophical idea of "[[#Types|theory reductionism]]". In a general sense, a problem (or set) is said to be reducible to another problem (or set), if there is a computable/feasible method to translate the questions of the former into the latter, so that, if one knows how to computably/feasibly solve the latter problem, then one can computably/feasibly solve the former. Thus, the latter can only be at least as "[[NP-hardness|hard]]" to solve as the former.

Reduction in [[theoretical computer science]] is pervasive in both: the mathematical abstract foundations of computation; and in real-world [[Analysis of algorithms|performance or capability analysis of algorithms]]. More specifically, reduction is a foundational and central concept, not only in the realm of mathematical logic and abstract computation in [[Computability theory|computability (or recursive) theory]], where it assumes the form of e.g. [[Turing reduction]], but also in the realm of real-world computation in time (or space) complexity analysis of algorithms, where it assumes the form of e.g. [[polynomial-time reduction]]. Further, in the even more practical domain of software development, reduction can be seen as the inverse of composition and the conceptual process a programmer applies to a problem in order to produce an alogrithm which solves the problem using a composition of existing algorithms (encoded as subroutines, or subclasses).

== Criticism ==


=== Free will ===
{{main|Free will}}
Philosophers of the [[Age of Enlightenment|Enlightenment]] worked to insulate human [[free will]] from reductionism. [[Descartes]] separated the material world of mechanical necessity from the world of mental free will. German philosophers introduced the concept of the "[[Noumenon|noumenal]]" realm that is not governed by the deterministic laws of "[[Phenomena (philosophy)|phenomenal]]" nature, where every event is completely determined by chains of causality.<ref>{{Citation|last=Guyer|first=Paul|title=18th Century German Aesthetics|date=2020|url=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/aesthetics-18th-german/|encyclopedia=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy|editor-last=Zalta|editor-first=Edward N.|access-date=2023-03-16|edition=Fall 2020|publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University}}</ref> The most influential formulation was by [[Immanuel Kant]], who distinguished between the causal deterministic framework the mind imposes on the world—the phenomenal realm—and the world as it exists for itself, the noumenal realm, which, as he believed, included free will. To insulate theology from reductionism, 19th century post-Enlightenment German theologians, especially [[Friedrich Schleiermacher]] and [[Albrecht Ritschl]], used the [[Romanticism|Romantic]] method of basing religion on the human spirit, so that it is a person's feeling or sensibility about spiritual matters that comprises religion.<ref>Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson, eds. ''The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science'' (2006) p. 161</ref>

=== Causation ===
Most common philosophical understandings of [[Causality|causation]] involve reducing it to some collection of non-causal facts. Opponents of these reductionist views have given arguments that the non-causal facts in question are insufficient to determine the causal facts.<ref name=Carroll>{{cite book |title=The Oxford Handbook of Causation |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=xGnZtUtG-nIC&pg=PA292 |page=292 |author=John W Carroll |chapter=Chapter 13: Anti-reductionism |isbn=978-0199279739 |publisher=Oxford Handbooks Online |year=2009 |editor1=[[Helen Beebee]] |editor2=[[Christopher Hitchcock]] |editor3=[[Peter Menzies (philosopher)|Peter Menzies]] }}</ref>

[[Alfred North Whitehead]]'s metaphysics opposed reductionism. He refers to this as the "[[Reification (fallacy)|fallacy of the misplaced concreteness]]". His scheme was to frame a rational, general understanding of phenomena, derived from our reality.

=== In science ===
An alternative term for ontological reductionism is ''fragmentalism'',<ref>{{cite journal|author=Kukla A|title=Antirealist Explanations of the Success of Science|journal=Philosophy of Science|volume=63|issue=1|pages=S298–S305|year=1996|doi=10.1086/289964|jstor=188539|s2cid=171074337}}</ref> often used in a [[pejorative]] sense.<ref>{{cite journal|author=Pope ML|title=Personal construction of formal knowledge |journal=Interchange |volume=13 |issue=4 |pages=3–14 |year=1982 |doi=10.1007/BF01191417 |s2cid=198195182}}</ref> In [[cognitive psychology]], [[George Kelly (psychologist)|George Kelly]] developed "constructive alternativism" as a form of [[personal construct psychology]] and an alternative to what he considered "accumulative fragmentalism". For this theory, knowledge is seen as the construction of successful [[mental model]]s of the exterior world, rather than the accumulation of independent "nuggets of truth".<ref>{{cite journal|vauthors=Pope ML, Watts M |title=Constructivist Goggles: Implications for Process in Teaching and Learning Physics|journal=Eur. J. Phys.|volume=9|pages=101–109|year=1988|doi=10.1088/0143-0807/9/2/004|issue=2|bibcode = 1988EJPh....9..101P |s2cid=250876891 }}</ref> Others argue that inappropriate use of reductionism limits our understanding of complex systems. In particular, ecologist [[Robert Ulanowicz]] says that science must develop techniques to study ways in which larger scales of organization influence smaller ones, and also ways in which feedback loops create structure at a given level, independently of details at a lower level of organization. He advocates and uses [[information theory]] as a framework to study [[Propensity probability|propensities]] in natural systems.<ref>R.E. Ulanowicz, ''Ecology: The Ascendant Perspective'', Columbia University Press (1997) ({{ISBN|0231108281}})</ref> The limits of the application of reductionism are claimed to be especially evident at levels of organization with greater [[complexity]], including living [[Cell (biology)|cells]],<ref name=Huber2013>{{cite journal |last1=Huber |first1=F |last2=Schnauss |first2=J |last3=Roenicke |first3=S |last4=Rauch |first4=P |last5=Mueller |first5=K |last6=Fuetterer |first6=C |last7=Kaes |first7=J  |title=Emergent complexity of the cytoskeleton: from single filaments to tissue |journal=Advances in Physics |volume=62 |issue=1 |pages=1–112 |year=2013 |doi=10.1080/00018732.2013.771509|bibcode = 2013AdPhy..62....1H |pmid=24748680 |pmc=3985726}} [http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00018732.2013.771509 online]</ref> [[neural networks (biology)]], [[ecosystems]], [[society]], and other systems formed from assemblies of large numbers of diverse components linked by multiple [[feedback loop]]s.<ref name="Huber2013" /><ref name=Clayton2006>{{cite journal |editor1-last= Clayton |editor1-first= P |editor2-last= Davies |editor2-first= P |title=The Re-emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion |publisher=Oxford University Press |location=New York |year=2006}}</ref>

== See also ==
{{Portal|Philosophy|Psychology}}
{{div col|colwidth=30em}}
* [[Antireductionism]]
* [[Eliminative materialism]]
* [[Emergentism]]
* [[Further facts]]
* [[Greedy reductionism]]
* [[Materialism]]
* [[Multiple realizability]]
* [[Physicalism]]
* [[Technological determinism]]
{{div col end}}

== References ==
{{Reflist|refs=
<ref name=GodfreySmith>{{cite book |title=Philosophy of Biology |author=Peter Godfrey-Smith |isbn= 978-1400850440 |year=2013 |publisher=Princeton University Press |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hfvsAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA16 |page=16}}</ref>

<ref name=Jones>{{cite book |title=Reductionism: Analysis and the Fullness of Reality |author= Richard H. Jones |chapter=Clarification of terminology |publisher=Bucknell University Press |year=2000 |isbn= 978-0838754399 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=sUgnio874NUC&q=%22+has+some+properties+that+other+levels+do+not+share%22&pg=PA19 |pages= 19– [27–28, 32]}}</ref>

<ref name=MerriamWebster>{{cite book |title=Merriam-Webster's Encyclopedia of World Religions |chapter=Reductionism |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ZP_f9icf2roC&q=reductionism+%22simpler+or+more+basic%22&pg=PA911 |isbn=978-0877790440 |year=1999 |editor=Wendy Doniger |publisher=Merriam-Webster |page=[https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780877790440/page/911 911] |url=https://archive.org/details/isbn_9780877790440/page/911 }}</ref>

<ref name=Nagel>{{cite book |title=Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False |author=Thomas Nagel |year=2012 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0199919758 |pages=4–5 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=sFRpAgAAQBAJ&q=%22psychophysical+reductionism,+a+position+in+the+philosophy+of+mind%22&pg=PA4}}</ref>

<ref name=Ney>{{cite encyclopedia |encyclopedia=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |author=Alyssa Ney |author-link=Alyssa Ney|title=Reductionism |url=http://www.iep.utm.edu/red-ism/ |access-date=March 13, 2015 |publisher=IEP, University of Tennessee}}</ref>

}}

== Further reading ==
* Churchland, Patricia (1986), ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=hAeFMFW3rDUC&q=reductionism Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain]''. MIT Press.
* Dawkins, Richard (1976), ''[[The Selfish Gene]]''. Oxford University Press; 2nd edition, December 1989.
* Dennett, Daniel C. (1995) ''Darwin's Dangerous Idea''. Simon & Schuster.
* Descartes (1637), ''Discourses'', Part V.
* Dupre, John (1993), ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=Ev3HvgSjb1EC&q=reductionism The Disorder of Things]''. Harvard University Press.
* Galison, Peter and David J. Stump, eds. (1996), ''The Disunity of the Sciences: Boundaries, Contexts, and Power''. Stanford University Press.
* Jones, Richard H. (2013), ''Analysis & the Fullness of Reality: An Introduction to Reductionism & Emergence''. Jackson Square Books.
* Laughlin, Robert (2005), ''A Different Universe: Reinventing Physics from the Bottom Down.'' Basic Books.
* Nagel, Ernest (1961), ''The Structure of Science''. New York.
* [[Pinker, Steven]] (2002), ''The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature''. Viking Penguin.
* Ruse, Michael (1988), ''Philosophy of Biology''. Albany, NY.
* [[Rosenberg, Alexander]] (2006), ''Darwinian Reductionism or How to Stop Worrying and Love Molecular Biology''. University of Chicago Press.
* Eric Scerri The reduction of chemistry to physics has become a central aspect of the philosophy of chemistry. See several articles by this author.
* [[Weinberg, Steven]] (1992), ''Dreams of a Final Theory: The Scientist's Search for the Ultimate Laws of Nature'', Pantheon Books.
* [[Weinberg, Steven]] (2002) describes what he terms the culture war among physicists in his review of ''[[A New Kind of Science (book)|A New Kind of Science]]''.
* [[Fritjof Capra|Capra, Fritjof]] (1982), ''The Turning Point''.
* Lopez, F., Il pensiero olistico di Ippocrate. Riduzionismo, antiriduzionismo, scienza della complessità nel trattato sull'Antica Medicina, vol. IIA, Ed. Pubblisfera, Cosenza Italy 2008.
* Maureen L Pope, ''Personal construction of formal knowledge,'' Humanities Social Science and Law, 13.4, December, 1982, pp.&nbsp;3–14
* Tara W. Lumpkin, ''Perceptual Diversity: Is Polyphasic Consciousness Necessary for Global Survival?'' December 28, 2006, [http://www.bioregionalanimism.com/2006/12/is-polyphasic-consciousness-necessary.html bioregionalanimism.com] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160410233733/http://www.bioregionalanimism.com/2006/12/is-polyphasic-consciousness-necessary.html |date=2016-04-10 }}
* Vandana Shiva, 1995, ''Monocultures, Monopolies and the Masculinisation of Knowledge.'' International Development Research Centre (IDRC) Reports: Gender Equity. 23: 15–17. [https://web.archive.org/web/20051015164356/http://idrinfo.idrc.ca/archive/ReportsINTRA/pdfs/v23n2e/109174.htm Gender and Equity (v. 23, no. 2, July 1995)]
* The Anti-Realist Side of the Debate: A Theory's Predictive Success does not Warrant Belief in the Unobservable Entities it Postulates Andre Kukla and Joel Walmsley.

== External links ==
{{Wiktionary|reductionism}}
{{Commons category}}
* [[Alyssa Ney]], [http://www.iep.utm.edu/red-ism/ "Reductionism"] in: ''[[Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]''.
* Ingo Brigandt and Alan Love, [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reduction-biology/ "Reductionism in Biology"] in: ''The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy''.
* [http://www.galilean-library.org/dupre.html John Dupré: The Disunity of Science]—an interview at the Galilean Library covering criticisms of reductionism.
* [http://hplusmagazine.com/2011/03/31/reduction-considered-harmful/ Monica Anderson: Reductionism Considered Harmful] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190416134011/http://hplusmagazine.com/2011/03/31/reduction-considered-harmful/ |date=2019-04-16 }}
* [http://www.iep.utm.edu/red-chem/  Reduction and Emergence in Chemistry], ''Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy''.

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{{analytic philosophy}}
{{philosophy of science}}
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