Editing Root certificate

{{Short description|Certificate identifying a root authority}}
[[File:Chain of trust v2.svg|alt=|thumb|400x400px|The role of root certificate as in the [[chain of trust]].]]
In [[cryptography]] and [[computer security]], a '''root certificate''' is a [[public key certificate]] that identifies a root [[certificate authority]] (CA).<ref>{{cite web
| url=https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc778623(v=ws.10).aspx
| title=What Are CA Certificates?
| date=2003-03-28
| publisher=[[Microsoft TechNet]]}}</ref> Root certificates are [[self-signed certificate|self-signed]] (and it is possible for a certificate to have multiple trust paths, say if the certificate was issued by a root that was cross-signed) and form the basis of an [[X.509]]-based [[public key infrastructure]] (PKI). Either it has matched Authority Key Identifier with Subject Key Identifier, in some cases there is no Authority Key identifier, then Issuer string should match with Subject string ({{IETF RFC|5280}}). For instance, the PKIs supporting [[HTTP Server|HTTPS]]<ref name=":0" /> for secure [[World Wide Web|web]] browsing and [[electronic signature]] schemes depend on a set of root certificates.

A [[certificate authority]] can issue multiple certificates in the form of a [[tree structure]]. A root certificate is the top-most certificate of the tree, the private key which is used to "sign" other certificates. All certificates signed by the root certificate, with the "CA" field set to true, inherit the trustworthiness of the root certificate—a signature by a root certificate is somewhat analogous to "notarizing" identity in the physical world. Such a certificate is called an intermediate certificate or subordinate CA certificate. Certificates further down the tree also depend on the trustworthiness of the intermediates.

The root certificate is usually made trustworthy by some mechanism other than a certificate, such as by secure physical distribution. For example, some of the best-known root certificates are distributed in operating systems by their manufacturers. [[Microsoft]] distributes root certificates belonging to members of the Microsoft Root Certificate Program to [[Windows]] desktops and [[Windows 8 phone | Windows Phone 8]].<ref name=":0">{{cite web
| url=http://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/14215.windows-and-windows-iphone-rsx-ssl-root-certificate-program-member-cas.aspx
| title=Windows and Windows Phone 8 SSL Root Certificate Program (Member CAs)
| date=October 2014
| publisher=[[Microsoft TechNet]]}}</ref> Apple distributes root certificates belonging to members of its own [[Public key certificate#Root programs|root program]].

==Incidents of root certificate misuse==

===DigiNotar hack of 2011===
{{main|DigiNotar}}
In 2011, the [[Netherlands|Dutch]] certificate authority [[DigiNotar]] suffered a security breach. This led to the issuing of various fraudulent certificates, which was among others abused to target Iranian Gmail users. The trust in DigiNotar certificates was retracted and the operational management of the company was taken over by the [[Dutch government]].

===China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) issuance of fake certificates===
[[File:Firefox 89 AboutCertificate RootCA screenshot.png|thumb|Example of a [[DigiCert]] root certificate]]
{{main|China Internet Network Information Center}}
In 2009, an employee of the [[China Internet Network Information Center]] (CNNIC) applied to [[Mozilla]] to add CNNIC to Mozilla's root certificate list<ref>{{Cite web|title=476766 - Add China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) CA Root Certificate|url=https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=476766|accessdate=2020-01-03|work=bugzilla.mozilla.org|language=en|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200222152232/https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=476766|archive-date=2020-02-22|url-status=dead}}</ref> and was approved. Later, [[Microsoft]] also added CNNIC to the root certificate list of [[Windows]].

In 2015, many users chose not to trust the digital certificates issued by CNNIC because an intermediate CA issued by CNNIC was found to have issued fake certificates for Google domain names<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.solidot.org/story?sid=43434|title=CNNIC发行的中级CA发行了Google的假证书|publisher=[[solidot]]|date=2015-03-24|accessdate=2015-03-24|url-status=dead|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20150326174351/http://www.solidot.org/story?sid=43434|archivedate=2015-03-26}}</ref> and raised concerns about CNNIC's abuse of certificate issuing power.<ref>{{cite web|title=最危险的互联网漏洞正在逼近|url=https://qdan.me/list/VRJfywTb_Gix3bnz|accessdate=2015-03-26|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151121234024/https://qdan.me/list/VRJfywTb_Gix3bnz|archive-date=2015-11-21|url-status=dead}}</ref>

On April 2, 2015, [[Google]] announced that it no longer recognized the electronic certificate issued by CNNIC.<ref>{{cite news |title=Google Bans China's Website Certificate Authority After Security Breach |url=https://techcrunch.com/2015/04/01/google-cnnic/ |issue=April 2, 2015 |publisher=Extra Crunch}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=谷歌不再承認中國CNNIC頒發的信任證書|url=https://cn.wsj.com/articles/CN-TEC-20150402163336|accessdate=2015-04-03|newspaper=[[華爾街日報]]|date=2015-04-03}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=谷歌不再信任中国CNNIC 的网站信任证书|url=http://www.voachinese.com/content/google-20150402/2704684.html|accessdate=2015-04-03|newspaper=[[美國之音]]|date=2015-04-03}}</ref> On April 4, following Google, Mozilla also announced that it no longer recognized the electronic certificate issued by CNNIC.<ref>{{cite news |title=Google and Mozilla decide to ban Chinese certificate authority CNNIC from Chrome and Firefox |url=https://venturebeat.com/2015/04/02/google-and-mozilla-decide-to-ban-chinese-certificate-authority-cnnic-from-chrome-and-firefox/ |publisher=VentureBeat |date=April 2, 2015}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=Mozilla紧随谷歌 拒绝承认中国安全证书|url=http://m.voachinese.com/a/mozilla-google-20150403/2706030.html|accessdate=2015-04-04|newspaper=[[美國之音]]|date=2015-04-04}}</ref>

===WoSign and StartCom: Issuing fake and backdated certificates ===
{{main|WoSign|StartCom}}
In 2016, [[WoSign]], [[China]]'s largest CA certificate issuer owned by [[Qihoo 360]]<ref>{{Cite web|title=谷歌宣布开始全面封杀使用沃通CA证书网站，信誉破产的恶果 - 超能网|url=https://www.expreview.com/55509.html|accessdate=2020-01-03|work=www.expreview.com}}</ref> and its [[State of Israel|Israeli]] subsidiary [[StartCom]], were denied recognition of their certificates by [[Google]]. [[Microsoft]] removed the relevant certificates in 2017.<ref>{{cite news |author1=Microsoft Defender Security Research Team |date=2017-08-08 |title=Microsoft to remove WoSign and StartCom certificates in Windows 10 |publisher=Microsoft |url=https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2017/08/08/microsoft-to-remove-wosign-and-startcom-certificates-in-windows-10/}}</ref>

WoSign and StartCom issued hundreds of certificates with the same serial number in just five days, as well as issuing backdated certificates.<ref>{{Cite web|title=CA:WoSign Issues - MozillaWiki|url=https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:WoSign_Issues|accessdate=2020-01-03|work=wiki.mozilla.org}}</ref> In 2016, a system administrator in Florida was able to get WoSign and StartCom to issue fake certificates for multiple [[GitHub]] domains.<ref>{{cite web |author1=Stephen Schrauger |title=The story of how WoSign gave me an SSL certificate for GitHub.com |url=https://www.schrauger.com/the-story-of-how-wosign-gave-me-an-ssl-certificate-for-github-com |website=Schrauger.com}}</ref>

== See also==
* [[Online Certificate Status Protocol]] (OCSP)
* [[Superfish]]
* [[SHA-1]]
* [[Timestamp]]
* [[Verisign]]
* [[Gen Digital#Google and Symantec clash on website security checks|Google and Symantec clash on website security checks]]

==References==
<references/>{{SSL/TLS}} 
[[Category: Public key infrastructure]]
[[Category: Transport Layer Security]]