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{{Short description|Conflict between groups related to the form of government they live under}} {{Distinguish|Secularism}} {{about|sectarianism and its different conceptual interpretations|sectarianism as a characteristic of sects|sect}} {{Discrimination sidebar|expand-social=yes}} '''Sectarianism''' is a debated concept. Some scholars and journalists define it as pre-existing fixed communal categories in society, and use it to explain political, cultural, or [[Religious conflict|religious conflicts]] between groups.<ref name=":12">{{Cite book |last=Sayed |first=Linda |title=In Practising Sectarianism |publisher=Stanford:Stanford University Press |year=2022 |pages=31–51 |chapter=Negotiating Citizenship}}</ref> Others conceive of sectarianism as a set of social practices where daily life is organized on the basis of communal norms and rules that individuals strategically use and transcend.<ref name=":16">{{Cite book |last=Sbaiti |first=Nadya |title=In Practising Sectarianism |publisher=Stanford:Stanford University Press |year=2022 |pages=14–30 |chapter=“No Room for This Story”}}</ref><ref name=":17">{{Cite book |last=L. Deeb, T. Nalbantian, N. Sbaiti |title=In Practicing sectarianism |publisher=Stanford: Stanford University Press |year=2022 |pages=1–13 |chapter=Introduction}}</ref> This definition highlights the co-constitutive aspect of sectarianism and people's agency, as opposed to understanding sectarianism as being fixed and incompatible communal boundaries.<ref name=":12" /><ref name=":16" /><ref name=":17" /> While sectarianism is often labelled as religious or political, the reality of a sectarian situation is usually much more complex. In its most basic form, sectarianism has been defined as, 'the existence, within a locality, of two or more divided and actively competing communal identities, resulting in a strong sense of dualism which unremittingly transcends commonality, and is both culturally and physically manifest.'<ref>{{Cite book|last=Roberts|first=Keith Daniel|title=Liverpool Sectarianism: The Rise and Demise|publisher=Liverpool University Press|year=2017|isbn=978-1-78694-010-0|location=Liverpool|pages=19}}</ref> == Definition == The term "sectarianism" is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as "excessive attachment to a particular sect or party, especially in religion".<ref name=":4">{{Citation |last=Dixon |first=Paul |title=Beyond Sectarianism in the Middle East? |date=2018-02-01 |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190876050.003.0002 |work=Beyond Sunni and Shia |pages=11–36 |publisher=Oxford University Press |doi=10.1093/oso/9780190876050.003.0002 |isbn=978-0-19-087605-0 |access-date=2022-05-23|url-access=subscription }}</ref> The phrase "[[sectarian conflict]]" usually refers to violent conflict along religious or political lines, such as the conflicts between [[Irish Nationalism|Nationalists]] and [[Unionism in Ireland|Unionists]] in [[Northern Ireland]] (religious and class-divisions may play major roles as well). It may also refer to general philosophical, political disparity between different schools of thought, such as that between [[Shia Islam|Shia]] and [[Sunni Islam|Sunni]] [[Muslim]]s. Non-sectarians see free association and tolerance of different beliefs as the cornerstones to successful, peaceful human interaction. They adopt political and religious [[Pluralism (political philosophy)|pluralism]]. === Polemics against the term "sectarianism" === Some scholars identify the problems with using the term "sectarianism" in articles.<ref name=":03">{{Cite journal |last1=Hashemi |first1=Nader |last2=Postel |first2=Danny |date=2017-07-03 |title=Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15570274.2017.1354462 |journal=The Review of Faith & International Affairs |volume=15 |issue=3 |pages=1–13 |doi=10.1080/15570274.2017.1354462 |s2cid=149047635 |issn=1557-0274}}</ref><ref name=":14">{{Citation |last=Haddad |first=Fanar |title=Sunni–Shi'a Relations |date=2020-03-15 |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197510629.003.0006 |work=Understanding 'Sectarianism' |pages=167–216 |publisher=Oxford University Press |doi=10.1093/oso/9780197510629.003.0006 |isbn=978-0-19-751062-9 |access-date=2022-05-23|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Western mainstream media and politicians often presume "sectarianism" as ancient and long-lasting. For example, [[Barack Obama|Obama]] in his final State of the Union address phrased the sectarian violence in the Middle East as "rooted in conflicts that dated back millennia", but many pointed out that some sectarian tensions don't even date back a decade.<ref>{{cite news |last=Adam |first=Karla |date=2016 |title=Washington Post |pages=np |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/01/13/obama-ridiculed-for-saying-conflicts-in-the-middle-east-date-back-millennia-some-dont-date-back-a-decade/ |access-date=May 24, 2022}}</ref> "Sectarianism" is also too ambiguous, which makes it a slogan whose meanings are up to the observers.<ref name=":14"/> Scholars argued that the use of term "sectarianism" has become a catch-all explanation to conflicts, which drives analytical attention away from underlying political and socioeconomic issues, lacks coherence, and is often associated with emotional negativity.<ref name=":03"/><ref name=":14"/> Many scholars find the term "sectarianism" problematic, and therefore three alternatives are proposed. ==== Alternative: Sectarianization ==== Hashemi and Postel and other scholars differentiate between "sectarianism" and "sectarianization".<ref name=":03"/> While "sectarianism" describes antipathy, prejudice, and discrimination between subdivisions within a group, e.g. based on their religious or ethnic identity, the latter describes a process mobilized by political actors operating within authoritarian contexts to pursue their political goals that involve popular mobilization around religious or identity markers.<ref name=":03" /> The use of the word ''sectarianism'' to explain [[sectarian violence]] and its upsurge in i.e. the [[Middle East]] is insufficient, as it does not take into account complex political realities.<ref name=":03" /> In the past and present, religious identities have been [[Politicization|politicized]] and mobilized by state actors inside and outside of the Middle East in pursuit of [[Political opportunism|political gain]] and [[Power in international relations|power]]. The term ''sectarianization'' conceptualizes this notion.<ref name=":blabla">Hashemi, Nader, and Danny Postel. "Introduction: The Sectarianization Thesis." In [https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/957133611 ''Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East''], edited by Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. pp. 3, 5, 6, 10. {{ISBN|978-0-19-937-726-8}}.</ref> Sectarianization is an active, multi-layered process and a set of practices, not a static condition, that is set in motion and shaped by political actors pursuing political goals.<ref name=":blabla" /><ref name=":blabla1">Weiss, Max. [https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674052987 ''In the Shadow of Sectarianism : Law, Shi`ism, and the Making of Modern Lebanon'']. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010. pp. 3, 4, 9–11, 11–128, 127, 129, 229. {{ISBN|978-0-674-05298-7}}.</ref><ref name=":blabla4">Hashemi, Nader. [https://en.qantara.de/content/interview-with-political-scientists-nader-hashemi-and-danny-postel-the-wests-intellectually The West's "intellectually lazy" obsession with sectarianism]. Interview by Emran Feroz. Qantara, 17 October 2018.</ref> The sectarianization thesis focuses on the intersection of politics and sectarian identity from a top-down state-centric perspective.<ref name=":03" /> Sectarianization would be more precise if you're referring to how sectarian identities and divisions are systematically created or reinforced by the state or other institutions, while sectarianism would be more appropriate when discussing the ideology or attitude that underpins sectarian divisions. While religious identity is salient in the Middle East and has contributed to and intensified conflicts across the region, it is the politicization and mobilization of popular sentiments around certain identity markers ("sectarianization") that explains the extent and upsurge of sectarian violence in the Middle East.<ref name=":blabla" /> The Ottoman [[Tanzimat]], [[colonialism|European colonialism]] and [[authoritarianism]] are key in the process of sectarianization in the Middle East.<ref name=":blabla" /><ref name=":blabla1" /><ref name=":blabla3">Makdisi, Ussama Samir. [https://www.ucpress.edu/book/9780520218468/the-culture-of-sectarianism ''The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon'']. California: University of California Press, 2000. p. 2. {{ISBN|0-520-21845-0}}</ref><ref name=":blabla2">Makdisi, Ussama Samir. [https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/17534/ISIM_8_Understanding_Sectarianism.pdf?sequence=1 "Understanding Sectarianism."] ''ISIM Newsletter'' 8, no.1 (2001), p. 19.</ref> ==== Alternative: Sectarian as a prefix ==== Haddad argues "sectarianism" cannot capture sectarian relations in reality nor represent the complex expressions of sectarian identities.<ref name=":14"/> Haddad calls for an abandonment of -''ism'' in "sectarianism" in scholarly research as it "has overshadowed the root" and direct use of 'sectarian' as a qualifier to "direct our analytical focus towards understanding sectarian ''identity''".<ref name=":14" /> Sectarian identity is "simultaneously formulated along four overlapping, interconnected and mutually informing dimensions: doctrinal, subnational, national, and transnational".<ref name=":14" /> The relevance of these factors is context-dependent and works on four layers in chorus. The multi-layered work provides more clarity and enables more accurate diagnoses of problems at certain dimensions to find more specific solutions. ==== Alternative: Sextarianism ==== In her book Sextarianism, Mikdashi emphasizes the relationship between sect, sex and sexuality.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Mikdashi |first=Maya |title=Sextarianism |date=2022 |publisher=University Press Stanford |year=2022}}</ref> She argues that sectarianism cannot be studied in isolation, because the practice of sectarianism always goes hand in hand with the practice of [[sexism]]. Moreover, she states that the category 'sect' is already a [[Patriarchy|patriarchal]] inheritance. For this reason she proposes the term "sextarianism". Sex, [[Human sexuality|sexuality]] and sect together define citizenship, and, since the concept of citizenship is the basis of the modern nation-state, sextarianism therefore forms the basis for the legal bureaucratic systems of the state and thus for state power.<ref name=":21">{{Cite book |last=Mikdashi |first=Maya |url=https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9781503631564/html |title=Sextarianism: Sovereignty, Secularism, and the State in Lebanon |date=2022-05-03 |publisher=Stanford University Press |isbn=978-1-5036-3156-4 |pages=23-50 |language=English |doi=10.1515/9781503631564}}</ref> It emphasizes how state power articulates, disarticulates, and manages sexual difference bureaucratically, ideologically, and legally.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Mikdashi |first=Maya |title=Sextarianism |date=2022 |publisher=Stanford University Press |year=2022 |pages=3}}</ref> To further illustrate the dimensions by which the dynamics of sextarianism in Lebanese society can be explained, Mikdashi refers to two central concepts: Evangelical Secularism, and the Epidermal State <ref>Mikdashi, M. (2022). The Epidermal State: Violence and the Materiality of Power. In Sextarianism (pp. 153–182). Stanford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781503631564-007</ref><ref>Mikdashi, M. (2022). Are You Going to Pride? Evangelical Secularism and the Politics of Law. In Sextarianism (pp. 117–152). Stanford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781503631564-006</ref> Based on [[Carole Pateman]], sexual difference is political difference, while sexual difference is not merely a biological or cultural distinction but a fundamental mechanism of power relations. She argues that sexual difference functions as a process through which sectarian, [[Gender|gendered]], and sexual positions are structurally produced, represented, imagined, desired, and managed. In this view, the construction of sexual difference is inseparable from political structures, shaping not only individual identities but also the broader organization of social and political life.<ref name=":23" /> '''Dimension of Sextarianism: Evangelical Secularism and the Epidermal State''' ''Sextarianism'' builds on [[Joan Wallach Scott|Joan Scott]]’s theorization of the constitutive nature of sexual difference to the history of secularism.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Mikdashi |first=Maya |title=Sextarianism |date=2022 |publisher=Stanford University Press |year=2022 |pages=3}}</ref> According to Mikdashi, sectarianism provided her with the chance to examine the Lebanese state without separating or favoring sectarian differences from sexual differences. This approach is rooted in the ways the state regulates and creates both sexual and sectarian distinctions. The Lebanese legal system shapes sexual difference across various areas of law, with sexual difference playing a far more significant role as a legal category than sectarian difference. The Lebanese state handles both sexual and sectarian differences through its judicial and governmental/bureaucratic structures.<ref name=":21" /> Mikdashi furthermore ties this development to the concepts of the evangelical and state based secularism which by emphasising the sectarian sphere through its sovereignty, securitisation, and citizenship laws, manages to enshrine its view into society <ref name=":23">Mikdashi, M. (2022). Afterlives of a Census: Rethinking State Power and Political Difference. Sextarianism: Sovereignty, Secularism, and the State in Lebanon. (pp 24-47). Stanford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781503631564-002</ref> The second important component - the epidermal state - is used by Mikdashi to show the locus and mode with which states manifest their power to enforce sextarianism. <ref>Mikdashi, M. (2022). The Epidermal State: Violence and the Materiality of Power. In Sextarianism (pp. 153–182). Stanford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781503631564-007</ref> Mikdashi also refers to the idea that sextarianism unpacks how [[heterosexuality]], the [[Gender binary|sex binary]], and civil and [[criminal law]] are key to secularism’s management of sexual and religious difference, with secularism’s investment in sex manifesting as the regulation of straight and [[queer]] sexualities and a sex-gender binary system.<ref name=":21" /> ==== Alternative: Practicing Sectarianism ==== In their book "Practicing Sectarianism" Deep, Nalbantian and Sbaiti (2022) emphasise that sectarianism does not need to remain a historical/anthropological pre-requisite for analyses but benefits from an understanding of the micro-level experiences of individuals, and how they relate, react, and contradict a static framing of "political" sectarianism. They also highlight that the concept - at least when focussing on the prominent example of Lebanon - should be understood as multi-dimensional with (1) political sectarianism, (2) Civil Sectarianism, and (3) Socio-Economic Sectarianism <ref>Deeb, L., Tsolin, N., Sbaiti, N., & Nalbantian, T. (2022). Introduction: Practicing Sectarianism in Lebanon. In Practicing Sectarianism (pp. 1–13). Stanford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781503633872-003</ref> == Intersectionality in Sectarianism == The analytical framework of [[intersectionality]] in examining sectarianism has gained increasing prominence in the study of this subject. Intersectionality highlights the nature of religious, ethnic, political, and social identities in contexts marked by sectarian tensions and conflicts.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Makofsky |first1=David |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=B21_EAAAQBAJ&q=intersectionality+sectarianism |title=Religious Fundamentalism in an Age of Conflict |last2=Unal |first2=Bayram |date=2022-08-04 |publisher=Cambridge Scholars Publishing |isbn=978-1-5275-8599-7 |language=en}}</ref> Acknowledging that individuals' experiences of sectarianism are shaped not only by their religious affiliation or other sectarian categories but also by other dimensions such as sex, class, and nationality among others, are essentially contributing to those experiences.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Aldoughli |first=Rahaf |date=2023-08-07 |title=Missing Gender: Conceptual Limitations in the Debate on "Sectarianism" in the Middle East |journal=Middle East Critique |volume=33 |language=en |pages=143–162 |doi=10.1080/19436149.2023.2243178 |issn=1943-6149|doi-access=free }}</ref> === Religious Dimension === Intersectionality reveals that factors like sex, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status intersect with religious identity to shape individuals' experiences of sectarianism. Authors such as Maya Mikdashi introduced the concept of 'Sextarianism', particularly showing how the role of gender is crucially influencing the individual's experience of religious sectarian differences in political sectarian systems such as in Lebanon.<ref name=":21" /> In the case of [[Sectarianism in Lebanon]], she highlights how Sextarian differences are decisive vectors in determining woman's experiences of power and sovereignty in a political sectarian system. === Political Dimension === In the political dimensions, the intersectional lens recognizes the intricate connections between political identities and other social categories. Political parties or other factions may exploit religious divisions for political gain, exacerbating sectarian tensions.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Kadhum |first=Oula |date=April 2019 |title=Ethno-sectarianism in Iraq, diaspora positionality and political transnationalism |url=https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/glob.12222 |journal=Global Networks |language=en |volume=19 |issue=2 |pages=158–178 |doi=10.1111/glob.12222 |issn=1470-2266|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Intersectionality helps to understand how for instance political affiliations intersect with factors such as socioeconomic status and regional background, providing insights into the motivation behind political mobilization and the dynamics of power in sectarian settings.<ref name=":22" /> === Implications for Communities === The [[intersectionality]] of sectarianism has profound implications for affected communities, particularly for individuals who belong to multiple marginalized groups such as women, migrants, and marginalized ethnicities living under sectarian systems. The recognition of these intersecting forms of discrimination and marginalization is decisive for developing inclusive strategies to promote peace, tolerance, and increased social cohesion within diverse societies. ==Political sectarianism== ===Sectarianism in the 21st century=== Sectarian tendencies in politics are visible in countries and cities associated with sectarian violence in the present, and the past.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Murphy|first1=Joanne|last2=McDowell|first2=Sara|date=1 September 2019|title=Transitional optics: Exploring liminal spaces after conflict|url=https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098018788988|journal=Urban Studies|language=en|volume=56|issue=12|pages=2499–2514|doi=10.1177/0042098018788988|s2cid=158601093|issn=0042-0980}}</ref> Notable examples where sectarianism affects lives are street-art expression, urban planning, and sports club affiliation.<ref name="Kennedy 510–522">{{Cite journal|last=Kennedy|first=David|date=1 July 2011|title=Moonbeams and baying dogs: football and Liverpool politics|url=https://doi.org/10.1080/14660970.2011.593792|journal=Soccer & Society|volume=12|issue=4|pages=510–522|doi=10.1080/14660970.2011.593792|s2cid=154131595|issn=1466-0970|url-access=subscription}}</ref> ====United Kingdom==== Across the United Kingdom, Scottish and Irish sectarian tendencies are often reflected in team-sport competitions.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Kavanagh|first=Thomas|date=October 2020|title="It'd Just Be Banter": Sectarianism in a Northern Irish Rugby Club|url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1532708619886330|journal=Cultural Studies ↔ Critical Methodologies|language=en|volume=20|issue=5|pages=485–495|doi=10.1177/1532708619886330|s2cid=210493062|issn=1532-7086|url-access=subscription}}</ref> Affiliations are regarded as a latent representation of sectarianism tendencies. (Since the early 1900s, cricket teams were established via patronage of sectarian affiliated landlords. In response to the Protestant representation of the sport, many Catholic schools founded their own Cricket schools.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Cairns|first=David|date=September 2000|title=The object of sectarianism: the material reality of sectarianism in Ulster Loyalism|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9655.00025|journal=Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute|volume=6|issue=3|pages=437–452|doi=10.1111/1467-9655.00025|issn=1359-0987|url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref name="Kennedy 510–522"/>) Modern day examples include tensions in sports such as football and have led to the passing of the ''"Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012''".<ref>{{Cite news|date=5 November 2013|title=Anti-sectarian football legislation could face early review|language=en-GB|work=BBC News|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-24825094|access-date=3 May 2021}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Bradley|first=Joseph M.|date=28 May 2015|title=Sectarianism, anti-sectarianism and Scottish football|url=https://doi.org/10.1080/17430437.2014.976008|journal=Sport in Society|volume=18|issue=5|pages=588–603|doi=10.1080/17430437.2014.976008|s2cid=144517890|issn=1743-0437|url-access=subscription}}</ref> ===Authoritarian regimes=== In recent years, authoritarian regimes have been particularly prone to sectarianization. This is because their key strategy of survival lies in manipulating sectarian identities to deflect demands for change and [[justice]], and preserve and perpetuate their power.<ref name=":blabla" /> The sectarianization as a theory and process that extended beyond the Middle East was introduced by Saleena Saleem (see <ref>{{Cite journal |last=Saleem |first=Saleena |date=2018 |title=State use of public order and social cohesion concerns in the securitisation of non-mainstream Muslims in Malaysia |url= |journal=Journal of Religious and Political Practice |language=en |volume=4 |issue=3 |pages=314–335 |doi=10.1080/20566093.2018.1525899}}</ref> and <ref>{{Cite thesis |last=Saleem |first=Saleena Begum |title=Trust in Polarised Plural Societies: Intersections Across the Ideological Divides of Women's Groups in Malaysia |date=2023 |degree=PhD |publisher=University of Liverpool |url=https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3172024 |doi=10.17638/03172024}}</ref>). Christian communities, and other religious and ethnic minorities in the Middle East, have been socially, economically and politically excluded and harmed primarily by regimes that focus on "securing power and manipulating their base by appeals to [[Arab nationalism]] and/or to [[Islam]]".<ref>Ellis, Kail C. "Epilogue." In [https://books.google.com/books?id=e7RGDwAAQBAJ&dq=authoritarianism+and+sectarianization&pg=PA211 ''Secular Nationalism and Citizenship in Muslim Countries: Arab Christians in Muslim Countries''], edited by Kail C. Ellis. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. p. 211. {{ISBN|978-3-319-71203-1}}.</ref> An example of this is the Middle Eastern regional response to the [[Iranian revolution]] of 1979. Middle Eastern dictatorships backed by the [[United States]], especially [[Saudi Arabia]], feared that the spread of the revolutionary spirit and ideology would affect their power and dominance in the region. Therefore, efforts were made to undermine the Iranian revolution by labeling it as a Shi’a conspiracy to corrupt the [[Sunni Islam|Sunni Islamic tradition]]. This was followed by a rise of [[anti-Shi'ism|anti-Shi’a sentiments]] across the region and a deterioration of [[Shi'a-Sunni relations]], impelled by funds from the Gulf states.<ref name=":blabla" /> Therefore, the process of sectarianization, the mobilization and politicization of sectarian identities, is a political tool for authoritarian regimes to perpetuate their power and justify violence.<ref name=":blabla" /> Western powers indirectly take part in the process of sectarianization by supporting undemocratic regimes in the Middle East.<ref name=":blabla4" /> As Nader Hashemi asserts:<blockquote>The U.S. invasion of Iraq; the support of various Western governments for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which commits war crime upon war crime in [[Yemen]] and disseminates poisonous sectarian [[propaganda]] throughout the Sunni world; not to mention longstanding Western support for highly repressive dictators who manipulate sectarian fears and anxieties as a strategy of control and regime survival – the "ancient hatreds" narrative [between Sunnis and Shi’as] washes this all away and lays the blame for the regionʹs problems on supposedly trans-historical religious passions. Itʹs absurd in the extreme and an exercise in bad faith.<ref name=":blabla4" /></blockquote> ==== Approaches to Study Sectarian Identities in authoritarian regimes ==== Scholars have adopted three approaches to study sectarian discourses: [[primordialism]], [[instrumentalism]], and [[Constructivism (ethnic politics)|constructivism]].<ref name=":4" /><ref name=":blabla" /><ref>{{Cite journal |date=2018-02-01 |editor-last=Wehrey |editor-first=Frederic |title=Beyond Sunni and Shia |url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190876050.001.0001 |doi=10.1093/oso/9780190876050.001.0001|isbn=978-0-19-087605-0 |url-access=subscription }}</ref> Primordialism sees sectarian identity as rotted in biology and ingrained in history and culture.<ref name=":4" /> Makdisi describes the process of bringing the sectarian discourses back to early Islamic history as "pervasive medievalization".<ref name=":10">Makdisi, Ussama. 2017. ‘The Problem of Sectarianism in the Middle East in an Age of Western Hegemony’. Pp. 23–34 in ''Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East'', edited by N. Hashemi and D. Postel. Oxford: University Press.</ref> The centuries-old narrative is problematic as it treats sectarian identities in the Middle East as ''sui generis'' instead of modern collective identities.<ref name=":14"/> Scholars should be cautious of sectarian essentialism and Middle East exceptionalism the primordial narrative reinforces since primordialism suggests sectarian tensions persist while theological differences do not guarantee conflicts.<ref name=":14"/><ref name=":blabla" /><ref name=":10" /> Instrumentalism emphasizes that ruling elites manipulate identities to create violent conflicts for their interests. Instrumentalists see the Sunni-Shi'a divide as a modern invention and challenge the myths of primordial narratives since sectarian harmony have existed for centuries.<ref name=":4" /> Constructivism is in the middle ground of primordialism and instrumentalism. ==Religious sectarianism== [[File:Orange Riot 1871 crop.jpg|thumb|right|250px|In 1871, New York's [[Orange Riots]] were incited by Irish Protestants. 63 citizens, mostly Irish Catholics, were massacred in the resulting police-action.]] Wherever people of different religions live in close proximity to each other, religious sectarianism can often be found in varying forms and degrees. In some areas, religious sectarians (for example Protestant and Catholic [[Christians]]) {{as of | 2010 | alt = now}} exist peacefully side by side for the most part, although these differences have resulted in violence, death, and outright warfare as recently as the 1990s. Probably the best-known example in recent times were [[The Troubles]]. Catholic-Protestant sectarianism has also been a factor in U.S. presidential campaigns. Prior to [[John F. Kennedy]], only one Catholic ([[Al Smith]]) had ever been a major party presidential nominee, and he had been solidly defeated largely because of claims based on his Catholicism. JFK chose to tackle the sectarian issue head-on during the West Virginia primary, but that only sufficed to win him barely enough Protestant votes to eventually win the presidency by one of the narrowest margins ever.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK-in-History/JFK-and-Religion.aspx|title=John F. Kennedy and Religion|access-date=29 July 2015}}</ref> Within [[Islam]], there has been dilemmas at various periods between [[Sunni Islam|Sunnis]] and [[Shia Islam|Shias]]; Shias consider Sunnis to be false, due to their refusal to accept the first caliph as [[Ali]] and accept all following descendants of him as infallible and divinely guided. Many Sunni religious leaders, including those inspired by [[Wahhabism]] and other ideologies have declared Shias to be [[Heresy|heretics]] or [[Apostasy|apostates]].<ref>{{cite news| url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7181042.stm | work=BBC News | title=Lahore bomb raises sectarian questions | date=10 January 2008 | access-date=23 May 2010}}</ref> ===Europe=== {{See also|The Troubles|Balkanization}} {{Original research|section|date=July 2016}} [[File:La masacre de San Bartolomé, por François Dubois.jpg|thumb|Painting of the [[St. Bartholomew's Day Massacre]], an event in the [[French Wars of Religion]]]] In some countries where the [[Protestant Reformation|Reformation]] was successful, there was persecution of Roman Catholics. This was motivated by the perception that Catholics retained allegiance to a 'foreign' power (the [[papacy]] or [[Holy See|the Vatican]]), causing them to be regarded with suspicion. Sometimes this mistrust manifested itself in Catholics being subjected to restrictions and discrimination, which itself led to further conflict. For example, before [[Catholic Emancipation]] was introduced with the [[Roman Catholic Relief Act 1829]], Catholics were forbidden from voting, becoming MP's or buying land in Ireland.{{citation needed|date=June 2021}} ====Ireland==== Protestant-Catholic sectarianism is prominent in [[History of Ireland|Irish history]]; during the period of [[British rule in Ireland|English (and later British) rule]], Protestant settlers from Britain were [[Plantations of Ireland|"planted" in Ireland]], which along with the [[Reformation|Protestant Reformation]] led to increasing sectarian tensions between Irish Catholics and British Protestants. These tensions eventually boiled over into widespread violence during the [[Irish Rebellion of 1641]]. At the end of that war the lands of Catholics were confiscated with over ten million acres granted to new English owners under the [[Act for the Settlement of Ireland 1652]].<ref>{{cite book |last=Gallagher |first=Frank |author-link= |date=1957 |title=The Indivisible Island |url= |location=London |publisher=Victor Gollancz Ltd. |page=29 |isbn=}}</ref> The [[Cromwellian conquest of Ireland]] (1649–1653) saw a series of massacres perpetrated by the Protestant [[New Model Army]] against Catholic English royalists and Irish civilians. Sectarianism between Catholics and Protestants continued in the [[Kingdom of Ireland]], with the [[Irish Rebellion of 1798]] against British rule leading to more sectarian violence in the island, most infamously the [[Scullabogue Barn massacre]], in which Protestants were burned alive in [[County Wexford]].<ref name="Dunne">Dunne, Tom; ''Rebellions: Memoir, Memory and 1798''. The Lilliput Press, 2004. {{ISBN|978-1-84351-039-0}}</ref> The British response to the rebellion which included the public executions of dozens of suspected rebels in [[Dunlavin Green executions|Dunlavin]] and [[Carnew executions|Carnew]], also inflamed sectarian sentiments.{{citation needed|date=June 2021}} ====Northern Ireland==== After the [[Partition of Ireland]] in 1922, [[Northern Ireland]] witnessed decades of intensified conflict, tension, and sporadic violence (see [[The Troubles in Ulster (1920–1922)]] and [[The Troubles]]) between the dominant Protestant majority and the Catholic minority. In 1969 the [[Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association]] was formed to support civil rights and end discrimination (based on religion) in voting rights (see [[Gerrymandering]]), housing allocation and employment. Also in 1969, 25 years of violence erupted, becoming what is known as “The Troubles” between [[Irish Republicans]] whose goal is a [[United Ireland]] and Ulster loyalists who wish for Northern Ireland to remain a part of the United Kingdom. The conflict was primarily fought over the existence of the Northern Irish state rather than religion, though sectarian relations within Northern Ireland fueled the conflict. However, religion is commonly used as a marker to differentiate the two sides of the community. Most Catholics favour the nationalist, and to some degree, republican, goal of unity with the [[Republic of Ireland]], whereas most Protestants favour Northern Ireland continuing the union with Great Britain. ====England==== In June 1780 a series of riots (see the [[Gordon Riots]]) occurred in London motivated by [[Anti-Catholicism|anti-Catholic]] sentiment. These riots were described as being the most destructive in the history of London and resulted in approximately 300-700 deaths.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-events/the-gordon-riots-of-1780-london-in-flames-a-nation-in-ruins |access-date=24 February 2024| title=The Gordon Riots of 1780: London in Flames, a Nation in Ruins | website=Gresham College | date= | author=Ian Haywood }}</ref> A long history of politically and religious motivated sectarian violence already existed in Ireland (see [[Irish Rebellion (disambiguation)|Irish Rebellions]]). The sectarian divisions related to the "[[Irish question]]" influenced local constituent politics in England. Liverpool is an English city sometimes associated with sectarian politics. Halfway through the 19th century, Liverpool faced a wave of mass-immigration from Irish Catholics as a consequence of the [[Great Famine (Ireland)|Great Famine in Ireland]]. Most of the Irish-Catholic immigrants were unskilled workers and aligned themselves with the Labour party.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Walker|first=Graham|date=2 January 2018|title=Liverpool Sectarianism: the rise and demise|url=https://doi.org/10.1080/03071022.2017.1397369|journal=Social History|volume=43|issue=1|pages=140–142|doi=10.1080/03071022.2017.1397369|s2cid=148655463|issn=0307-1022|url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Roberts|first=Keith Daniel|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.5949/liverpool/9781786940100.001.0001|title=Liverpool Sectarianism|date=1 December 2017|publisher=Liverpool University Press|doi=10.5949/liverpool/9781786940100.001.0001|isbn=978-1-78694-010-0}}</ref> The Labour-Catholic party saw a larger political electorate in the many Liverpool-Irish, and often ran on the slogan of "Home Rule" - the independence of Ireland, to gain the support of Irish voters. During the first half of the 20th century, Liverpool politics were divided not only between Catholics and Protestants, but between two polarized groups consisting of multiple identities: Catholic-Liberal-Labour and Protestant-Conservative-Tory/Orangeists.<ref>{{Citation|title=Protectionism, paternalism and Protestantism: popular Toryism in early Victorian Liverpool*|date=1 May 2006|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.5949/liverpool/9781846310102.003.0006|work=Merseypride|pages=155–176|publisher=Liverpool University Press|doi=10.5949/liverpool/9781846310102.003.0006|isbn=978-1-84631-010-2|access-date=3 May 2021|url-access=subscription}}</ref><ref name=":0">{{Citation|last=Roberts|first=Keith Daniel|title=The Diminishing Politics of Sectarianism: How Class Politics Displaced Identity Politics|date=1 December 2017|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.5949/liverpool/9781786940100.003.0006|work=Liverpool Sectarianism|publisher=Liverpool University Press|doi=10.5949/liverpool/9781786940100.003.0006|isbn=978-1-78694-010-0|access-date=3 May 2021|url-access=subscription}}</ref> From early 1900 onwards, the polarized Catholic Labour and Protestant Conservative affiliations gradually broke apart and created the opportunity for mixed alliances. The Irish National party gained its first electoral victory in 1875, and kept growing until the realization of Irish independence in 1921, after which it became less reliant on Labour support. On the Protestant side, Tory opposition in 1902 to vote in line with Protestant proposed bills indicated a split between the working class Protestants and the Tory party, which were regarded as "too distant" from its electorate.<ref name=":0" /><ref>Day, 2011: 65: "''Conservatives fared poorly in Liverpool elections in 1919 which was largely due to the silence and apathy of the Orange Order … Many saw signs of Orangemen turning to the Labour Party at this time … Tory jingoism, it seems, died on the First World War battlefields and the new generation were joining trade unions''." (in ''Keith Daniel Roberts,'' p.157)</ref> After the First and Second World War, religiously mixed battalions provided a counterweight to anti-Roman Catholic and anti-Protestant propaganda from either side.<ref>The First World War Belchem Chapter 10</ref> While the IRA-bombing in 1939 (see [[S-Plan]]) somewhat increased violence between the Irish-Catholic associated Labour party and the Conservative Protestants, the German May Blitz destroyed property of more than 40.000 households.<ref name=":0" /> Rebuilding Liverpool after the war created a new sense of community across religious lines.<ref>''"I had a good talk last night over Old Ireland. Walter, there are thousands of Irish boys here and I may tell you it is God help the Boche if they come across them. Then they say Ireland is not doing her fair share in this war." -'' Andy Burnham, 28 March 2013, citing a speech made in the House of Commons during a debate on veterans affairs, dated 9 June 2004.</ref> Inter-church relations increased as a response as well, as seen through the warming up of relations between [[Derek Worlock|Archbishop Worlock]] and Anglican Bishop [[David Sheppard]] after 1976, a symbol of decreasing religious hostility.<ref>{{Citation|last=Roberts|first=Keith Daniel|title=Ecumenism: 'The Great Mersey Miracle' and a Decline in Religious Observance|date=1 December 2017|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.5949/liverpool/9781786940100.003.0007|work=Liverpool Sectarianism|publisher=Liverpool University Press|doi=10.5949/liverpool/9781786940100.003.0007|isbn=978-1-78694-010-0|access-date=3 May 2021|url-access=subscription}}</ref> The increase in education rates and the rise of trade and labour unions shifted religious affiliation to class affiliation further, which allowed Protestant and catholic affiliates under a Labour umbrella in politics. In the 1980s, class division had outgrown religious division, replacing religious sectarianism with class struggle.<ref name=":0"/> Growing rates of non-English immigration from other parts of the Commonwealth near the 21st century also provides new political lines of division in identity affiliation.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Doebler|first1=Stefanie|last2=McAreavey|first2=Ruth|last3=Shortall|first3=Sally|date=25 October 2017|title=Is racism the new sectarianism? Negativity towards immigrants and ethnic minorities in Northern Ireland from 2004 to 2015|journal=Ethnic and Racial Studies|volume=41|issue=14|pages=2426–2444|doi=10.1080/01419870.2017.1392027|issn=0141-9870|doi-access=free}}</ref>[[File:Sack of Magdeburg 1631.jpg|thumb|The [[sack of Magdeburg]] by Catholic army in 1631. Of the 30,000 Protestant citizens, only 5,000 survived.]] Northern Ireland has introduced a Private Day of Reflection,<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.dayofreflection.com/|title=HTR - Day of Reflection - Home|access-date=29 July 2015}}</ref> since 2007, to mark the transition to a post-[sectarian] conflict society, an initiative of the cross-community [[Healing Through Remembering]]<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.healingthroughremembering.org/|title=Healing Through Remembering|access-date=29 July 2015}}</ref> organization and research project. ====Ex-Yugoslavia==== The [[Yugoslav Wars|civil wars]] in [[ex-Yugoslav]] countries which followed [[breakup of Yugoslavia|its breakup]] in the 1990s have been heavily tinged with sectarianism. [[Croats]] and [[Slovenes]] have traditionally belonged to Catholicism, [[Serbs]] and [[Macedonians (ethnic group)|Macedonians]] to [[Eastern Orthodoxy]], and [[Bosniaks]] and [[Kosovo Albanians]] to [[Islam]]. Religious affiliation served as a marker of group identity in this conflict, despite relatively low rates of religious practice and belief among these various groups after decades of ''de facto'' [[state atheism]] in [[communist Yugoslavia]]. ===Africa=== Over 1,000 Muslims and Christians were killed in the [[Central African Republic conflict (2012–present)|sectarian violence]] in the [[Central African Republic]] in 2013–2014.<ref>"[https://www.amnesty.org/en/news/central-african-republic-ethnic-cleansing-sectarian-violence-2014-02-12 Central African Republic: Ethnic cleansing and sectarian killings]". Amnesty International. 12 February 2014.</ref> Nearly 1 million people, a quarter of the population, were displaced.<ref>"[https://www.reuters.com/article/us-centralafrican-idUSBREA0P0O220140126 Eight dead in Central African Republic capital, rebel leaders flee city]". [[Reuters]]. 26 January 2014.</ref> ===Australia=== {{Main|Sectarianism in Australia}} Sectarianism in Australia is a historical legacy from the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, between Catholics of mainly Celtic heritage and Protestants of mainly English descent. It has largely disappeared in the 21st century. In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, religious tensions were more centered between Muslim immigrants and non-Muslim nationalists, amid the backdrop of the [[War on Terror]].<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-10-29/one-in-four-australians-had-a-negative-attitude-towards-muslims/5849744|title=One in four Australians has negative attitude towards Muslims: report|author=Stephanie Chalkley-Rhoden|date=29 October 2014|publisher=[[ABC News (Australia)|ABC News]]}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.smh.com.au/national/muslims-on-what-its-like-to-live-in-australia-20160429-goi953.html|title=Muslims on what it's like to live in Australia|author=Beau Donelly|date=2 May 2016|publisher=[[Sydney Morning Herald]]}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.abc.net.au/religion/the-online-dehumanisation-of-muslims/12614148|title=The online dehumanisation of Muslims made the Christchurch massacre possible|author=Rita Jabri-Markwell|date=31 August 2020|publisher=ABC News}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=hlocSoOjkxwC|title=Us & Them: Muslim-Christian Relations and Cultural Harmony in Australia|author=Abe W. Ata|year=2009|publisher=Australian Academic Press|isbn=9781921513190}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09596410.2011.606187|title=Being an Aussie Mossie: Muslim and Australian identity among Australian-born Muslims|author=Rachel Woodlock|date=12 October 2011|journal=Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations|volume=22|issue=4|pages=391–407|publisher=Routledge/University of Birmingham/University of Notre Dame|doi=10.1080/09596410.2011.606187|s2cid=145322962|url-access=subscription}}</ref> {{citation needed|date=February 2018}} ===Asia=== {{main|Sectarian violence among Muslims}} [[File:Basawan. Battle of rival ascetics. Akbarnama, ca. 1590, V&A Museum.jpg|thumb|180px|[[Battle of Thanesar (1567)|Battle]] of rival ascetics in 1567. [[Muslim conquests of the Indian subcontinent|Hindu-Muslim conflicts]] provoked the creation of a military order of [[Sannyasa|Hindu ascetics]] in India.]] [[File:Al-Askari Mosque 2006.jpg|250px|thumb|The [[Al-Askari Mosque]], one of the holiest sites in Shia Islam, after [[2006 al-Askari Mosque bombing|the first attack]] by [[Sunni]] affiliated [[Al-Qaeda in Iraq]] in 2006]] ====Japan==== For the violent conflict between Buddhist sects in Japan, see [[Japanese Buddhism]]. ====Pakistan==== {{Main|Sectarian violence in Pakistan}} [[Pakistan]], one of the largest Muslim countries the world, has seen serious [[Shia Islam|Shia]]-[[Sunni]] [[sectarian violence]].<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Bhattacharya|first=Sanchita|date=30 June 2019|title=Pakistan: Sectarian War Scourging an Entire Nation|url=https://ojs.indrastra.com/index.php/liberalstudies/article/view/251|journal=Liberal Studies|language=en|volume=4|issue=1|pages=87–105|issn=2688-9374}}</ref> Almost 80-85% of Pakistan's Muslim population is [[Sunni]], and another 15-20% are [[Shia]].<ref name="State">{{cite web |url=https://2001-2009.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108505.htm |title=Pakistan - International Religious Freedom Report 2008 |work=[[United States Department of State]] |date=19 September 2008 |access-date=19 April 2013}}</ref><ref name="Oxford">{{cite web |url=http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1809?_hi=1&_pos=1 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130618023219/http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e1809?_hi=1&_pos=1 |url-status=dead |archive-date=June 18, 2013 |title=Pakistan, Islam in |access-date=19 April 2013 |work=[[Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies]] |quote=''Approximately 97 percent of Pakistanis are Muslim. The majority are Sunnis following the [[Hanafi]] school of Islamic law. Between 10 and 15 percent are Shiis, mostly Twelvers.'' |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] }}</ref> However, this Shia minority forms the second largest Shia population of any country, larger than the Shia majority in [[Iraq]]. In the last two decades, as many as 4,000 people are estimated to have died in sectarian fighting in Pakistan, 300 in 2006.<ref name="csmonitor.com">{{cite journal|url=http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0202/p01s02-wosc.html|title=Shiite-Sunni conflict rises in Pakistan|author=The Christian Science Monitor|journal=The Christian Science Monitor|date=2 February 2007 |access-date=29 July 2015}}</ref> Among the culprits blamed for the killing are [[Al Qaeda]] working "with local sectarian groups" to kill what they perceive as Shi'a apostates.<ref name="csmonitor.com"/> ====Sri Lanka==== {{See also|Sri Lankan civil war}} The BBC reported that "Sri Lanka’s Muslim minority is being targeted by hardline Buddhists. ... There have also been assaults on churches and Christian pastors but it is the Muslims who are the most concerned."<ref>{{cite web | url =http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21840600| title =The hardline Buddhists targeting Sri Lanka's Muslims | publisher =[[BBC]] | date = March 25, 2013}}</ref> Most of the [[LTTE]] leaders were captured and gunned down at blank range in May, 2009, after which a genocide of [[Sri Lankan Tamil people|Sri Lankan Tamils]] in the [[Northern Province, Sri Lanka]] has started.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.canberratimes.com.au/comment/tribunal-delivers-sri-lankas-guilty-verdict-20140101-305zf.html |author=Bruce Haigh |title=Tribunal delivers Sri Lanka's guilty verdict |date=January 2, 2014 |website=www.canberratimes.com.au |publisher=Fairfax Media |accessdate=6 February 2014}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.tamilsagainstgenocide.org/Contacts.aspx |title=Contacts|work=Tamils Against Genocide|date=April 29, 2011|accessdate=May 3, 2011}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2013/11/04/sri_lankas_hidden_genocide.html |author=Rosie DiManno |title=Sri Lanka’s hidden genocide |date=February 6, 2014 |website=www.thestar.com |publisher=Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. |accessdate=6 February 2014}}</ref> Even a book, [[The Tamil Genocide by Sri Lanka]] has been written on this genocide. Tamils Against Genocide hired US attorney [[Bruce Fein]]<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.indianexpress.com/news/tamil-group-files-lawsuit-against-rajapaksa-in-us/743516/|title=Tamil group files lawsuit against Rajapaksa in US - Indian Express|date=29 January 2011|work=[[The Indian Express]]|accessdate=29 November 2012}}</ref> to file human rights violation charges against two Sri Lankan officials associated with the [[civil war]] in Sri Lanka which has reportedly claimed the lives of thousands of civilians.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.tgte.org/usa|title=TGTE Launches Signature Campaign for Sri Lanka Genocide Investigation|publisher=Transitional Government of Tamil Eelam|date=April 24, 2011|accessdate=May 3, 2011}}</ref> === Turkey === ==== Ottoman Empire ==== In 1511, a pro-Shia revolt known as [[Şahkulu Rebellion]] was brutally suppressed by the Ottomans: 40,000 were massacred on the order of the sultan.<ref>H.A.R. Gibb & H. Bowen, "Islamic society and the West", i/2, Oxford, 1957, p. 189</ref> ==== Republican era (1923-) ==== [[Alevism|Alevis]] were targeted in various massacres including 1978 [[Maraş massacre]], 1980 [[Çorum massacre]] and 1993 [[Sivas massacre]]. During his [[Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu 2023 presidential campaign|campaign]] for the [[2023 Turkish presidential election]], [[Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu]] was attacked with sectarian insults in [[Adıyaman Province|Adıyaman]].<ref>{{Cite web |last= |date=21 April 2023 |title=Attempted attack on opposition leader Kılıçdaroğlu after tomb visit in Adıyaman: Meeting with Kurdish leader Sırrı Süreyya Önder cancelled |url=https://sendika.org/2023/04/attempted-attack-on-opposition-leader-kilicdaroglu-after-tomb-visit-in-adiyaman-meeting-with-kurdish-leader-sirri-sureyya-onder-cancelled-682930/ |access-date=23 May 2023 |website=Sendika.org |language=tr}}</ref> === Iran === ==== Overview ==== Sectarianism in Iran has existed for centuries, dating back to the [[Islam in Iran|Islamic conquest]] of the country in early Islamic years and continuing throughout Iranian history until the present. During the [[Safavid conversion of Iran to Shia Islam|Safavid dynasty's reign]], sectarianism started to play an important role in shaping the path of the country.<ref name="Iran's Regime of Religion">{{cite journal |last1=Khalaji |first1=Mehdi |title=Iran's Regime of Religion |journal=Journal of International Affairs |date=1 September 2001 |volume=65 |issue=1 |page=131 }}</ref> During the Safavid rule between 1501 and 1722, [[Shiism]] started to evolve and became established as the official state religion, leading to the creation of the first religiously legitimate government since the occultation of the [[Hujjat-Allah al-Mahdi|Twelfth imam]].<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Khalaji |first1=Mehdi |title=Iran's Regime of Religion |journal=Journal of International Affairs |date=1 September 2001 |volume=65 |issue=1 |page=134 }}</ref> This pattern of sectarianism prevailed throughout the Iranian history. The approach that sectarianism has taken after the Iranian 1979 revolution is shifted compared to the earlier periods. Never before the Iranian 1979 revolution did the Shiite leadership gain as much authority.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Mishal |first1=Shaul |title=Understanding Shiite Leadership: the Art of the Middle Ground in Iran and Lebanon. |date=5 March 2015 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1107632677 |page=43}}</ref> Due to this change, the sectarian timeline in Iran can be divided in pre- and post-Iranian 1979 revolution where the religious leadership changed course. ==== Pre-1979 Revolution ==== Shiism has been an important factor in shaping the politics, culture and religion within Iran, long before the Iranian 1979 revolution.<ref name="Iran's Regime of Religion"/> During the [[Safavid dynasty]] Shiism was established as the official ideology.<ref name="Iran's Regime of Religion"/> The establishment of Shiism as an official government ideology opened the doors for clergies to benefit from new cultural, political and religious rights which were denied prior to the Safavid ruling.<ref name="Iran's Regime of Religion"/> During the [[Safavid dynasty]] Shiism was established as the official ideology.<ref name="Iran's Regime of Religion"/> The Safavid rule allowed greater freedom for religious leaders. By establishing Shiism as the state religion, they legitimised the religious authority. After this power establishment, religious leaders started to play a crucial role within the political system but remained socially and economically independent.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Abisaab |first1=Rula |title=Converting Persia: religion and power in the Safavid Empire |date=26 February 2004 |publisher=I.B. Tauris |isbn=186064970X }}</ref> The monarchial power balance during the Safavid ere changed every few years, resulting in a changing limit of power of the clergies. The tensions concerning power relations of the religious authorities and the ruling power eventually played a pivotal role in the [[Persian Constitutional Revolution|1906 constitutional revolution]] which limited the power of the monarch, and increased the power of religious leaders.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Bayat |first1=Mangol |title=Iran's first revolution : Shi'ism and the constitutional revolution of 1905-1909 |year=1991 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=0-19-506822-X }}</ref> The 1906 constitutional revolution involved both constitutionalist and anti-constitutionalist clergy leaders. Individuals such as [[Sayyid Jamal al-Din Va'iz]] were constitutionalist clergies whereas other clergies such as [[Mohammed Kazem Yazdi]] were considered anti-constitutionalist. The establishment of a Shiite government during the Safavid rule resulted in the increase of power within this religious sect. The religious power establishment increased throughout the years and resulted in fundamental changes within the Iranian society in the twentieth century, eventually leading to the establishment of the Shiite Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. ==== Post-1979 Revolution: Islamic Republic of Iran ==== [[Iranian Revolution|The Iranian 1979 revolution]] led to the overthrow of the [[Pahlavi dynasty]] and the establishment of the [[Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran|Islamic Government of Iran]]. The governing body of Iran displays clear elements of sectarianism which are visible within different layers of its system. The 1979 revolution led to changes in political system, leading to the establishment of a bureaucratic clergy-regime which has created its own interpretation of the [[Shia Islam|Shia sect]] in Iran.<ref name="Iran's Regime of Religion"/> Religious differentiation is often used by authoritarian regimes to express hostility towards other groups such as ethnic minorities and political opponents.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Grabowski |first1=Wojciech |title=Sectarianism as a Factor Shaping Persian Gulf Security |journal=International Studies |date=2017 |volume=52 |issue=1–4 |page=1 |doi=10.1177/0020881717715550 |s2cid=158923334 |url=https://journals.sagepub.com/home/isq|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Authoritarian regimes can use religion as a weapon to create an '' "us and them" '' paradigm. This leads to hostility amongst the involved parties and takes place internally but also externally. A valid example is the suppression of religious minorities like the Sunnis and [[Baháʼí Faith|Baha-ís]]. With the establishment of [[the Islamic Republic of Iran]] sectarian discourses arose in the Middle-East as the Iranian religious regime has attempted and in some cases succeeded to spread its religious and political ideas in the region. These sectarian labeled issues are politically charged. The most notable Religious leaders in Iran are named ''Supreme-leaders.'' Their role has proved to be pivotal in the evolvement of sectarianism within the country and in the region. The following part discusses Iran's supreme-leadership in further detail. ==== Ruhollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei ==== During the Iran-Iraq war, Iran's first supreme-leader, [[Ayatollah Khomeini]] called for the participation of all Iranians in the war. His usage of [[Martyrdom in Iran|Shia martyrdom]] led to the creation of a national consensus.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Abedin |first1=Mahan |title=Iran Resurgent: The Rise and Rise of the Shia State |date=15 July 2015 |publisher=C. Hurst and Company (Publishers) Limited}}</ref> In the early aftermath of the Iranian 1979 revolution, Khomeini started to evolve a sectarian tone in his speeches. His focus on Shiism and Shia Islam grew which was also implemented within the changing policies of the country. In one of his speeches Khomeini quoted: "the Path to Jerusalem passes through Karbala." His phrase lead to many different interpretations, leading to turmoil in the region but also within the country.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Abedin |first1=Mahan |title=Iran Resurgent: The Rise and Rise of the Shia State |date=15 July 2015 |publisher=C. Hurst and Company (Publishers) Limited |page=24 }}</ref> From a religious historic viewpoint, [[Karbala]] and [[Najaf]] which are both situated in Iraq, serve as important sites for Shia Muslims around the world. By mentioning these two cities, Khomeini led to the creation of Shia expansionism.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Abedin |first1=Mahan |title=Iran Resurgent : The Rise and Rise of the Shia State |date=15 July 2015 |publisher=C. Hurst and Company (Publishers) Limited |page=27}}</ref> Khomeini's war with the [[Iraqi Bath Regime]] had many underlying reasons and sectarianism can be considered one of the main reasons. The tensions between Iran and Iraq are of course not only sectarian related, but religion is often a weapon used by the Iranian regime to justify its actions. Khomeini's words also resonated in other Arab countries who had been fighting for [[Palestine-Israel conflict|Palestinian liberation against Israel.]] By naming Jerusalem, Khomeini expressed his desire for liberating Palestine from the hands of what he later often has named [[Iran Israel relations|"the enemy of Islam."]] Iran has supported rebellious groups throughout the region. Its support for Hamas and Hezbollah has resulted in international condemnation.<ref>{{cite news |title=Profile: Lebanon's Hezbollah |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-10814698 |work=BBC News |date=15 March 2016}}</ref> This desire for Shia expansionism did not disappear after Khomeini's death. It can even be argued that sectarian tone within the Islamic Republic of Iran has grown since then. The Friday prayers held in Tehran by [[Ali Khamenei]] can be seen as a proof of growing sectarian tone within the regime. Khamenei's speeches are extremely political and sectarian.<ref>{{cite news |title=Khamenei: Iran not calling for elimination of Jews, wants non-sectarian Israel |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-israel-iran-khamenei/khamenei-iran-not-calling-for-elimination-of-jews-wants-non-sectarian-israel-idUSKBN1XP0WP |access-date= 8 May 2020 |work= Reuters |date=15 November 2019}}</ref> He often mentions extreme wishes such as the removal of Israel from the world map and fatwas directed towards those opposing the regime.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Pileggi |first1=Tamar |title=Khamenei: Israel a 'cancerous tumor' that 'must be eradicated' |url=https://www.timesofisrael.com/khamenei-israel-a-cancerous-tumor-that-must-be-eradicated/ |work=www.timesofisrael.com}}</ref> ===Iraq=== {{See also|Civil war in Iraq (2006-07)|Shia Islam in Iraq}} Sunni [[Iraqi insurgency (Iraq War)|Iraqi insurgency]] and foreign Sunni terrorist organizations who came to Iraq after the fall of [[Saddam Hussein]] have targeted Shia civilians in sectarian attacks. Following the civil war, the Sunnis have complained of discrimination by Iraq's Shia majority governments, which is bolstered by the news that Sunni detainees were allegedly discovered to have been [[torture]]d in a compound used by government forces on 15 November 2005.<ref>{{cite news | title = Iraqi Sunnis demand abuse inquiry | work = BBC News | date =16 November 2005 | url = http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4441568.stm | access-date = 12 May 2007 }}</ref> This sectarianism has fueled a giant level of emigration and internal displacement. The Shia majority oppression by the Sunni minority has a long history in Iraq. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the British government placed a Sunni Hashemite monarchy to the [[Kingdom of Iraq|Iraqi throne]] which suppressed various uprisings against its rule by the Christian Assyrians and Shi'ites. ===Syria=== {{See also|Sectarianism and minorities in the Syrian civil war}}Although sectarianism has been described as one of the characteristic features of the [[Syrian civil war]], the narrative of sectarianism already had its origins in Syria's past. ==== Ottoman rule ==== [[File:Wounded civilians arrive at hospital Aleppo.jpg|thumb|Wounded civilians arrive at a hospital in Aleppo]]The hostilities that took place in [[Massacre of Aleppo (1850)|1850]] in [[Aleppo]] and subsequently in 1860 in [[Damascus]], had many causes and reflected long-standing tensions. However, scholars have claimed that the eruptions of violence can also be partly attributed to the modernizing reforms, the [[Tanzimat]], taking place within the [[Ottoman Empire]], who had been ruling Syria since 1516.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Sahner|first=Christian C.|title=Among the Ruins: Syria Past and Present|publisher=Hurst & Company|year=2014|isbn=9781849044004|location=London|pages=99}}</ref><ref name="Phillips 364">{{Cite journal|last=Phillips|first=Christopher|date=1 February 2015|title=Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria|journal=Third World Quarterly|volume=36|issue=2|pages=364|doi=10.1080/01436597.2015.1015788|s2cid=144558644}}</ref> The Tanzimat reforms attempted to bring about equality between [[Muslims]] and non-Muslims living in the Ottoman Empire. These reforms, combined with European interference on behalf of the Ottoman Christians, caused the non-Muslims to gain privileges and influence.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Fawaz|first=Leila Tarazi|title=An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860|publisher=I.B. Tauris|year=1994|isbn=1850432015|location=London|pages=22}}</ref> In the silk trade business, European powers formed ties with local sects. They usually opted for a sect that adhered to a religion similar to the one in their home countries, thus not Muslims.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Fawaz|first=Leila Tarazi|title=An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860|publisher=I.B. Tauris|year=1994|isbn=1850432015|location=London|pages=23}}</ref> These developments caused new social classes to emerge, consisting of mainly Christians, Druzes and Jews. These social classes stripped the previously existing Muslim classes of their privileges. The involvement of another foreign power, though this time non-European, also had its influence on communal relations in Syria. [[Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt]] ruled Syria between 1831 and 1840. His divide-and-rule strategy contributed to the hostilities between the Druze and [[Maronites|Maronite]] community, by arming the Maronite Christians. However, it is noteworthy to mention that different sects did not fight the others out of religious motives, nor did Ibrahim Pasha aim to disrupt society among communal lines.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Makdisi|first=Ussama Samir|title=The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon|publisher=University of California Press|year=2000|isbn=0-520-21845-0|location=London|pages=55}}</ref> This can also be illustrated by the unification of Druzes and Maronites in their revolts to oust Ibrahim Pasha in 1840. This shows the fluidity of communal alliances and animosities and the different, at times non-religious, reasons that may underline sectarianism.{{citation needed|date=February 2022}} ==== After Ottoman rule ==== Before the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the [[Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon|French Mandate]] in Syria, the Syrian territory had already witnessed massacres on the Maronite Christians, other Christians, [[Alawites]], [[Shia Islam|Shias]] and [[Isma'ilism|Ismailiyas]], which had resulted in distrustful sentiments between the members of different sects.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Tomass|first=Mark|title=The Religious Roots of the Syrian Conflict: The Remaking of the Fertile Crescent|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|year=2016|isbn=978-1-137-53149-0|location=London|pages=151}}</ref> In an attempt to protect the minority communities against the majority Sunni population, [[France]], with the command of [[Henri Gouraud (general)|Henri Gouraud]], created five states for the following sects: [[Armenians]], Alawites, Druzes, Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Tomass|first=Mark|title=The Religious Roots of the Syrian Conflict: The Remaking of the Fertile Crescent|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|year=2016|isbn=978-1-137-53149-0|location=London|pages=151–152}}</ref> This focus on minorities was new and part of a divide-and-rule strategy of the French, which enhanced and politicized differences between sects.<ref name="Phillips 364"/> The restructuring by the French caused the Alawite community to advance itself from their marginalized position. In addition to that, the Alawites were also able to obtain a position of power through granting top level positions to family members of the ruling clan or other tribal allies of the Alawite community.<ref name=":20">{{Cite book|last=Wehrey|first=Frederic|title=Beyond Sunni and Shia: The Roots of Sectarianism in a Changing Middle East|publisher=Hurst & Company|year=2017|isbn=9781849048149|location=London|pages=65}}</ref> During the period 1961–1980, Syria was not necessarily exclusively ruled by the Alawite sect, but due to efforts of the Sunni Muslim extremist opponents of the Ba’th regime in Syria, it was perceived as such. The [[Ba'ath Party (Syrian-dominated faction)|Ba’ath]] regime was being dominated by the Alawite community, as well as were other institutions of power.<ref name=":18">{{Cite book|last=van Dam|first=Nikolaos|title=The Struggle for Power in Syria: Sectarianism, Regionalism and Tribalism in Politics, 1961-1980|publisher=Croom Helm|year=1981|isbn=0-7099-2601-4|location=London|pages=111–113}}</ref> As a result of this, the regime was considered to be sectarian, which caused the Alawite community to cluster together, as they feared for their position.<ref name=":18" /> This period is actually contradictory as [[Hafez al-Assad]] tried to create a Syrian [[Arab nationalism]], but the regime was still regarded as sectarian and sectarian identities were reproduced and politicized.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Phillips|first=Christopher|date=1 February 2015|title=Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria|journal=Third World Quarterly|volume=36|issue=2|pages=366|doi=10.1080/01436597.2015.1015788|s2cid=144558644}}</ref> Sectarian tensions that later gave rise to the Syrian civil war, had already appeared in society due to events preceding 1970. For example, President Hafez al-Assad's involvement in the [[Lebanese Civil War|Lebanese civil war]] by giving political aid to Maronite Christians in [[Lebanon]]. This was viewed by many Sunny Muslims as an act of treason, which made them link al-Assad's actions to his Alawite identity.<ref name=":19">{{Cite book|last=Tomass|first=Mark|title=The Religious Roots of the Syrian Conflict: The Remaking of the Fertile Crescent|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|year=2016|isbn=978-1-137-53149-0|location=London|pages=156}}</ref> The [[Muslim Brotherhood of Syria|Muslim Brothers]], a part of the Sunni Muslims, used those tensions towards the Alawites as a tool to boost their political agenda and plans.<ref name=":19" /> Several assassinations were carried out by the Muslim Brothers, mostly against Alawites, but also against some Sunni Muslims. The failed assassination attempt on President Hafez al-Assad is arguably the most well-known.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Tomass|first=Mark|title=The Religious Roots of the Syrian Conflict: The Remaking of the Fertile Crescent|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|year=2016|isbn=978-1-137-53149-0|location=London|pages=156–157}}</ref> Part of the animosity between the Alawites and the Sunni Islamists of the Muslim Brothers is due to the [[secularization]] of Syria, which the later holds the Alawites in power to be responsible for. ==== Syrian Civil War ==== As of 2015, the majority of the Syrian population consisted of Sunni Muslims, namely two-thirds of the population, which can be found throughout the country. The Alawites are the second largest group, which make up around 10 percent of the population.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Phillips|first=Christopher|date=1 February 2015|title=Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria|journal=Third World Quarterly|volume=36|issue=2|pages=357–376|doi=10.1080/01436597.2015.1015788|s2cid=144558644}}</ref> This makes them a ruling minority. The Alawites were originally settled in the highlands of Northwest Syria, but since the twentieth century have spread to places like [[Latakia]], [[Homs]] and Damascus.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Sahner|first=Christian C.|title=Among the Ruins: Syria Past and Present|publisher=Hurst & Company|year=2014|isbn=9781849044004|location=London|pages=81}}</ref> Other groups that can be found in Syria are Christians, among which the Maronite Christians, Druzes and Twelver Shias. Although sectarian identities played a role in the unfolding of events of the Syrian Civil War, the importance of tribal and kinship relationships should not be underestimated, as they can be used to obtain and maintain power and loyalty.<ref name=":20" /> At the start of the protests against President [[Bashar al-Assad|Basher al-Assad]] in March 2011, there was no sectarian nature or approach involved. The opposition had national, inclusive goals and spoke in the name of a collective Syria, although the protesters being mainly Sunni Muslims.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Phillips|first=Christopher|date=1 February 2015|title=Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria|journal=Third World Quarterly|volume=36|issue=2|pages=359|doi=10.1080/01436597.2015.1015788|s2cid=144558644}}</ref> This changed after the protests and the following civil war began to be portrayed in sectarian terms by the regime, as a result of which people started to mobilize along ethnic lines.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Wehrey|first=Frederic|title=Beyond Sunni and Shia: The Roots of Sectarianism in a Changing Middle East|publisher=Hurst & Company|year=2017|isbn=9781849048149|location=London|pages=61–62}}</ref> However, this does not mean that the conflict is solely or primarily a sectarian conflict, as there were also socio-economic factors at play. These socio-economic factors were mainly the result of Basher al-Assad's mismanaged economic restructuring.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Wehrey|first=Frederic|title=Beyond Sunni and Shia: The Roots of Sectarianism in a Changing Middle East|publisher=Hurst & Company|year=2017|isbn=9781849048149|location=London|pages=68}}</ref> The conflict has therefore been described as being semi-sectarian, making sectarianism a factor at play in the civil war, but certainly does not stand alone in causing the war and has varied in importance throughout time and place.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Phillips|first=Christopher|date=1 February 2015|title=Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria|journal=Third World Quarterly|volume=36|issue=2|pages=358|doi=10.1080/01436597.2015.1015788|s2cid=144558644}}</ref> In addition to local forces, the role of external actors in the conflict in general as well as the sectarian aspect of the conflict should not be overlooked. Although foreign regimes were first in support of the [[Free Syrian Army]], they eventually ended up supporting sectarian militias with money and arms. However, it has to be said that their sectarian nature did not only attract these flows of support, but they also adopted a more sectarian and Islamic appearance in order to attract this support.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Phillips|first=Christopher|date=1 February 2015|title=Sectarianism and Conflict in Syria|journal=Third World Quarterly|volume=36|issue=2|pages=370|doi=10.1080/01436597.2015.1015788|s2cid=144558644}}</ref> ===Yemen=== {{main|Shia insurgency in Yemen|Yemeni Civil War (2015–present)}} ==== Introduction ==== In Yemen, there have been many clashes between [[Salafi]]s and Shia [[Houthi]]s. According to ''The Washington Post'', "In today’s Middle East, activated sectarianism affects the political cost of alliances, making them easier between co-religionists. That helps explain why Sunni-majority states are lining up against Iran, Iraq and Hezbollah over Yemen."<ref>{{cite news |title=How sectarianism shapes Yemen's war |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/04/13/how-sectarianism-shapes-yemens-war/ |newspaper=The Washington Post |date=13 April 2015}}</ref> Historically, divisions in Yemen along religious lines ([[sect]]s) used to be less intense than those in Pakistan, [[Lebanon]], [[Syria]], Iraq, [[Saudi Arabia]], and [[Bahrain]]. However, the situation has changed dramatically after the Houthi takeover in 2014.<ref name=":126">{{Cite book|last1=Brehony|first1=Noel|title=Rebuilding Yemen: political, economic and social challenges|last2=Al-Sarhan|first2=Saud|publisher=Gerlach Press|year=2015|isbn=978-3-940924-69-8|location=Berlin|pages=2, 3, 7, 10, 11, 12, 27, 28|oclc=954337262}}</ref><ref name=":32">{{Cite book|last=Potter|first=Lawrence|title=Sectarian Politics in the Persian Gulf|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2014|isbn=978-0-19-937-726-8|location=New York|pages=207–228|oclc=889813086}}</ref><ref name=":05">{{Cite book|last=Day|first=Stephen|title=Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2012|isbn=978-1-139-42415-8|location=New York|pages=1–312, 43,149,152,194,199,215,216,259,261,262,294|oclc=795895697}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|last=Hull|first=Edmund|title=High-value target: countering al Qaeda in Yemen|date=2011|publisher=Potomac Books|isbn=978-1-59797-679-4|location=Virginia|pages=Introduction|oclc=759401914}}</ref> Most political forces in Yemen are primarily characterized by regional interests and not by religious sectarianism.<ref name=":126"/><ref name=":05"/> Regional interests are, for example, the north's proximity to the [[Hejaz]], the south's coast along the [[Indian Ocean trade]] route, and the southeast's [[oil and gas field]]s.<ref name=":05"/><ref name=":1">{{Cite book|last1=Hashemi|first1=Nader|title=Sectarianization: Mapping the new politics of the Middle East|last2=Postel|first2=Danny|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2017|isbn=978-0-19-937-726-8|location=New York|pages=207–228|oclc=957133611}}</ref> Yemen's northern population consists for a substantial part of [[Zaydis]], and its southern population predominantly of [[Shafi'is|Shafi’is]].<ref name=":05"/> [[Hadhramaut]] in Yemen's southeast has a distinct [[Sufism|Sufi]] [[Ba 'Alawiyya|Ba’Alawi]] profile.<ref name=":05"/> ==== Ottoman era, 1849–1918 ==== Sectarianism reached the region once known as [[Arabia Felix]] with the 1911 [[Treaty of Daan]].<ref name=":102">{{Cite book|last=Stookey|first=Robert|title=Yemen: the politics of the Yemen Arab Republic|date=1978|publisher=Westview Press|isbn=0-89158-300-9|location=Colorado|pages=21,22,163,164,172,173,182,234,253|oclc=912527363}}</ref><ref name=":8">{{Cite book|last=Kuehn|first=Thomas|title=Empire, Islam, and politics of difference: Ottoman rule in Yemen, 1849-1919|date=2011|publisher=Brill|isbn=978-90-04-21131-5|location=Leiden|pages=28, 201–247|oclc=812943066}}</ref> It divided the [[Yemen Vilayet]] into an Ottoman controlled section and an Ottoman-Zaydi controlled section.<ref name=":102"/><ref name=":8" /> The former dominated by Sunni Islam and the latter by Zaydi-Shia Islam, thus dividing the Yemen Vilayet along Islamic sectarian lines.<ref name=":102"/><ref name=":8" /> [[Imam Yahya|Yahya Muhammad Hamid ed-Din]] became the ruler of the Zaidi community within this Ottoman entity.<ref name=":102"/><ref name=":164">{{Cite book|last=Rabi|first=Uzi|title=Yemen: revolution, civil war and unification|date=2015|publisher=I.B. Tauris|isbn=978-1-78076-946-2|location=London|pages=14,15,22,23,68,161,166–171,173–192|oclc=900948571}}</ref> Before the agreement, inter-communal battles between Shafi’is and Zaydis never occurred in the Yemen Vilayet.<ref name=":126"/><ref name=":8" /> After the agreement, sectarian strife still did not surface between religious communities.<ref name=":8" /> Feuds between Yemenis were nonsectarian in nature, and Zaydis attacked Ottoman officials not because they were Sunnis.<ref name=":8" /> Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the divide between Shafi’is and Zaydis changed with the establishment of the [[Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen|Kingdom of Yemen]].<ref name=":102"/><ref name=":164"/> Shafi’i scholars were compelled to accept the supreme authority of Yahya Muhammad Hamid ed-Din, and the army “institutionalized the supremacy of the Zaydi tribesman over the Shafi’is”.<ref name=":102"/><ref name=":164"/> ==== Unification period, 1918–1990 ==== Before the 1990 [[Yemeni unification]], the region had never been united as one country.<ref name=":126"/><ref name=":9">{{Cite book|last=Ferris|first=Jesse|title=Nasser's Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power|publisher=Princeton University Press|year=2012|isbn=978-1-4008-4523-1|location=Princeton|oclc=845246859}}</ref> In order to create unity and overcome sectarianism, the [[myth]] of [[Qahtanite]] was used as a nationalist [[narrative]].<ref name=":05"/> Although not all [[ethnic group]]s of Yemen fit in this narrative, such as the [[Al-Akhdam]] and the [[Teimanim]].<ref name=":05"/><ref name=":6">{{Cite web|title='Even war discriminates': Yemen's minorities, exiled at home|url=https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/MRG_Brief_Yemen_Jan16.pdf|last=El Rajji|first=Rania|date=2016|website=Minority Rights Group International}}</ref> The latter established a Jewish kingdom in ancient Yemen, the only one ever created outside [[Palestine (region)|Palestine]].<ref name=":15">{{Cite book|last=Schmidt|first=Dana|title=Yemen: the unknown war|publisher=The Bodley Head|year=1968|location=London|pages=76,103,104|oclc=963440070}}</ref> A [[massacre]] of Christians, executed by the Jewish king [[Dhu Nuwas]], eventually led to the fall of the [[Homerite Kingdom]].<ref name=":102"/><ref name=":15" /> In modern times, the establishment of the [[Jewish state]] resulted in the [[1947 Aden riots]], after which most Teimanim left the country during [[Operation Magic Carpet (Yemen)|Operation Magic Carpet]].<ref name=":6" /> Conflicting [[Geopolitics|geopolitical]] interests surfaced during the [[North Yemen Civil War]] (1962–1970).<ref name=":9" /> [[Wahhabism|Wahhabist]] Saudi Arabia and other Arab [[monarchies]] supported [[Muhammad al-Badr]], the deposed Zaydi [[imam]] of the Kingdom of Yemen.<ref name=":126"/><ref name=":9" /><ref name=":24">{{Cite book|last=Wedeen|first=Lisa|title=Peripheral visions: publics, power, and performance in Yemen|date=2008|publisher=University of Chicago Press|isbn=978-0-226-87791-4|location=Chicago|pages=2, 46–51, 149–150, 153–157, 165–167, 180–185|oclc=435911844}}</ref> His adversary, [[Abdullah al-Sallal]], received support from [[Egypt]] and other Arab [[republic]]s.<ref name=":126"/><ref name=":9" /><ref name=":24"/> Both international backings were not based on religious sectarian affiliation.<ref name=":126"/><ref name=":9" /><ref name=":24"/><ref name=":174">{{Cite book|last=Lackner|first=Helen|title=Yemen in crisis: autocracy, neo-liberalism and the disintegration of a state|publisher=Saqi Books|year=2017|isbn=978-0-86356-193-1|location=London|pages=37,49,50,56,70,72,81,82,86,125,126,149,155,159,160|oclc=975123669}}</ref> In Yemen however, President Abdullah al-Sallal (a Zaydi) sidelined his vice-president Abdurrahman al-Baidani (a Shaffi'i) for not being a member of the Zaydi sect.<ref name=":102" /><ref name=":15" /> Shaffi'i officials of [[Yemen Arab Republic|North Yemen]] also lobbied for "the establishment of a separate Shaffi'i state in [[Lower Yemen]]" in this period.<ref name=":102" /> ==== Contemporary Sunni-Shia rivalry ==== According to [[Lisa Wedeen]], the perceived [[Shia–Sunni relations|sectarian rivalry between Sunnis and Shias]] in the [[Muslim world]] is not the same as Yemen's sectarian rivalry between Salafists and Houthis.<ref name=":24"/> Not all supporters of [[Houthi tribe|Houthi's]] Ansar Allah movement are Shia, and not all Zaydis are Houthis.<ref name=":05"/><ref name=":63">{{Cite web|title='Even war discriminates': Yemen's minorities, exiled at home|url=https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/MRG_Brief_Yemen_Jan16.pdf|last=El Rajji|first=Rania|date=2016|website=Minority Rights Group International}}</ref><ref name=":174"/> Although most Houthis are followers of Shia's Zaydi branch, most Shias in the world are from the [[Twelver]] branch. Yemen is [[geographically]] not in proximity of the so-called [[Shia crescent|Shia Crescent]]. To link [[Hezbollah]] and [[Iran]], whose subjects are overwhelmingly Twelver Shias, organically with Houthis is exploited for political purposes.<ref name=":164"/><ref name=":63" /><ref name=":174"/><ref name=":142">{{Cite book|last=Fraihat|first=Ibrahim|title=Unfinished revolutions: Yemen, Libya, and Tunisia after the Arab Spring|publisher=Yale University Press|year=2016|isbn=978-0-300-21563-2|location=New Haven|pages=39–57,79–83,112–116,161–166,177–182,224|oclc=945662865}}</ref><ref name=":52">{{Cite web|title=Yemen in Crisis|url=https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/190632/Backgrounder_%20Yemen's%20Ci...pdf|last=Laub|first=Zachary|date=2015|website=Council on Foreign Relations}}</ref> Saudi Arabia emphasized an alleged military support of Iran for the Houthis during [[Operation Scorched Earth]].<ref name=":126"/><ref name=":63" /><ref name=":43">{{Cite journal|last=Dorlian|first=Samy|date=2011|title=The ṣa'da War in Yemen: between Politics and Sectarianism|journal=The Muslim World|language=en|volume=101|issue=2|pages=182–201|doi=10.1111/j.1478-1913.2011.01352.x|issn=1478-1913}}</ref> The [[slogan of the Houthi movement]] is '[[Death to America]], death to [[Israel]], a curse upon the [[Jews]]'. This is a [[Trope (philosophy)|trope]] of Iran and Hezbollah, so the Houthis seem to have no qualms about a perceived association with them.<ref name=":05"/><ref name=":164"/><ref name=":63" /><ref name=":43"/> ==== Tribes and political movements ==== [[Tribal culture]] in the southern regions has virtually disappeared through [[policies]] of the [[People's Democratic Republic of Yemen]].<ref name=":05"/><ref name=":11">{{Cite web|title=War and pieces: Political divides in southern Yemen|url=https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/war_and_pieces_political_divides_in_southern_yemen.pdf|last1=Al-Hamdani|first1=Raiman|last2=Lackner|first2=Helen|date=2020|website=European Council on Foreign Relations}}</ref> However, Yemen's northern part is still home to the powerful tribal [[confederation]]s of [[Bakil]] and [[Hashid]].<ref name=":05"/> These tribal confederations maintain their own [[institution]]s without state interference, such as [[prison]]s, [[court]]s, and [[armed forces]].<ref name=":05"/> Unlike the Bakils, the Hashids adopted Salafist tenets, and during the [[Sa'dah War|Sa’dah War]] (2004–2015) sectarian tensions materialized.<ref name=":05"/> Yemen's Salafists attacked the Zaydi [[Mosque]] of Razih in [[Sa'dah|Sa’dah]] and destroyed [[tomb]]s of Zaydi imams across Yemen.<ref name=":32"/><ref name=":05"/><ref name=":24"/> In turn, Houthis attacked Yemen's main Salafist center of [[Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi'i|Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi'I]] during the [[Siege of Dammaj]].<ref name=":32" /><ref name=":05"/><ref name=":174"/> Houthis also attacked the Salafist [[Bin Salman Mosque]] and threatened various Teimanim families.<ref name=":164"/><ref name=":43"/> Members of Hashid's [[elite]] founded the Sunni [[Islamism|Islamist]] party [[Al-Islah (Yemen)|Al-Islah]] and, as a counterpart, [[Party of Truth (Yemen)|Hizb al-Haqq]] was founded by Zaydis with the support of Bakil's elite.<ref name=":05"/><ref name=":174"/><ref name=":43"/> [[Violent non-state actor]]s Al-Qaeda, [[Ansar al-Sharia (Yemen)|Ansar al-Sharia]] and [[Daesh]], particularly active in southern cities like [[Mukalla]], fuel sectarian tendencies with their animosity towards Yemen's [[Isma'ilism|Isma'ilis]], Zaydis, and others.<ref name=":126"/><ref name=":05"/><ref name=":62">{{Cite web|title='Even war discriminates': Yemen's minorities, exiled at home|url=https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/MRG_Brief_Yemen_Jan16.pdf|last=El Rajji|first=Rania|date=2016|website=Minority Rights Group International}}</ref><ref name=":5">{{Cite web|title=Yemen in Crisis|url=https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/190632/Backgrounder_%20Yemen's%20Ci...pdf|last=Laub|first=Zachary|date=2015|website=Council on Foreign Relations}}</ref><ref name=":7">{{Cite web|title=Whatever happened to Yemen's army?|url=https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_9_Yemen.pdf|last=Gaub|first=Florence|date=2015|website=European Union Institute for Security Studies}}</ref> An [[assassination]] attempt in 1995 on [[Hosni Mubarak]], executed by Yemen's Islamists, damaged the country's international reputation.<ref name=":164"/> The [[War on Terrorism in Yemen|war on terror]] further strengthened [[Salafi jihadism|Salafist-jihadist]] groups impact on Yemen's politics.<ref name=":05"/><ref name=":164"/><ref name=":24"/> The 2000 [[USS Cole bombing]] resulted in US [[military operation]]s on Yemen's soil.<ref name=":05"/><ref name=":164"/> [[Collateral damage]] caused by [[cruise missile]]s, [[cluster bombs]], and [[List of drone strikes in Yemen|drone attacks]], deployed by the United States, compromised Yemen's [[sovereignty]].<ref name=":05"/><ref name=":164"/><ref name=":174"/> ==== Ali Abdullah Saleh's reign ==== [[Ali Abdullah Saleh]] is a Zaydi from the Hashid's Sanhan clan and founder of the nationalist party [[General People's Congress (Yemen)|General People's Congress]].<ref name=":05"/> During his decades long reign as [[head of state]], he used Sa'dah's Salafist's ideological dissemination against Zaydi's [[Islamic revival]] [[advocacy]].<ref name=":24"/><ref name=":43"/> In addition, the [[Armed forces of Yemen|Armed Forces of Yemen]] used Salafists as [[mercenaries]] to fight against Houthis.<ref name=":05" /> Though, Ali Abdullah Saleh also used Houthis as a political counterweight to Yemen's [[Muslim Brotherhood]].<ref name=":164"/><ref name=":43" /> Due to the Houthis persistent opposition to the central government, [[Upper Yemen]] was economically marginalized by the state.<ref name=":164" /><ref name=":43" /> This policy of [[divide and rule]] executed by Ali Abdullah Saleh worsened Yemen's [[social cohesion]] and nourished sectarian persuasions within Yemen's society.<ref name=":164" /><ref name=":24" /><ref name=":43" /> Following the [[Arab Spring]] and the [[Yemeni Revolution]], Ali Abdullah Saleh was forced to step down as president in 2012.<ref name=":05" /><ref name=":13">{{Cite book|last=Bonnefoy|first=Laurent|title=Yemen and the world: beyond insecurity|publisher=Hurst & Company|year=2018|isbn=978-1-849-04966-5|location=London|pages=48–51|oclc=1089454196}}</ref> Subsequently, a complex and violent power struggle broke out between three national [[alliance]]s: (1) Ali Abdullah Saleh, his political party General People's Congress, and the Houthis; (2) [[Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar]], supported by the political party Al-Islah; (3) [[Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi]], supported by the Joint Meeting Parties.<ref name=":174"/><ref name=":142"/><ref name=":72">{{Cite web|title=Whatever happened to Yemen's army?|url=https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief_9_Yemen.pdf|last=Gaub|first=Florence|date=2015|website=European Union Institute for Security Studies}}</ref> According to Ibrahim Fraihat, “Yemen’s conflict has never been about sectarianism, as the Houthis were originally motivated by economic and political grievances. However, in 2014, the regional context substantially changed”.<ref name=":142"/> The [[Houthi takeover in Yemen|Houthi takeover]] in 2014-2015 provoked a [[Saudi-led intervention in Yemen|Saudi-led intervention]], strengthening the sectarian dimension of the conflict.<ref name=":126"/><ref name=":142"/> Hezbollah's [[Hassan Nasrallah]] heavily criticized the Saudi intervention, bolstering the regional Sunni-Shia geopolitical dynamic behind it.<ref name=":142"/> ===Saudi Arabia=== {{Main article|Sectarianism in Saudi Arabia}} Sectarianism in [[Saudi Arabia]] is exemplified through the tensions with its Shi’ite population, who constitute up to 15% of the Saudi population.<ref name=":2">{{Cite journal|date=2017|title=The Shiites of Saudi Arabia:: Riyadh's Ultimate Other|journal=Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, and the New Regional Landscape|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep04754.8|pages=37–42}}</ref> This includes the anti-Shi’ite policies and persecution of the Shi’ites by the Saudi government.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Neo|first=Ric|date=1 September 2020|title=Religious securitisation and institutionalised sectarianism in Saudi Arabia|journal=Critical Studies on Security|volume=8|issue=3|pages=203–222|doi=10.1080/21624887.2020.1795479|issn=2162-4887|doi-access=free}}</ref> According to [[Human Rights Watch]], Shi’ites face marginalisation socially, politically, religiously, legally and economically, whilst facing discrimination in education and in the workplace.<ref>{{Cite web|date=3 September 2009|title=Saudi Arabia: Treat Shia Equally|url=https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/09/03/saudi-arabia-treat-shia-equally|access-date=12 May 2021|website=Human Rights Watch|language=en}}</ref> This history dates back to 1744, with the establishment of a coalition between the [[House of Saud]] and the [[Wahhabism|Wahhabis]], who equate Shi’ism with polytheism.<ref name=":3">{{Cite book|last=Hiro|first=Dilip|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/1083471952|title=Cold war in the Islamic world : Saudi Arabia, Iran and the struggle for supremacy|date=2018|isbn=978-0-19-005022-1|location=New York|oclc=1083471952}}</ref> Over the course of the twentieth century clashes and tensions unfolded between the Shi’ites and the Saudi regime, including the [[1979 Qatif Uprising]] and the repercussions of the [[1987 Mecca incident|1987 Makkah Incident]].<ref name=":3" /><ref>{{Cite journal|date=1 November 2017|title=Oil, Dissent, and Distribution|url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0305750X15312420|journal=World Development|language=en|volume=99|pages=186–202|doi=10.1016/j.worlddev.2017.05.028|issn=0305-750X|last1=Mazaheri|first1=Nimah|url-access=subscription}}</ref> Though relations underwent a détente in the 1990s and the early 2000s, tensions rose again after the 2003 US-led election of Iraq (owing to a broader rise of Shi’ism in the region) and peaked during the [[Arab Spring]].<ref name=":2" /> Sectarianism in Saudi Arabia has attracted widespread attention by Human Rights groups, including Human Rights Watch and [[Amnesty International]], especially after the [[Execution of Nimr al-Nimr|execution]] of Shi'ite cleric [[Nimr al-Nimr]] in 2016, who was active in the [[2011–2012 Saudi Arabian protests|2011 domestic protests]].<ref>{{Cite web|title=Shia cleric among 47 executed by Saudi Arabia in a single day|url=https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/01/shia-cleric-among-47-executed-by-saudi-arabia-in-a-single-day/|access-date=12 May 2021|website=www.amnesty.org|date=2 January 2016 |language=en}}</ref> Despite [[Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia|Crown Prince]] [[Mohammed bin Salman]]'s [[Saudi Vision 2030|reforms]], Shi’ites continue to face discrimination today.<ref>{{Cite web|date=21 September 2018|title=Saudi Arabia's "Reforms" Don't Include Tolerance of Shia Community|url=https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/09/21/saudi-arabias-reforms-dont-include-tolerance-shia-community|access-date=12 May 2021|website=Human Rights Watch|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|date=15 February 2021|title=Saudi Arabia: Further Textbook Reforms Needed|url=https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/15/saudi-arabia-further-textbook-reforms-needed|access-date=12 May 2021|website=Human Rights Watch|language=en}}</ref> ===Lebanon=== {{Main|Sectarianism in Lebanon}} Sectarianism in Lebanon has been formalized and legalized within state and non-state institutions and is inscribed in its constitution. Lebanon recognizes 18 different sects, mainly within Muslim and Christian worlds. The foundations of sectarianism in Lebanon date back to the mid-19th century during Ottoman rule. It was subsequently reinforced with the creation of the Republic of Lebanon in 1920 and its 1926 constitution and in the National Pact of 1943. In 1990, with the Taif Agreement, the constitution was revised but did not structurally change aspects relating to political sectarianism.<ref name="Bahout">{{cite journal|last=Bahout|first=Joseph|title=Sectarianism in Lebanon and Syria: The Dynamics of Mutual Spill-Over|journal=United States Institute of Peace|date=18 November 2013}}</ref> The dynamic nature of sectarianism in Lebanon has prompted some historians and authors to refer to it as "the sectarian state ''par excellence''" because it is a mixture of religious communities and their myriad sub-divisions, with a constitutional and political order to match.<ref>{{cite book|last=Hirst|first=David|title=Beware of Small States: Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East|year=2011|publisher=Nation Books|page=2}}</ref> Yet, the reality on the ground has been more complex than such a conclusion, because as Nadya Sbaiti has shown in her research, in the aftermath of the First World War, the “need of shaping a collective future that paralleled shifting conceptions of the newly territorialized nation-state of Lebanon”<ref name=":22">{{cite book |last1=Deeb |first1=Lara |last2=Nalbantian |first2=Tsolin |last3=Sbaiti |first3=Nadya |title=Practicing Sectarianism |date=2022 |publisher=Stanford University Press |location=Stanford |page=16 }}</ref> was clearly present. “Over the course of the Mandate, educational practitioners and the wide range of schools that proliferated helped shape the epistemological infrastructure en route to creating this entity. By ‘epistemological infrastructure’, one means the cast array of ideas that become validated as truths and convincing explanations.”<ref name="Practicing Sectarianism">{{cite book |last1=Sbaiti |first1=Nadya |last2=Nalbantian |first2=Tsolin |last3=Deeb |first3=Lara |title=Practicing Sectarianism |date=2022 |publisher=Stanford University Press |location=Stanford |page=16 }}</ref> In other words, contrary to the colonial sectarian education system, “students, parents, and teachers created educational content through curricula, and educational practices so as to produce new ‘communities of knowledge’. These communities of knowledge, connected as they were by worlds of ideas and networks of knowledge, often transcended confessional, sociopolitical, and even at times regional subjectivities.”<ref name="Practicing Sectarianism"/> Some of these schools such as the "Ahliyya National School for Girls" would even go as far as to promote an anti-colonial stance among students to increase popular resistance towards French Mandate policies at the time <ref>Sbaiti, N., Nalbantian, T., & Deeb, L. (2022). No Room for This Story: Education and the Limits of Sectarianism during the Mandate Era. In Practicing Sectarianism (pp. 14–30). Stanford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781503633872-004 | page 22</ref>This perspective therefore also uncovers the underlying factors at work within these historical events and confirms that such happenings were not inevitable but simply one of many paths for possible outcomes.<ref>Sbaiti, N., Nalbantian, T., & Deeb, L. (2022). No Room for This Story: Education and the Limits of Sectarianism during the Mandate Era. In Practicing Sectarianism (pp. 14–30). Stanford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781503633872-004 | page 30</ref> In a more recent developent, the sectarian political system in Lebanon was questioned, as 2019-uprisings prompted "calls to dismantle the system were both a culmination of the growth of multiple activist movements over the past decades—including the intersection of antisectarian, feminist, environmentalist, and queer rights strands—and an echo of earlier movements on the left."<ref>{{cite book |last1=L AR A DEEB, TSOLIN NA LBA N TIA N, and NADYA SBAITI |title=Practicing sectarianism |date=2023 |publisher=Stanford University Press |pages=11 |chapter=I N T R O D U C T I O N P R A C T I C I N G S E C T A R I A N I S M I N L E B A N O N}}</ref> ==See also== {{columns-list|colwidth=30em| * [[Apartheid]] * [[Bigot]] * [[Chauvinism]] * [[Collective narcissism]] * [[Communalism (South Asia)]] * [[Cybersectarianism]] * [[Discrimination]] * [[Ethnic cleansing]] * [[Exclusivism]] * [[Group conflict]] * [[Homophobia]] * [[Identity politics]] * [[Identitarianism]] * [[Ingroups and outgroups]] * [[Jingoism]] * [[Narcissism of small differences]] * [[Partisanship]] * [[Pillarization]] * [[Religious segregation]] * [[Racism]] * [[Sect]] * [[Supremacism]] * [[Tribalism]] * [[Xenophobia]] }} == References == {{reflist}} ==Further reading== {{Wiktionary|sectarian}} {{Wikiquote}} * [https://web.archive.org/web/20160401130757/http://tda-sy.org/english-sectarianism-in-syria-survey-study/?lang=en Sectarianism in Syria (Survey Study), The Day After, 2016.] * [http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/culture/middle-east-sectarianism-explained-the-narcissism-of-small-differences_31307 Middle East sectarianism explained: the narcissism of small differences] Victor Argo 13 April 2015 ''Your Middle East'' * Bryan R. Wilson, ''The Social Dimensions of Sectarianism: Sects and New Religious Movements in Contemporary Society'', Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990 {{Discrimination}} [[Category:Sectarianism| ]] [[Category:Identity politics]] [[Category:Religious discrimination]] [[Category:Social conflict]]
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