Editing Soviet atomic bomb project

{{Short description|Russian program to develop nuclear weapons during and after World War II}}{{Expand Russian|Создание_советской_атомной_бомбы|date=March 2025|topic=hist}}{{Infobox operational plan
| name          = Soviet atomic bomb project
| partof        = 
| image         = {{multiple image|border=infobox|perrow=1/2/2/3|total_width=300
| image1 = Alihanov_Kurchatov_Ioffe.jpg
| image2 = 
| image3 = Model of F-1 reactor 01.jpg 
| image4 = RBMK reactor from Ignalina ArM.jpg  
| image5 = Greenglass_bomb_diagram.png  
| image6 = A-bomb (RDS-1).jpg 
| image7 = Joe-1 location prediction 1949.jpg
| image8 = Semipalatinsk crater and lake.jpg
}} From top to bottom, left to right: {{flatlist|
*  [[Abram Ioffe]], [[Abram Alikhanov]], and [[Igor Kurchatov]]
* Model of the [[F-1_(nuclear_reactor)|F-1]] reactor
* [[RBMK]] reactor similar to [[Mayak]] plutonium production reactors
* Diagram of an [[implosion-type nuclear weapon|implosion bomb]] passed by [[atomic spy]] [[David Greenglass]]
* Replica of [[RDS-1]]
* US estimations of RDS-1 location, 1949
* Test crater at the [[Semipalatinsk Test Site]]
}}
| caption       = 
| scope         = [[Science and technology in Russia|Operational R&D]]
| type          = 
| location      = {{plainlist|
* [[Kurchatov Institute]], Moscow
* [[KB-11|Design Bureau 11]], [[Arzamas-16]]
* [[Semipalatinsk Test Site]], Kazakhstan
}}
| coordinates   = 
| map_type      = 
| map_size      = 
| map_caption   = 
| map_label     = 
| planned       = 
| planned_by    = [[File:Emblema NKVD.svg|10px]] [[NKVD]], [[People's Commissariat for State Security|NKGB]], [[Ministry of State Security (Soviet Union)|MGB]] [[First Chief Directorate|PGU]]<br />[[File:Red star.svg|10px]] [[GRU (Soviet Union)|GRU]]
| commanded_by  = 
| objective     = 
| target        = 
| date          = 1942–1949
| time          = 
| time-begin    = 
| time-end      = 
| timezone      = 
| executed_by   = {{USSR}}
| outcome       = * Successful development of a plutonium implosion weapon
* United States accelerates development of the [[hydrogen bomb]]
| fatalities    = 
| injuries      = 
}}

The '''Soviet atomic bomb project''' was authorized by [[Joseph Stalin]] in the [[Soviet Union]] to develop [[nuclear weapon]]s during and after [[World War II]].<ref name="nuclearweaponarchive, part I">{{cite web|last1=Sublette|first1=Carey|title=The Soviet Nuclear Weapons Program|url=http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Russia/Sovwpnprog.html|website=nuclearweaponarchive.org|publisher=nuclearweaponarchive, part I|access-date=21 April 2017}}</ref><ref name="History Today">{{cite web|last1=Swift|first1=John|title=The Soviet-American Arms Race|url=http://www.historytoday.com/john-swift/soviet-american-arms-race|website=www.historytoday.com|publisher=History Today|access-date=21 April 2017}}</ref>

Russian physicist [[Georgy Flyorov]] suspected that the [[Allies of World War II|Allied powers]] were secretly developing a "[[Weapon of mass destruction|superweapon]]"<ref name="History Today" /> since 1939. Flyorov urged Stalin to start a nuclear program in 1942.<ref name="Yale University Press, Holloway">{{cite book|last1=Holloway|first1=[by] David|title=Stalin and the bomb : the Soviet Union and atomic energy|date=1994|publisher=Yale University Press|location=New Haven|isbn=978-0300066647|page=421|edition=|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ICO6aUnQ2KcC&pg=PA78 |access-date=21 April 2017 |language=en}}</ref>{{rp|78–79}} Early efforts mostly consisted of research at [[Kurchatov Institute|Laboratory No. 2]] in [[Moscow]], and intelligence gathering of Soviet-sympathizing [[atomic spies]] in the US [[Manhattan Project]].<ref name="nuclearweaponarchive, part I"/> Subsequent efforts involved plutonium production at [[Mayak]] in [[Chelyabinsk Oblast|Chelyabinsk]] and weapon research and assembly at [[KB-11]] in [[Sarov]].

After Stalin learned of the [[atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki]], the nuclear program was accelerated through intelligence gathering about the Manhattan Project and [[German nuclear weapon project]].<ref name="US DOE">{{cite web |publisher=US Dept of Energy |title=Manhattan Project: Espionage and the Manhattan Project, 1940–1945 |url=https://www.osti.gov/opennet/manhattan-project-history/Events/1942-1945/espionage.htm |website=www.osti.gov |access-date=21 April 2017}}</ref> Espionage coups, especially via [[Klaus Fuchs]] and [[David Greenglass]], included detailed descriptions of the [[Implosion-type nuclear weapon|implosion-type]] [[Fat Man]] bomb and plutonium production. In the final months of the war, the Soviet "[[Russian Alsos]]" task force competed against the Western Allies' [[Alsos Mission]] to capture German and Austrian nuclear scientists and material, including refined uranium and [[cyclotrons]].<ref name="Lulu.com, Strickland">{{cite book|last1=Strickland|first1=Jeffrey|title=Weird Scientists: the Creators of Quantum Physics|date=2011|publisher=Lulu.com|location=New York|isbn=978-1257976249|page=549|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ivDBAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA242 |access-date=21 April 2017|language=en}}</ref>{{rp|242–243}} The Soviet project utilized [[East German]] industry for further uranium mining, refinement, and instrument manufacture. [[Lavrentiy Beria]] was placed in charge of the atomic project, and the replication of the Nagasaki [[plutonium]] [[Implosion-type nuclear weapon|weapon]] was prioritized.<ref name="d168">{{cite journal |last=Oleynikov |first=Pavel V. |date=2000 |title=German scientists in the Soviet atomic project |url=http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10736700008436807 |journal=The Nonproliferation Review |volume=7 |issue=2 |pages=1–30 |doi=10.1080/10736700008436807 |issn=1073-6700 |access-date=2025-04-29}}</ref>

The Manhattan Project had [[Combined Development Agency|established a monopoly]] on the global [[uranium market]]. The Soviet project relied on [[SAG Wismut]] in East Germany and the development of the [[Taboshar]] mine in Tajikistan. Domestic large-scale production of [[Nuclear graphite|high purity graphite]] and high purity uranium metal, to construct plutonium production reactors, was a significant challenge.

In late 1946, [[F-1 (nuclear reactor)|F-1]], the first [[nuclear reactor]] outside North America, achieved criticality at Laboratory No. 2, led by [[Igor Kurchatov]]. In mid-1948, the [[A-1 (nuclear reactor)|A-1]] plutonium production reactor became operational at the [[Mayak Production Association]], and in mid-1949, the first plutonium metal was separated.<ref name="m543">{{cite journal |last=Diakov |first=Anatoli |date=2011-04-25 |title=The History of Plutonium Production in Russia |url=http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08929882.2011.566459 |journal=Science & Global Security |volume=19 |issue=1 |pages=28–45 |doi=10.1080/08929882.2011.566459 |issn=0892-9882 |access-date=2025-04-29}}</ref> The first nuclear weapon was assembled at the [[KB-11]] design bureau, led by [[Yulii Khariton]], in the [[closed city]] of [[Arzamas-16]] (Sarov).<ref name="h802">{{cite journal |last=Il’kaev |first=R. I. |year=2007 |title=60 years of scientific exploits |journal=Bulletin of the Russian Academy of Sciences: Physics |publisher=Allerton Press |volume=71 |issue=3 |pages=289–298 |doi=10.3103/s106287380703001x |issn=1062-8738}}</ref>

On 29 August 1949, the Soviet Union secretly and successfully conducted its first weapon test, [[RDS-1]], at the [[Semipalatinsk Test Site]] of the [[Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic|Kazakh SSR]].<ref name="nuclearweaponarchive, part I" /> Simultaneously, project scientists had been developing conceptual [[thermonuclear weapons]]. The US detection of test, via anticipatory atmospheric [[Nuclear fallout|fallout]] monitoring, led to a more rapid US program to develop thermonuclear weapons, and marked the opening of the [[nuclear arms race]] of the [[Cold War]].

Following RDS-1, the Soviet nuclear program rapidly expanded. [[Boosted fission]] and multi-stage thermonuclear weapons were developed during the 1950s, testing expanded to [[Novaya Zemlya]] and [[Kapustin Yar]], and [[fissile material]] production sites grew, including the invention of the [[gas centrifuge]]. The program created demand for [[nuclear weapons delivery]], influencing the [[Soviet space program]].

==Early efforts==
===Background origins and roots===
{{Main|: Timeline of Russian inventions and technology records|History of the periodic table}}
As early as [[1910 in Russia]], independent research was being conducted on [[radioactive element]]s by several Russian scientists.<ref name="MIT Press Schmid">{{cite book|last1=Schmid|first1=Sonja D.|title=Producing Power: The Pre-Chernobyl History of the Soviet Nuclear Industry|date=2015|publisher=MIT Press|location=[S.l.]|isbn=978-0262028271|page=315|edition=|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UoPVBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA44 |access-date=12 June 2017|language=en|chapter-format=googlebooks|chapter=Dual Origins}}</ref>{{rp|44}}<ref name="Springer, Lante">{{cite book|last1=Lente|first1=Dick van|title=The Nuclear Age in Popular Media: A Transnational History, 1945–1965|date=2012|publisher=Springer|location=New York|isbn=978-1137086181|page=270|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=6SwhAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA24 |access-date=12 June 2017|language=en|chapter-format=googlebooks|chapter=A Conspicuous Silence}}</ref>{{rp|24–25}} Despite the hardship faced by the Russian [[USSR Academy of Science|academy of sciences]] during the [[Russian Revolution|national revolution]] in 1917, followed by the violent [[Russian Civil War|civil war]] in 1922, Russian scientists had made remarkable efforts toward the advancement of physics research in the Soviet Union by the 1930s.<ref name="Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Johnson">{{cite book|last1=Johnson|first1=Paul R.|title=Early years of Soviet nuclear physics|date=1987|publisher=Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists|location=U.S.|page=60|edition=2nd|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=-wUAAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA36 |access-date=22 April 2017|language=en}}</ref>{{rp|35–36}} Before the [[Russian Revolution of 1905|first revolution]] in 1905, the mineralogist [[Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadsky|Vladimir Vernadsky]] had made a number of public calls for a survey of Russia's [[uranium]] deposits but none were heeded.<ref name="Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Johnson"/>{{rp|37}} Such early efforts were independently and privately funded by various organizations until 1922 when the [[V. G. Khlopin Radium Institute|Radium Institute]] in [[Saint Petersburg|Petrograd]] (now [[Saint Petersburg]]) opened and industrialized the research.{{rp|44}}<ref name="MIT Press Schmid"/>

From the 1920s until the late 1930s, Russian physicists had been conducting joint research with their European counterparts on the advancement of [[atomic physics]] at the [[Cavendish Laboratory]] run by a New Zealand physicist, [[Ernest Rutherford]], where [[George Gamow|Georgi Gamov]] and [[Pyotr Kapitsa]] had studied and researched.<ref name="Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Johnson"/>{{rp|36}}

Influential research towards the advancement of nuclear physics was guided by [[Abram Ioffe]], who was the director at the [[Ioffe Physical-Technical Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences|Leningrad Physical-Technical Institute]] (LPTI), having sponsored various research programs at various technical schools in the [[Soviet Union]].<ref name="Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Johnson"/>{{rp|36}} The discovery of the [[neutron]] by the British physicist [[James Chadwick]] further provided promising expansion of the LPTI's program, with the operation of the first [[cyclotron]] to energies of over 1 [[MeV]], and the first "splitting" of the atomic nucleus by [[John Cockcroft]] and [[Ernest Walton]].<ref name="Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Johnson"/>{{rp|36–37}} Russian physicists began pushing the government, lobbying in the interest of the development of science in the Soviet Union, which had received little interest due to the upheavals created during the [[Russian Revolution|Russian revolution]] and the [[February Revolution]].<ref name="Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Johnson"/>{{rp|36–37}} Earlier research was directed towards the medical and scientific exploration of [[radium]]; a supply of it was available as it could be retrieved from borehole water from the [[Ukhta]] oilfields.<ref name="Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Johnson"/>{{rp|37}}

In 1939, German [[chemist]] [[Otto Hahn]] reported his discovery of [[nuclear fission|fission]], achieved by the splitting of [[uranium]] with [[neutron]]s that produced the much lighter element [[barium]]. This eventually led to the realization among Russian scientists, and their American counterparts, that such [[Nuclear reaction|reaction]] could have military significance.<ref name="W. W. Norton & Company, Richelson">{{cite book|last1=Richelson|first1=Jeffrey|title=Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear Intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea|date=2007|publisher=W.W. Norton & Company|location=New York|isbn=978-0393329827|page=600|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8XQrAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA20 |access-date=12 June 2017|language=en|chapter-format=googlebooks|chapter=A Terrifying Prospect}}</ref>{{rp|20}} The discovery excited the Russian physicists, and they began conducting their independent investigations on nuclear fission, mainly aiming towards power generation, as many were skeptical of the possibility of creating an [[atomic bomb]] anytime soon.<ref name="ABC-CLIO, Burns 2013">{{cite book|last1=Burns|first1=Richard Dean|last2=Siracusa|first2=Joseph M.|title=A Global History of the Nuclear Arms Race: Weapons, Strategy, and Politics [2 volumes]: Weapons, Strategy, and Politics|date=2013|publisher=ABC-CLIO|isbn=978-1440800955|page=641|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=EX2jAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA25 |access-date=12 June 2017|language=en|chapter-format=googlebooks|chapter=Soviet scientists began Quest}}</ref>{{rp|25}} Early efforts were led by [[Yakov Frenkel]] (a physicist specialised on [[Condensed matter physics|condensed matter]]), who did the first theoretical calculations on [[continuum mechanics]] directly relating the kinematics of [[Nuclear binding energy|binding energy]] in fission process in 1940.<ref name="W. W. Norton & Company, Richelson"/>{{rp|99}} [[Georgy Flyorov]]'s and [[Lev Rusinov]]'s collaborative work on thermal reactions concluded that 3–1 neutrons were emitted per fission only days after similar conclusions had been reached by the team of [[Frédéric Joliot-Curie]].<ref name="W. W. Norton & Company, Richelson"/>{{rp|63}}<ref name="CRC Press, Ponomarev">{{cite book|last1=Ponomarev|first1=L. I.|last2=Kurchatov|first2=I. V.|title=The Quantum Dice|date=1993|publisher=CRC Press|location=Bristol|isbn=978-0750302517|page=250|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=iu0umhnc_00C&pg=PA200 |access-date=12 June 2017|language=en|chapter-format=googlebooks|chapter=Quantumalia}}</ref>{{rp|200}}

===World War II and accelerated feasibility===
{{Main|Eastern Front (World War II)}}
[[File:2352cc.jpg|thumb|250px|right|The 1942 Russian report on the feasibility of uranium titled: ''Disposition No. 2352: "On the organization of work on uranium''.]]

After a strong lobbying of Russian scientists, the [[Government of the Soviet Union|Soviet government]] initially set up a [[commission (government)|commission]] that was to address the "uranium problem" and investigate the possibility of chain reaction and [[isotope separation]].<ref name="Reed Business Information, Kelly">{{cite journal|last1=Kelly|first1=Peter|title=How the USSR Broke in the Nuclear Club|journal=New Scientist|date=8 May 1986|issue=1507|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=MyU4bxbCfF8C&pg=PA33|access-date=12 June 2017|publisher=Reed Business Information|language=en|format=googlebooks}}{{Dead link|date=April 2024 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>{{rp|33}} The Uranium Problem Commission was ineffective because the [[Operation Barbarossa|German invasion]] of [[Soviet Union]] eventually limited the focus on research, as Russia became engaged in a bloody conflict along the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Eastern Front]] for the next four years.<ref name="Dover Publications, Allen">{{cite book|last1=Allen|first1=Thomas B.|last2=Polmar|first2=Norman|title=World War II : the encyclopedia of the war years 1941–1945|date=2012|publisher=Dover Publications|location=Mineola, N.Y.|isbn=978-0486479620|page=941|edition=|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=30gRAGjXrIIC&pg=PA115 |access-date=14 June 2017|language=en|chapter-format=googlebooks|chapter=Atomic Bomb: Soviet Union}}</ref>{{rp|114–115}}<ref name="Springer, Higham">{{cite book|last1=Higham|first1=R.|title=The Military History of the Soviet Union|date=2010|publisher=Springer|isbn=978-0230108219|page=400|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=952HDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA200 |access-date=12 June 2017|language=en|chapter-format=googlebooks|chapter=The Stalin Years: 1946–53}}</ref>{{rp|200}} The Soviet atomic weapons program had no significance, and most work was unclassified as the papers were continuously published as public domain in academic journals.<ref name="Reed Business Information, Kelly"/>{{rp|33}}

[[Joseph Stalin]], the [[Soviet leadership|Soviet leader]], had mostly disregarded the atomic knowledge possessed by the Russian scientists as had most of the scientists working in the [[metallurgy of Russia|metallurgy]] and [[mining industry of Russia|mining industry]] or serving in the [[Soviet Armed Forces]] technical branches during the [[World War II]]'s [[Eastern Front (World War II)|eastern front]] in 1940–42.<ref name="Little, Brown and Co.2010">{{cite book|last1=Kean|first1=Sam|title=The disappearing spoon and other true tales of madness, love, and the history of the world from the periodic table of the elements|date=2010|publisher=Little, Brown and Co.|location=New York|isbn=978-0316089081|edition=Sony eReader|format=googlebooks|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Cky2x4wWvEUC&pg=PT94 |access-date=13 June 2017|language=en}}</ref>{{rp|xx}}

In 1940–42, [[Georgy Flyorov]], a Russian physicist serving as an officer in the [[Soviet Air Force]], noted that despite progress in other areas of physics, the [[German people|German]], [[British people|British]], and [[Americans|American]] scientists had ceased publishing papers on [[nuclear science]]. Clearly, they each had active secret research programs.<ref name="Yale University Press, 1999 Tsarev">{{cite book|last1=West|first1=Nigel|last2=Tsarev|first2=Oleg|title=The Crown Jewels: The British Secrets at the Heart of the KGB Archives|date=1999|publisher=Yale University Press|isbn=978-0300078060|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=wO4-dEhKwpQC&pg=PA230 |access-date=13 June 2017|language=en|chapter-format=googlebooks|chapter=Atom Secrets}}</ref>{{rp|230}}<!-- If contextually correct, replace with: "He presumed that each had active secret research programs, a presumption that was correct." If not contextually correct, reword in some other way to remove "Clearly", which violates MOS:PRESUME --> The dispersal of Soviet scientists had sent [[Abram Ioffe]]'s [[V. G. Khlopin Radium Institute|Radium Institute]] from Leningrad to Kazan; and the wartime research program put the "uranium bomb" programme third, after radar and anti-mine protection for ships. Kurchatov had moved from Kazan to Murmansk to work on mines for the Soviet Navy.{{sfn|Erickson|1999|pp=79, 80}}

In April 1942, Flyorov directed two classified letters to Stalin, warning him of the consequences of the development of atomic weapons: "the results will be so overriding [that] it won't be necessary to determine who is to blame for the fact that this work has been neglected in our country."<ref name="Skyhorse Publishing, Inc. Hamilton 2016">{{cite book|last1=Hamilton|first1=William H.|last2=Sasser|first2=Charles W.|title=Night Fighter: An Insider's Story of Special Ops from Korea to SEAL Team 6|date=2016|publisher=Skyhorse Publishing, Inc.|isbn=978-1628726831|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1Zv1DAAAQBAJ&pg=PT21 |access-date=13 June 2017|language=en}}</ref>{{rp|xxx}} The second letter, by Flyorov and [[Konstantin Petrzhak]], highly emphasized the importance of a "uranium bomb": "it is essential to manufacture a uranium bomb without a delay."<ref name="Yale University Press, 1999 Tsarev"/>{{rp|230}}

Upon reading the Flyorov letters, Stalin immediately pulled Russian physicists from their respective military services and authorized an atomic bomb project, under [[engineering physics|engineering physicist]] [[Anatoly Alexandrov (physicist)|Anatoly Alexandrov]] and [[Nuclear Physics|nuclear physicist]] [[Igor Kurchatov|Igor V. Kurchatov]].<ref name="Yale University Press, 1999 Tsarev"/>{{rp|230}}<ref name="Little, Brown and Co.2010"/>{{rp|xx}} For this purpose, the [[Kurchatov Institute|Laboratory No. 2]] near [[Moscow]] was established under Kurchatov.<ref name="Yale University Press, 1999 Tsarev"/>{{rp|230}} Kurchatov was chosen in late 1942 as the technical director of the Soviet bomb program; he was awed by the magnitude of the task but was by no means convinced of its utility against the demands of the front.{{sfn|Erickson|1999|pp=79, 80}} [[Abram Ioffe]] had refused the post as he was too old, and recommended the young Kurchatov.
<!-- Is this a quote? If it is, please remove the italics and add quotation marks. It should also be sourced. --> 

At the same time, Flyorov was moved to [[Dubna]], where he established the [[Joint Institute for Nuclear Research|Laboratory of Nuclear Reactions]], focusing on [[synthetic element]]s and thermal reactions.<ref name="Little, Brown and Co.2010"/>{{rp|xx}} In late 1942, the [[State Defense Committee]] officially delegated the program to the [[Soviet Army]], with major wartime logistical efforts later being supervised by [[Lavrentiy Beria]], the [[Political commissar|head]] of [[Narodny Kommisariat Vnutrennikh Del|NKVD]].<ref name="Dover Publications, Allen"/>{{rp|114–115}}

In 1945, the [[Arzamas 16]] site, near Moscow, was established under [[Yakov Borisovich Zel'dovich|Yakov Zel'dovich]] and [[Yuli Khariton]] who performed calculations on nuclear combustion theory, alongside [[Isaak Pomeranchuk]].<ref name="ABC-CLIO, 2005">{{cite book|last1=Hamblin|first1=Jacob Darwin|title=Science in the early twentieth century : an encyclopedia|date=2005|publisher=ABC-CLIO|location=Santa Barbara, Calif.|isbn=978-1851096657|page=400|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=mpiZRAiE0JwC&pg=PA177 |access-date=13 June 2017|language=en|chapter-format=googlebooks|chapter=I.V. Kurchatov}}</ref>{{rp|117–118}} Despite early and accelerated efforts, it was reported by historians that efforts on building a bomb using weapon-grade uranium seemed hopeless to Russian scientists.<ref name="ABC-CLIO, 2005"/>{{rp|117–118}} Igor Kurchatov had harboured doubts working towards the uranium bomb, but made progress on a bomb using weapon-grade plutonium after British data was provided by the [[NKVD]].<ref name="ABC-CLIO, 2005"/>{{rp|117–118}}

The situation dramatically changed when the Soviet Union learned of the [[atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki]] in 1945.<ref name="MIT Press, Bukharin">{{cite book|last1=Bukharin|first1=Oleg|last2=Hippel|first2=Frank Von|title=Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces|date=2004|publisher=MIT Press|isbn=978-0262661812|page=695|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=CPRVbYDc-7kC&pg=PA1 |access-date=14 June 2017|language=en|chapter-format=googlebooks|chapter=Making the First Nuclear Weapons}}</ref>{{rp|2–5}}

Immediately after the atomic bombing, the [[Soviet Politburo]] took control of the atomic bomb project by establishing a special committee to oversee the development of nuclear weapons as soon as possible.<ref name="MIT Press, Bukharin"/>{{rp|2–5}} On 9 April 1946, the [[Council of Ministers (Soviet Union)|Council of Ministers]] created [[All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics|KB–11]] ('Design Bureau-11') that worked towards mapping the first [[Fat Man|nuclear weapon design]], primarily based on the American approach and detonated with weapon-grade plutonium.<ref name="MIT Press, Bukharin"/>{{rp|2–5}}

Work on the program was accelerated by constructing a [[F-1 (nuclear reactor)|nuclear research reactor]] near Moscow which went critical for the first time on 25 October 1946.<ref name="MIT Press, Bukharin"/>{{rp|2–5}} Even while this facility was still in the planning stage, a government commission inspected and approved a location east of the Urals for a plutonium production facility similar to the American [[Hanford Site]], with nuclear production reactor much larger in size than the research reactor, combined with a radiochemical extraction factory. Constructed some fifteen miles east of the small town of [[Kyshtym]], this plutonium production complex came to be known as Chelyabinsk-40 and later still, as [[Mayak]].

The area was chosen in part because of its proximity to the [[Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant]] which had merged during the war with the evacuated [[Malyshev Factory|Kharkov Diesel Works]] and parts of the Leningrad [[Kirov Plant]] into a major tank production complex popularly known as "Tankograd". To supply the complex and dozens of other armament works in the area, a huge new power station had gone up in 1942 from which electricity could be drawn. Chelyabinsk province, particularly around the small town of Kyshtym, was also a major [[gulag]] station, with some twelve forced labor camps in the area.<ref name="Dark Sun">{{cite book|last1=Rhodes|first1=Richard|title=Dark Sun. The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb|date=1995|publisher=Simon & Schuster
}}{{page needed|date=August 2023}}</ref>

== Organization and administration ==
===The German assistance===
{{Main|Russian Alsos}}
From 1941 to 1946, the Soviet Union's [[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Soviet Union)|Ministry of Foreign Affairs]] handled the logistics of the atomic bomb project, with [[Foreign Minister of Russia|Foreign Minister]] [[Vyacheslav Molotov]] controlling the direction of the program.{{rp|33}}<ref name="Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Burns">{{cite book|last1=Burns|first1=Richard Dean|last2=Coyle III|first2=Philip E.|title=The Challenges of Nuclear Non-Proliferation|date=2015|publisher=Rowman & Littlefield Publishers|isbn=978-1442223769|page=237|edition=1|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=KzELCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA33 |access-date=15 June 2017|language=en|chapter-format=googlebooks|chapter=Seeking to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation}}</ref> However, Molotov proved to be a weak administrator, and the program stagnated.<ref name="Pegasus Books, Baggott"/> In contrast to American [[US Army Corps of Engineers|military administration]] in their [[Manhattan Project|atomic bomb project]], the Russians' program was directed by political dignitaries such as [[Vyacheslav Molotov|Molotov]], [[Lavrentiy Beria]], [[Georgy Malenkov|Georgii Malenkov]], and [[Mikhail Pervukhin]]—there were no military members.<ref name="Pegasus Books, Baggott"/>{{rp|313}}

After the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the program's leadership changed, when Stalin appointed Lavrentiy Beria on 22 August 1945.<ref name="Pegasus Books, Baggott">{{cite book|last1=Baggott|first1=Jim|title=The First War of Physics: The Secret History of the Atom Bomb, 1939–1949|date=2011|publisher=Pegasus Books|isbn=978-1605987699|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=qSJbBAAAQBAJ&pg=PT203 |access-date=16 June 2017|language=en}}</ref> Beria is noted for leadership that helped the program to its final implementation.<ref name="Pegasus Books, Baggott"/>

{{blockquote|Beria understood the necessary scope and dynamics of research. This man, who was the personification of evil to modern Russian history, also possessed the great energy and capacity to work. The scientists who met him could not fail to recognize his intelligence, his will power, and his purposefullness. They found him first-class administrator who could carry a job through to completion...|sign=[[Yulii Khariton]], ''The First War of Physics: The Secret History of the Atom Bomb, 1939–1949''<ref name="Pegasus Books, Baggott"/>}}

The new Committee, under Beria, retained [[Georgy Malenkov|Georgii Malenkov]] and added [[Nikolai Voznesensky]] and [[Boris Vannikov]], People's Commissar for Armament.<ref name="Pegasus Books, Baggott"/> Under the administration of Beria, the NKVD co-opted [[atomic spies]] of the [[Soviet Atomic Spy Ring]] into the American program, and infiltrated the [[German nuclear program]] whose nuclear scientists were later instrumental in attaining the feasibility of Soviet nuclear weapons.<ref name="Pegasus Books, Baggott"/> 

The German assistance and the roles of the German nuclear scientists in advancing the Soviet program is subjected to the controversy as Russians had played down their contributions or passed their research to Russian scientists.{{rp|163-166}}<ref>{{cite book |last1=Riehl |first1=Nikolaus |last2=Seitz |first2=Frederick |title=Stalin's Captive: Nikolaus Riehl and the Soviet Race for the Bomb |date=1996 |publisher=Chemical Heritage Foundation |isbn=978-0-8412-3310-2 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=RycjxBr15NAC&q=controversial |access-date=23 December 2024 |language=en}}</ref>

== Espionage ==

===Soviet atomic ring===
{{Main|Nuclear espionage|Atomic spies}}
[[File:Cross-section Sketch of Atomic Bomb - NARA - 278753.jpg|thumb|right|250px|{{small|The 1945 sketch of circular shaped implosion-type passed by the American spies for the Soviet Union. This schematic was part of the development of [[RDS-1]], test fired in [[Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic|Kazakhstan]] in [[:Category:1949 in the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic|1949]].}}]]The [[Nuclear espionage|nuclear]] and [[Industrial espionage|industrial]] [[espionage]]s in the [[United States]] by American sympathisers of communism who were controlled by their ''[[rezident]]'' Russian officials in [[North America]] greatly aided the speed of the Soviet nuclear program from [[History of the United States (1945–64)|1942–54]].<ref name="Harvard University press">{{cite journal|last1=Schwartz|first1=Michael I.|title=The Russian–A(merican) Bomb: The Role of Espionage in the Soviet Atomic Bomb Project|journal=J. Undgrad.Sci|date=1996|volume=3|page=108|url=http://www.hcs.harvard.edu/~jus/0302/schwartz.pdf|access-date=20 June 2017|publisher=Harvard University press|location=Harvard University|language=en|quote={{small|''There was no "Russian" atomic bomb. There only was an American one, masterfully discovered by Soviet spies."''}}|archive-date=29 October 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191029164858/http://www.hcs.harvard.edu/~jus/0302/schwartz.pdf|url-status=dead}}</ref>{{rp|105–106}}<ref name="Yale University Press, Haynes">{{cite book|last1=Haynes|first1=John Earl|title=Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America|date=2000|publisher=Yale University Press|location=|isbn=978-0300129878|page=400|chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=M8p00bTFvRkC&q=Soviet+nuclear+espionage|access-date=20 June 2017|ref=Yale University Press, Haynes|language=en|chapter-format=googlebooks|chapter=Industrial and Atomic Espionage}}</ref>{{rp|287–305}} The willingness in sharing classified information to the Soviet Union by recruited American communist sympathizers increased when the [[USSR|Soviet Union]] faced possible defeat during the [[German invasion of Russia|German invasion]] in [[World War II]].<ref name="Yale University Press, Haynes"/>{{rp|287–289}} The Russian intelligence network in the [[United Kingdom]] also played a vital role in setting up the spy rings in the United States when the [[State Defense Committee]] approved resolution 2352<ref name=":1">{{Cite web |last=Moscow |first=Kremlin |date=28 September 1942 |title=Decree No. 2352 cc of Ukrainian State Committee of Defence |url=https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/decree-no-2352-cc-ukrainian-state-committee-defence |access-date=9 May 2024 |website=wilsoncenter.org}}</ref> in September 1942.<ref name="Harvard University press"/>{{rp|105–106}} This resolution instructed the Academy of Sciences of [[Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic|Ukrainian SSR]] to renew research efforts on nuclear energy and uranium nuclear fission and also directed the academy to report on the possibilities of a bomb or fuel source by April 1 of the following year.<ref name=":1" />

For this purpose, the spy [[Harry Gold]], controlled by [[Semyon Semyonov]], was used for a wide range of espionage that included industrial espionage in the American [[chemical industry]] and obtaining sensitive atomic information that was handed over to him by the British physicist [[Klaus Fuchs]].<ref name="Yale University Press, Haynes"/>{{rp|289–290}} Knowledge and further technical information that were passed by the American [[Theodore Hall]], a theoretical physicist, and Klaus Fuchs had a significant impact on the direction of Russian development of nuclear weapons.<ref name="Harvard University press"/>{{rp|105}}

[[Leonid Kvasnikov]], a Russian engineer turned [[KGB]] officer, was assigned for this special purpose and moved to [[New York City]] to coordinate such activities.<ref name="Regnery Publishing, Romerstein">{{cite book|last1=Romerstein|first1=Herbert|last2=Breindel|first2=Eric|title=The Venona secrets exposing Soviet espionage and America's traitors|date=2000|publisher=Regnery Pub.|location=Washington, DC|isbn=978-1596987326|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TrlRaHFHspsC&q=soviet+espionage|access-date=21 June 2017|language=en}}</ref> [[Anatoli Yatskov|Anatoli Yatzkov]], another NKVD official in New York, was also involved in obtaining sensitive information gathered by [[Sergey Nikolaevich Kurnakov|Sergei Kournakov]] from [[Saville Sax]].<ref name="Regnery Publishing, Romerstein"/>

The existence of Russian spies was exposed by the [[United States Army|U.S. Army]]'s secretive [[Venona project]] in 1943.<ref name="Yale University Press, Powers">{{cite book|last1=Powers|first1=Daniel Patrick Moynihan|editor1-last=Gid|editor1-first=Richard|title=Secrecy : the American experience.|date=1999|publisher=Yale University Press|location=New Haven|isbn=978-0300080797|edition=New preface|url-access=registration|url=https://archive.org/details/secrecyamericane00moyn}}</ref>{{rp|54}}

In 1943, Molotov shared with Kurchatov the intelligence data accumulated through NKVD espionage. Kurchatov told Molotov, "The materials are magnificent. They add exactly what we have been missing." According to [[Richard Rhodes]], "...Kurchatov learned enough, to transform the Soviet program...information that would accelerate the Soviet program by a full two years." This included an alternative to the problem of uranium isotope separation in making a bomb. Instead, [[Plutonium-239]] could be used, which could be produced in a uranium-graphite pile through the absorption of neutrons by [[Uranium-238]]. Additionally, according to Kurchatov, the espionage material "made us include [[gaseous diffusion|diffusion]] experiments in our plans along with centrifuge."<ref name="rr">{{cite book |last1=Rhodes |first1=Richard |title=Dark Sun |date=2005 |publisher=Simon & Schuster Paperbacks |location=New York |isbn=9780684824147 |pages=71–82}}</ref>

===Soviet intelligence management in the Manhattan Project===
{{Main|History of Soviet and Russian espionage in the United States|History of Soviet espionage}}
In 1945, the Soviet intelligence obtained rough blueprints of the first U.S. atomic device.<ref>{{Cite web| title=The Russian-A(merican) Bomb: The Role of Espionage in the Soviet Atomic Bomb Project| url=http://www.hcs.harvard.edu/~jus/0302/schwartz.pdf|archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20191029164858/http://www.hcs.harvard.edu/~jus/0302/schwartz.pdf|url-status=dead|archivedate=October 29, 2019|website=www.hcs.harvard.edu}}</ref><ref>The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union
 by Martin Mccauley</ref>{{full citation needed|date=February 2025}} Alexei Kojevnikov has estimated that the primary way in which the espionage may have sped up the Soviet project was that it allowed Khariton to avoid dangerous tests to determine the size of the critical mass.{{Sfn|Kojevnikov|2004}} These tests in the U.S., known as "tickling the dragon's tail", consumed a good deal of time and claimed at least two lives; see [[Harry Daghlian]] and [[Louis Slotin]].

The published [[Smyth Report]] of 1945 on the Manhattan Project was translated into Russian, and the translators noted that a sentence on the effect of "poisoning" of Plutonium-239 in the first (lithograph) edition had been deleted from the next (Princeton) edition by [[Leslie Groves|Groves]]. This change was noted by the Russian translators, and alerted the Soviet Union to the problem (which had meant that reactor-bred plutonium could not be used in a simple gun-type bomb like the proposed [[Thin Man (nuclear bomb)|Thin Man]]).

One of the key pieces of information, which Soviet intelligence obtained from Fuchs, was a cross-section for [[Nuclear fusion|D-T fusion]]. This data was available to top Soviet officials roughly three years before it was openly published in the ''Physical Review'' in 1949. However, this data was not forwarded to [[Vitaly Ginzburg]] or [[Andrei Sakharov]] until very late, practically months before publication.{{Citation needed|date=March 2013}} Initially both Ginzburg and Sakharov estimated such a cross-section to be similar to the D-D reaction. Once the actual cross-section become known to Ginzburg and Sakharov, the Sloika design become a priority, which resulted in a successful test in 1953.

Comparing the timelines of H-bomb development, some researchers{{Who|date=August 2023}} came to the conclusion that the Soviets had a gap in access to classified information regarding the H-bomb at least between late 1950 and some time in 1953. Earlier, e.g., in 1948, Fuchs gave the Soviets a detailed update of the classical super<ref>{{cite web |title=The Classical Super is Born |url=https://www.atomicarchive.com/history/hydrogen-bomb/page-3.html |website=atomicarchive.com: Exploring the History, Science, and Consequences of the Atomic Bomb |publisher=AJ Software & Multimedia. |access-date=21 July 2023}}</ref> progress, including an idea to use lithium, but did not explain it was specifically lithium-6. By 1951 Teller accepted the fact that the "classical super" scheme wasn't feasible, following results obtained by various researchers (including [[Stanislaw Ulam]]) and calculations performed by [[John von Neumann]] in late 1950.

Yet the research for the Soviet analogue of "classical super" continued until December 1953, when the researchers were reallocated to a new project working on what later became a true H-bomb design, based on radiation implosion. This remains an open topic for research, whether the Soviet intelligence was able to obtain any specific data on Teller–Ulam design in 1953 or early 1954. Yet, Soviet officials directed the scientists to work on a new scheme, and the entire process took less than two years, commencing around January 1954 and producing a successful test in November 1955. It also took just several months before the idea of radiation implosion was conceived, and there is no documented evidence claiming priority. It is also possible that Soviets were able to obtain a document lost by [[John Archibald Wheeler|John Wheeler]] on a train in 1953, which reportedly contained key information about thermonuclear weapon design.

== Initial design of thermonuclear weapons ==
{{main|Tsar Bomba|Thermonuclear weapon}}
{{more citations needed|date=March 2009}}
[[File:Размещение кораблей при опыте 21 сентября 1955 года.svg|thumb|250px|left|{{small|The Russian language data studying the placement of Soviet warships to measure the [[Shock waves|(blast) ranges]] of their thermonuclear devices in 1955.}}]]

Early ideas of the thermonuclear bomb came from the Russian espionages in the United States, and the internal Soviet studies. Though the espionage did help the Soviet studies, the early American thermonuclear designs and [[Thermonuclear weapon|concepts]] had substantial flaws, so it may have confused, rather than assisted, the Soviet effort to achieve the nuclear capability.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Beginnings of the Soviet H-Bomb Program|last=Goncharov}}</ref> The designers of the early thermonuclear bombs envisioned using an atomic bomb as a trigger to provide the needed heat and compression to initiate the thermonuclear reaction in a layer of liquid deuterium between the fissile material and the surrounding chemical high explosive.<ref name=":0">{{Cite book|title=The Kremlin's Nuclear Sword: The Rise and Fall of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces|last=Zaloga|first=Steve|publisher=Smithsonian Books|year=2002|pages=32–35}}</ref> The group would realize that a lack of sufficient heat and compression of the deuterium would result in an insignificant fusion of the deuterium fuel.<ref name=":0" />

The [[Andrei Sakharov]]'s study group at FIAN in 1948 came up with a second concept in which adding a shell of natural, unenriched uranium around the deuterium would increase the deuterium concentration at the uranium-deuterium boundary and the overall yield of the device, because the natural uranium would capture neutrons and itself fission as part of the thermonuclear reaction. This idea of a layered fission-fusion-fission bomb led Sakharov to call it the sloika, or layered cake.<ref name=":0" /> 

It was also known as the RDS-6S, or Second Idea Bomb.<ref>The American counterpart to this idea was Edward Teller's Alarm Clock design of August 1946. In August 1990 the Soviet science journal Priroda published a special issue devoted to Andrei Sakharov, which contained more detailed notes on the early fusion bomb than Sakharov's own memoirs, especially the articles by V.E. Ritus and Yu A. Romanov</ref> This second bomb idea was not a fully evolved thermonuclear bomb in the contemporary sense, but a crucial step between pure fission bombs and the thermonuclear "supers".<ref>{{Cite book|title=Beginnings|last=Goncharov|pages=50–54}}</ref> Due to the three-year lag in making the key breakthrough of radiation compression from the United States the Soviet Union's development efforts followed a different course of action. In the United States they decided to skip the single-stage fusion bomb and make a two-stage fusion bomb as their main effort.<ref name=":0" /><ref>The Super Oralloy bomb was developed in Los Alamos and tested on 15 November 1952</ref> Unlike the Soviet Union, the analog RDS-7 advanced fission bomb was not further developed, and instead, the single-stage 400-kiloton RDS-6S was the Soviet's bomb of choice.<ref name=":0" />

The RDS-6S Layer Cake design was detonated on 12 August 1953, in a test given the code name by the Allies of "[[Joe 4]]".<ref>[https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/soviet-hydrogen-bomb-program Soviet Hydrogen Bomb Program], Atomic Heritage Foundation, August 8, 2014.  Retrieved 28 March 2019.</ref> The test produced a yield of 400 kilotons, about ten times more powerful than any previous Soviet test. Around this time the United States detonated its first super using radiation compression on 1 November 1952, [[Ivy Mike|code-named Mike]]. Though the Mike was about twenty times greater than the RDS-6S, it was not a design that was practical to use, unlike the RDS-6S.<ref name=":0" />

Following the successful launching of the [[RDS-6s]], Sakharov proposed an upgraded version called RDS-6sD.<ref name=":0" /> This bomb was proved to be faulty, and it was neither built nor tested. The Soviet team had been working on the RDS-6t concept, but it also proved to be a dead end.

In 1954, Sakharov worked on a third concept, a two-stage thermonuclear bomb.<ref name=":0" /> The third idea used the radiation wave of a fission bomb, not simply heat and compression, to ignite the fusion reaction, and paralleled the discovery made by Ulam and Teller. Unlike the RDS-6s boosted bomb, which placed the fusion fuel inside the primary A-bomb trigger, the thermonuclear super placed the fusion fuel in a secondary structure a small distance from the A-bomb trigger, where it was compressed and ignited by the A-bomb's X-ray radiation.<ref name=":0" /> The [[KB-11]] Scientific-Technical Council approved plans to proceed with the design on 24 December 1954. Technical specifications for the new bomb were completed on 3 February 1955, and it was designated the [[RDS-37]].<ref name=":0" />

The RDS-37 was successfully tested on 22 November 1955 with a yield of 1.6 megaton. The yield was almost a hundred times greater than the first Soviet atomic bomb six years before, showing that the Soviet Union could compete with the United States,<ref name=":0" /><ref>Details of Soviet weapons designs after 1956–57 are generally lacking. A certain amount can be inferred from data about missile warheads, and in recent histories, the two nuclear-warhead development bureaus have begun to cautiously reveal which weapons they designed,</ref> and would even [[Tsar Bomba|exceed them]] in time.

== Logistics ==
{{Location map+|USSR|alt=области|width=800|float=center|caption=Nuclear weapons program sites of the USSR. 
{{bulleted list|
 Green: Laboratory
| Purple: Plutonium production plant
| Orange: Uranium enrichment plant
| Black: Nuclear test site}}

|places={{Location map~|USSR|lat_deg=59|lat_min=57|lon_deg= 30|lon_min=19|label=[[Ioffe Institute|LPTI]]|background=#fefee9|position=left|mark=Green pog.svg}}
{{Location map~|USSR|lat_deg=55|lat_min=45|lon_deg= 37|lon_min=37|label=[[Laboratory No. 2]]|background=#fefee9|mark=Green pog.svg}}
{{Location map~|USSR|lat_deg=43|lat_min=00|lon_deg= 41|lon_min=03|label=[[Sukhumi Institute of Physics and Technology|Sukhumi
]]|position=bottom|background=#fefee9|mark=Green pog.svg}}
{{Location map~|USSR|lat_deg=54|lat_min=56|lon_deg= 43|lon_min=19|position=left|label=[[Arzamas-16]]|background=#fefee9|mark=Green pog.svg}}
{{Location map~|USSR|lat_deg=56|lat_min=04|lon_deg= 60|lon_min=41|label=[[NII-1011]]|background=#fefee9 |mark=Green pog.svg}}
{{Location map~|USSR|lat_deg=55|lat_min=45|lon_deg= 60|lon_min=43|position=bottom|label=[[Mayak]]|background=#fefee9|mark=Purple pog.svg}}
{{Location map~|USSR|lat_deg=50|lat_min=07|lon_deg= 78|lon_min=43|position=left|label=[[Semipalatinsk Test Site| Semipalatinsk]]|background=#fefee9|mark=Black pog.svg}}
{{Location map~|USSR|lat_deg=57|lat_min=15|lon_deg= 60|lon_min=05|label=[[Sverdlovsk-44]]|position=top|mark=Orange pog.svg|background=#fefee9}}
{{Location map~|USSR|lat_deg=70|lat_min=42|lon_deg= 54|lon_min=36|label=[[Novaya Zemlya]]|mark=Black pog.svg}}
{{Location map~|USSR|lat_deg=56|lat_min=36|lon_deg= 84|lon_min=49|label=[[Tomsk-7]]|mark=Orange pog.svg|background=#fefee9}}
{{Location map~|USSR|lat_deg=56|lat_min=15|lon_deg= 93|lon_min=32|label=[[Krasnoyarsk-26]]|position=left|background=#fefee9|mark=Purple pog.svg}}
{{Location map~|USSR|lat_deg=56|lat_min=6|lon_deg= 94|lon_min=64|label=[[Krasnoyarsk-45]]|background=#fefee9| |mark=Orange pog.svg}}
{{Location map~|USSR|lat_deg=52|lat_min=33|lon_deg= 103|lon_min=54|label=[[Angarsk Electrolysis Chemical Combine |Angarsk]]|background=#fefee9|mark=Orange pog.svg}}
{{Location map~|USSR|lat_deg=48|lat_min=35|lon_deg= 45|lon_min=43|label=[[Kapustin Yar]]|mark=Black pog.svg|position=top|background=#fefee9}}


}}



[[File:USSR Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Sites and Military Districts and Surface-to-Air Missile Deployment - DPLA - 0a728ae045255f600fc1d536897776ab.jpg|thumb|right|The 1981 CIA intelligence data showing the Soviet nuclear weapons sites in throughout the former Soviet Union. Declassified in 2017.]]

=== Mining of raw uranium ===
The single largest problem during the early Soviet program was the procurement of raw [[uranium]] ore, as the Soviet Union had limited domestic sources at the beginning of their nuclear program. The era of domestic uranium mining can be dated exactly, to November 27, 1942, the date of a directive issued by the all-powerful wartime [[State Defense Committee]].  The first Soviet uranium mine was established in [[Taboshar]], present-day [[Tajikistan]], and was producing at an annual rate of a few tons of [[uranium concentrate]] by May 1943.<ref>{{cite web|last1=Medvedev|first1=Zhores|title=Stalin and the Atomic Gulag|url=http://www.spokesmanbooks.com/Spokesman/PDF/medvedev69.pdf|website=Spokesman Books|access-date=3 January 2018}}</ref>  Taboshar was the first of many officially secret Soviet [[Closed city#Soviet Union closed cities|closed cities]] related to uranium mining and production.<ref>{{cite web|title=Uranium in Tajikistan|url=http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/tajikistan.aspx|website=World Nuclear Association|access-date=3 January 2018}}</ref>

Demand from the experimental bomb project was far higher. The Americans, with the help of Belgian businessman [[Edgar Sengier]] in 1940, had already blocked access to known sources in Congo, South Africa, and Canada. In December 1944 Stalin took the uranium project away from [[Vyacheslav Molotov]] and gave to it to [[Lavrentiy Beria]].  The first Soviet uranium processing plant was established as the [[Leninabad Mining and Chemical Combine]] in Chkalovsk (present-day [[Buston, Ghafurov District]]), Tajikistan, and new production sites identified in relative proximity.  This posed a need for labor, a need that Beria would fill with forced labor:  tens of thousands of [[Gulag]] prisoners{{Citation needed|date=July 2023}} were brought to work in the mines, the processing plants, and related construction.

Domestic production was still insufficient when the Soviet [[F-1 (nuclear reactor)|F-1]] reactor, which began operation in December 1946, was fueled using uranium confiscated from the remains of the [[German atomic bomb project]]. This uranium had been mined in the [[Belgian Congo]], and the ore in Belgium fell into the hands of the Germans after their [[Battle of Belgium|invasion and occupation of Belgium]] in 1940. In 1945, the Uranium enrichment through [[Electromagnetic isotope separation|electromagnetic method]] under [[Lev Artsimovich]] also failed due to USSR's inability to build the parallel [[Oak Ridge National Laboratory|American Oak Ridge]] site and the limited power grid system could not produce the electricity for their program.

Further sources of uranium in the early years of the program were mines in East Germany (via the deceptively-named [[SDAG Wismut|SAG Wismut]]), Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania (the [[Băița mine]] near [[Ștei]]) and Poland. [[Boris Pregel]] sold 0.23 tonnes of uranium oxide to the Soviet Union during the war, with the authorisation of the U.S. Government.<ref>"[[Time Magazine]]" March 13, 1950</ref><ref name="Zoellner">{{cite book|last1=Zoellner|first1=Tom|title=Uranium|date=2009|publisher=Penguin Books|location=London|isbn=978-0143116721|pages=45, 55, 151–158}}</ref><ref name=Williams>{{cite book|last1=Williams|first1=Susan|title=Spies in the Congo|date=2016|publisher=Public Affairs|location=New York|isbn=978-1610396547|pages=186–187, 217, 233}}</ref>

Eventually, large domestic sources were discovered in the Soviet Union (including those now in [[Kazakhstan]]).

The uranium for the Soviet nuclear weapons program came from mine production in the following countries,<ref name="chronik">Chronik der Wismut, Wismut GmbH 1999</ref>

{| class="wikitable"
! style="font-weight: bold;" | Year
! style="font-weight: bold;" | USSR
! style="font-weight: bold;" | [[East Germany|Germany]]
! style="font-weight: bold;" | [[Czechoslovak Socialist Republic|Czechoslovakia]]
! style="font-weight: bold;" | [[People's Republic of Bulgaria|Bulgaria]]
! style="font-weight: bold;" | [[People's Republic of Poland|Poland]]
|-
| 1945
| 14.6 t
|
|
|
|
|-
| 1946
| 50.0 t
| 15 t
| 18 t
| 26.6 t
|
|-
| 1947
| 129.3 t
| 150 t
| 49.1 t
| 7.6 t
| 2.3 t
|-
| 1948
| 182.5 t
| 321.2 t
| 103.2 t
| 18.2 t
| 9.3 t
|-
| 1949
| 278.6 t
| 767.8 t
| 147.3 t
| 30.3 t
| 43.3 t
|-
| 1950
| 416.9 t
| 1,224 t
| 281.4 t
| 70.9 t
| 63.6 t
|}

=== Plutonium production ===
Reactors in italics were built for tritium production.
{| class="wikitable sortable mw-collapsible"
|+Plutonium production reactors in the USSR<ref name="e352">{{cite journal |last=DIAKOV |first=ANATOLI |date=2011-04-25 |title=The History of Plutonium Production in Russia |journal=Science & Global Security |publisher=Informa UK Limited |volume=19 |issue=1 |pages=28–45 |doi=10.1080/08929882.2011.566459 |bibcode=2011S&GS...19...28D |issn=0892-9882}}</ref>
!Reactor name
!Site
!Design power (MWth)
!Upgraded power (MWth)
!Began operation
!Shut down
!Total plutonium (tons)
!Design
!Coolant circuit
|-
|A
|[[Mayak Production Association]]
|100
|900
|19 June 1984
|16 June 1987
|6.138
|LWGR
|Single-pass
|-
|AV-1
|[[Mayak Production Association]]
|300
|1200
|5 April 1950
|12 August 1989
|8.508
|LWGR
|Single-pass
|-
|AV-2
|[[Mayak Production Association]]
|300
|1200
|6 April 1951
|14 July 1990
|8.407
|LWGR
|Single-pass
|-
|AV-3
|[[Mayak Production Association]]
|300
|1200
|15 September 1952
|1 November 1990
|7.822
|LWGR
|Single-pass
|-
|''AI-IR''
|[[Mayak Production Association]]
|40
|100
|22 December 1952
|25 May 1987
|0.053
|LWGR
|Single-pass
|-
|''OK-180''
|[[Mayak Production Association]]
|100
|233
|17 October 1951
|3 March 1966
|0
|HWR
|Closed-circuit
|-
|''OK-190''
|[[Mayak Production Association]]
|300
|300
|27 December 1955
|8 November 1965
|0
|HWR
|Closed-circuit
|-
|''OK-190M''
|[[Mayak Production Association]]
|300
|300
|16 April 1966
|16 April 1986
|0
|HWR
|Closed-circuit
|-
|''LF-2 "Ludmila"''
|[[Mayak Production Association]]
|800
|800
|May 1988
|In operation
|0
|HWR
|Closed-circuit
|-
|''"Ruslan"''
|[[Mayak Production Association]]
|800
|1100
|12 June 1979
|In operation
|0
|LWR
|Closed-circuit
|-
|I-1
|[[Siberian Chemical Combine]]
|400
|1200
|20 November 1955
|21 September 1990
|8.237
|LWGR
|Single-pass
|-
|EI-2
|[[Siberian Chemical Combine]]
|400
|1200
|24 September 1958
|31 December 1990
|7.452
|LWGR
|Closed-circuit
|-
|ADE-3
|[[Siberian Chemical Combine]]
|1450
|1900
|14 July 1961
|14 August 1990
|14.020
|LWGR
|Closed-circuit
|-
|ADE-4
|[[Siberian Chemical Combine]]
|1450
|1900
|26 February 1964
|20 April 2008
|19.460
|LWGR
|Closed-circuit
|-
|ADE-5
|[[Siberian Chemical Combine]]
|1450
|1900
|27 June 1965
|5 June 2008
|19.144
|LWGR
|Closed-circuit
|-
|AD
|[[Mining and Chemical Combine]]
|1450
|2000
|25 August 1958
|30 June 1992
|15.433
|LWGR
|Single-pass
|-
|ADE-1
|[[Mining and Chemical Combine]]
|1450
|2000
|20 July 1961
|29 September 1992
|14.184
|LWGR
|Single-pass
|-
|ADE-2
|[[Mining and Chemical Combine]]
|1450
|1800
|January 1964
|15 April 2010
|16.317
|LWGR
|Closed-circuit
|-
| colspan="6" |Total
|144.9
| colspan="2" |
|}

== Important nuclear tests ==
{{see also|List of nuclear weapons tests of the Soviet Union}}[[File:Soviet super test.jpg|thumb|The [[mushroom cloud]] from the<br>first air-dropped bomb test in 1951.<br>{{small|This picture is confused with [[RDS-27]] and [[RDS-37]] tests.}}]]
[[File:U. S. and USSR (now Russia) warhead levels, 1974–94.gif|thumb|250px|The Soviet program of nuclear weapons produces the stockpile {{small|(shown in black and white)}} reaching at its height in 1986 exceeding the United States stockpiles.]]

=== RDS-1 ===
The [[RDS-1]], ([[Russian language|Russian]]: PДC), was the first Soviet nuclear device that was test fired in [[Semipalatinsk Test Site|Semipalatinsk]] in [[Kazakh SSR|Kazakhstan]] on August 29, 1949. The first [[atomic test|nuclear test]], that proved the [[Russia]]'s nuclear capability, has many codenames within Russian political community including the internally code-named ''First Lightning'' (''Первая молния'', or Pervaya Molniya).

Nonetheless, the test was widely known as "RDS-1" (''Россия делает сама,'' Rossiya Delayet Sama, which translate as "Russia Does it Herself"), which was suggested by [[Igor Kurchatov]]– all Russian nuclear tests were then followed the ''RDS'' nomenclature. The [[United States|Americans]] codenamed the test as ''Joe 1''. The energy yield measurement and its design was mostly based on the American design "[[Fat Man]]", using a [[Trinitrotoluene|TNT]]/[[hexogen]] implosion lens design.

=== RDS-2 ===

The RDS-2 was a second important nuclear test that was conducted on September 24, 1951. The Soviet physicists measured the energy yield of the device at the 38.3 kiloton.<ref>Andryushin et al., "Taming the Nucleus"</ref> The U.S. codenamed the test as "Joe-2".

=== RDS-3 ===

The [[RDS-3]] was a third nuclear explosive device that was test fired on October 18, 1951, also in [[Semipalatinsk Test Site|Semipalatinsk]]. Known as ''Joe 3'' in [[United States|America]], this was a fission device using a composite construction of levitated [[plutonium core]] and a [[uranium-235]] shell with estimated blast yield of 41.2 [[TNT equivalent|kt]]. The ''RDS-3'' was also distinguished of being the first Russian air-dropped bomb test which was released at an altitude of 10&nbsp;km, it detonated 400 meters above the ground.

=== RDS-4 ===
[[RDS-4]] represented a branch of research on small tactical weapons. It used plutonium in a "levitated" core design. The first test was an air drop on August 23, 1953, yielding 28 kilotons. In 1954, the bomb was also used during [[Totskoye nuclear exercise|Snowball exercise]] at the [[Totskoye range]], dropped by [[Tupolev Tu-4|Tu-4 bomber]] on the simulated battlefield, in the presence of 40,000 infantry, tanks, and jet fighters. The RDS-4 comprised the warhead of the [[R-5 (rocket)|R-5M]], the first [[medium-range ballistic missile]] in the world, which was tested with a live warhead for the first and only time on February 5, 1956

=== RDS-5 ===
[[RDS-5]] was a small plutonium based device, probably using a hollow core. Two different versions were made and tested.

=== RDS-6s ===
[[RDS-6|RDS-6s]], the first Soviet test of a [[hydrogen bomb]], took place on August 12, 1953, and was nicknamed ''Joe 4'' by the Americans. It used a layer-cake design of fission and fusion fuels (uranium-235, lithium-6 deuteride, and lithium-6 deuteride tritide) and produced a yield of 400 kilotons. This yield was about ten times more powerful than any previous Soviet test.<ref name=":0" /> When developing higher level bombs, the Soviets proceeded with the RDS-6 concept as their main effort instead of the analog RDS-7 advanced fission bomb. This led to the third idea bomb which is the [[RDS-37]].<ref name=":0" />

=== RDS-9 ===
A much lower-power version of the RDS-4 with a 3-10 kiloton yield, the [[RDS-9]] was developed for the [[Nuclear torpedo#T-5|T-5 nuclear torpedo]]. A 3.5 kiloton underwater test was performed with the torpedo on September 21, 1955.

=== RDS-37 ===
The first Soviet test of a "true" hydrogen bomb in the megaton range was conducted on November 22, 1955. It was dubbed ''[[RDS-37]]'' by the Soviets. It was of the multi-staged, [[radiation implosion]] thermonuclear design called ''Sakharov's "Third Idea"'' in the USSR and the [[Thermonuclear weapon|Teller–Ulam design]] in the U.S.<ref name="johnstonsarchive">{{cite web|url=http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/nuclear/tests/1955USSR-1.html |title=RDS-37 nuclear test, 1955 |publisher=johnstonsarchive.net|access-date=20 May 2015}}</ref>

<!-- Deleted image removed: [[File:Rsd 37 nuclear test.JPG|left|thumb|250px|A color image of [[RDS-37]].]] -->
RDS-1, RDS-6s, and RDS-37 were all tested at the [[Semipalatinsk Test Site]] in [[Kazakhstan]].

=== Tsar Bomba (AN602) ===

The [[Tsar Bomba]] (Царь-бомба) was the largest, most powerful thermonuclear weapon ever detonated. It was a three-stage [[Teller-Ulam design|hydrogen bomb]] with a [[Nuclear weapon yield|yield]] of about 50 [[TNT equivalent|megatons]].<ref>The yield of the test has been estimated between 50 and 57.23 megatons by different sources over time. Today all Russian sources use 50 megatons as the official figure. See the section "Was it 50 Megatons or 57?" at {{cite web |title=The Tsar Bomba ("King of Bombs") |url=http://www.nuclearweaponarchive.org/Russia/TsarBomba.html |access-date=11 May 2006}}</ref> This is equivalent to ten times the amount of all the explosives used in World War II combined.<ref>DeGroot, Gerard J. ''The Bomb: A Life''. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2005. p. 254.</ref> It was detonated on October 30, 1961, in the [[Novaya Zemlya]] [[archipelago]], and was capable of approximately 100 [[megatons]], but was purposely reduced shortly before the launch. Although [[weapon]]ized, it was not entered into service; it was simply a demonstrative testing of the capabilities of the Soviet Union's military technology at that time. The heat of the explosion was estimated to potentially inflict [[third degree burn]]s at 100&nbsp;km distance of clear air.<ref name="NWA-Tsar_Bomba">{{cite web|url=http://www.nuclearweaponarchive.org/Russia/TsarBomba.html|title=The Soviet Weapons Program&nbsp;– The Tsar Bomba|date=3 September 2007|work=NuclearWeaponArchive.org|publisher=The Nuclear Weapon Archive|access-date=23 August 2010}}</ref>

=== Chagan ===

[[Chagan (nuclear test)|Chagan]] was a shot in the [[Nuclear Explosions for the National Economy]] (also known as Project 7), the Soviet equivalent of the US ''[[Operation Plowshare]]'' to investigate [[Peaceful nuclear explosions|peaceful uses of nuclear weapons]]. It was a subsurface detonation. It was fired on January 15, 1965. The site was a dry bed of the river [[Chagan River (tributary of Irtysh River)|Chagan]] at the edge of the [[Semipalatinsk Test Site]], and was chosen such that the lip of the crater would dam the river during its high spring flow. The resultant crater had a diameter of 408 meters and was 100 meters deep. A major lake (10,000&nbsp;m<sup>3</sup>) soon formed behind the 20–35&nbsp;m high upraised lip, known as ''[[Chagan Lake (Kazakhstan)|Chagan Lake]]'' or ''Balapan Lake''.{{Citation needed|date=March 2008}}

The photo is sometimes confused with [[RDS-1]] in literature.

== Secret cities ==
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union created at least nine [[closed city|closed cities]], known as Atomgrads,<ref>{{Cite web |last=Mersom |first=Daryl |title=The city in the shadow of an ageing nuclear reactor |url=https://www.bbc.com/worklife/article/20190527-the-city-in-the-shadow-of-an-ageing-nuclear-reactor |access-date=2022-05-02 |website=www.bbc.com |date=27 May 2019 |language=en}}</ref> in which nuclear weapons-related research and development took place. The code names were generally given by the name of the nearest large city, suffixed with the last two digits of the postcode. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, all of the cities changed their names. All are still legally "closed", though some have parts of them accessible to foreign visitors with special permits (Sarov, Snezhinsk, and Zheleznogorsk).

{| class="wikitable sortable mw-collapsible"
|-
! Cold War names
! Current name
! Established
!Establishments
!Current name
! Primary functions
|-
| Arzamas-16
Arzamas-75
| [[Sarov]]
| 1946
|Design Bureau-11
|[[All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics]]
| Weapons design and research, warhead assembly
|-
| Sverdlovsk-44
| [[Novouralsk]]
| 1946
| colspan="2" |[[Ural Electrochemical Combine|Ural Electrochemical Integrated Plant]]<ref name="w921">{{cite journal |last1=Perry |first1=T |last2=Remington |first2=B |date=1997-09-01 |title=Nova laser experiments and stockpile stewardship |url=https://www.osti.gov/biblio/560606 |journal=Science and Technology Review |page= |osti=560606 |access-date=2025-01-14}}</ref>
| Uranium enrichment
|-
| Chelyabinsk-40 
Chelyabinsk-65
| [[Ozyorsk, Chelyabinsk Oblast|Ozyorsk]]
| 1947
| colspan="2" |[[Mayak|Mayak Production Association]]
| Plutonium production, component manufacturing
|-
| Sverdlovsk-45
| [[Lesnoy, Sverdlovsk Oblast|Lesnoy]]
| 1947
| colspan="2" |{{Interlanguage link multi|Elektrokhimpribor|lt=Elektrokhimpribor Combine|ru|Электрохимприбор|preserve=1}}<ref name="c879">{{cite web |last=Sokova |first=Elena |date=2002-05-31 |title=Russia's Ten Nuclear Cities |url=https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/russias-ten-nuclear-cities/ |access-date=2025-01-14 |website=The Nuclear Threat Initiative}}</ref>
| Uranium enrichment, warhead assembly
|-
| Tomsk-7
| [[Seversk]]
| 1949
| colspan="2" |[[Siberian Chemical Combine]]
| Uranium enrichment, plutonium production, component manufacturing
|-
| Krasnoyarsk-26
| [[Zheleznogorsk, Krasnoyarsk Krai|Zheleznogorsk]]
| 1950
| colspan="2" |[[Mining and Chemical Combine]]
| Plutonium production
|-
| Zlatoust-36
| [[Tryokhgorny]]
| 1952
| colspan="2" |[[Instrument Making Plant]]<ref name="c879" />
| Warhead assembly
|-
| Penza-19
| [[Zarechny, Penza Oblast|Zarechny]]
| 1955
| colspan="2" |{{Interlanguage link multi|Start Production Association|lt=Start Production Association|ru|Старт (научно-производственный центр)|preserve=1}}
| Warhead assembly
|-
| Krasnoyarsk-45
| [[Zelenogorsk, Krasnoyarsk Krai|Zelenogorsk]]
| 1956
| colspan="2" |{{Interlanguage link multi|Electrochemical Plant|lt=Electrochemical Plant|ru|Электрохимический завод|preserve=1}}
| Uranium enrichment
|-
| Kasil-2
Chelyabinsk-50
Chelyabinsk-70
| [[Snezhinsk]]
| 1957
|Scientific Research Institute-1011
|[[All-Russian Scientific Research Institute Of Technical Physics]]
| Weapons design and research
|}

== Environmental and public health effects ==
{{furtherinfo|Totskoye nuclear exercise|Kyshtym disaster|Chernobyl disaster|Andreev Bay nuclear accident}}
[[File:Tchernobyl bois arbres radioactivité cernes2 modifié-1.jpg|300px|thumb|The former Soviet [[nuclear fission|nuclear devices]] left behind large amounts of radioactive isotopes, which have contaminated air, water, and soil in the areas immediately surrounding them, enough to double the normal rate of [[Carbon-14|<sup>14</sup>C]] from the atmosphere, and due to the increase in biomass and necromass.<ref name="nucleartest">Norris, Robert S., and Thomas B. Cochran. "Nuclear Weapons Tests and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions by the Soviet Union: August 29, 1949, to October 24, 1990." Natural Resource Defense Council. Web. 19 May 2013.</ref>{{rp|1}}]]
[[File:Laboratory_B_warning_sign.jpg|right|thumb|267x267px|The ''Radioaktivnost'''  warning sign left at the now-ruined and abandoned [[Laboratory B in Sungulʹ]], ca. 2009.]]
The Soviets started experimenting with nuclear technology in 1943 with very little regard of [[nuclear safety]] as there were no reports of accidents that were ever made public to learn from, and the public was kept in ignorance about the radiation dangers.{{rp|24–25}}<ref name="Greenwood Publishing Group, Neimanis, 1997">{{cite book |last1=Neimanis |first1=George J. |title=The Collapse of the Soviet Empire: A View from Riga |date=1997 |publisher=Greenwood Publishing Group |isbn=978-0275957131 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=nlLSpT9J_yMC&dq=kurchatov+father+of+atom&pg=PA24 |access-date=6 November 2022 |language=en}}</ref> Many of the [[nuclear fission|nuclear devices]] left behind radioactive isotopes which have contaminated air, water and soil in the areas immediately surrounding, downwind and downstream of the blast site. According to the records that the Russian government released in 1991, the Soviet Union tested 969 nuclear devices between 1949 and 1990— more nuclear testing than any nation on the planet.<ref name="nucleartest" />{{rp|1}} Soviet scientists conducted the tests with little regard for environmental and public health consequences.{{rp|24}}<ref name="Greenwood Publishing Group, Neimanis, 1997" /> The detrimental effects that the toxic waste generated by weapons testing and processing of radioactive materials are still felt to this day. Even decades later, the risk of developing various types of cancer, especially that of the [[thyroid cancer|thyroid]] and the [[lung cancer|lungs]], continues to be elevated far above national averages for people in affected areas.<ref name="legacy">{{cite journal | last1 = Goldman | first1 = Marvin | year = 1997 | title = The Russian Radiation Legacy: Its Integrated Impact and Lessons | journal = Environmental Health Perspectives | volume = 105 | issue = 6| pages = 1385–1391 | doi=10.2307/3433637| jstor = 3433637 | pmc = 1469939 | pmid=9467049}}</ref>{{rp|1385}} [[Iodine-131]], a [[radionuclide|radioactive isotope]] that is a major byproduct of fission-based weapons, is retained in the thyroid gland, and so poisoning of this kind is commonplace in impacted populations.<ref name="legacy" />{{rp|1386}}

The Soviets set off 214 nuclear devices in the [[Atmospheric nuclear testing|open atmosphere]] between 1949 and 1963, the year the [[Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty]] came into effect (there were no Soviet tests in 1950, 1959, 1960, or 1962).<ref name=nucleartest />{{rp|6}} The billions of radioactive particles released into the air exposed countless people to extremely mutagenic and carcinogenic materials, resulting in a myriad of deleterious genetic maladies and deformities. The majority of these tests took place at the [[Semipalatinsk Test Site]], or the Polygon, located in northeast of Kazakhstan.<ref name=nucleartest />{{rp|61}} The testing at Semipalatinsk alone exposed hundreds of thousands of Kazakh citizens to these harmful effects, and the site continues to be one of the most highly irradiated places on the planet.<ref name="cold">{{Cite journal |last=Clay |first=R |date=April 2001 |title=Cold war, hot nukes: legacy of an era. |journal=Environmental Health Perspectives |volume=109 |issue=4 |pages=A162–A169 |issn=0091-6765 |pmc=1240291 |pmid=11335195 |doi=10.2307/3454880|jstor=3454880 }}</ref>{{rp|A167}} When the earliest tests were being conducted, even the scientists had only a poor understanding of the medium-and long-term effects of radiation exposure - many did not notify each other of their work if they had serious accidents or radiation exposure.{{rp|24}}<ref name="Greenwood Publishing Group, Neimanis, 1997"/> In fact, the Semipalatinsk was chosen as the primary site for open-air testing precisely because the Soviets were curious about the potential for lasting harm that their weapons held.<ref name=legacy />{{rp|1389}}{{Failed verification|date=April 2023}}
[[File:Chernobyl radiation map 1996.svg|thumb|250px|right|The 1996 level of [[Cesium-137]] contamination over Ukraine after an unsafe operation led to a [[Chernobyl disaster|serious accident]] in 1986.]]
Contamination of air and soil due to atmospheric testing is only part of a wider issue. Water contamination due to improper disposal of spent [[uranium]] and decay of sunken nuclear-powered submarines is a major problem in the [[Kola Peninsula]] in northwest Russia. Although the Russian government states that the radioactive power cores are stable, various scientists have come forth with serious concerns about the 32,000 spent nuclear fuel elements that remain in the sunken vessels.<ref name="cold" />{{rp|A166}} There have been no major incidents other than the [[Kursk submarine disaster|explosion and sinking of a nuclear-powered submarine]] in August 2000, but many international scientists are still uneasy at the prospect of the hulls eroding, releasing uranium into the sea and causing considerable contamination.<ref name="cold" />{{rp|A166}} Although the submarines pose an environmental risk, they have yet to cause serious harm to public health. However, water contamination in the area of the [[Mayak test site]], especially at [[Lake Karachay]], is extreme, and has gotten to the point where radioactive byproducts have found their way into drinking water supplies. It has been an area of concern since the early 1950s, when the Soviets began disposing of tens of millions of cubic meters of [[radioactive waste]] by pumping it into the small lake.<ref name="cold" />{{rp|A165}} Half a century later, in the 1990s, there are still hundreds of millions of curies of waste in the Lake, and at points contamination has been so severe that a mere half-hour of exposure to certain regions would deliver a dose of radiation sufficient to kill 50% of humans.<ref name="cold" />{{rp|A165}} Although the area immediately surrounding the lake is devoid of population, the lake has the potential to dry up in times of drought. Most significantly, in 1967, it dried up and winds carried radioactive dust over thousands of square kilometers, exposing at least 500,000 citizens to a range of health risks.<ref name="cold" />{{rp|A165}} To control dust, Soviet scientists piled concrete on top of the lake. Although this was effective in helping mediate the amount of dust, the weight of the concrete pushed radioactive materials into closer contact with standing underground groundwater.<ref name="cold" />{{rp|A166}} It is difficult to gauge the overall health and environmental effects of the water contamination at Lake Karachay because figures on civilian exposure are unavailable, making it hard to show causation between elevated cancer rates and radioactive pollution specifically from the lake.

Contemporary efforts to manage radioactive contamination in the former Soviet Union are few and far between. Public awareness of the past and present dangers, as well as the Russian government's investment in current cleanup efforts, are likely dampened by the lack of media attention STS and other sites have gotten in comparison to isolated nuclear incidents such as [[Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki|Hiroshima]], [[Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki|Nagasaki]], [[Chernobyl disaster|Chernobyl]] and [[Three Mile Island accident|Three-Mile Island]].<ref>{{Citation | last = Taylor | first = Jerome | title = The World's Worst Radiation Hotspot | newspaper = The Independent | publisher = Independent Digital News and Media | date = 10 Sep 2009 }}.</ref> The domestic government's investment in cleanup measures seems to be driven by economic concerns rather than care for public health. The most significant political legislation in this area is a bill agreeing to turn the already contaminated former weapons complex Mayak into an international [[radioactive waste]] dump, accepting cash from other countries in exchange for taking their radioactive byproducts of nuclear industry.<ref name="cold" />{{rp|A167}} Although the bill stipulates that the revenue go towards decontaminating other test sites such as Semipalatinsk and the Kola Peninsula, experts doubt whether this will actually happen given the current [[Politics of Russia|political]] and [[Economy of Russia|economic]] climate in Russia.<ref name="cold" />{{rp|A168}}

== See also ==
{{Columns-list|colwidth=22em|
* [[History of nuclear weapons]]
* [[History of the Soviet Union (1927–1953)]]
* [[Julius and Ethel Rosenberg]]
* [[Military history of the Soviet Union]]
* [[Pavel Sudoplatov]]
* [[Sino-Soviet split]]
* [[Soviet space program]]
}}

== References ==
{{Reflist |2}}

=== Bibliography ===
* {{cite book |last= Erickson  |first= John |title= The Road to Berlin: Stalin's War with Germany, Volume Two |orig-year= 1983 |year= 1999 |publisher= Yale University Press |location= New Haven |isbn= 0300078137  |pages= 79–80, 659}}
* {{Citation | first = Alexei | last = Kojevnikov | title = Stalin's Great Science: The Times and Adventures of Soviet Physicists | publisher = Imperial College Press | year = 2004 | isbn = 978-1860944208}}
* {{Cite Q | Q105755363 | last1 = Rhodes | first1 = Richard | author-link1 = Richard Rhodes | df = dmy-all | via = [[Internet Archive]] }}

== External links ==
* [https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/79/soviet-nuclear-history Collection of Archival Documents on the Soviet Nuclear Program], Wilson Center Digital Archive
* {{Citation | url = http://ufn.ru/en/articles/2013/5/h/ | last = Ilkaev | first = RI | title = Major stages of the Atomic Project | journal = Phys. Usp. | volume = 56 | issue = 5 | pages = 502–509 | year = 2013| bibcode = 2013PhyU...56..502I | doi = 10.3367/UFNe.0183.201305h.0528 | s2cid = 204012111 }},
* Video archive of [https://archive.today/20130104191058/http://sonicbomb.com/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=110 '''Soviet Nuclear Testing'''] at [http://www.sonicbomb.com sonicbomb.com]
* {{Citation | url = http://www.kiae.ru/ | title = Kurchatov institute | type = official website | access-date = 2007-03-01 | archive-date = 2006-09-06 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20060906170559/http://www.kiae.ru/ | url-status = dead }}
* {{Citation | url = https://www.pbs.org/opb/citizenk/ | publisher = PBS | title = Citizen Kurchatov}}.
* [http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Russia/ Soviet and Nuclear Weapons History]
* [http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/72pavel.pdf German Scientists in the Soviet Atomic Project]
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20071106091010/http://en.vniief.ru/VNIIEF/museum/ Russian Nuclear Weapons Museum] (''in English'')
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20060410191626/http://npc.sarov.ru/issues/volume1/illustrations.html Images of Soviet bombs] (''in Russian'')&nbsp;– RDS-1, RDS-6, Tsar Bomba, and an ICBM warhead
* [http://www.atomicarchive.com/History/coldwar/index.shtml Cold War: A Brief History]
* [http://alsos.wlu.edu/qsearch.aspx?browse=warfare/Russian+Nuclear+Weapons+Program Annotated bibliography on the Russian nuclear weapons program from the Alsos Digital Library] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060714103052/http://alsos.wlu.edu/qsearch.aspx?browse=warfare%2FRussian+Nuclear+Weapons+Program |date=2006-07-14 }}
* [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol11no4/html/v11i4a02p_0001.htm On the Soviet Nuclear Scent] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170501004432/https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol11no4/html/v11i4a02p_0001.htm |date=2017-05-01 }} – CIA Library

{{Soviet Atomic Bomb Project}}
{{Soviet nuclear weapons}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Soviet Atomic Bomb Project}}
[[Category:Nuclear weapons program of the Soviet Union| ]]
[[Category:Cold War history of the Soviet Union]]
[[Category:1943 establishments in the Soviet Union]]
[[Category:1949 disestablishments in the Soviet Union]]
[[Category:Nuclear weapons programme of Russia]]

[[sv:Kärnteknik i Sovjetunionen]]s