Editing Unit 101

{{Short description|Disbanded special forces unit of the Israel Defense Forces}}
{{Infobox military unit
| unit_name = Unit 101
| image = File:Meir_Har-Zion,_1954.jpg | image_size = 300px
| caption = Unit 101 in 1954
| dates = August 1953 – January 1954
| country = {{Flag|Israel}} 
| branch = {{army|Israel}} 
| type = Sayeret 
| role = [[Air assault]]<br>[[Anti-tank warfare]]<br>[[Artillery observer]]<br>[[Bomb disposal]]<br>[[Clandestine operation]]<br>[[Close-quarters combat]]<br>[[Counterinsurgency]]<br>[[Desert warfare]]<br>[[Direct action (military)|Direct action]]<br>[[Forward air control]]<br>[[HUMINT]]<br>[[Irregular warfare]]<br>[[Long-range penetration]]<br>[[Maneuver warfare]]<br>[[Mountain warfare]]<br>[[Parachuting]]<br>[[Patrolling]]<br>[[Raid (military)|Raiding]]<br>[[Reconnaissance]]<br>[[Special operations]]<br>[[Special reconnaissance]]<br>[[Urban warfare]]
| size = 50
| garrison = [[Tel Aviv]], [[Israel]].
| nickname = 
| motto = 
| battles = [[Bureij]]<br>[[Qibya massacre]]
| disbanded = January 1954
| notable_commanders = [[Ariel Sharon]]<br />[[Meir Har-Zion]]
}}
[[File:Dayan w Kuntila Raid comm.jpg|thumb|Various Israeli officers of the Paratrooper Battalion 890 in 1955 with [[Moshe Dayan]] (standing, third from the left). Unit 101 merged with Paratrooper Battalion 890 upon disbandment. [[Meir Har-Zion]] is standing, first from the left and [[Ariel Sharon]] is standing, second from the left.]]
Commando '''Unit 101''' ({{langx|he|יחידה 101}}) was a sayeret (commando) unit of the [[Israeli Defense Forces]] (IDF), founded and commanded by [[Ariel Sharon]] on orders from [[Prime Minister of Israel|Prime Minister]] [[David Ben-Gurion]] in August 1953.<ref name="Specwar">{{cite web|url=http://en.specwar.info/special_forces/Unit_101/|title=Unit 101 |publisher=Specwar.info |access-date=2009-09-04}}</ref> They were armed with non-standard weapons and tasked with carrying out [[retribution operations]] across the state's borders—in particular, establishing small unit maneuvers, activation and insertion tactics.

Members of the unit were recruited only from agricultural [[kibbutz]]im and [[moshav]]im. Membership in the unit was by invitation only, and any new member had to be voted on by all existing members before they were accepted.<ref name="Halevi">Yossi Klein Halevi, ''Like Dreamers'', (New York, 2013), pp. 42–43</ref>

The unit was merged into the [[Paratroopers Brigade|890th Paratroop Battalion]] during January 1954, on orders of General [[Moshe Dayan]], Chief of Staff, because he wanted their experience and spirit to be spread among all infantry units of IDF starting with the [[Paratroopers Brigade|paratroopers]]. They are considered to have had a significant influence on the development of subsequent Israeli infantry-oriented units.<ref name="Israeli Special Forces History">{{cite web|url=http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society_&_Culture/special.html|title=Jewish Virtual Library&nbsp;– Israeli Special Forces History|access-date=2009-09-04}}</ref>

==Background==
Following the [[1948 Arab–Israeli War]], Israel was faced with cross-border raids and infiltrations by Arab militants and non-militants respectively. Many of these were small scale infiltrations that consisted of unarmed Palestinian refugees attempting to rejoin their families and of smugglers bringing in contraband for Israeli markets.<ref name="UNS/636">'No one would deny that the Israel authorities would be justified, and are justified, in using strong measures to check (infiltration), in so far as damage to property or loss of life results. But not everyone who crosses the armistice demarcation line does so with criminal intent. Acts of violence are indeed committed, but as the volume of illegal crossings of the demarcation line is so considerable, if one is to judge from the available statistics, it seems probable that ''many crossings are carried out by persons—sometimes, I understand, even by children—with no criminal object in view''. 'England's ambassador to the UN [http://domino.un.org//UNISPAL.NSF//9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/eef5490a45758c7c05256727006e0e6c!OpenDocument S/635/Rev.1] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090504233428/http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/eef5490a45758c7c05256727006e0e6c!OpenDocument |date=2009-05-04 }} 9 November 1953</ref> These were later followed with attacks launched by [[Palestinian Fedayeen|refugees]] often motivated by economic reasons, but they were quickly adopted by the military of the neighboring Arab states, who organized them into semi-formal brigades which mounted larger scale operations from 1954 onwards.<ref name=Almog>{{cite book|title=Britain, Israel, and the United States, 1955–1958: Beyond Suez|author=Orna Almog|year=2003|page=20|publisher=[[Routledge]]|isbn=0-7146-5246-6}}</ref> According to Israel, about 9,000 attacks were launched from 1949 to 1956,<ref>{{cite book|title=Big Lies: Demolishing The Myths of the Propaganda War Against Israel|url=https://archive.org/details/bigliesdemolishi00meil|url-access=limited|author=David Meir-Levi|year=2005|page=[https://archive.org/details/bigliesdemolishi00meil/page/n19 36]|publisher=[[David Horowitz Freedom Center|Center for the Study of Popular Culture]]|isbn=1-886442-46-0}}</ref> resulting in hundreds of Israeli civilian casualties.<ref>[http://www.jafi.org.il/education/100/concepts/d3.html The Arab Israeli Conflict 1949–1956] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061001230819/http://www.jafi.org.il/education/100/concepts/d3.html |date=2006-10-01 }}</ref><ref>[[Howard Sachar]], ''History of Israel'', p. 450. cited at {{cite web|publisher=[[Jewish Agency for Israel]] |title=Fedayeen Raids 1951–1956 |url=http://www.jafi.org.il/education/100/maps/fed.html |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090623224146/http://www.jafi.org.il/education/100/maps/fed.html |archive-date=June 23, 2009 }}</ref><ref>[http://www.adl.org/ISRAEL/Record/sinai.asp The 1956 Sinai Campaign] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071016201124/http://www.adl.org/ISRAEL/Record/sinai.asp |date=2007-10-16 }}</ref>

At the same time the IDF was ill-prepared to respond to these raids. The [[Palmach]], its three best combat units of the 1948 war, had been disbanded at Ben-Gurion's instruction.<ref name="Palmach">{{cite web|url=http://www.palmach.org.il/show_item.asp?itemId=8525&levelId=42858&itemType=0|title=Dismantling of the Palmach|access-date=2009-10-15}}</ref> Many experienced officers had left the army after the war, and Israeli society had undergone a difficult period of [[Austerity in Israel|impoverishment]]. As a result, the IDF did not have any units capable of effective reprisal, and did not perform well in offensive operations.<ref name=Morris>{{cite book|title=Israel's Border Wars, 1949–1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation, and the Countdown to the Suez War|author=Benny Morris|year=1993|page=251|publisher=[[Oxford University Press]]|isbn=0-19-829262-7}}</ref>

{{Quote|text=The Palestinians must learn that they will pay a high price for Israeli lives.|sign=A conversation between [[David Ben-Gurion]] and [[Ariel Sharon]].<ref name="Specwar" />}}

As a response to this problem the IDF formed Unit 30 in 1951—a secret unit that belonged to the [[Southern Command (Israel)|IDF Southern Command]].<ref name="Unit 101 (history) - Specwar.info ">{{cite web|url=http://en.specwar.info/special_forces/Unit_101/history.php|title=Unit 101 (history) |publisher=Specwar.info |access-date=2009-09-06}}</ref> Their purpose was to execute [[reprisal operations|retribution missions]] while operating in compact and well-trained teams. Unfortunately for the IDF the officers lacked the required training and executed their duties poorly, leading to the unit's disbandment in 1952.<ref name="Unit 101 (history) - Specwar.info "/>

One of Sharon's final operations before leaving the army in 1952 was the semi-successful [[Operation Bin Nun Alef]] into [[Jordan]].<ref>{{citation|author-link=Ariel Sharon|last=Sharon|first=Ariel|title=Warrior. An Autobiography|year=2001|publisher=[[Simon & Schuster]]|publication-date=2001|page=[https://archive.org/details/warriorautobiogr00shar_0/page/57 57]|isbn=978-0-7432-2566-3|url-access=registration|url=https://archive.org/details/warriorautobiogr00shar_0/page/57}}</ref> During the operation he suffered serious injuries, after which Sharon had recommended to the General Staff that an elite force, trained in [[commando]] tactics, be set up for [[reprisal operations]].<ref name="953 Retribution Acts">{{cite web|url=http://www.ariel-sharon-life-story.com/03-Ariel-Sharon-Biography-1953-Retribution-Acts-Peulot-Tagmul.shtml|title=Ariel Sharon&nbsp;– Biography: 1953 Retribution Acts (Pe'ulot Tagmul)|access-date=2009-10-15|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090927144747/http://www.ariel-sharon-life-story.com/03-Ariel-Sharon-Biography-1953-Retribution-Acts-Peulot-Tagmul.shtml|archive-date=2009-09-27}}</ref> After a series of unsuccessful retribution infiltrations by existing IDF units, Ben Gurion pressed [[Chief of Staff]] [[Mordechai Maklef]] to establish such a special forces unit in the summer of 1953.<ref name="Mordechai Maklef">{{cite web|url=http://dover.idf.il/IDF/English/about/History/50s/1952/1002.htm|title=Mordechai Maklef- Chief of Staff|publisher=Israel Defense Forces|access-date=2009-10-15|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141026101052/http://dover.idf.il/IDF/English/about/History/50s/1952/1002.htm|archive-date=2014-10-26}}</ref> This was Israel's first, and reservist Ariel Sharon was recalled to duty.

Sharon was given the rank of Major and chosen to command the company-sized unit, with [[Shlomo Baum]] as deputy in command. The unit was to consist of 50 men, most of them former [[Paratroopers Brigade|Tzanhanim]] and Unit 30 personnel.<ref name="Unit 101 (history) - Specwar.info "/> They were armed with non-standard weapons and tasked with carrying out special reprisals across the state's borders—mainly establishing small unit maneuvers, activation and insertion tactics that are utilized even today.{{sfn|Morris|1993|pages=251–253}}<ref name="Unit 101 (history) - Specwar.info "/>

The new unit began a hard process of day and night training.<ref name="The roots of Ariel Sharon's legacy">{{cite web|url=http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/print/2006/779/re91.htm|title=The roots of Ariel Sharon's legacy|date=26 January 2006|work=al-Ahram|access-date=2009-09-04|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090807144422/http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/print/2006/779/re91.htm|archive-date=7 August 2009}}</ref> Some of their exercises frequently took them across the border, as enemy engagement was seen as the best preparation. The recruits went on forced marches and undertook weapons and sabotage training at their base camp at [[Sataf]], a depopulated Arab village just west of [[Jerusalem]].<ref name="The roots of Ariel Sharon's legacy" />

'''In addition to the unit's tactical variation, they were also unique in two ways''':<ref name="Specwar" />
* They were first IDF Special Forces unit formed from scratch, rather than modify a previously existing infantry oriented unit—such as with the [[Golani Brigade]] Special Reconnaissance Platoon.
* No other unit ever before received its orders directly from the [[General Staff (Israel)|IDF General Staff]]—the IDF High Command MATKAL, rather than from a lower sub-command.

Originally T'zanhanim ({{langx|he|הצנחנים}}, ''Paratroopers'') company's officers were the biggest opposition against the creation of Unit 101.<ref name="Israeli Special Forces History" /> The reason for this was simply that they didn't want another competitor for retaliation missions. Before the formation of Unit 101 only they undertook these missions.<ref name="Israeli Special Forces History" /><ref name="Unit 101 (history) - Specwar.info "/> One of the unit's tactical commanders was [[Meir Har-Zion]], who was later awarded the rank of an officer solely for his conduct in battle. The tactics of Unit 101 was politically very effective and soon the fighters simply could not keep up with the attrition.<ref name="Specwar" />

This meant that the attacks on Israel decreased and the political objective of Unit 101 was accomplished. The creation of Unit 101 was a major landmark in the Israeli Special Forces history. Beside the [[Sayeret Matkal]], they are considered to be the unit with the most influence on the Israeli infantry oriented units including both special and conventional units.<ref name="Israeli Special Forces History" />

==Recruitment==
Members of the unit were recruited exclusively from agricultural [[kibbutz]]im and [[moshav]]im, with the view that only those who were raised as farmers on the land had the spirit to defend it. Membership in the unit was by invitation only, and any new member had to be voted on by all existing members before they were accepted.<ref name="Halevi" />

==Operations==

===Palestinian refugee camp===
According to [[Yoav Gelber]], after one month of training a patrol of Unit 101 infiltrated into the [[Gaza Strip]] as an exercise.<ref name="The roots of Ariel Sharon's legacy" /><ref>[http://www.aisisraelstudies.org/2006papers/Gelber%20Yoav%202006.pdf Yoav Gelber, 2006, "Sharon's Inheritance"] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130605014133/http://www.aisisraelstudies.org/2006papers/Gelber%20Yoav%202006.pdf |date=June 5, 2013 }}</ref> Some sources estimate that a result of the infiltration was 20 killed Arabs. Unit 101 suffered two wounded soldiers.<ref name="A lifetime credo ">{{cite web|url=http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/654/op2.htm |title=Al-Ahram Weekly&nbsp;– A lifetime credo |last=Bishara |first=Azmi |date=4 September 2003 |access-date=2009-09-06 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090807062148/http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/654/op2.htm |archive-date=7 August 2009 }}</ref> The raid was heavily condemned by foreign observers, who called it "an appalling case of deliberate mass murder", and was publicly criticized in the Israeli cabinet by at least one minister.{{sfn|Morris|1993|page=256}}

===Qibya massacre===
{{Main|Qibya massacre}}
[[File:Qibya2.jpg|thumb|180px|Inhabitants of [[Qibya]] coming back to their village after the attack]]
Two months later, in October, the unit was involved in the [[Qibya massacre|raid into the village of Qibya]] in the northern [[West Bank]], then a part of [[Jordan]]. During this operation that inflicted heavy damage on the [[Arab Legion]] forces in Qibya 42 villagers were killed, and 15 wounded.<ref>{{cite book |first=Benny |last=Morris |title=Israel's Border Wars, 1949–1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation and the Countdown to the Suez War |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=1993 |pages=258–259 |isbn=0-19-827850-0}}</ref><ref name="razoux">{{cite book |first=Pierre |last=Razoux |title=Tsahal&nbsp;– Nouvelle histoire de l'armée israélienne |year=2006 |pages=125–127 |isbn=2-262-02328-X|language=fr}}</ref> According to [[United Nations]] observers, bullet-riddled bodies near the doorways and multiple bullet hits on the doors of the demolished houses indicated that the inhabitants may have remained inside until their homes were blown up over them.

The international outcry caused by the operation required a formal reply by Israel. The Israelis denied responsibility, claiming that Israeli settlers or a local [[kibbutz]] had carried out the raid on their own initiative.<ref>{{cite book|last=Maoz|first=Zeev|author-link=Zeev Maoz|title=Defending the Holy Land|date=2006|publisher=University of Michigan Press|isbn=0472115405|page=[https://books.google.com/books?id=bWEV__6BYPgC&pg=PA236 236]|language=en}}</ref>

==Disbandment==
After realizing the huge success of Unit 101, the Chief of Staff, General Moshe Dayan decided that the experience gained by it must be shared with all IDF infantry units starting with the Paratroopers Battalion 890. This was done by merging the two together under the command of Ariel Sharon who was then promoted to the rank of Lt. Colonel. After the merger and the addition of a Nachal Mutznach battalion, the combined outfit turned into a brigade size unit, named Brigade 202 (now the 35th [[Paratroopers Brigade]]). Sharon became the commander of the merged brigade which was now composed of two battalions—890 and 88 and a few months later joined by reserve battalion 771 which included ex-101 members together with reserve paratroopers and Nachal paratroopers.

[[File:Kibya ruins.jpg|thumb|200px|A resident of [[Qibya]] at the ruins of his house after the attack by Israeli forces in October 1953]]
The merge with T'zanhanim company{{Clarify|date=October 2015}} was actually ironic since their officers were originally the biggest opposition against the creation of Unit 101.<ref name="Israeli Special Forces History" />  This was because they didn't want a competitor for retaliation missions.  Before the formation of Unit 101 only they undertook these missions.<ref name="Israeli Special Forces History" /><ref name="Unit 101 (history) - Specwar.info "/>

Operating within the brigade, they{{Who|date=October 2015}} carried out a large-scale attack on the Egyptian army positions in the Gaza strip during February 1955.  Sharon personally led the raid, codenamed [[Operation Black Arrow]].  It resulted in 42 Egyptian soldiers killed and 36 wounded, versus 8 Israeli dead.<ref name="Unit 101 (history) - Specwar.info "/>  The newly formed brigade did most of the Israeli special forces operations during the remainder of the 1950s.<ref name="Israeli Special Forces History" /><ref name="Unit 101 (history) - Specwar.info "/>

Egyptian shock over the magnitude of their losses is often cited as one of the catalysts for the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal that opened the Middle East to the [[Soviet Union]].  Up to 20 such attacks were carried out between 1955 and 1956, culminating in the [[Qalqilya|Qalqilya Police raid]] of October 1956.<ref name="Unit 101 (history) - Specwar.info "/>  This particular raid targeted a position of the Jordanian [[Arab Legion]] in one of the old [[Mandatory Palestine|British]] police forts, during which 18 Israeli soldiers and up to a hundred Legionnaires were killed.

During the end of the 1950s the IDF realized that they were lacking a small SF unit, since the T'zanhanim company had turned into an infantry brigade. That is the main reason why Avraham Arnan formed the [[Sayeret Matkal]] in 1958.  In various ways the Sayeret Matkal combined the operational experience gathered by Unit 101 and utilised the structure of the British [[Special Air Service]].<ref name="The secret remains">{{cite web|url=http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1019894.html|title=The secret remains&nbsp;– Haaretz&nbsp;– Israel News|last=Reicher-Atir |first=Yiftach|date=September 2008|access-date=2009-09-05}}</ref>  After losing their special forces title, the T'zanhanim company formed its own SF unit—the [[Sayeret T'zanhanim]] in October 1958.<ref name="Unit 101 (history) - Specwar.info "/>

==See also==
* [[Ariel Sharon]]
* [[List of special forces units]]
* [[Meir Har-Zion]]
* [[Sayeret]]
* [[Special Air Service]]

==References==
{{Reflist|30em}}

==External links==
* [https://web.archive.org/web/20090927144747/http://www.ariel-sharon-life-story.com/03-Ariel-Sharon-Biography-1953-Retribution-Acts-Peulot-Tagmul.shtml Ariel Sharon – Life Story | A Biography]
* [http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society_&_Culture/special.html Israeli Special Forces History]
* [http://en.specwar.info/special_forces/Unit_101/ Unit 101 – Specwar.info]

{{Israeli-Palestinian Conflict}}
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[[Category:Military units and formations of Israel]]
[[Category:Special forces of Israel]]
[[Category:Reprisal operations (Israel)]]
[[Category:Ariel Sharon]]
[[Category:1953 establishments in Israel]]
[[Category:Military units and formations established in 1953]]
[[Category:Military units and formations disestablished in 1954]]