Editing Vietnamization

{{Short description|U.S. foreign policy during the Vietnam War}}

'''Vietnamization''' was a failed [[Foreign policy of the United States|foreign policy]] of the [[Presidency of Richard Nixon|Richard Nixon administration]] to end [[United States in the Vietnam War|U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War]] through a program to "expand, equip, and train [[Republic of Vietnam Military Forces|South Vietnamese forces]] and assign to them an ever-increasing combat role, at the same time steadily reducing the number of U.S. [[combat troops]]".<ref name=Laird-VNzation>{{citation|url= http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/bios/laird.htm|contribution=Melvin R. Laird |title=Secretaries of Defense|author=[[United States Department of Defense]]}}</ref> Brought on by the communist [[North Vietnam]]'s [[Tet Offensive]], the policy referred to U.S. combat troops specifically in the [[ground combat]] role, but did not reject combat by the [[U.S. Air Force]], as well as the support to South Vietnam, consistent with the policies of [[U.S. foreign military assistance organizations]]. U.S. citizens' mistrust of their government that had begun after the offensive worsened with the release of news about U.S. soldiers [[My Lai massacre|massacring civilians at My Lai]] (1968), the [[Cambodian Incursion|invasion of Cambodia]] (1970), and the leaking of the ''[[Pentagon Papers]]'' 
At a January 28, 1969, meeting of the [[United States National Security Council|National Security Council]], General [[Andrew Goodpaster]], deputy to General [[Creighton Abrams]] and commander of the [[Military Assistance Command, Vietnam]], stated that the [[Army of the Republic of Vietnam]] (ARVN) had been steadily improving, and the point at which the war could be "de-Americanized" was close. [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] [[Melvin Laird]] agreed with the point, but not with the language: "What we need is a term like 'Vietnamizing' to put the emphasis on the right issues."{{sfn|Kissinger|2003|p=81}} Nixon immediately liked Laird's word.{{sfn|Kissinger|2003|pages=81–82}}

Vietnamization fit into the broader [[détente]] policy of the Nixon administration, in which the United States no longer regarded its fundamental strategy as the [[Containment policy#Vietnam|containment of communism]] but as a cooperative [[world order]], in which Nixon and his chief adviser [[Henry Kissinger]] were focused on the other [[world powers]].<ref name=NSAEBB233>{{citation|title=Kissinger conspired with Soviet Ambassador to keep Secretary of State in the Dark|publisher=George Washington University|series=National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book|volume=233|editor=Burr, William|date=November 2, 2007|url= http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB233/index.htm}}</ref> Nixon had ordered Kissinger to negotiate diplomatic policies with Soviet statesman [[Anatoly Dobrynin]]. Nixon also opened high-level contact with China. U.S. relations with the [[Soviet Union]] and [[China]] were of higher priority than [[South Vietnam]]. The policy of Vietnamization, despite its successful execution, was ultimately a failure as the improved ARVN forces and the reduced American and Allied component were unable to prevent the [[fall of Saigon]] and the subsequent merger of the north and south under [[communism]], to form the [[Vietnam|Socialist Republic of Vietnam]].

Nixon said Vietnamization had two components. The first was "strengthening the armed force of the South Vietnamese in numbers, equipment, leadership and combat skills", while the second was "the extension of the pacification program [i.e. military aid to civilians] in South Vietnam". To achieve the first goal, U.S. helicopters would fly in support; however, helicopter operations were too much part of ground operations to involve U.S. personnel.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Franke |first=Volker |title=Conflict Management and Peacebuilding: Pillars of a New American Grand Strategy |last2=Dorff |first2=Robert H. |date=2013 |publisher=Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press |isbn=1-58487-583-6 |pages=179 |language=en}}</ref> Thus, ARVN candidates were enrolled in U.S. helicopter schools to take over the operations. As observed by [[Dave Richard Palmer|Lieutenant General Dave Palmer]], to qualify an ARVN candidate for U.S. helicopter school, he first needed to learn English; this, in addition to the months-long training and practice in the field, made adding new capabilities to the ARVN take at least two years.<ref name=Palmer>{{citation|first=Dave R.|last=Palmer|title=Summons of the Trumpet|publisher=Presidio Press|isbn=9780891410416|year=1978|pages=[https://archive.org/details/summonsoftrumpet00palm/page/219 219–220]|url=https://archive.org/details/summonsoftrumpet00palm/page/219}}</ref> Palmer did not disagree that the first component, given time and resources, was achievable. However: "Pacification, the second component, presented the real challenge&nbsp;... it was benevolent government action in areas where the government should always have been benevolently active&nbsp;... doing both was necessary if Vietnamization were to work."

==Precedent: French ''jaunissement'' in Indochina War==
From 1950, after several years of the [[First Indochina War]], French commanders adopted a policy they called "yellowing" ([[wiktionary:jaunissement|''jaunissement'']]), expressly to minimize [[White people|White casualties]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Asselin |first=Pierre |title=Vietnam's American War: A History |publisher=Cambridge University Press |year=2018 |isbn=978-1-107-10479-2 |location=Cambridge, UK |pages=53 |language=en}}</ref> This change, at the time, was mostly due to a deficit of troops in the FTEO, the Far-East segment of the [[French army]]. Vietnamese soldiers were progressively integrated in battalions.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Bodin |first=Michel |date=2010 |title=Le jaunissement de la Légion en Indochine, 1950-1954 |url=https://www.cairn.info/revue-guerres-mondiales-et-conflits-contemporains-2010-1-page-63.htm |journal=Guerres Mondiales et Conflits Contemporains |volume=1 |issue=237 |pages=63–80 |doi=10.3917/gmcc.237.0063 |via=Cairn|url-access=subscription }}</ref> As part of [[decolonization]] process, after recognizing Vietnamese independence within the [[French Union]] on 8 March 1949, France allowed Vietnam to establish its own army ([[Vietnamese National Army]]) on 8 December 1950, this army then worked side by side with the [[French Far East Expeditionary Corps|French army]] (French Union Army) to fight against the communist [[Viet Minh]] rebels.<ref name="vietnam.ttu.edu">[http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/vietnamcenter/events/2006_Conference/presentations/sherman/RVNAF.pdf ''A Brief Overview of the Vietnam National Army and the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces''(1952-1975)] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090327061040/http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/vietnamcenter/events/2006_Conference/presentations/sherman/RVNAF.pdf |date=2009-03-27 }}, Stephen Sherman and Bill Laurie</ref> U.S. critics of the war compared Vietnamization to ''jaunissement''.<ref>[[Eugene McCarthy]], [https://www.nytimes.com/1970/08/01/archives/topics-the-failure-of-vietnamization-by-any-name.html "The Failure of Vietnamization by Any Name"], ''[[The New York Times]]'',  1 August 1970. Retrieved on 24 August 2019.
</ref>

==Preparation under Johnson==
{{Main|Joint warfare in South Vietnam 1963–1969}}
[[File:Lyndon B. Johnson speech (September 29, 1967).ogv|thumb|Excerpt of Lyndon B. Johnson speech on the Vietnam War (September 29, 1967)]]
[[Lyndon Johnson]]'s major political interests were domestic; the war interfered with his domestic focus, and he was eager to end the war in a way that he considered politically acceptable. In 1967, Kissinger attended a [[Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs|Pugwash Conference]] of scientists interested in [[nuclear disarmament]]. This was the first contact between [[Ho Chi Minh]] and Kissinger, who was then an adviser to [[Nelson Rockefeller]], the governor of New York and a presidential candidate.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Landau |first=Susan |title=Joseph Rotblat: The road less traveled |date= |publisher=The Bulletin/Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science, Inc. |year=1996 |pages=53 |language=en}}</ref> Two participants approached Kissinger and offered a [[wikt:disavowal|disavowable]] means of communication between the U.S. and the communist leadership. In particular, [[Raymond Aubrac]], an official of the [[World Health Organization]], knew Ho Chi Minh and agreed to carry a message.

After discussing the matter with Assistant Secretary of State [[William Bundy]] and Secretary of Defense [[Robert McNamara]], a message was sent. Ho said he would be willing to negotiate if the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam under [[Operation Rolling Thunder]] ceased. Mai Van Bo, Hanoi's diplomatic representative in Paris, was named a point of contact. Since Hanoi would not communicate with an American official without a bombing halt, Kissinger served as an intermediary. Johnson made a speech in San Antonio on September 29, offering the possibility of talks. They were rejected, although brought up again in 1967.{{sfn|Kissinger|2003|pages=41–42}}

===End of Americanization===
The departure of [[Lyndon B. Johnson]] did not end the war; rather, it spread throughout [[Southeast Asia]]. The [[Tet Offensive]] (1968) was a political and media disaster. Newsman [[Walter Cronkite]] announced that he saw a stalemate as the best case scenario for the Tet Offensive. Other members of the press added to the call to [[wikt:retrench|retrench]] (reduce costs and spending).{{citation needed|date=November 2013}} President Johnson's popularity plummeted and he announced a bombing halt on March 31, simultaneously announcing he would not run for re-election.<ref name=LBJ1968-03-31>{{citation|title=President Lyndon B. Johnson's Address to the Nation Announcing Steps To Limit the War in Vietnam and Reporting His Decision Not To Seek Reelection|date=March 31, 1968|author=Lyndon B. Johnson|url=http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/Johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/680331.asp|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20020616021105/http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/680331.asp|archive-date=June 16, 2002}}</ref> Though he had low expectations, on May 10, 1968, Johnson began peace talks between U.S. and North Vietnamese in [[Paris]]. The war, however, continued.

==Nixon Administration analysis of options==
Under the [[Richard Nixon|Nixon]] administration, [[Henry Kissinger]], Nixon's chief adviser, asked the [[Rand Corporation]] to provide a list of policy options, prepared by [[Daniel Ellsberg]]. On receiving the report, Kissinger and Schelling asked Ellsberg about the apparent absence of a victory option; Ellsberg said "I don't believe there is a win option in Vietnam." While Ellsberg eventually did send a withdrawal option, Kissinger would not circulate something that could be perceived as defeat, though privately, he realized the United States was in a difficult position and priorities needed to be set.<ref name=Gibson>{{citation|title=The Perfect War: Technowar in Vietnam|first=James William|last=Gibbs|publisher=Atlantic Monthly Press|year=1986|page=170|isbn=9780871130631}}</ref><ref name=":0">{{Cite journal |last=Huei |first=Pang Yang |date=2006 |title=Beginning of the End: ARVN and Vietnamisation (1969-72) |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592310600671620 |journal=Small Wars and Insurgencies |volume=17 |issue=3 |pages=287–310|doi=10.1080/09592310600671620 |s2cid=145416692 |url-access=subscription }}</ref>

According to a record, prepared by Soviet Ambassador to the United States [[Anatoliy Dobrynin]], of discussions between Dobrynin and Kissinger, the crux of the U.S. position, was progress still must be made at the Paris talks and, for domestic political reasons, Nixon "simply cannot wait a year for Hanoi to decide to take some new step and take a more flexible position". Dobrynin expressed the Soviet position that the U.S. needed to stop trying to divide the [[Paris Peace Talks]] into two parts:
*discussion of military issues between the U.S. and the DRV
*resolution of political issues by placing them, "for all practical purposes, entirely in the hands of Saigon, which does not want to resolve them and is unable to do so, since it is unable to soberly assess the situation and the alignment of forces in South Vietnam".<ref name= NSAEBB233-08>{{citation|title=Kissinger conspired with Soviet Ambassador to keep Secretary of State in the Dark|contribution=Document 8: Their First "One-on-One": Dobrynin's record of meeting with Kissinger, 21 February 1969, pp. 20-25 of ''Soviet-American Relations: the Détente Years, 1969-1972''|volume=George Washington University National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 233|editor=Burr, William|date=November 2, 2007|url=http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB233/index.htm}}</ref>
Dobrynin, however, misunderstood the extent to which the U.S. was willing to apply military force not involving ground troops, culminating in [[Operation Linebacker II]].<ref name=NSAEBB233/>

=== Domestic aspect ===
The process of Vietnamization was partly influenced by Nixon’s delicate political position on a domestic level. He had been elected with [[1968 United States presidential election|43.4% of the votes]], and Laird was concerned with his support at home. Indeed, he could sense the impatience of the American public regarding the war.<ref name=":0" /> Nixon himself believed American casualties reduced the support for the war. For members of his administration, a campaign of attrition was useless against an Asian power, because they were able to tolerate a greater number of casualties compared to a Western power.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Gartner |first=Scott Sigmund |date=1998 |title=Differing Evaluations of Vietnamization |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/207045 |journal=The Journal of Interdisciplinary History |volume=29 |issue=2 |pages=243–262|doi=10.1162/002219598551698 |jstor=207045 |s2cid=144319457 |url-access=subscription }}</ref> 

On the left, [[J. William Fulbright|Senator Fulbright]], chairman of the Foreign Relations committee, feared Vietnamization would not be enough to reduce the numbers of casualties:<blockquote>My fear is that the current policy will keep the US bogged down in Vietnam – with the killing and cost continuing indefinitely.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Scott |first=Richard |date=Feb 4, 1970 |title=Senators doubt Vietnamisation |pages=3 |work=The Guardian |url=https://www.proquest.com/docview/185382883 |access-date=9 May 2023|id={{ProQuest|185382883}} }}</ref></blockquote>

==Nixon policy direction==
Nixon directed the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]] to prepare a six-step withdrawal plan. The [[Commandant of the United States Marine Corps|Commandant of the Marine Corps]] General [[Leonard F. Chapman Jr.]] remembered, "I felt, and I think that most Marines felt, that the time had come to get out of Vietnam." Leading the ground force withdrawals, [[Operation Keystone Eagle|Marine redeployments started in mid-1969]], and by the end of the year the entire 3rd Marine Division had departed.<ref name=III-MAF>{{citation
 |contribution=The Marine War: III MAF in Vietnam, 1965-1971 
 |first=Jack 
 |last=Shumlimson 
 |title=1996 Vietnam Symposium: "After the Cold War: Reassessing Vietnam" 18–20 April 1996 
 |publisher=Vietnam Center and Archive at Texas Tech University 
 |url=http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/vietnamcenter/events/1996_Symposium/96papers/marwar.htm 
 |url-status=dead 
 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060821193042/http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/vietnamcenter/events/1996_Symposium/96papers/marwar.htm 
 |archive-date=August 21, 2006 
}}</ref>

In the aftermath of the Tet Offensive, {{abbr|ARVN|Army of the Republic of Vietnam}} units were able to take control of areas held by the [[Viet Cong]]. General [[Tran Van Tra]] of the Viet Cong forces in the South stated:

{{Blockquote|We suffered large sacrifices and losses with regard to manpower and materiel, especially cadres at the various echelons, which clearly weakened us. Afterwards, we were not only unable to retain the gains we had made but had to overcome a myriad of difficulties in 1969 and 1970.<ref name=TVT-B2-V>{{citation|title=Vietnam: History of the Bulwark B2 Theater|volume= 5: Concluding the 30 Years of War|author=[[Tran Van Tra]]|url=http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/Vietnam.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120916230911/http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/Vietnam.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-date=September 16, 2012|publisher=Joint Publications Research Service, [[Foreign Broadcast Information Service]], online by U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute|date=2 February 1983|series=FBIS Southeast Asia Report|issue=1247}}</ref>}}

Some ARVN units, especially that had been operating closely with U.S. troops or using facilities, could quickly move into a dominant role in their areas.

Other ARVN units faced more of a challenge. For example, the ARVN 5th Division was directed to move from its existing base camp, Phu Cuong, to that of the U.S. [[1st Infantry Division (United States)|1st Infantry Division]] in [[Lai Khê]], while the U.S. division moved southeast to [[Dĩ An]]. The ARVN unit had to retain its previous operational responsibility, while replacing a division that was far better equipped with helicopters than a standard U.S. division.<ref name=NVT-Vnz>{{citation|title=Why Did Vietnamization of The Vietnam War Fail?|url=http://www.archive.vietnam.ttu.edu/vietnamcenter/events/2002_Symposium/2002Papers_files/vietnamization.htm|author=Nguyen Van Tin|date=April 12, 2002|journal=Fourth Triennial Symposium, Vietnam Center, Texas Tech University|access-date=April 7, 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040701192448/http://archive.vietnam.ttu.edu/vietnamcenter/events/2002_Symposium/2002Papers_files/vietnamization.htm|archive-date=July 1, 2004|url-status=dead|df=mdy-all}}</ref> At Phu Cong, Major General [[Nguyen Van Hieu]], the 5th Division commander, was able to use a local [[South Vietnamese Popular Force|Popular Force]] battalion for base security. The Popular Force battalions, however, did not move away from the area in which they were formed.{{clarify|date=November 2013}}

==Joint operations against Cambodia==
{{Main|1969 in the Vietnam War}}
{{more citations needed section|date=November 2013}}
In 1969, Nixon ordered [[B-52]] strikes against the [[People's Army of Vietnam]] (PAVN) bases and supply routes in [[Cambodia]], which had been used as a sanctuary by North Vietnam forces. The orders for U.S. bombing of Cambodia were classified, and thus kept from the U.S. media and Congress. In a given strike, each B-52 normally dropped {{convert|42000|lb|kg|abbr=on}} of bombs, and each strike consisted of three or six bombers.

===Cambodian change of government===
Much of North Vietnamese infiltration went through Cambodia. Nixon authorized unacknowledged bombing in Cambodia while U.S. ground troops were in South Vietnam. General [[Lon Nol]] had overthrown Prince [[Norodom Sihanouk]] in March 1970, who had presented himself as a neutralist while aware of the PAVN use of his country.

In June 1969, the Viet Cong and its allied organizations formed the [[Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam]] (PRG), recognized by [[Hanoi]] as the legal government of South Vietnam. At that time, communist losses dating from the Tet Offensive numbered 75,000, and morale was faltering, even among the party leadership.

===Joint ground operations===
{{Main|1970 in the Vietnam War}}
On April 30, 1970, responding to a Communist attempt to take Cambodia, Nixon announced a large scale U.S.–ARVN [[Cambodian Campaign|incursion into Cambodia]] to directly hit the PAVN headquarters and [[Ammunition dump|supply dumps]]; the area bordered ARVN [[III Corps tactical zone]].<ref name=Smith1971>{{citation| journal=Air University Review|date=September–October 1971|title=The Presidential Decision on the Cambodian Operation: A Case Study in Crisis Management|first=Russell H.|last=Smith|url= http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1971/sep-oct/smith.html|archive-url= https://archive.today/20121212213615/http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1971/sep-oct/smith.html|url-status= dead|archive-date= December 12, 2012}}</ref><ref name=RMN1969-04-01>{{citation|title= Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia|first=Richard M.|last=Nixon|date=April 30, 1970|url=http://www.mekong.net/cambodia/nixon430.htm}}</ref>

The campaign began on May 1. The U.S. Task Force Shoemaker, of the [[1st Cavalry Division (United States)|1st Cavalry Division]]s, carried out B-52 strikes in the [[Fishhook (Cambodia)|Fishhook area of Cambodia]]. T.F. Shoemaker operated with the ARVN Airborne Brigade. Separate ARVN operations took place in the [[Parrot's Beak, Cambodia|Parrot's Beak area]].{{sfn|Tolson|1973|loc=Chapter XI: The Changing War and Cambodia, 1969–1970}} [[III Corps tactical zone]] commander [[Do Cao Tri]], the most visible ARVN leader,<ref name=Time1971-03-98>{{citation |title= The Death of a Fighting General |magazine=[[Time (magazine)|Time]] |date= March 8, 1971 |url=https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,904774,00.html}}</ref> encouraged the deepest ARVN penetrations.<ref>{{citation |title= Two Fighting Generals: Generals Do Cao Tri and Nguyen Viet Thanh |url= http://www.generalhieu.com/trithanh.htm |first1= David |last1= Fulghum |first2= Terrence |last2= Mailand |work= South Vietnam on Trial – The Vietnam Experience |publisher= Boston Publishing Company |access-date= 2010-04-07 |archive-date= 2013-07-03 |archive-url= https://web.archive.org/web/20130703132313/http://www.generalhieu.com/trithanh.htm |url-status= dead }}</ref>

The incursion prevented the immediate takeover of Cambodia by [[Pol Pot]] and his [[Khmer Rouge]], and cost the PAVN the supply line from the port of Sihanoukville. The Khmer Rouge broke with its North Vietnamese sponsors, and aligned with China. This made American involvement visible to the U.S. population, and there were intense protests, including [[Kent State shootings|deaths in a confrontation]] between rock-throwing protesters and National Guardsmen at Kent State University.

==Intelligence and security==
The U.S. intelligence collection systems, a significant amount of which (especially the techniques) were not shared with the ARVN, and, while not fully declassified, examples have been mentioned earlier in this article. The Communist side's intelligence operations, beyond the spies that were discovered, are much less known.

While there had been many assumptions that the South Vietnamese government was penetrated by many spies, and there indeed were many, a December 1969 capture of a Viet Cong [[communications intelligence]] center and documents revealed that they had been getting a huge amount of information using simple technology and smart people, as well as sloppy U.S. communications security.<ref name=Fiedler>{{citation |journal= Army Communicator |date= Spring 2003 |title= Project touchdown: how we paid the price for lack of communications security in Vietnam - A costly lesson |first= David |last=Fiedler |url=http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PAA/is_1_28/ai_103992824/print?tag=artBody;col1 }}</ref> This specific discovery was made by U.S. Army infantry, with interpretation by regular communications officers; the matter infuriated General Abrams in regards to the communications specialists. Before and after, there had been a much more highly classified, and only now available in heavily censored form, [[National Security Agency]] analysis of how the Communists were getting their information, which has led to a good deal of modern [[counterintelligence]] and [[operations security]].{{sfn|Center for Cryptologic History|1993}}

Some of the material from Touchdown also gave insight into the North Vietnamese intelligence system. For example, the NVA equivalent of the [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] was the Central Research Directorate (CRD) in Hanoi. COSVN intelligence staff, however, disseminated the tactically useful material.{{sfn|Center for Cryptologic History|1993|p=64}} Their espionage was under the control of the Military Intelligence Sections (MIS), which were directed by the Strategic Intelligence Section (SIS) of CRD.

==U.S. direct discussions with North Vietnam==
Henry Kissinger began secret talks with the North Vietnamese official, [[Lê Đức Thọ]], in February 1970.  However, this is credible.<ref name=Donaldson>{{citation |title= America at War Since 1945: Politics and Diplomacy in Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War |first=Gary |last= Donaldson |publisher= Greenwood Publishing Group |year=1996 |isbn=9780275956608 |url= https://books.google.com/books?id=1wOv3enW1ccC&q=Nixon+%22losing+VIetnam%22&pg=PA120}}, pp. 120-124</ref>

==1971==
{{Main|1971 in the Vietnam War}}
Subsequent congressional action banned further U.S. ground intervention outside the boundaries of South Vietnam, so the next major drive, [[Operation Lam Son 719]], would have to be based on ARVN ground forces, U.S. air and artillery support, and U.S. advisory and logistical assistance.

The Vietnamization policy achieved limited rollback of Communist gains inside South Vietnam only, and was primarily aimed at providing the arms, training and funding for the South to fight and win its own war, if it had the courage and commitment to do so. By 1971, the Communists lost control of most, but not all, of the areas they had controlled in the South in 1967. The Communists still controlled many remote jungle and mountain districts, especially areas that protected the [[Ho Chi Minh trail]].

Commanded by [[Hoang Xuan Lam]], known more for loyalty to [[Nguyen Van Thieu]] than for military talent, Saigon's effort to strike against one of these strongholds, [[Operation Lam Son 719]], failed in 1971. The SVN forces, with some U.S. air support, were unable to defeat PAVN regulars. While the operation is detailed in a separate sub-article, the key issues were that the ARVN were inexperienced in executing large operations. They underestimated the needed forces, and the senior officers had developed in a context that rewarded loyalty rather than competence. Let there be no doubt that there were individual ARVN commanders who would be credit to any military, but, Thieu, like those RVN leaders before him, was constantly concerned at preventing a military coup. "Promotions were won in Saigon, not in battle. And vital to advancement was the avoidance of risk, even at the price of defeat."{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=630}}

Thieu relieved the operational commander, head of [[I Corps tactical zone]] commander [[Hoang Xuan Lam]] with the most respected combat commander in the ARVN, [[Do Cao Tri]]. Tri died 2.5 hours later in his first helicopter crash of inspection. It is known the crash was at low altitude; it has been argued it had crashed due to mechanical failure or enemy fire. Certainly, mechanical failure was less demoralizing.<ref name=Time1971-03-98/>

The 25,000-man ARVN force, which U.S. planners had considered half the necessary size,{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=628}} took admitted 25% casualties, which some estimates put as high as 50%.<ref name= Time1971-04-05>{{citation |date= April 5, 1971 |title= The Invasion Ends |magazine= Time |url= http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,876899,00.html|archive-url= https://archive.today/20130105013910/http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,876899,00.html|url-status= dead|archive-date= January 5, 2013}}</ref>

==1972==
{{Main|1972 in the Vietnam War}}

By the beginning of 1972, over 400,000 U.S. personnel had been withdrawn, most of whom were combat troops. Politically, this allowed Nixon to negotiate with China and the Soviet Union without suggesting that he was compromising U.S. soldiers in the field.{{sfn|Karnow|1983|p=636}}

North Vietnam made a [[Easter Offensive|major conventional attack on the South]], for which the U.S. provided major air support under [[Operation Linebacker I]], which enabled the ARVN to regain substantial control. In [[Battle of An Lộc|An Lộc]], South Vietnamese forces halted the North Vietnamese advance towards [[Saigon]] capital. When North Vietnam, late in the year, left the negotiating table, Nixon authorized the destructive [[Operation Linebacker II]] campaign, which forced the North Vietnamese to negotiate; a peace treaty was signed and all U.S. combat forces were withdrawn.

==1973 and ceasefire==
{{Main|1973 in the Vietnam War}}

The Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam had some excellent ground combat units, but still had very serious problems of command, control, and communications at division level and above.

Many units had become overdependent on American air support, and, while the RVN Air Force had not developed large-scale interdiction capability, they were also of varied quality for [[close air support]]. Beyond the issue that the Air Force was always fragmented to the corps commanders, they also did not receive various expected equipment upgrades. Photoreconnaissance was extremely limited.<ref name=Smith1975>{{citation|first=Homer D.|last=Smith|title=End of Tour Report|date=30 May 1975|url=http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/star/images/636/6360101001.pdf}}{{Dead link|date=April 2021 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}, pp. 3-4, 8-11</ref>

Armored units had developed the greatest confidence in their ability to fight without U.S. air support. Ground commanders also learned that armored units were not for infantry support and static defenses, but needed to be used as mobile reserves.{{sfn|Tolson|1973|pages=218–219}} Neither North nor South Vietnam, however, had really mastered large-scale [[combined arms]] methods, compared to a [[NATO]] or [[Warsaw Pact]] level of proficiency.

In a postwar interview with the [[RAND Corporation]], [[Nguyễn Bá Cẩn]] said: "Vietnamese officials called Vietnamization the U.S. Dollar and Vietnam Blood Sharing Plan."<ref>{{cite book|first1=Stephen|last1=Hosmer|first2=Konrad|last2=Kellen|first3=Brian|last3=Jenkins|title=The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese military and civilian leaders|publisher=RAND Corporation|year=1978|url=https://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R2208.html|isbn=|page=42}}</ref>

==See also==

* [[Withdrawal of United States troops from Afghanistan (2011–2016)#2012-2014: Security handover and Bilateral Security Agreement|Afghanization]] - Similar program to equip and train the [[Afghan Armed Forces]].
* [[Chechenization]]

==Notes==
{{Reflist|2}}

==References==
{{Refbegin}}
*{{citation|author=Center for Cryptologic History, [[National Security Agency]]|title=PURPLE DRAGON: The Origin and Development of the United States OPSEC Program|volume=United States Cryptologic History, Series VI, The NSA Period, Volume 2|year=1993|url=http://www.nsa.gov/public/purple_dragon.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080726122509/http://www.nsa.gov/public/purple_dragon.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-date=July 26, 2008|ref={{harvid|Center for Cryptologic History|1993}}}}
*{{citation|last=Karnow|first=Stanley|title=Vietnam: A History|publisher=Viking Press|year=1983|isbn=9780670746040|url=https://archive.org/details/vietnamhistory00karn}}
*{{citation|last=Kissinger|first=Henry|author-link=Henry Kissinger|title=Ending the Vietnam War: a History of America's involvement and extrication from the Vietnam War|publisher=Simon & Schuster|year=2003|isbn=9780743215329|url=https://archive.org/details/endingvietnamwar00kiss}}
*{{citation|last=Tolson|title=Vietnam Studies: Airmobility 1961–1971|first=John J.|publisher=[[Office of the Chief of Military History]]|year=1973|url=http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/090/90-4/CMH_Pub_90-4-B.pdf|lccn=72-600371|access-date=2013-11-23|archive-date=2016-03-03|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160303220159/http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/090/90-4/CMH_Pub_90-4-B.pdf|url-status=dead}}
{{Refend}}

{{Vietnam War}}
{{Presidency of Richard Nixon}}
{{Authority control}}

[[Category:United States in the Vietnam War]]
[[Category:History of South Vietnam]]
[[Category:Presidency of Richard Nixon]]
[[Category:Vietnam War]]
[[Category:1969 in Vietnam]]
[[Category:1970 in Vietnam]]
[[Category:1971 in Vietnam]]
[[Category:1973 in Vietnam]]
[[Category:Military history of the United States during the Vietnam War]]
[[Category:United States–Vietnam relations]]
[[Category:Articles containing video clips]]