Template:About Enforcement is the proper execution of the process of ensuring compliance with laws, regulations, rules, standards, and social norms.<ref>See Template:Smallcaps, Enforcement (2d ed. 1910).</ref>
Governments attempt to effectuate successful implementation of policies by enforcing laws and regulations.<ref>Kate Andrias, The President's Enforcement Power Template:Webarchive, 88 Template:Smallcaps 1031, 1034 (2013); Avlana Eisenberg, Expressive Enforcement, 61 Template:Smallcaps 858, 901 (2014) (discussing "gaps" between the enactment and enforcement of legislation).</ref> Enactment refers to application of a law or regulation, or carrying out of an executive or judicial order.
Theories of enforcementEdit
Enforcement serves a number of functions; the enforcement of social norms can ensure conformity within insular communities,<ref>Amalia D. Kessler, Enforcing Virtue: Social Norms and Self-Interest in an Eighteenth-Century Merchant Court, 22 Template:Smallcaps 71 (2011).</ref> the enforcements of laws can maximize social benefits and protect the public interest,<ref>John T. Scholz, Voluntary Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement, 6 Template:Small 385-88 (1984); see also Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 Template:Smallcaps 698, 701 (2011) ("The public interest promoted by state enforcement is the interest of the state and its citizens, while federal enforcement purports to serve the broader national interest.").</ref> and enforcement may also serve the self-interest of the institutions that oversee enforcement.<ref>Margaret H. Lemos and Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 853, 886 (2014).</ref> Enforcement can be effectuated by both public institutions and private, non-governmental actors.<ref>Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 69 Template:Smallcaps 285, 288 (2016); Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45 Template:Smallcaps 1401, 1456 (1998).</ref> Enforcement is often accomplished through coercive means or by utilizing power disparities to constrain action.<ref>See Scott A. Anderson, The Enforcement Approach to Coercion, 5 J. of Ethics &Soc. Phil. 1 (2010).</ref> Some scholars, such as Kate Andrias, have also argued that institutions enforce rules when deciding "when and how to apply" laws and regulations.<ref>Kate Andrias, The President's Enforcement Power Template:Webarchive, 88 Template:Smallcaps 1031, 1040 (2013) (comparing "enforcement" with "rulemaking").</ref>
Delegation of enforcement powersEdit
Some governments will delegate enforcement powers to subordinate governmental entities or private parties.<ref>Kurt T. Lash, The Sum of All Delegated Power: A Response to Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 Template:Smallcaps 180, 184 (2014) (discussing enforcement powers in federalist systems of government); John F. Manning, The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 Template:Smallcaps 1, 44 (2014) (citing specific examples of delegation of enforcement powers to agencies in the United States); Kate Andrias, The President's Enforcement Power Template:Webarchive, 88 Template:Smallcaps 1031, 1040 (2013) (noting that enforcement powers can be delegated to "private parties").</ref> In the United States, for example, the federal government and state governments often delegate a range of enforcement powers to administrative agencies.<ref>Robert F. Durant, Template:Smallcaps 379 (2010) (discussing agencies' "compliance and enforcement" powers).</ref> There has been considerable debate in legal scholarship about the degree to which governments should oversee and supervise institutions to which enforcement powers have been delegated.<ref>Compare, e.g., Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn, and Glen O. Robinson, Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 Template:Smallcaps 1 (1982) with Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty To Supervise, 124 Yale L. J. 124 (2015).</ref>
Enforcement mechanismsEdit
Template:See also Template:Excerpt In 2017, of 265 policies for ocean protection only 13% had specific enforcement mechanisms.<ref>Template:Cite journal</ref>
Enforcement mechanisms are major component of governance structures.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> It has been suggested that an effective global public health security convention would require a governing body (or bodies) to enforce the framework with appropriate enforcement mechanisms.<ref name="10.1016/S2468-2667(21)00070-0">Template:Cite journal</ref> Similar approaches include the concept of "climate clubs" of polities for climate change mitigation. In such, "border adjustments [...] have to be introduced to target those states that do not participate [...] to avoid shifting effects with ecologically and economically detrimental consequences", with such "border adjustments or eco-tariffs" incentivizing other countries to adjust their standards and domestic production to join the climate club.<ref name="10.3390/su14074365">Template:Cite journal</ref> The Paris Agreement may lack enforcement mechanisms.<ref name="10.1007/s10584-021-03082-4">Template:Cite journal</ref>
On a national level, penalties for non-complying countries could include:
- public reprimands
- economic sanctions
- denial of benefits, such as those related to travel, trade, and tourism
- public disclosures of compliance, which could act either as an incentive or penalty<ref name="10.1016/S2468-2667(21)00070-0"/>
- tariffs<ref name="10.3390/su14074365"/>
Benefits for countries could include:
- tangible resources, such as financial aid or technical assistance
- other support
- access to data and information, recommendations and guidance, or other services provided by a governing body<ref name="10.1016/S2468-2667(21)00070-0"/>
- tariffs
Selective enforcementEdit
{{#invoke:Labelled list hatnote|labelledList|Main article|Main articles|Main page|Main pages}}
Institutions may choose to exercise discretion, thereby enforcing laws, regulations, or norms only in selective circumstances.<ref>See Kenneth Culp Davis, Dialogue on Police Rulemaking: Police Rulemaking on Selective Enforcement: A Reply, 125 Template:Smallcaps 1167 (1977).</ref> Some scholars, such as Joseph H. Tieger, have suggested that selective enforcement is an inherent component of all enforcement regimes, because it is impossible for enforcers to observe and catch every violation.<ref>Joseph H. Tieger, Police Discretion and Discriminatory Enforcement, 1971 Template:Smallcaps 717, 743 (1971) ("The exigencies of police work are such that even the most elaborate set of statutory or regulatory directives could not succeed in removing all occasion for the exercise of judgment.").</ref> Other scholars, such as Margaret H. Lemos and Alex Stein, have suggested that "strategic" enforcement is a cost-effective method of achieving social benefits; by focusing enforcement on the worst violators, other violators will "downscale" their activities so that they do not appear to be the worst offender.<ref>Margaret H. Lemos and Alex Stein, Strategic Enforcement, 95 Template:Smallcaps 9, 9-10 (2010).</ref>