Convoy PQ 17

Template:Use British English Template:Short description {{#invoke:Infobox military conflict|main}} Convoy PQ 17 was an Allied Arctic convoy during the Second World War. On 27 June 1942, the ships sailed from Hvalfjörður, Iceland, for the port of Arkhangelsk in the Soviet Union. The convoy was located by German forces on 1 July, shadowed and attacked.

The First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Dudley Pound, acting on information that German ships, including Template:Ship, were moving to intercept, ordered the covering force, based on the Allied battleships Template:HMS and Template:USS away from the convoy and told the convoy to scatter. Because of vacillation by Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW, German armed forces high command), the Tirpitz raid never materialised.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn The convoy was the first large joint Anglo-American naval operation under British command; in Churchill's view this encouraged a more careful approach to fleet movements.Template:Sfn

As the close escort and the covering cruiser forces withdrew westwards to intercept the German raiders, the merchant ships were left without escorts.Template:Sfn The freighters were attacked by Luftwaffe aircraft and U-boats and of the 35 ships, only eleven reached their destination, delivering Template:Convert of cargo.Template:Sfn The convoy disaster demonstrated the difficulty of passing adequate supplies through the Arctic, especially during the summer, with the midnight sun.Template:Sfn The German success was possible through German signals intelligence and cryptological analysis.Template:Sfn

BackgroundEdit

During Operation Barbarossa, the German war against the USSR, the British and American governments agreed to send unconditional aid to their Soviet ally. The Beaverbrook–Harriman Anglo-American Mission visited Moscow in October 1941, agreeing to a series of munitions deliveries to the Soviet Union.Template:Sfn The most direct way to carry these supplies was by sea around the North Cape, through Arctic waters to the ports of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. The agreement stated that the Soviet government was responsible for receiving the supplies in Soviet ships at British or American ports. Since the Soviets did not have enough ships for the quantities of aid, British and American ships began to constitute an increasing proportion of the convoy traffic.Template:Sfn Although the defence of the Arctic convoys was the responsibility of the Royal Navy, the American Admiral Ernest King assigned Task Force 39 (TF 39) – based on the carrier Template:USS and the battleship Template:USS – to support the British.Template:Sfn

The first convoy, Operation Dervish, sailed from the United Kingdom in August 1941, two months after the beginning of Barbarossa. By the spring of 1942, twelve more convoys had made the passage with the loss of only one of the 103 ships.<ref name=longaz1>Template:Citation</ref> The threat of attacks on the convoys increased, with the Germans making a maximum effort to stop the flow of supplies to the USSR. In 1941, the Kriegsmarine had begun concentrating its strength in Norway in winter, to prevent a British invasion of Norway and to obstruct Allied convoys to the Soviet Union. The battleship Template:Ship was moved to Trondheim in January, where she was joined by the heavy cruiser Template:Ship and in March by the heavy cruiser Template:Ship.<ref name=longaz2>Template:Citation</ref> The battleships Template:Ship, Template:Ship and the heavy cruiser Template:Ship were also sent to Arctic waters but fell victim to Allied air attacks and had to turn back for repairs. The Germans had bases along the Norwegian coast, which meant, until escort carriers became available, Allied convoys had to be sailed through these areas without adequate defence against aircraft and submarine attack.Template:Sfn

British planEdit

File:Convoy PQ-17 map 1942-en.svg

Track of Convoy PQ 17, showing approximate positions of sinkings

British naval intelligence in June reported Unternehmen Rösselsprung (Operation Knight's Move), the German plan to use their big ships to attack the next convoy, east of Bear Island.<ref name=longaz2/>Template:Sfn German forces would operate close to the Norwegian coast, with support of shore-based air reconnaissance and striking forces, with a screen of U-boats in the channels between Svalbard and Norway.<ref name=longaz3>Template:Citation</ref> Allied covering forces would be without air support, Template:Cvt from their base and with the destroyers too short on fuel to escort a damaged ship to harbour.<ref name=longaz2/>

The Admiralty issued instructions on 27 June, which allowed the convoy to be turned back, temporarily to shorten the distance to the nearest Allied base.<ref name=longaz3/> German surface movements took place later than expected, making these instructions unnecessary.Template:Sfn The Admiralty also stated that the safety of the convoy from surface attack westward of Bear Island depended on Allied surface forces, while to the eastward it was to be provided by Allied submarines. The convoy's cruiser covering force was not to go east of Bear Island, unless the convoy was threatened by the presence of a surface force which the cruiser force could fight, nor to go beyond 25° East under any circumstances.Template:Sfn<ref name=longaz4>Template:Citation</ref>

A decoy convoy was also organised to divert enemy forces, consisting of the First Minelaying Squadron and four colliers, escorted by the light cruisers Template:HMS and Template:HMS, five destroyers and several trawlers. This diversionary force assembled at Scapa Flow for a week, sailing two days after the convoy.<ref name=longaz5>Template:Citation</ref> German reconnaissance of Scapa during the period of assembly failed to notice the diversion, which was also not sighted on its passage. The operation was repeated on 1 July, again without success. On 26 June the Admiralty took the opportunity to pass the westbound Convoy QP 13, in conjunction with Convoy PQ 17. The former was made up of returning merchant ships from Arkhangelsk, with some ships from Murmansk. It consisted of thirty-five ships and was escorted by five destroyers, three corvettes, an anti-aircraft ship, three minesweepers, two trawlers and to the Bear Island area, a submarine. It was sighted by German aircraft on 30 June and 2 July. Convoy QP 13 was not attacked, since the German tactic was to concentrate on eastbound (laden) convoys, rather than westbound convoys in ballast.<ref name=longaz5/>

A fresh ice reconnaissance done on 3 July found the passage north of Bear Island had widened. The Admiralty suggested the convoy should pass at least Template:Cvt north of it.<ref name=longaz6>Template:Citation</ref> The senior officer of the escort (SOE), Commander Jack Broome, preferred to stay in the low visibility on the original route and to make ground to the eastward. Rear Admiral Louis Hamilton, in command of the cruiser squadron, later decided that a more northerly route was necessary, ordered the SOE to alter course, to pass Template:Cvt north of Bear Island and later on to open to Template:Cvt from Banak.<ref name=longaz6/>

Covering forcesEdit

File:PQ17 HMS London and USS Wichita.png

Template:USS and Template:HMS, part of the cruiser covering force.

The convoy's close escort was the First Escort Group (EG1, SOE Jack Broome) and included the anti-aircraft auxiliary cruisers Template:HMS and HMS Pozarica, the destroyers Template:HMS, Template:HMS, Template:HMS, Template:HMS, Template:HMS and Template:HMS, the corvettes, minesweepers or armed trawlers Template:HMS, Template:HMS, Template:HMS and Template:HMS, the Template:Sclasss Template:HMS, Salamander and Template:HMS and the anti-submarine trawlers Template:HMT, Lord Austin, Ayrshire and Northern Gem.<ref>Template:Citation</ref> Distant cover came from the 1st Cruiser Squadron (CS1, Hamilton), consisting of the British cruisers Template:HMS (flagship) and Template:HMS, the American cruisers Template:USS and Template:USS and four destroyers, two from the United States Navy. As further protection, Home Fleet battleships cruised at about Template:Cvt distance.Template:Sfn

A second heavy covering force, under the command of Admiral John Tovey, was made up of the aircraft carrier Template:HMS, the battleship Template:HMS (flagship), the cruisers Template:HMS and Template:HMS, the US battleship Washington and nine destroyers.Template:Sfn As the convoy sailed, the covering forces were moving into position. CS1 left Seidisfjord in the night of 30 June/1 July. It arrived in a covering position north of the convoy on 2 July. The cruisers were not sighted by the Germans until late on 3 July. The heavy covering force was shadowed for a short period while north-east of Iceland on 1 July, while the cruiser screen was refuelling at Seidisfjord. It was shadowed for a short period early on 3 July, while in a covering position south of the convoy.<ref name=longaz5/>

Later that day, course was altered northwards to cross the convoy's track and to reach a position north-west of Bear Island. This would place Victorious within air striking range of the convoy on the morning of 4 July. This was calculated to occur at the same time at which a surface attack was expected. While en route to the new covering area, the force was joined by Template:HMS and Template:HMS from Spitzbergen. Air reconnaissance of Norwegian harbours had been hindered by weather but information showed German heavy units were probably moving northwards and an air photograph of Trondheim late on 3 July showed that Tirpitz and Hipper were absent. The flying boat patrol and the two lines of submarines between North Cape and Bear Island were adjusted to cover the line of approach to the convoy as it moved eastwards. In view of the uncertainty of the two German ships' positions, Hamilton decided to continue to provide close cover with the cruiser squadron and to pass east of Bear Island.<ref name=longaz6/>

German forcesEdit

{{#invoke:Lang|lang}}Edit

Against Convoy PQ 17 the Kriegsmarine prepared wolfpack {{#invoke:Lang|lang}} (Ice Devil), to intercept the convoy; three U-boats were in a patrol line north of the Denmark Strait to give advance warning and another five further north of Jan Mayen Island. The {{#invoke:Lang|lang}} also had two battle groups in Norwegian ports, Force I ({{#invoke:Lang|lang}}) consisting of the battleship Tirpitz, the cruiser Hipper and the destroyers Karl Galster, Friedrich Ihn, Hans Lody, Theodor Riedel with the torpedo boats T 7 and T 15. Force II ({{#invoke:Lang|lang}}) Lützow, Scheer and the destroyers Template:Ship, Template:Ship, Template:Ship, Template:Ship and Template:Ship, ready to carry out a surface attack on the convoy. This was orchestrated as a complex two-stage operation codenamed {{#invoke:Lang|lang}} (Operation Knight's Move); the force was the strongest yet assembled for a convoy attack but was hampered by an unwieldy chain of command, with the authority to attack resting with Hitler and a contradictory mission statement; the forces were instructed to attack and destroy the convoy and also to avoid any action that would lead to damage to the capital ships, particularly Tirpitz.Template:Sfn On 16 June, the cruisers Lützow and Scheer took part in a joint naval and air exercise simulating an attack on Convoy PQ 17 and its escort.<ref name="NavalReview-20Feb24">Template:Citation</ref>

{{#invoke:Lang|lang}}Edit

These forces were supported by aircraft of {{#invoke:Lang|lang}}, which had to contend with the growth of the Soviet Air Force at the terminus of the Arctic sea route. During Convoy PQ 16, German attacks faded away during 27 May due to the arrival of Soviet destroyers and the arrival of Soviet bombers overhead; when the convoy came into range on 29 May, Soviet fighters began escort sorties. The rise on the number of opposing aircraft led to Germans claiming 162 aircraft shot down in May, 113 being Hurricanes provided from Britain. On 28 May the Luftwaffe claimed 22 aircraft for no loss. The German claims were exaggerated but the Luftwaffe airfields at Petsamo, Kirkenes and Banak began to receive frequent attacks by Soviet bombers and fighters, often timed to ground the Luftwaffe during convoys. On 29 May, the Soviets tried to jam Luftflotte 5 wireless frequencies and raided Kirkenes with small formations of aircraft or solo attacks. The Soviet raids stretched the resources of Luftflotte 5 and increased losses on raids against Murmansk.Template:Sfn

No convoys were spotted during June and the weather was too bad for convoy operations. Training in the {{#invoke:Lang|lang}} (Golden Comb) tactic, first used against Convoy PQ 16, continued. By early June there were 264 aircraft available, a strike force of 103 Ju 88 bombers, 42 He 111 torpedo-bombers and 30 Ju 87 Stuka dive-bombers, eight FW 200 Kondor and 22 Ju 88s for long-range reconnaissance, 44 Bv 138 flying boats for shorter-range reconnaissance and fifteen He 115 floatplanes for general use.Template:Sfn Many of the torpedo-bombers had been hurriedly transferred from other theatres and retrained from conventional bombing, as part of Hitler's demand for greater action against the Arctic convoys.<ref name="NavalReview-20Feb24" />

VoyageEdit

File:PQ17 USS Wainwright.png

Template:USS broke up an air attack on the convoy on 4 July.

The convoy sailed from Hvalfjörður on 27 June, under the command of the convoy commodore, John Dowding. With the 34 merchant ships, an oiler (Template:RFAux) for the escort, and three rescue ships (Rathlin, Zamalek, and Zaafaran) sailed with the convoy.Template:Sfn The escort was made up of six destroyers, four corvettes, three minesweepers, four trawlers, two anti-aircraft ships and two submarines. The route was longer than earlier convoys, since the ice allowed for a passage north of Bear Island and an evasive detour in the Barents Sea. All the convoy was bound for Arkhangelsk, because recent air attacks had destroyed most of Murmansk.Template:Sfn One ship suffered mechanical failure just out of port and was forced to turn back. SS Exford, turned back after sustaining ice damage.<ref>Template:Citation</ref>

Part of the convoy ran into drifting ice in thick weather whilst in the Denmark Strait. Two merchant ships were damaged and had to turn back; Grey Ranger was also damaged and her speed reduced to Template:Cvt. Since it was doubtful if she could face heavy weather, it was decided to transfer her to the fuelling position north-east of Jan Mayen in exchange for the Template:RFAux. Shortly after it sailed, Convoy PQ 17 was sighted and tracked by U-456 and shadowed continuously, except for a few short intervals in fog. This was augmented by {{#invoke:Lang|lang}} BV 138 flying boats on 1 July. On 2 July, the convoy sighted the reciprocal Convoy QP 13. Convoy PQ 17 was attacked by nine torpedo aircraft, later the same day; one aircraft was shot down. At 13:00 on 3 July, the Convoy PQ 17 destroyer screen was steering east to pass between Bear Island and Spitsbergen.Template:Sfn

On the morning of 4 July, a Heinkel He 115, from Küstenfliegergruppe 906, hit the Liberty ship Template:SS, around Template:Cvt north-east of Bear Island, at Template:Coord. The submarine HMS P-614 attempted to scuttle her but she remained afloat; Template:GS sank the ship at 08:08.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> There was an abortive attack by six bombers in the evening.Template:Sfn Template:Sfn Template:USS broke up an air attack on the convoy the same day. Later that evening, an attack by 25 torpedo bombers took place, sinking Template:SS.Template:Sfn

DispersalEdit

Excerpts of signals between the Admiralty (ADMY) and the First Cruiser Squadron (CS1)Template:Sfn
Time	From	To	Message
21:11	ADMY	CS1	Cruiser Force withdraw to the westward at high speed.
21:23	ADMY	CS1	Owing to threat from surface ships, convoy is to disperse and proceed to Russian ports.
21:36	ADMY	CS1	Convoy is to scatter.

At 12:30 on 4 July, the Admiralty gave Hamilton permission to proceed east of 25° east, should the situation demand, unless contrary orders were received from Tovey. This was a reversal of previous orders and as no information in Tovey's possession justified this change, Hamilton was ordered to withdraw when the convoy was east of 25° east or earlier at his discretion, unless the Admiralty assured him Tirpitz would not be met. At 18:58 the Admiralty informed Hamilton that more information was expected shortly, instructing him to remain with the convoy pending further instructions. At 21:11, the Admiralty sent a message prefixed "Most Immediate" ordering Hamilton to withdraw westwards at high speed. This was due to U-boat information, a fact not shared with Hamilton. At 21:23, the Admiralty, in a message prefixed "Immediate", ordered the convoy to disperse and proceed to Russian ports independently owing to threat from surface ships.Template:Sfn At 21:36, the Admiralty sent another "Most Immediate" message, ordering the convoy to scatter.Template:Sfn Template:Ref label

*Luftwaffe* and *Kriegsmarine* aircraft
Northern Norway, June 1942Template:Sfn
Ju 88	Bomber	103
He 111	Bomber	42
He 115	Floatplane	15
Ju 87	Dive bomber	30
Ju 88 FW 200 BV 138	Reconnaissance	74
Total		264

Hamilton, Broome and Dowding took these signals to indicate that an attack by Tirpitz was imminent. The convoy was immediately ordered to scatter, with the escorting destroyers ordered to join the cruiser force and the merchantmen to proceed independently.Template:Sfn Winston Churchill later speculated that the Admiralty's decision and orders would not have been so vehement had only British warships been concerned but the idea the first joint Anglo-American operation under British command might involve the destruction of American as well as British units may well have influenced the decisions of Dudley Pound, the First Sea Lord.Template:Sfn The Allied cruiser squadron was already beyond the standing orders set by the Admiralty and if no new orders had gone out, the cruisers would have had to withdraw some time afterwards in any case. The earlier cruiser movement did not influence the tactical situation but in light of later knowledge, the decision was deemed precipitate.Template:Sfn

Unbeknownst to the escort and convoy commanders, the Tirpitz battlegroup was not advancing toward the convoy or anywhere near. Tirpitz had left Trondheim on 2 July to the port of Vestfjord; the next day, the Kriegsmarine Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Erich Raeder, received permission to move Tirpitz to Altenfjord to join the ships there.Template:Sfn Prior to issuing the orders, Pound visited Whitehall and consulted an intelligence officer, Lieutenant Commander Norman Denning, to confirm that Tirpitz had left Altentfjord. Though Denning did not know if it was still there he did explain that his sources would have confirmed if the ship had or was about to put to sea. It was not until several hours after Pound's orders that Tirpitz was shown still to be anchored at Altenfjord.Template:Sfn Tirpitz's battlegroup sailed on July 5 but the operation by surface ships to attack the convoy was cancelled and the ships returned to Altenfjord that day.Template:Sfn

Convoy lossesEdit

Template:See also

File:PQ17 U255 back.jpg

U-255 after the attacks on Convoy PQ 17, flying four victory pennants and the captured flag of the merchant ship SS Paulus Potter

When the order to scatter the convoy was received, it had covered more than half of its route and lost three ships. The consequences for the merchantmen were dire; the ships were spread over a wide area, stripped of mutual protection and their trained escort. As the larger escort vessels retreated from the suspected German surface force, messages on Merchant Navy wavelengths began to be received by the destroyers: "Am being bombed by a large number of planes", "On fire in the ice", "Abandoning ship", "Six U-boats approaching on the surface".Template:Sfn With the majority of the escorts ordered to return to Scapa Flow, only the close escort of anti-aircraft auxiliaries, corvettes, minesweepers and armed trawlers was left to protect the scattered ships.Template:Sfn

On 5 July, six merchantmen, including SS Fairfield City and SS Daniel Morgan were sunk by the Luftwaffe and six more by four U-boats. Among the losses that day were SS Pan Kraft, Washington, Carlton, Honomu, the Commodore's flagship Template:SS, Template:SS and Peter Kerr. (Kerr was abandoned after a fire got out of control.)Template:Sfn SS Paulus Potter had been abandoned by her crew after an aerial attack on 5 July; the ship was boarded by sailors from Template:GS on 13 July; after taking the ship's documents and flag, Kapitänleutnant Reinhart Reche sank Potter with a torpedo.Template:Sfn

On 6 July, SS Pan Atlantic was sunk by the Luftwaffe and SS John Witherspoon by U-255. From 7 to 8 July, five more ships were sunk (two by U-255), including SS Olapana and SS Alcoa Ranger. The remaining escorts withdrew into the Arctic Ocean on 9 July but the merchant ships suffered no more that day. The last losses were SS Hoosier and SS El Capitan on 10 July. The Luftwaffe flew over 200 sorties and lost only five aircraft in exchange for the eight merchantmen.<ref name="uboat.net">{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>

On receiving the third order to scatter on 4 July 1942, Lieutenant Leo Gradwell RNVR, commanding the anti-submarine trawler Template:HMS, did not want to head for Archangelsk and led his convoy of Ayrshire and Troubador, Ironclad and Silver Sword north. On reaching the Arctic ice, the convoy pushed into it, then stopped engines and banked their fires. The crews used white paint from Troubador, covered the decks with white linen and arranged the Sherman tanks on the merchant vessels' decks into a defensive formation, with loaded main guns. After a period of waiting and having evaded Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft, finding themselves unstuck, they proceeded to the Matochkin Strait. They were found there by a flotilla of corvettes, who escorted the four-ship convoy plus two other merchant vessels to Archangel, arriving on 25 July.Template:Sfn

In the voyage to the Russian ports, some of the ships and lifeboat craft took refuge along the frozen coast of Novaya Zemlya, landing at Matochkin.Template:Sfn The Soviet tanker Azerbaijan lost her cargo of linseed oil and much of SS Winston-Salem's cargo was jettisoned in Novaya Zemlya.Template:Sfn Many of the ships' locations were unknown, in spite of searches by Coastal Command aircraft, which had proceeded to north Russia after their patrols and by minesweepers and corvettes. A fortnight elapsed before the results of the attacks and the fate of the convoy were fully known.Template:Sfn Of the 34 ships which had left Iceland, 23 were sunk; two British, four American, one Panamanian and two Russian merchant ships reached Arkhangelsk. Two American ships, Samuel Chase and Benjamin Harrison, docked at Murmansk.Template:Sfn The deliveries amounted to Template:Cvt out of the Template:Cvt which had started from Iceland.Template:Sfn Matériel losses in the convoy were: 3,350 vehicles, 210 aircraft, 430 tanks and 109,466 short tons (99,316 t) of other cargo such as food and ammunition.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>

AftermathEdit

AnalysisEdit

In the short term, the losses caused poor relations between the three major Allies. Stalin and Soviet naval leaders found it difficult to understand the order to scatter given by the Admiralty, which required unescorted cargo vessels to reach Soviet ports, one by one.Template:Sfn This contributed to perceptions in the west that the Soviets lacked appreciation for the efforts of and losses by the Western Allies.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref> When the head of the Soviet Military Mission in London, Admiral Nikolay Kharlamov and the Soviet ambassador in London, Ivan Maisky, asked subsequently when Convoy PQ 18 would sail, Pound said nothing could be done until better air cover was arranged – after which Kharlamov criticised the order to withdraw the cruisers from PQ 17. Pound, angered by the comment, stated that he had ordered the convoy to scatter; Maisky commented that "even British admirals make mistakes".Template:Sfn US Admiral Ernest J. King, who already distrusted his British counterparts, was furious with what he perceived as Pound's bungling and promptly transferred TF 39 to the Pacific. King hesitated to conduct further joint operations under British command.Template:Sfn US Admiral Dan Gallery, who was serving in Iceland, later described Convoy PQ 17 "a shameful page in naval history".<ref name=gallery>Template:Citation</ref>

Churchill called the convoy "one of the most melancholy naval episodes in the whole of the war".Template:Sfn An inquiry assigned no blame to anyone, since orders were issued by the First Sea Lord and blaming the First Sea Lord himself was considered politically unacceptable.Template:Sfn In view of the Convoy PQ 17 disaster, the Admiralty proposed to suspend the Arctic convoys at least until the ice receded and perpetual daylight passed.Template:Sfn

In a meeting with Hitler, Raeder stated that "our submarines and aircraft, which totally destroyed the last convoy, have forced the enemy to give up this route temporarily...".Template:Sfn

Subsequent operationsEdit

It was not until September that Convoy PQ 18 set out for North Russia. The convoy's defence scheme was revised, with a very strong constant close escort of sixteen destroyers and the first of the new escort carriers, Template:HMS, with twelve fighters and three Swordfish ASW aircraft.Template:Sfn After the war there was criticism of this delay in American and Soviet sources.Template:Sfn Soviet historians give varying reasons for the suspension and reduction in supply caused by the halt in the Arctic convoys. Some considered it the result of "the fact that in 1942, Anglo-American (ocean) communications were destroyed".Template:Sfn

Awards and commemorationsEdit

At least sixteen officers and men of the Merchant Navy were honoured for gallantry or distinguished service for the actions in the convoy. A supplement to the London Gazette published on 6 October 1942 carried notification of two George Medals, six appointments to various grades of the Order of the British Empire, six British Empire Medals and two King's Commendation for Brave Conduct.<ref>See Template:Citation and Template:London Gazette</ref> In December 2012 the Arctic Star medal was created and on 19 March 2013 the first medals were presented to approximately 40 veterans, in London.<ref>Template:Cite news</ref><ref>Template:Cite news</ref>

Broome v Cassell & Co LtdEdit

In 1968, David Irving published a controversial book about Convoy PQ 17. It concentrated on Allied blunders and shortcomings, alleging that Broome's decision to withdraw his destroyers was the primary cause of the disaster to the convoy. Broome litigated in Broome v Cassell & Co Ltd, to defend his reputation. Broome won his case and was awarded £40,000 in damages and secured the withdrawal of all copies of the offending book from circulation (it has since been republished, with corrections). The damages (donated by Broome to charity) were the highest paid in English legal history until 1987.

{{#invoke:Lang|lang}} 5 order of battleEdit

*Luftflotte* 5, order of battle, 1 June 1942Template:Sfn
Command	Units
Luftflotte 5 HQ Colonel-General Hans-Jürgen Stumpff Oslo	Wettererkundungsstaffel 5 (Weather reconnaissance squadron)
Fliegerführer Nord (Ost)Template:Efn Colonel Alexander Holle Kirkenes	I. und II./Kampfgeschwader 30; II. and 13./Jagdgeschwader 5; I./Sturzkampfgeschwader 5 (Dive-Bomber Wing); 3./Kampfgeschwader 26; 1./Seeaufklärungsgruppe 125 (Maritime Reconnaissance Wing); 1./Fernaufklärungsgruppe 22; 1./Fernaufklärungsgruppe 124 (Long-Range Reconnaissance Wing)
Fliegerführer Nord (West)Template:Efn	I./Kampfgeschwader 26; I./Kampfgeschwader 40; 2./Küstenfliegergruppe 906 (Coastal Reconnaissance Wing); Bordfliegerstaffel Tirpitz; 1./Fernaufklärungsgruppe 120
Fliegerführer LofotenTemplate:Efn Colonel Ernst-August Roth Bardufoss	III./Kampfgeschwader 30; III./Jagdgeschwader 5; 2./Kampfgeschwader 26; 4./Sturzkampfgeschwader 5; Kette 1./Fernaufklärungsgruppe 124
Jagdfliegerführer NorwegenTemplate:Efn	I./Jagdgeschwader 5; Jagdgruppe Drontheim (Fighter Wing)
Seenotdienstführer NorwegenTemplate:Efn	Seenotbereichskommando VIII (Maritime Rescue Area Command); Seenotbereichskommando IX

NotesEdit

Template:Refbegin a. Template:Note label This latter signal was intended merely as a correction of technical wording from "disperse" to "scatter", but this was not known at the time. The order to scatter was only used under immediate threat of surface attack. Detailed instructions in each ship's signal book laid down the actions that were to be taken by each ship on receipt of this order.Template:Sfn Template:Refend