Vaisheshika

Template:Short description Template:EngvarB Template:Use dmy dates Template:Hindu philosophy Vaisheshika (IAST: Vaiśeṣika; Template:IPAc-en; Template:Langx) is one of the six schools of Hindu philosophy from ancient India. In its early stages, Vaiśeṣika was an independent philosophy with its own metaphysics, epistemology, logic, ethics, and soteriology.<ref>Amita Chatterjee (2011), Nyāya-vaiśeṣika Philosophy, The Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy, {{#invoke:doi|main}}</ref> Over time, the Vaiśeṣika system became similar in its philosophical procedures, ethical conclusions and soteriology to the Nyāya school of Hinduism, but retained its difference in epistemology and metaphysics.

The epistemology of the Vaiśeṣika school of Hinduism, like Buddhism, accepted only two reliable means to knowledge: direct observation and inference.<ref name="dpsb">DPS Bhawuk (2011), Spirituality and Indian Psychology (Editor: Anthony J.Marsella), Springer, Template:ISBN, page 172</ref><ref name="eliottjag">* Eliot Deutsch (2000), in Philosophy of Religion : Indian Philosophy Vol 4 (Editor: Roy Perrett), Routledge, Template:ISBN, pages 245-248;

John A. Grimes, A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy: Sanskrit Terms Defined in English, State University of New York Press, Template:ISBN, page 238</ref> The Vaiśeṣika school and Buddhism both consider their respective scriptures as indisputable and valid means to knowledge, the difference being that the scriptures held to be a valid and reliable source by Vaiśeṣikas were the Vedas.

The Vaiśeṣika school is known for its insights in naturalism,<ref>Dale Riepe (1996), Naturalistic Tradition in Indian Thought, Template:ISBN, pages 227-246</ref><ref name="Kak">Kak, S. 'Matter and Mind: The Vaisheshika Sutra of Kanada' (2016), Mount Meru Publishing, Mississauga, Ontario, Template:ISBN.</ref> a form of atomism in natural philosophy.<ref name=jganeri>Analytical philosophy in early modern India Template:Webarchive J Ganeri, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</ref> It postulated that all objects in the physical universe are reducible to paramāṇu (atoms), and one's experiences are derived from the interplay of substance (a function of atoms, their number and their spatial arrangements), quality, activity, commonness, particularity and inherence.<ref name=olil>Oliver Leaman, Key Concepts in Eastern Philosophy. Routledge, Template:ISBN, 1999, page 269.</ref> Everything was composed of atoms, qualities emerged from aggregates of atoms, but the aggregation and nature of these atoms was predetermined by cosmic forces. The Ājīvika and Trairāśika schools of Jainism also included a theory of atoms; however, their theories were similar to each other but different from and less developed than that of the Vaisheshika school.Template:Sfn

According to the Vaiśeṣika school, knowledge and liberation were achievable by a complete understanding of the world of experience.<ref name=olil/>

Vaiśeṣika darshana was founded by Kaṇāda Kashyapa around the 6th to 2nd century BC.Template:Sfn<ref>Oliver Leaman (1999), Key Concepts in Eastern Philosophy. Routledge, Template:ISBN, page 269</ref><ref>J Ganeri (2012), The Self: Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance, Oxford University Press, Template:ISBN</ref>

OverviewEdit

The name Vaiśeṣika derives from viśeṣa, the category that represents the individuality of innumerable existing objects.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref>

Although the Vaiśeṣika system developed independently from the Nyāya philosophy of Hinduism, the two became similar and are often studied together. However, in its classical form, the Vaiśeṣika school differed from Nyāya in a significant way: where Nyāya accepted four sources of valid knowledge, the Vaiśeṣika accepted only two.<ref name="dpsb" /><ref name="eliottjag" />

The epistemology of Vaiśeṣika school of Hinduism accepted only two reliable means to knowledge – perception and inference.<ref name=dpsb/>

Vaisheshika espouses a form of atomism, that the reality is composed of five substances (examples are earth, water, air, fire, and space). Each of these five are of two types, explains Ganeri:<ref name=jganeri/> paramāṇu and composite. A paramāṇu is that which is indestructible, indivisible, and has a special kind of dimension, called "small" (aṇu). A composite is that which is divisible into paramāṇu. Whatever human beings perceive is composite, and even the smallest perceptible thing, namely, a fleck of dust, has parts, which are therefore invisible.<ref name=jganeri/> The Vaiśeṣikas visualized the smallest composite thing as a "triad" (tryaṇuka) with three parts, each part with a "dyad" (dyaṇuka). Vaiśeṣikas believed that a dyad has two parts, each of which is an atom. Size, form, truths and everything that human beings experience as a whole is a function of parmanus, their number and their spatial arrangements.

Parama means "most distant, remotest, extreme, last" and aṇu means "atom, very small particle", hence paramāṇu is essentially "the most distant or last small (i.e. smallest) particle".

Vaiśeṣika postulated that what one experiences is derived from dravya (substance: a function of atoms, their number and their spatial arrangements), guna (quality), karma (activity), samanya (commonness), vishesha (particularity) and samavaya (inherence, inseparable connectedness of everything).<ref name=olil/><ref>M Hiriyanna (1993), Outlines of Indian Philosophy, Motilal Banarsidass, Template:ISBN, pages 228-237</ref>

The followers of this philosophy are mostly Shaivas Template:Citation needed. Acharya Haribhadra Suri, in his work Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya describes the followers of Vaiśeṣika as worshippers of Pashupati or Shiva.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>

DevelopmentEdit

Foundational TextEdit

The earliest systematic exposition of the Vaisheshika is found in the [[Vaisheshika Sutra|Template:IAST]] of Template:IAST (or Template:IAST). Kanada is also referred to as Uluka by Ci-tsan, a Chinese Buddhist commentator.<ref>Template:Cite book</ref> This treatise is divided into ten books.

CommentariesEdit

The two commentaries on the Template:IAST, Template:IAST and Template:IAST are no more extant. [[Prashastapada|Template:IAST]]’s Template:IAST (c. 4th century) is the next important work of this school. Though commonly known as Template:IAST of Template:IAST, this treatise is basically an independent work on the subject. The next Vaisheshika treatise, Candra’s Template:IAST (648) based on Template:IAST’s treatise is available only in Chinese translation. The earliest commentary available on Template:IAST’s treatise is Template:IAST’s Template:IAST (8th century). The other three commentaries are Template:IAST’s Template:IAST (991), Udayana’s Template:IAST (10th century) and Template:IAST’s Template:IAST (11th century). Template:IAST’s Template:IAST which also belongs to the same period, presents the Template:IAST and the Template:IAST principles as a part of one whole. Template:IAST’s Upaskara on Template:IAST is also an important work.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>

MetaphysicsEdit

The Categories or PadārthaEdit

According to the Vaisheshika school, all things that exist, that can be cognized and named are Template:IASTs (literal meaning: the meaning of a word), the objects of experience. All objects of experience can be classified into six categories, dravya (substance), Template:IAST (quality), karma (activity), Template:IAST (generality), Template:IAST (particularity) and Template:IAST (inherence). Later Template:IASTs (Template:IAST and Udayana and Template:IAST) added one more category abhava (non-existence). The first three categories are defined as artha (which can perceived) and they have real objective existence. The last three categories are defined as Template:IAST (product of intellectual discrimination) and they are logical categories.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>

Dravya (substance): There are nine substances. They are, Template:IAST (earth), ap (water), tejas (fire), Template:IAST (air), Template:IAST (ether), Template:IAST (time), dik (space), Template:IAST (self or soul) and manas (mind). The first five are called Template:IASTs, the substances having some specific qualities so that they could be perceived by one or the other external senses.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>
Guṇa (quality): The Template:IAST mentions 17 Template:IASTs (qualities), to which Template:IAST added another 7. While a substance is capable of existing independently by itself, a Template:IAST (quality) cannot exist so. The original 17 Template:IASTs (qualities) are, Template:IAST (colour), rasa (taste), gandha (smell), Template:IAST (touch), Template:IAST (number), Template:IAST (size/dimension/quantity), Template:IAST (individuality), Template:IAST (conjunction/accompaniments), Template:IAST (disjunction), Template:Transliteration (priority), aparatva (posteriority), buddhi (knowledge), sukha (pleasure), Template:IAST (pain), Template:IAST (desire), Template:IAST (aversion) and prayatna (effort). To these Template:IAST added gurutva (heaviness), dravatva (fluidity), sneha (viscosity), dharma (merit), adharma (demerit), Template:IAST (sound) and Template:IAST (faculty).<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>
Karma (activity): The karmas (activities) like Template:IASTs (qualities) have no separate existence, they belong to the substances. But while a quality is a permanent feature of a substance, an activity is a transient one. Template:IAST (ether), Template:IAST (time), dik (space) and Template:IAST (self), though substances, are devoid of karma (activity).<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>
Sāmānya (generality): Since there are plurality of substances, there will be relations among them. When a property is found common to many substances, it is called Template:IAST.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>
Template:IAST (particularity): By means of Template:IAST, we are able to perceive substances as different from one another. As the ultimate atoms are innumerable so are the Template:IASTs.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>
Template:IAST (inherence): Template:IAST defined Template:IAST as the relation between the cause and the effect. Template:IAST defined it as the relationship existing between the substances that are inseparable, standing to one another in the relation of the container and the contained. The relation of Template:IAST is not perceivable but only inferable from the inseparable connection of the substances.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>
Abhava (non-existence)

AtomismEdit

{{#invoke:Labelled list hatnote|labelledList|Main article|Main articles|Main page|Main pages}}

According to the Template:IAST school, a paramanu (atom) is an indestructible particle of matter. The atom is indivisible because it is a state at which no measurement can be attributed. They used invariance arguments to determine properties of the atoms. It also stated that anu can have two states—absolute rest and a state of motion.<ref>{{#invoke:citation/CS1|citation |CitationClass=web }}</ref>

They postulated four different kinds of atoms: two with mass, and two without.<ref name="Kak" /> Each substance is supposed to consist of all four kinds of atoms. Atoms can be combined into Template:IASTs (triads) and Template:IAST (dyad)before they aggregate into bodies of a kind that can be perceived.<ref>Template:Citation</ref><ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> Each Template:IAST (atom) possesses its own distinct Template:IAST (individuality)<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>

The measure of the partless atoms is known as parimaṇḍala parimāṇa. It is eternal and it cannot generate the measure of any other substance. Its measure is its own absolutely.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>

EpistemologyEdit

Six pramāṇas (epistemically reliable means to accurate knowledge and to truths)<ref>P Bilimoria (1993), Pramāṇa epistemology: Some recent developments, in Asian philosophy - Volume 7 (Editor: G Floistad), Springer, Template:ISBN, pages 137-154</ref> are noted within different Indian philsophical schools: Pratyakṣa (perception), Anumāna (inference), Śabda or āgama "(word, testimony of past or present reliable experts), Upamāna (comparison and analogy), Arthāpatti (postulation, derivation from circumstances), and Anupalabdhi (non-perception, negative/cognitive proof).<ref name="dpsb" /><ref name="eliottjag" /><ref name="gflood">Gavin Flood, An Introduction to Hinduism, Cambridge University Press, Template:ISBN, page 225</ref> Of these Template:IAST epistemology considered only pratyakṣa (perception) and Template:IAST (inference) as reliable means of valid knowledge.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref> Yoga accepts the first three of these six as pramāṇa; and the Nyaya school, related to Vaiśeṣika, accepts the first four out of these six.<ref name="dpsb" />

Pratyakṣa (प्रत्यक्ष) means perception. It is of two types: external and internal. External perception is described as that arising from the interaction of five senses and worldly objects, while internal perception is described by this school as that of inner sense, the mind.<ref name="kamal">MM Kamal (1998), The Epistemology of the Carvaka Philosophy, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 46(2): 13-16</ref><ref>B Matilal (1992), Perception: An Essay in Indian Theories of Knowledge, Oxford University Press, Template:ISBN</ref> The ancient and medieval texts of Hinduism identify four requirements for correct perception:<ref name="kpmat">Karl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 2, Princeton University Press, Reprinted in 1995 by Motilal Banarsidass, Template:ISBN, pages 160-168</ref> Indriyarthasannikarsa (direct experience by one's sensory organ(s) with the object, whatever is being studied), Avyapadesya (non-verbal; correct perception is not through hearsay, according to ancient Indian scholars, where one's sensory organ relies on accepting or rejecting someone else's perception), Avyabhicara (does not wander; correct perception does not change, nor is it the result of deception because one's sensory organ or means of observation is drifting, defective, suspect) and Vyavasayatmaka (definite; correct perception excludes judgments of doubt, either because of one's failure to observe all the details, or because one is mixing inference with observation and observing what one wants to observe, or not observing what one does not want to observe).<ref name="kpmat" /> Some ancient scholars proposed "unusual perception" as pramāṇa and called it internal perception, a proposal contested by other Indian scholars. The internal perception concepts included pratibha (intuition), samanyalaksanapratyaksa (a form of induction from perceived specifics to a universal), and jnanalaksanapratyaksa (a form of perception of prior processes and previous states of a 'topic of study' by observing its current state).<ref>Karl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 2, Princeton University Press, Reprinted in 1995 by Motilal Banarsidass, Template:ISBN, pages 168-169</ref> Further, the texts considered and refined rules of accepting uncertain knowledge from Pratyakṣa-pranama, so as to contrast nirnaya (definite judgment, conclusion) from anadhyavasaya (indefinite judgment).<ref>Karl Potter (1977), Meaning and Truth, in Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 2, Princeton University Press, Reprinted in 1995 by Motilal Banarsidass, Template:ISBN, pages 170-172</ref>
Anumāna (अनुमान) means inference. It is described as reaching a new conclusion and truth from one or more observations and previous truths by applying reason.<ref>W Halbfass (1991), Tradition and Reflection, State University of New York Press, Template:ISBN, page 26-27</ref> Observing smoke and inferring fire is an example of Anumana.<ref name="kamal" /> In all except one Hindu philosophies,<ref>Carvaka school is the exception</ref> this is a valid and useful means to knowledge. The method of inference is explained by Indian texts as consisting of three parts: pratijna (hypothesis), hetu (a reason), and drshtanta (examples).<ref name="jl4647">James Lochtefeld, "Anumana" in The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism, Vol. 1: A-M, Rosen Publishing. Template:ISBN, page 46-47</ref> The hypothesis must further be broken down into two parts, state the ancient Indian scholars: sadhya (that idea which needs to proven or disproven) and paksha (the object on which the sadhya is predicated). The inference is conditionally true if sapaksha (positive examples as evidence) are present, and if vipaksha (negative examples as counter-evidence) are absent. For rigor, the Indian philosophies also state further epistemic steps. For example, they demand Vyapti - the requirement that the hetu (reason) must necessarily and separately account for the inference in "all" cases, in both sapaksha and vipaksha.<ref name="jl4647" /><ref>Karl Potter (2002), Presuppositions of India's Philosophies, Motilal Banarsidass, Template:ISBN</ref> A conditionally proven hypothesis is called a nigamana (conclusion).<ref>Monier Williams (1893), Indian Wisdom - Religious, Philosophical and Ethical Doctrines of the Hindus, Luzac & Co, London, page 61</ref>

SyllogismEdit

The syllogism of the Template:IAST school was similar to that of the Nyāya school of Hinduism, but the names given by Template:IAST to the 5 members of syllogism are different.<ref>Template:Harvnb</ref>

ReferencesEdit

Template:Reflist

SourcesEdit

External linksEdit

Vaisheshika-sutra with three commentaries English translation by Nandalal Sinha, 1923 (includes glossary)
A summary of Vaisheshika physics
Shastra Nethralaya - Vaisheshika
GRETIL e-text of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras

Template:Indian Philosophy