Editing Almanzor (section)

=== Reform of army and administration ===
The separation between the temporal power, held by Almanzor, and the spiritual, in the hands of Hisham as Caliph, increased the importance of military force, a symbol – along with the new majesty of the chamberlain's court, rival of that of the caliph himself – of the power of Almanzor, and an instrument to guarantee the payment of taxes.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=119}}

Almanzor successfully continued the military reforms begun by Al-Hakam{{Sfn|Valdés Fernández|1999|p=37}} and his predecessors,{{Sfn|Kennedy|1996|p=117}} covering many aspects.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=128}} On one hand, he increased the professionalization of the regular army,{{Sfn|Kennedy|1996|p=117}} necessary both to guarantee his military power in the capital and to ensure the availability of forces for his numerous campaigns, one of the sources of his political legitimacy.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=128}} This policy de-emphasized levies and other non-professional troops, which he replaced with taxes used to support the professional troops—often ''saqalibas'' {{Sfn|Kennedy|1996|p=117}} or Maghrebis—which freed the natives of al-Andalus from military service.{{Sfn|Valdés Fernández|1999|p=15}}{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=128}}{{Sfn|Castellanos Gómez|2002|p=46}} Recruitment of ''saqalibas'' and Berbers was not new, but Almanzor expanded it.{{Sfn|Kennedy|1996|p=117}}{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=126}}{{Sfn|Fletcher|2000|p=95}} On the other hand, he created new units, unlike the regular army of the Caliphate, that were faithful primarily to himself{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=126}} and served to control the capital.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=128}}  Emir [[Abd al-Rahman I]] had already used Berbers and ''saqalibas'' for a permanent army of forty thousand to end the conflicts that hitherto had plagued the emirate.{{Sfn|Dozy|2010|p=239}}  At the time of Emir [[Muhammad I of Córdoba|Muhammad I]], the army reached thirty-five to forty thousand combatants, half of them Syrian military contingents.{{Sfn|Cruz Hernández|1992|p=326}} This massive hiring of mercenaries and slaves meant that, according to Christian chroniclers, "ordinarily the Saracen armies amount to 30, 40, 50, or 60,000 men, even when in serious occasions they reach 100, 160, 300 and even 600,000 fighters." {{Sfn|Colmeiro y Penido|1863|p=172}} In fact, it has been argued that, in Almanzor's time, the Cordovan armies could muster six hundred thousand laborers and two hundred thousand horses "drawn from all provinces of the empire."{{Sfn|Colmeiro y Penido|1863|p=173}}

[[File:Mouwahidoune.jpg|thumb|left|Almanzor's troops, as represented in the ''[[Cantigas de Santa María]]''. The chamberlain carried out wide-ranging military reforms.]]
In order to eliminate a possible threat to his power and to improve military efficiency, Almanzor abolished the system of tribal units{{Sfn|Valdés Fernández|1999|p=14}}{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=131}}{{Sfn|Castellanos Gómez|2002|p=45}} that had been in decline due to lack of Arabs and institution of pseudo-feudalism on the frontiers,{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=130}} in which the different tribes each had their own commander and that had caused continuous clashes, and replaced it with mixed units{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=134}} without clear loyalty under orders from Administration officials.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=129}} The nucleus of the new army, however, was formed increasingly by Maghrebi Berber forces.{{Sfn|Castellanos Gómez|2002|p=46}}{{Sfn|Fletcher|2000|p=95}}{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=130}} The ethnic rivalries among Arabs, Berbers and Slavs within the Andalusi army were skillfully used by Almanzor to maintain his own power{{Sfn|Fletcher|2000|p=95}}--for example, by ordering that every unit of the army consist of diverse ethnic groups so that they would not unite against him;{{sfn|Vara|2012}} and thus preventing the emergence of possible rivals.{{Sfn|Russell|Carr|1982|p=70}} However, once their centralizing figure disappeared, these units were one of the main causes of the 11th-century civil war called the ''[[Fitna of al-Andalus]]''.{{Sfn|Russell|Carr|1982|p=70}} Berber forces were also joined by contingents of well-paid Christian mercenaries,{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=140}} who formed the bulk of Almanzor's personal guard and participated in his campaigns in Christian territories.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=133}} Almanzor's completion of this reform, begun by his predecessors, fundamentally divided the population into two unequal groups: a large mass of civilian taxpayers and a small professional military caste, generally from outside the peninsula.{{Sfn|Kennedy|1996|p=119}}

The increase in military forces and their partial professionalization led to an increase in financial expenses to sustain them.{{Sfn|Kennedy|1996|p=117}} This represented an additional incentive to carry out campaigns, which produced loot and land with which to pay the troops.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=133}} These lands, when handed over to the soldiers as payment, were thereafter subject to tribute and ceased to operate under a system of border colonization.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=134}}{{Sfn|Kennedy|1996|p=118}} The Caliphal army was funded by the taxpaying farmers in exchange for military exemptions, and consisted of local recruits as well as foreign mercenaries – Berber militias, Slav and Black slaves, mercenary Christian companies and [[jihad]]i volunteers.{{Sfn|Ríu Ríu|1988|p=72}} At that time al-Andalus was known as ''Dar Jihad'', or "country of jihad", and attracted many volunteers, and though these were relatively few compared to the total army, their zeal in combat more than compensated for this.{{Sfn|Fletcher|2000|p=77}}

According to modern studies, these mercenary contingents made it possible to increase the total size of the Caliphal army from thirty or fifty thousand troops in the time of Abd al-Rahman III to fifty or ninety thousand.{{Sfn|Cruz Hernández|1992|p=326}}{{Sfn|Fletcher|1991|p=23}}{{Sfn|Fletcher|1999|p=39}} Others, like [[Évariste Lévi-Provençal]], argue that the Cordoban armies in the field with the Almanzor were between thirty-five thousand and seventy or seventy-five thousand soldiers.{{Sfn|Ríu Ríu|1988|p=72}}{{Sfn|Weiner|2001|p=15}} Contemporary figures are contradictory: some accounts claim that their armies numbered two hundred thousand horsemen and six hundred thousand foot soldiers, while others talk about twelve thousand horsemen, three thousand mounted Berbers and two thousand ''sūdān'', African light infantry.{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=138}} According to the chronicles, in the campaign that swept [[Astorga, Spain|Astorga]] and [[León, Spain|León]], Almanzor led twelve thousand African and five thousand Al Andalus horsemen, and forty thousand infantry.{{Sfn|Colmeiro y Penido|1863|p=173}} It is also said that, in his last campaigns, he mobilized forty-six thousand horsemen, while another six hundred guarded the train, twenty-six thousand infantry, two hundred scouts or 'police' and one hundred and thirty [[drummer]]s.{{Sfn|Vallvé Bermejo|1992|p=125|ps=: "Normalmente participaban en sus aceifas doce mil hombres de a caballo, inscritos en la escalilla militar y a los que, además de la acostumbrada soldada, se les proporcionaban una caballería con sus arreos, armas, alojamiento, pagas y gratificaciones para diversos gastos, y forraje para las caballerías, según su categoría."}} or that the garrison of Cordoba consisted of 10,500 horsemen and many others kept the northern border in dispersed detachments.{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=140}} However, it is much more likely that the leader's armies, even in their most ambitious campaigns, may not have exceeded twenty thousand men.{{Sfn|Bariani|2003|p=140}} It can be argued that until the eleventh century no Muslim army on campaign exceeded thirty thousand troops, while during the eighth century the trans-Pyrenean expeditions totaled ten thousand men and those carried out against Christians in the north of the peninsula were even smaller.{{Sfn|Cruz Hernández|1992|p=326}}

In the time of Emir Al-Hakam I, a palatine guard of 3000 riders and 2000 infantry was created, all Slavic slaves.{{Sfn|Arié|1984|p=124}} This proportion between the two types of troops was maintained until Almanzor's reforms.  The massive incorporation of North African horsemen relegated the infantry to sieges and fortress garrisons.{{Sfn|Arié|1984|p=137}} This reform led to entire tribes, particularly Berber riders, being moved to the peninsula.{{Sfn|González Batista|2007|p=116}}

The main weapon of the peninsular campaigns, which required speed and surprise, was the light cavalry.{{Sfn|Castellanos Gómez|2002|p=45}} To try to counteract them, the Castilians created the role of "villain knights" – ennobling those free men who were willing to keep a horse to increase the mounted units – through the ''Fuero de Castrojeriz'' of 974.{{Sfn|Castellanos Gómez|2002|p=45}} For similar reasons, the Barcelonan count [[Borrell II, Count of Barcelona|Borrell II]] created the figure of the ''homes of paratge''- who obtained privileged military status by fighting against the Cordobans armed on horseback – after losing their capital in the fall of 985.{{Sfn|Castellanos Gómez|2002|p=93}} In contrast to the prominent role the navy had played in previous decades under Abd al-Rahman III,{{Sfn|De Bordejé Morencos|1992|p=111}} under Almanzor it served only as a means of transporting ground troops,{{Sfn|De Bordejé Morencos|1992|p=113}} such as between the Maghreb and the Iberian Peninsula, or [[Alcácer do Sal]]'s ships in the campaign against [[Santiago de Compostela]] in 997.{{Sfn|De Bordejé Morencos|1992|p=113}}

During this time, military industry flourished in factories around Córdoba.{{Sfn|Fletcher|2000|p=77}} It was said to be able to produce a thousand bows and twenty thousand arrows monthly,{{Sfn|Fletcher|2000|p=77}}{{Sfn|Fletcher|1999|p=39}} and 1300 shields{{Sfn|Fletcher|2000|p=77}} and three thousand campaign stores annually.{{Sfn|Fletcher|2000|p=77}}{{Sfn|Fletcher|1999|p=39}}

As for the fleet, its network of ports was reinforced with a new base in the Atlantic, in Alcácer do Sal, which protected the area of [[Coimbra]], recovered in the 980s, and served as the origin of the units that participated in the campaign against Santiago.{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=134}} On the Mediterranean shore, the naval defense was centered at the base of al-Mariya, now [[Almería]].{{Sfn|Martínez Enamorado|Torremocha Silva|2001|p=146}}  The [[Shipyard|dockyards]] of the fleet had been built in [[Tortosa]] in 944.{{Sfn|Vernet Ginés|1979|p=403}}

Initially the maritime defense of the Caliphate was led by Abd al-Rahman ibn Muhammad ibn Rumahis, a veteran admiral who had served Al-Hakam II and was Qadi of [[Province of Granada|Elvira]]{{Sfn|Ballestín Navarro|2004|p=153}} and [[Pechina]].{{Sfn|Martínez Enamorado|Torremocha Silva|2001|p=146}} He repulsed raids by ''al-Magus'' (idolaters) or ''al-Urdumaniyun'' ('men of the north', [[vikings]]),<ref>Crespi, Gabriele (1982). "L'Europe Musulmane". ''Les Formes de la nuit''. No. 2. Saint Léger-Vauban: Zodiaque, pp. 55. En francés. {{ISSN|0763-7608}}.</ref> in the west of al-Andalus in mid-971;{{Sfn|Morales Romero|2004|p=195}} at the end of that year, when they tried to invade Al Andalus,{{Sfn|Allen|ʻAbd_al-Raḥmān|2002|p=130}} the admiral left Almería and defeated them off the coast of [[Algarve]].{{Sfn|Tapia Garrido|1976|p=166}} In April 973, he transported the army of Ghalib from Algeciras{{Sfn|Martínez Enamorado|Torremocha Silva|2001|p=93}} to subdue the rebellious tribes of the Maghreb and end Fatimid ambitions in that area.{{Sfn|Jiménez Losantos|1999|p=78}} As in 997, when the Al Andalus fleet hit the [[Galicia (Spain)|Galician]] coast, in 985 it had ravaged the [[Catalans]].{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=62}} During the Catalan campaign, [[Gausfred I]], Count of [[County of Empúries|Empurias]] and [[Counts of Roussillon|Roussillon]], tried to gather an army to help the locals but then several flotillas of Berber pirates threatened their coasts, forcing them to stay to defend their lands.{{Sfn|Frers|2008|p=66}}

To ensure control of the military, Almanzor eliminated the main figures who could have opposed his reforms:{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=134}} in addition to the death of Ghalib, the participation of the governor of Zaragoza in the plot of his eldest son served as a justification to replace him{{Sfn|Ballestín Navarro|2004|p=152}} with another, more amenable, member of the same clan, the Banu Tujib.{{Sfn|Castellanos Gómez|2002|p=100}}{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=135}} The admiral of the fleet,{{Sfn|Suárez Fernández|1976|p=354}} who maintained a significant budget, was poisoned{{Sfn|Lévi Provençal|1957|p=431}} in January 980{{Sfn|Ballestín Navarro|2004|p=154}} and replaced by a man faithful to Almanzor.{{Sfn|Ballestín Navarro|2004|p=153}}{{Sfn|Echevarría Arsuaga|2011|p=135}}

As in the Army he encouraged the recruitment of Berbers faithful to him, so in the Administration he favored the ''saqalibas'' to the detriment of native officials, again with the aim of surrounding himself with personnel loyal only to him.{{Sfn|Valdés Fernández|1999|p=15}}

Land transport routes were dotted with strongholds,{{Sfn|Fletcher|2000|p=77}} since ancient Al Andalus dignitaries sought to control communications.{{Sfn|Fletcher|1999|p=40}} Messengers were bought in [[Sudan]] and specially trained to handle Almanzor's messages and to transmit the official reports that his foreign ministries wrote about the annual campaigns.{{Sfn|Fletcher|1999|p=40}}

The Caliphate ruled by Almanzor was a rich and powerful state. According to Colmeiro, it is estimated that in a pre-industrial society, for every million inhabitants, ten thousand soldiers could be mustered. Even assuming the chronicles exaggerated tenfold the real numbers – these speak of eight hundred thousand soldiers – the caliphate could have had eight million inhabitants.{{Sfn|Colmeiro y Penido|1863|p=173}} Those who use more bullish criteria estimate between seven{{Sfn|Matés Baco|Agustín González|2006|p=48}} and ten{{Sfn|Ríu Ríu|1988|p=66}} million, but the population was probably much fewer.{{Sfn|Matés Baco|Agustín González|2006|p=48}}{{Sfn|Colmeiro y Penido|1863|p=173}} Traditionally speaking, around the year 1000, the caliphate occupied four hundred thousand square kilometers and was populated by three million souls.{{Sfn|Fusi Azpurúa|2012|p=50}} By comparison, the Iberian Christian states comprised one hundred and sixty thousand square kilometers and half a million people.{{Sfn|Fusi Azpurúa|2012|p=49}} By the 10th century, 75% of the population under the Umayyads had converted to Islam, a number reaching 80% two centuries later.{{Sfn|Marín Guzmán|2006|p=109}} By comparison, at the time of the Muslim invasion, Spain had about four million inhabitants, although there is no shortage of historians who would raise that estimate to seven or eight million.{{Sfn|Marín Guzmán|2006|p=109}}

His realm also had large cities like Córdoba, which surpassed one hundred thousand inhabitants; [[Toledo, Spain|Toledo]], Almería and [[Granada]], which were around thirty thousand; and Zaragoza, [[Valencia]] and [[Málaga]], all above fifteen thousand.{{Sfn|Matés Baco|Agustín González|2006|p=48}} This contrasted sharply with the Christian north of the peninsula, which lacked large urban centers.{{Sfn|Mitre Fernández|1979|p=134}}